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ABSTRACT 
     Commerce Clause New Federalism in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts describes 
how interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution has evolved since the 
Constitution was first ratified by the several states. It shows how the clause, which was 
originally included to facilitate trade between the states by removing barriers to trade, 
evolved into Congress’ primary justification for all kinds of actions that had previously 
been the domains of the states.  The work includes case studies of four controversial 
cases that occurred when the Chief Justice was William Rehnquist along with a case 
study of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius decided in the court of 
Chief Justice John Roberts.  The work also makes the case that commerce-clause-based 
legislation was a critical contributor to the current culture wars occurring in America 
because each piece of legislation becomes a winner take all proposition with national 
ramifications.  
1 
Introduction 
Of all the enumerated powers the United States Constitution granted to Congress, perhaps, 
the most pervasively employed by it is that set out in the Commerce Clause. With the power to 
regulate interstate commerce, Congress has been able to legislate in such diverse areas as labor, 
agriculture, civil rights, education, gun control, and drugs, as well as a wide array of criminal 
activity.1 The marvelously-serviceable language of the Commerce Clause, set out in Section 8 of 
Article I of the United States Constitution, certainly does not appear obviously fit for such 
myriad applications: 
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . . 2 
Before the spring of 1937, Congressional reliance on the Commerce Clause to justify one of 
its statutes was no guarantee that it would stand up in federal court. However, after the New Deal 
Supreme Court expanded the scope of the federal commerce power, Congress utilized it 
unsparingly with virtually no judicial interference for over a half a century.3 The result was an 
1 Respectively, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the 
National Firearms Act of 1934, Federal Firearms Act of 1938 and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, and the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990 and 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber, 
and Keith E. Whittington, American Constitutionalism. Volume II. Rights and Liberties (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 479-736. 
2 U.S. Const. Art. 1, Sect. 8.  
3 The watershed moment, for better or worse, came on April 12, 1937, when a 5-4 majority of the 
United States Supreme Court, newly enlightened as to the import of the New Deal engineered by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, rendered its decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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ever-enlarging federal legal framework and regulatory infrastructure that, ultimately, reached 
into nooks and crannies of everyday life the Founders never intended. Labor relations, 
reproductive decisions, and health care, for example, had once been freely managed by self-
responsible individuals, households, neighborhoods, churches, civic groups, and, in exigent 
cases, by municipal, county or state authorities. The rise of the Commerce Clause-based 
regulatory state, “the fourth branch of government,” insisted critics, ran roughshod over the 
original constitutional scheme prescribing a dual system of state and federal government, 
ultimately authorizing unelected federal functionaries to dictate compliance in ways that no 
county or state government official had ever imagined.   
Beginning in the mid-1960s, growing congressional employment of commerce power, along 
with new understandings of individual rights made national by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
caused local issues concerning matters once deemed beyond the reach of government to take on 
national political implications. Congress and the United States Supreme Court deployed 
commerce power increasingly to rearrange the relations of race, class, and gender; the relations 
between increasingly militaristic law enforcement and newly-invented classes of law breakers; 
and the relations between human beings, a steadily growing array of protected flora and fauna, 
and natural resources, climate, and the weather. The stakes at election times became 
extraordinary high, as the customary celebrations of democracy became winner-take-all contests. 
Americans became ever more divided, fearful of what new exercise of federal power a victorious 
opposition might devise next. Trepidations about rising power and its interventions, whether in 
the name of social justice or crime control, were central features of a complex social, ideological 
and political engagement by which the American populace increasingly became polarized and 
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locked in a no-holds-barred grudge-match for political and cultural supremacy – a seemingly 
endless struggle that pundits and scholars, by the early 1990s, had dubbed the “culture wars.”  
Beginning in 1985, amid this escalating cultural and political clash, William Rehnquist 
assumed the position of Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and that tribunal 
began to look more critically at the myriad encroachments on state authority committed in the 
name of the Commerce Clause – a development that was central to the larger judicial agenda of 
the Rehnquist Court to rein in federal power, one that jurists soon denominated the “New 
Federalism.” Five Supreme Court decisions, which will be given extensive treatment in this 
study, stand out for being the most contentious and, not coincidentally, most indicative of the 
evolving relationship of congressional exertions of Commerce Clause power, Supreme Court 
accommodation or resistance thereto, partisan politics, and related culture wars conflict in the 
period 1995-2012.4  
Several of the Rehnquist Court decisions seemed to inaugurate a New Federalism Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence that might turn back the clock on New Deal-era rulings that had seemed to 
affirm an unbounded commerce power. In United States v. Lopez (1995), the Supreme Court 
held that the lawmaking power of Congress under the Commerce Clause did not extend so far as 
to make criminal, under the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, the mere possession of a 
handgun in a statutorily-defined school zone, at least when Congress had not even bothered to 
explain the connection of the novel transgression with interstate commerce. In Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. The State of Florida (1996), the Supreme Court ruled that the so-called “Indian 
Commerce Clause” did not give Congress the power to pass legislation that would authorize 
                                                 
4 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe v. the State of Florida, 517 U.S. 
44 (1996); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005); National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 576 U.S. ___ 2012). 
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Native American tribes to sue state officials for not agreeing on demand to contract state-tribal 
compacts to facilitate the establishment of Indian casinos as required by the 1988 Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act. To do so would impermissibly abrogate the sovereign immunity of a state as 
provided for by the Eleventh Amendment. In United States v. Morrison (2000), the High Court 
declared unconstitutional the civil remedy for the new crime of gender-motivated violence set 
out in the Violence Against Women Act, passed by Congress in 1994, in part, because such 
egregious criminality had no more impact on interstate commerce than most other crimes of 
violence traditionally punished under state criminal codes. In Gonzales v. Raich (2005), 
however, the Supreme Court ruled that bona fide users of medical marijuana in the State of 
California, under its 1996 Compassionate Use Act, could not be exempted from criminal 
prosecution under the Commerce Clause-based 1970 Controlled Substances Act. To some jurists 
and commentators, the extraordinary rebirth of constitutional limits to the federal commerce 
power announced in Lopez and Morrison had died an untimely death because of the decision in 
Raich. Other jurists and commentators were not so sure.  
Especially in the period 1995-2012, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich spurred intense debate 
among jurists, scholars, and commentators over how the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Commerce Clause and construed federalism – and the question of whether this triad of 
Commerce Clause decisions had, in fact, imposed a limit on commerce power. Some optimistic 
conservatives and anxious liberals believed that the decision in Lopez and Morrison, at least, had 
returned the commerce power and the Constitution to its pre-1937 incarnation. Others 
maintained that the rulings in Lopez and Morrison, had been, simply, aberrations that would have 
little or no enduring impact. Still, others occupied a cautious middle ground, supposing that the 
three decisions had signaled to Congress a need to support better with hard evidence and make 
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more textually explicit the interstate commerce rationale in forthcoming statutes based on the 
Commerce Clause. Other observers postulated that, in the future, perhaps Congress ought to be 
more circumspect in passing criminal legislation based on the commerce power – historically, 
and under the Constitution, a largely state and local government domain.  
 Complicating considerably the debate over the significance of the Rehnquist Court 
Commerce Clause decisions was the 2012 ruling of the Supreme Court, now presided over by 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. This 
decision, which will also be the subject of one case study chapter, reviewed the constitutionality 
of the Commerce Clause-based Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, expedited in 
Congress by Democrats along exclusively partisan lines and signed into law by Democrat 
President Barack H. Obama. Known popularly as “Obamacare,” superheated partisan conflict 
over this comprehensive regulatory scheme seemed to constitute yet another apocalyptic culture 
wars battle. Particularly galling to some was its “individual mandate” requiring most Americans 
to acquire health care insurance coverage before 2014. The highly-publicized conflagration 
pitted the well-intended decades-old liberal-progressive commitment to providing universal 
health care against conservatives and libertarians who viewed the measure as nothing less than 
socialized medicine and an unprecedented overreach of central power – certain to rob Americans 
of another portion of their liberty and burden them with yet another heavy layer of expensive, 
intrusive, and wasteful federal bureaucracy. Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts and four of the 
more liberal justices, surprisingly, upheld the individual mandate with the power of Congress to 
tax, while the Chief Justice combined with four of the more conservative justices to hold that the 
Commerce Clause could not justify the individual mandate. Given the persistent quandary over 
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the significance of the Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the decision in Sebelius 
only compounded uncertainty, while also raising questions about the fate of the New Federalism. 
The prime purpose of this dissertation is to assess the contentious development of commerce 
power from United States v. Lopez through NFIB v. Sebelius – as an integral feature of culture 
wars conflict from 1964 through 2012. As such it examines the dynamic interaction of Congress 
and the Supreme Court in the sociocultural, economic, and political contexts that shaped and 
were shaped by the key decisions under study – and by asking these questions: What were the 
roles of Congress and the Supreme Court in deploying commerce power and producing 
contention over that power in the period under study? To what extent did Lopez, Seminole Tribe, 
Morrison, and Raich shape or reflect the New Federalism commonly attributed to the Rehnquist 
Court? What does Seminole Tribe, particularly, tell us about Rehnquist Court New Federalism 
understandings of state sovereignty? Did the Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions, in 
fact, signify a “constitutional revolution” akin to the decisions of the New Deal Supreme Court 
that had radically expanded commerce power beginning in 1937? If not, did the Rehnquist Court 
Commerce Clause decisions underwrite or, perhaps, forestall the expansion of commerce power 
that had occurred in the sixty years preceding Lopez? If Lopez, Morrison, and Raich established 
new limits to the commerce power, what were they? To what extent did the Roberts Court ruling 
in NFIB v. Sebelius reflect the New Federalism? Did Sebelius conflict with or augment the key 
Commerce Clause holdings in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich? Did Sebelius establish any new 
limitations on the commerce power? If so, what were they? And why should any limits to 
commerce power established by the Rehnquist Court and Roberts Court matter to ordinary 
citizens at the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century? What do all these 
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developments indicate to Americans about the future governance and political and cultural 
coherence of the United States?  
Scholarship on Commerce Clause-based legislation and United States Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with such enactments, not surprisingly, exists in abundance. A great many 
book-length works have added to the scholarship on the topic; however, most of these 
comprehensive works were written before 1937. In the sixty years following the constitutional 
revolution of 1937, scholars showed little interest in the Commerce Clause since jurisprudence 
on it seemed settled.  Later, however, Rehnquist Court decisions resulted in a renaissance of 
Commerce Clause publications. A plethora of academic papers debated whether the rulings were 
correct or incorrect, lacked breadth, or were overreaching; moreover, much attention was 
focused on ways the rulings may affect future Court decisions.   
The Commerce Clause was studied most closely around the turn of the twentieth century to 
either justify or thwart progressive programs. Similar studies continued into the Great 
Depression, designed either to support or disparage Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. However, in 
the period 1937-1994, when the Supreme Court upheld virtually all Commerce Clause-based 
legislation, the debate over the meaning of the Commerce Clause became moribund. After 1995 
and the decision in United States v. Lopez, there was a renewed interest in the meaning of the 
Commerce Clause.  
 A worthwhile discussion of the Commerce Clause and the history of its interpretation must 
begin with a discussion of the contending constitutional theories that have given it meaning. 
Scholars have debated this subject since Chief Justice John Marshall made his first ruling on 
Commerce Clause power in 1824. Since the Supreme Court’s adoption of the New Deal in 1937, 
two camps, broadly speaking, have emerged to argue the meaning of the Clause. One school 
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comprises those who take a relatively fixed view of the Commerce Clause that emphasizes the 
original intent of the Framers or common original understanding of the constitutional text, 
commonly denominated constitutional “originalists.” The adherents of another school favor a 
broader and more flexible understanding, sometimes called constitutional “contextualists,” but 
who generally embrace the theory of a “living Constitution.” These labels are undoubtedly 
oversimplifications of the spectrum of views that exist, but will serve herein to define the major 
contentious points in the debate regarding what authority the Clause has given to Congress.  
The debate over the original meaning of the Commerce Clause may be simplified by 
focusing on three basic areas of enquiry. First, what was the meaning (or intended meaning) of 
the word “commerce” at the time of the Constitutional Convention? Was the term confined to 
“trade,” thus excluding manufacturing or agriculture, or did it mean something broader, like “all 
gainful activity”? Second, did “among the states” mean, in a limited sense, “between the states” 
or did it broadly encompass activities that took place wholly within individual states that affected 
commerce in other states?  Third did “to regulate” mean, in a restricted sense, “to make regular,” 
that is, to specify how some activity was to occur, or did its meaning imply the broader power to 
prohibit altogether? Some of the influential legal scholars who have taken a more limited view 
include Albert Abel, writing in 1941, and Raoul Berger, Richard Epstein, and Randy Barnett, all 
of whom published in the period 1987-2001.5  Some of those who have taken a wider originalist 
view include Walton H. Hamilton and Douglas Adair, writing in 1937, and William Crosskey, 
                                                 
5 Albert S. Abel, “The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary 
Comment,” Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 25 (1940-1941): 432-494; Raoul Berger, “Judicial 
Manipulation of the Commerce Clause,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 (March 1996): 695-
717; Richard A. Epstein, “The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power,” Virginia Law Review, 
Vol. 73, No. 8 (Nov. 1987): 1387-1455; Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, (2001): 101-147. 
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publishing in 1953, and Grant Nelson and Robert Pushaw, who published together in 1999 and 
2002.6   
As one might expect, arguments about the meanings of the Commerce Clause at the 
Founding have varied with Supreme Court decision-making across many decades – and the 
socioeconomic, cultural, and political contexts of such decisions. Writing with a relatively 
moderate view of the matter was the work of Albert Abel, completed in 1941, shortly after the 
Supreme Court had broadened its view of the scope of commerce power. His work followed the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to understand the intentions of the framers as they 
constructed the founding document. He argued that the purpose was to create a general 
government that would have authority over areas “where the individual states lacked the capacity 
for effective action, or where state legislation constituted an appreciable interference with the 
conditions making for good relations between the several states.”7 Three decades later, his ideas 
about federalism and the sharing of power by the states and the federal government would make 
a significant resurgence. 
In 1953, William Crosskey produced a two-volume work on the Constitutional Convention 
and its immediate aftermath. Written with a very broad view of federal power, he stated that the 
Commerce Clause includes the power “to govern universally every species of gainful activity 
                                                 
6 Walton H. Hamilton and Douglas Adair, The Power to Govern: The Constitution—Then and 
Now (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1937); William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and 
the Constitution in the History of the United States, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1953); Grant S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., “Rethinking the Commerce Clause: 
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control 
over Social Issues,” Iowa Law Review, Vol. 85, (1999): 1, and “A Critique of the Narrow 
Interpretation of the Commerce Clause,” Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 96 (2002): 
695-720. 
7 Abel, “The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention,” 440. 
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carried on by the people within the United States.”8 He reached his conclusion by attempting to 
determine the original intent of the framers, just as Abel did, rather than the less ambitious 
objective of determining the original meaning of the words used in the Commerce Clause. His 
definition of commerce as “every species of gainful activity” would also prove to be quite 
contentious among later writers. 
Writing in 2001, Randy E. Barnett disputed Nelson and Pushaw’s definition of “commerce,” 
articulated just a few years earlier. Barnett researched the records of the Constitutional 
Convention, The Federalist, or “Federalist Papers,” as well as the ratification debates. He 
discovered that “there is no surviving example” of the term “commerce” used but in a limited 
sense – meaning “trade or exchange of goods.”9 Regarding the other language in the Commerce 
Clause, Barnett concluded from then-contemporary usage that “‘to regulate’ meant ‘to make 
regular’ – that is, to specify how an activity may be transacted” between states and the additional 
power to regulate trade with Native tribes and foreign nations.10 Additionally, Barnett pointed 
out that “[t]he only reason for adding ‘among the several states’ (and with foreign nations and 
Indian tribes) is to exclude some type of commerce from the power of Congress.”11 Barnett 
argues that common usage by the Founders of the term “among the states” equated to “between 
the states,” and, thus, the power of Congress was not intended to extend to the internal matters of 
the states.12 This argument makes a great deal of sense when it is considered in light of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. Barnett states that “[i]t can be asserted with certainty that the southern states 
would never have ratified the Constitution if the power to regulate commerce among the states 
                                                 
8 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, Vol. I, 77, 81, 84, 117, Vol. II, 738. [Emphasis added] 
9 Barnett, “Original Meaning,” 104, 112. 
10 Ibid., 146. 
11 Ibid., 132. 
12 Ibid. 
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included the power to regulate the slave trade within a particular state, which was unquestionably 
and reprehensibly thought to be a form of commerce.”13   
Barnett limited his research to the word “commerce,” rather than searching also on closely 
related terms, such as “commercial.” He identified the use of the word “commerce” in over 1,500 
instances before concluding that the term was intended invariably to describe “trade” or 
“exchange.”  Had Barnett also examined the meanings of related words, it would certainly have 
resulted in an expanded meaning.   
There is certainly ample documentation supporting the conclusion that the rubric “among the 
states” was intended to mean “between the states.” Consider the view of James Madison on the 
subject:  
[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous 
and indefinite.  The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, 
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation 
will, for the most part, be connected.  The powers, reserved to the several States 
will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, 
and prosperity of the State.14  
 
The delimited view of the phrase “to regulate” suggests that the Framers intended it to mean 
“to make regular” or to “standardize.” However, Randy Barnett and co-authors Robert Pushaw 
and Grant Nelson note that Article 1, Section 8, indicates that the new Congress also was to have 
the power to prohibit some kinds of trade.15 They disagree about whether Congress was to have 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 134. 
14 Federalist 45 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers, (New York: Penguin 
Putnam, 1999). 
15 “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think 
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year . . . .” U.S. Const., Art. 
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the power to prohibit only external trade or internal trade. In this regard, Barnett’s attempt to 
create a dual meaning of the same phrase is not as convincing, as it seems reasonable that the 
Framers intended that Congress would have the power to make statutes that prohibited internal 
and external trade as it deemed “necessary and proper.”16 
While the debate over the original meanings of the Commerce Clause has been the subject of 
increased scholarship in the last several decades, disagreement over these meanings is not new. 
Before 1937, at least, debate focused on the way the Supreme Court interpreted the provision. 
Charles Warren employed the progressive perspective in his The Supreme Court in United States 
History, published in 1922. The influence of Theodore Roosevelt is apparent in Warren’s 
interpretation of Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), in which the Supreme Court held that the power 
granted to Congress to regulate interstate commerce encompassed the power to regulate 
navigation.17 According to Warren, Ogden’s steamboat monopoly was “busted” by the Marshall 
Court. “It was the first great ‘trust’ decision in this country and quite naturally met with popular 
approval on this account.”18 Warren saw Marshall’s decision to interpret the commerce power 
broadly as a step that paved the way for federally-funded projects, such as internal improvement 
efforts to facilitate interstate commerce and similar endeavors. 
Publishing in 1937, Felix Frankfurter conveyed his disappointment with the Supreme Court’s 
restricted view of the commerce power in the late nineteenth and through the early 1930s. His 
book The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney, and Wait, however, strategically dealt with 
                                                 
1, Sec. 9, Cl. 1.  See Barnett, “Original Meaning,” 143, and Pushaw and Nelson, “A Critique,” 
702. 
16 U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 18. 
17 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824). 
18 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1922), 2:76. 
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the period 1801-1888.19 In this sophisticated and succinct account, Frankfurter advocated for a 
strong centralized government and a policy of judicial restraint. In his opinion, one of the most 
important aspects of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in Gibbons v. Ogden was that the Court 
limited state authority; national authority was the purview of Congress, which, in turn, was 
subject to the oversight of the voters:   
What Marshall merely adumbrated in Gibbons v. Ogden became central to our 
whole constitutional scheme: the doctrine that the Commerce Clause, by its own 
force and without national legislation, puts it into the power of the Court to place 
limits upon state authority.20 
  
Frankfurter also made the point that, although Chief Justice Taney had often been 
characterized as an advocate of states’ rights, the chief justice had actually believed that it was 
the function of the Supreme Court to determine the existence of a conflict between state and 
federal law regarding commerce and “to override the state statute only if an indubitable conflict 
with [an] act of Congress was found to exist.”21 Frankfurter also warned his readers to beware 
“the traps of retrospective interpretation [of history] . . . . Marshall and Taney and Waite lived in 
their time and not ours.”22  The point he likely intended to make was that the Constitution was 
designed to be adaptable for the needs of the times – and that a new interpretation of it was 
needed to implement the New Deal. Thus, because of the Supreme Court’s changed 
interpretation of commerce power beginning in 1937, and buttressed by the appointment of 
Frankfurter and other Roosevelt nominees to the Court, a majority sustained every legal 
                                                 
19 Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney, and Waite (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1937). 
20 Ibid., 18-19. 
21 Ibid., 50. 
22 Ibid., 9-10. 
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challenge to Commerce Clause-based legislation for the next half a century. While certainly 
retaining the power of judicial review, the Court chose to leave constitutional considerations of 
the commerce power to Congress – and thus to congressional electoral majorities. Consequently, 
the production of scholarship that focused solely on the Commerce Clause dropped 
precipitously. And concerns about interpretation of its provisions to support increased federal 
power or revitalize recognition of state sovereign authority faded somewhat as most of the 
citizens of the United States accepted the post-1937 condition.    
In the twentieth century, one of the first scholars to write about Commerce Clause decisions 
of the Supreme Court was Frederick H. Cooke, who published The Commerce Clause of the 
Federal Constitution in 1908.23 This work engaged the so-called Lochner Era, when the 
progressive movement was gaining traction and the Supreme Court yet maintained a very 
conservative view of the Constitution. At issue was whether Congress should exclusively control 
all commerce, or whether the states should retain some authority besides basic police powers. 
Fundamental to the question was the fact that the United States had become interconnected after 
the Civil War through railroad, telegraph systems, and large corporations. Cooke was 
conservative in his views and advocated a return to a federal government of strictly defined 
powers. Regarding commerce, he sought to formulate a consistent rationale for delineating state 
versus federal power. In Cooke’s view, the nineteenth century commerce decisions lacked 
consistency and the states had suffered as a result: “Rules applicable to such matters grew up in a 
somewhat sporadic, haphazard fashion, with what seems to me to have been inadequate 
comprehension of unifying principles.”24 Cooke maintained that commerce should be understood 
                                                 
23 Frederick H. Cooke, The Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution (New York: Baker, 
Voorhis & Company, 1908), iii. 
24 Ibid. 
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to encompass the transportation of property, people, and “intelligence”; he also contended that 
states should continue to hold power over issues beyond that definition, quite opposite from the 
more progressive view. 
While Cooke presented his own ideas regarding how the Commerce Clause should be 
interpreted based upon a haphazard array of nineteenth-century Supreme Court rulings, David 
Walter Brown attempted to find the roots of the Commerce Clause to justify more fully broad 
federal power. In his descriptively titled work, The Commercial Power of Congress Considered 
in Light of Its Origin, Brown concluded that federal powers over the states in commercial matters 
far exceeded those over foreign commerce; hence, the federal government could restrict or 
prohibit commerce at will in the interest of great national purposes. 25 Brown’s idea of returning 
to the original definition of the Commerce Clause would be used again eight decades later to 
reduce, rather than expand, the power of the federal government. Writing in 1999, Kazuyuki 
Matsuo emphasizes that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which strengthened federal power 
over interstate trade at the expense of state power, constituted something of a popular response 
by Congress to an array of partisan groups. This array included the National Grange of the Order 
of Patrons of Husbandry, who sought relief from a depressed agricultural economy and the 
increasing practice by which railroad company monopolies set freight rates. Congress thus 
sought to increase competition and ensure equitable pricing.26  
                                                 
25 David Walter Brown, The Commercial Power of Congress Considered in the Light of Its 
Origin: The origin, development and contemporary interpretation of the commerce clause of the 
Federal Constitution, from the New Jersey Representations of 1778, to the Embargo Laws of 
Jefferson’s second administration in 1809 (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1910). 
26 Kazuyuki Matsuo, “Congressional Struggle for the First American Regulatory Agency: The 
Formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission as a Prelude to Modern America.” Journal of 
American and Canadian Studies, Vol. 17 (1999): 25-48. 
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Amid the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, Bernard Gavit produced The Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution.27  Like its somewhat ambiguous title, the work itself 
lacked definition as well as argumentative direction. To his credit, Gavit described and 
categorized 839 Commerce Clause cases that had been adjudicated by the Supreme Court 
between the adoption of the Constitution and 1932. However, he provided no overarching 
theories or conclusions that would support greater or lesser federal power. A mere four years 
later, in 1936, New Deal proponents sought solid historical evidence to support expanded federal 
power.    
Espousing the more liberal view, Hamilton and Adair published their work in 1937, evidently 
before the notable change in the Court’s view of the Commerce Clause. Their work was a 
critique of how the Court had ruled with a very restricted view from the late 1880s until the time 
of their writing. The two authors argued that Chief Justice Marshall set a proper precedent for 
ruling on Commerce Clause decisions but that recent (as of 1936) rulings gave the Clause a 
meaning for too limited. Based upon their research of the founders, it was clear to them that the 
merchants who participated in framing the Constitution all would have understood the term 
“commerce” to mean “all activities directly affecting the wealth of the nation.”28 Such a view 
would certainly support the wider interpretation of the Clause, but their approach seems to 
neglect the views of those at the founding who were not merchants and had other concerns.  
Edward S. Corwin wrote The Commerce Power Versus States Rights after the Court had 
struck down as unconstitutional the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935 as well as the 
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Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1936 and other New Deal legislation.29 Corwin wrote purely to 
convince his readers that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution should be interpreted in its 
broadest sense. He argued that just as the power of Congress to regulate overseas trade is 
absolute, so it is within that entity’s power to regulate all aspects of commerce that occur within 
states.  A steadfast fan of Chief Justice Marshall, he was equally critical of the restrictive 
precedents that came about after Marshall’s death in 1835, which firmly supported states’ rights 
prior to the Civil War. Corwin also argued that the Constitution provided the federal government 
power to handle issues that individual states were incapable of handling, like a severe economic 
depression. As a buttress to the New Deal, Corwin’s work was quite powerful. In 1939, Corwin 
surely would have been pleased to see that President Franklin Roosevelt had the opportunity to 
nominate a strong New Deal advocate like Felix Frankfurter to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court.   
Although a great number of works on the Commerce Clause were produced during the 
progressive era and during the early years of the New Deal, relatively few book-length studies 
were produced from 1937 when the Supreme Court took a broadened view of Commerce Clause-
based legislation but before 1995. At the end of the turbulent 1960s, Paul R. Benson authored 
The Supreme Court and the Commerce Clause, 1937-1970.30  Benson divides his work into three 
sections; the first section reviews the decisions from 1824 to 1942, which included the transition 
to unrestricted congressional power in 1937. Next, the second section elaborates the idea that 
Congress may use its plenary commerce power to address issues having only an indirect effect 
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on interstate commerce. This section also highlights the congressional debates on the public 
accommodations sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Congress grounded in the 
commerce power – and the related seminal decisions of the Warren Court in Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung, both handed down in December 1964, which 
upheld Title II of the act requiring the desegregation of public accommodation. In the final 
section, Benson argues that states still burden interstate commerce through state taxation.  
Indeed, the balance of state and federal taxation of interstate commerce appeared to have been 
one of the few remaining disputes about commerce power in the period that Benson studied. 
While warning the Supreme Court against an undue deference to state power, Benson concludes 
that “the Court deserves high praise and strong public support for a job well done in an 
exceedingly difficult field.”31 
Writing in 1992, Neil H. MacBride argues that the administration of President John F. 
Kennedy was correct to take the view that Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights, which mandated the 
racial desegregation of public accommodations, was warranted by the Commerce Clause. But he 
also reveals that the internal deliberations of the Warren Court over this extraordinarily 
important question suggested a majority would have preferred to uphold Title II entirely on 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That section declared that Congress had the power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, including its equal protection provisions, by “appropriate 
legislation.”32 
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In the 1980s, scholarly interest in Commerce Clause adjudication picked up slightly as 
federal courts rendered several decisions appearing to calibrate the heretofore seemingly 
unlimited regulatory power it provided Congress. Publishing in 1980, Jerome M. Balsam 
examines closely a decision of the Burger Court, handed down that year, which invalidated a 
special tariff levied on foreign container cargoes.33 Stephen L. Schechter, writing in 1978, 
assessed four lower federal court decisions upholding the power of Congress to preempt state 
and municipal authority to regulated noise produced by air traffic.34 Quite similarly, in 1985, 
Charles A. Lofgren retrospectively examined a number of recently-passed congressional 
measures based on the commerce power to deal with the growing complexity of transportation 
and communications networks.35 
The 1985 Commerce Clause decision of the Burger Court in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority drew notable scholarly attention. Writing in 1987, with William 
Rehnquist now sitting as chief justice, Edward A. Lopez argued strenuously that the decision of 
the Burger Court declaring that Congress had preempted the regulation of employer-employee 
relations in the transit authority had improperly extended commerce power beyond its proper 
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bounds, that is the regulation of management-labor relations in the private sector.36 In a similar 
vein, publishing the same year, William R. Denny complained that the failure of the Burger 
Court, in Garcia, to recognize the sovereign power of the states and their incorporated 
subdivisions marked yet another step in the slow demise of a proper administration of federalism 
principles.37   
Scholarship on the Rehnquist Court amply addresses its novel conservative bearings. The 
Rehnquist Court began with Scalia and eight members of the Burger Court: Rehnquist, William 
Brennan, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens, 
and Sandra Day O’Connor. Powell retired in 1987 and was, ultimately, replaced by Reagan-
appointee Anthony Kennedy. After Brennan’s retirement in 1990 and Marshall’s in 1991, 
President George H.W. Bush appointed David Souter and Clarence Thomas. After White retired 
in 1993 and Blackmun did so in 1994, President Bill Clinton appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Stephen Breyer. Consequently, nine justices served together from 1994 until Rehnquist’s death 
in 2005. Mark V. Tushnet describes the distinctive stability of the Court in these years.38  The 
autobiography that Chief Justice Rehnquist published in 2001 suggests the importance he 
attached to the processes of Supreme Court decision making, from the assignment of cases to the 
scheduling and structuring of conferences.39 According to David L. Hudson, Jr., the 
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conservatism of Chief Justice Rehnquist was relatively mild in comparison to that of justices 
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, which the chief justice engaged with respect and 
moderation.40 
On the other hand, biographer John Jenkins argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
politicized the Court, moved it to the right, and that he was the most openly conservative jurist 
ever to occupy the office of chief justice.41 While Rehnquist was commonly the lone 
conservative dissenter on the Burger Court, the appointments of O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
and, perhaps most importantly, Thomas, situated him as something of a moderate among his 
conservative colleagues.42 According to Mark V. Tushnet the key division of the Rehnquist 
Court was, in fact, between justices attuned to the ideals of the “modern post-Reagan Republican 
Party” and centrists who adhered to an older Republican tradition.43 Contributors to an anthology 
edited by Christopher E. Smith, Christina Dejong, and Michael A. McCall conclude, among 
other things, that the Rehnquist Court refined and delimited many of the Warren Court decisions 
expanding the rights of criminal suspects and defendants.44  
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Richard Epstein, writing in 1987, sought to take advantage of the conservative judicial winds 
to weigh in on an argument most liberal-minded jurists thought was over – the significance of the 
Commerce Clause. According to him, “the expansive construction of the clause accepted by the 
New Deal Supreme Court is wrong, and clearly so, and that a host of other interpretations are 
more consistent with both the text and the structure of our constitutional government.”45  Epstein 
explained that, based upon documents of the founding era, the term “commerce” is 
interchangeable with the term “trade.” He grounded his assertions on his readings of David 
Hume’s work on commerce, as well as Madison’s notes on the convention and The Federalist 
Papers.46  Based upon his argument that “commerce” means only “trade” and not “every species 
of gainful activity,” it followed that the Lochner Era justices were correct in their jurisprudence 
and the subsequent New Deal Congress had no constitutional authority to legislate in areas of 
agriculture and manufacturing that occurred within a single state.47 Epstein also stressed that 
Congress’ powers were limited to those enumerated in Article 1, Section 8 and that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause only applied to those specific powers in their most restricted sense, 
rather than a power to create law in any area that Congress believed was needed. 
In the early years of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure, it was not entirely clear to some legal 
scholars whether the Court would steer a new direction in federalism jurisprudence. An article by 
Earl A. Molander and Janice E. Jackson, published in 1988, commented favorably on the way 
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Congress and the federal courts were employing Commerce Clause power quite consistently on 
behalf of affirmative action programs based on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.48 
Publishing in 1992, Vicki C. Jackson concluded that several Burger Court rulings seemed to 
have drawn into question the long-established view that the Eleventh Amendment set out a broad 
constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, handed 
down in 1988, the Rehnquist Court seemed to have departed from these decisions, holding, 
instead, that Congress had the power to abrogate states’ immunity from suit under its commerce 
power – at least if the text of the congressional statute itself, as distinct from its legislative 
history, clearly and specifically so provided.49 Writing in 1993, David M. O’Brien described how 
constitutional scholars had anticipated that the Supreme Court of the 1980s would become more 
protective of states’ rights. He based this view on the ruling of the Supreme Court in National 
League of Cities v. Usery (1976), in which it held that Congress could not extend the minimum 
wage and maximum hours of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of states and their 
political subdivisions. According to O’Brien, however the Rehnquist Court had not retreated 
from decisions that found implied statutory preemptions of state authority in Commerce Clause-
based congressional legislation or from otherwise finding dormant-Commerce Clause restrictions 
on state sovereignty. On the other hand, he identified a notable exception in the 1992 decision 
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New York v. United States, in which the Court declared that a provision of the 1985 Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act had improperly attempted to coerce the states into 
participating in a federal regulatory program.50  
Among those who, in response to the watershed 1995 decision United States v. Lopez, 
hopefully predicted a constitutional revolution much like that which occurred in 1937 were well-
known constitutional originalists. Steven Calabresi, one of the more prominent of these legal 
scholars, writing in 1995, suggests that the decision in Lopez constituted a sea change in 
Commerce Clause doctrine, indeed, one that revitalized seminal understandings of its initial 
constitutional moorings.”51 
Also writing shortly after the Lopez decision, Kathleen F. Brickey argued that the greatest 
significance of Lopez might have been its communicative value, as the Court’s message to 
Congress conveyed that the federal court system was overburdened with the “burgeoning body 
of federal criminal law, much of which overlaps with or merely duplicates state crimes.”52  
Andrew Weis made similar comments and stressed that the Lopez decision “spawned a revival of 
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence in lower federal courts across the states.”53 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court relied heavily on  Lopez in its 2000 decision United States v. Morrison. 
Raoul Berger’s 1996 article criticizing the post-New Deal expansion of Commerce Clause 
power came in the wake of the Lopez ruling. He argued that it was not too late to correct the 
wrongs of previous precedents. In his view, Lopez offered a singular opportunity to appreciate 
anew what the Framers, in fact, intended the Commerce Clause to mean.”54  Berger mirrored the 
1987 conclusions of Richard Epstein about the meaning of the Commerce Clause, although 
Berger especially emphasizes how the Founding generation expected the government to live 
firmly within the boundaries set by the Constitution.55 Any increase in the commerce power of 
the federal government would have to be authorized by an amendment to Constitution per the 
requirements of its Article V. Having made the case to live within the Constitution’s limits and 
showing why the Commerce Clause’s meaning should be tightly constructed, Berger concludes 
by positing that current precedents should not impede the Supreme Court’s return to a limited 
construction of the Clause: “The precedents of ‘the past 60 years,’ however, are entitled to no 
more respect than the Court.”56  
Countering the approaches to Commerce Clause interpretation advanced by Epstein and 
Berger were Grant S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. Writing in 1999, they agreed with 
Epstein and Burger that “the Court’s post-1937 jurisprudence sustaining congressional power to 
regulate any activity as long as some “rational basis” exists for the legislative conclusion that it 
                                                 
53 Andrew Weis, “Commerce Clause in the Cross-Hairs: The Use of Lopez-Based Motions to 
Challenge the Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Statutes,” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48 
(May 1996): 1432. 
54 Berger, “Judicial Manipulation,” 696. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 715. 
26 
 
“substantially affects” interstate commerce” was an overextension of the original commerce 
power. However, they argued, “[t]he Epstein/Burger/[Clarence]Thomas approach is historically 
unsound and lacks practical utility.”57 Nelson and Pushaw researched the meaning of 
“commerce” as well as the term “commercial” as used in the eighteenth century and determined 
that “commerce” meant “the voluntary sale or exchange of property or services and all 
accompanying market-based activities, enterprises, relationships, and interests.”58  With this 
broadened view of the Clause, they suggested sustaining federal laws pertaining to commercial 
matters that implicated more than one state. However, federal Commerce Clause-based laws that 
“cover conduct such as consensual sex, the possession of guns or drugs for personal use, and 
gender-related violence”59 were to be struck down as unconstitutional. They concluded that this 
standard would be less disruptive to the modern regulatory state while still providing a 
constitutionally sound standard against which to apply Commerce Clause-based statutes. 
Environmentalist Lydia B. Hoover, writing in 1997, was less enthusiastic about the recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court that had moved away from allowing the power of the federal 
government to increase steadily. In her view, the renewed recognition by the Court of state 
sovereign authority posed a serious problem for environmentalism and environmental legislation. 
Particularly worrisome to her was the holding in United States v. Lopez, which, in her view, 
articulated the view of the Court that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause could, 
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in fact, extend only to commerce or economic activities that substantially affected actual 
interstate commerce.60   
Economist Michael Conant, writing in 2001, declared that, notwithstanding the alarmed 
responses by some commentators to United States v. Lopez, the future of federalism had not, in 
fact, been at stake in the decision. He argued that the unusual federalism issue ruled on in Lopez 
was, simply, whether “noncommercial activity,” the simple possession of a handgun in a school 
zone, was a proper subject for regulation by Congress under its interstate commerce authority. 
He declares that any conscientious student of constitutional law would know that the vast array 
of Commerce Clause decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, from Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 
to the time of his publication, concerned the regulation of commercial transactions. In his view, 
the Rehnquist Court came to the obviously correct decision in Lopez.61 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, numerous commentators concluded that the 
Rehnquist Court had, in various ways, doubled down on undergirding state sovereignty in ways 
unfavorable to progress. Publishing in 2000, Susan Gluck Mezey surveyed the federalism 
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court in the 1990s, emphasizing that the Court had rendered 
decisions interpreting the Commerce Clause that clearly placed limits on the power of Congress. 
According to Mezey, of critical importance in this development was the 1999 decision Alden v. 
Maine, in which the Court concluded that Article I of the Constitution did not provide Congress 
the power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in federal courts. Such 
immunity, the Court declared was necessary to maintain the state sovereignty that lay at the heart 
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of federalism and that such sovereign rights derived from the federal structure of the original 
Constitution. Mezey, however, concludes that this interpretation of sovereign-immunity doctrine 
posed a threat to a fundamental principle inherent to the rule of law: “where there is a right, there 
is a remedy.”62 Writing in 2001, Vicki Lens argued that, indeed, the Supreme Court had, through 
the 1990s, entered a new era by discarding precedents to reshape state-federal relations. In this 
court-generated policy of “devolution,” new Commerce Clause interpretations severely threated 
numerous civil rights and social welfare laws.63 
Some proponents of a “living Constitution” agreed with the 1995 prediction of Steven 
Calabresi that the decision in Lopez constituted a sea change in Commerce Clause doctrines – 
but viewed this turn of events with less enthusiasm. In 2002, Erwin Chemerinski lamented that 
“[w]e are at a time of the triumph of conservative judicial ideology” but reminded readers that 
“no single decision changes the nature of constitutional law.”  Instead, he argued, the Court had 
not overturned the most politically important Supreme Court decisions, such as those concerning 
abortion rights or affirmative action, but, instead, made its most dramatic changes in 
constitutional understanding in less newsworthy ways, such as limiting access to the federal 
courts and expanding sovereign immunity.64 But, in 2000, Linda Greenhouse of the New York 
Times referred to the ruling in Lopez and others bolstering state sovereignty as part of “a federal 
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counterrevolution” in which “a constitutional development of potentially enormous significance 
has been unfolding.”65  
Other commentators and scholars were impressed, both positively and negatively, with the 
Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions, although they were not convinced that a new era 
of Constitutional law had arrived. Mark V. Tushnet argued that no significant “revolution” had 
or could occur because the Republican side of the Court was divided into three Goldwater 
conservatives, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, and two socially liberal but fiscally conservative 
justices, O’Connor and Kennedy. Given that division, the likelihood that the Court would 
overturn precedents was minimal and its turnaround would be partial at most.66 Likewise, Diane 
McGimsey commented that while the Rehnquist Court decisions were important, they held little 
meaning if Congress could simply rewrite statutes to include an express jurisdictional-element to 
satisfy the Court’s requirement for a nexus with interstate commerce. She argued that the Court 
must limit congressional use of the jurisdictional element by imposing a “purpose nexus” 
requirement that “would require the jurisdictional element to conform both to the purposes of the 
statute and the purposes underlying the Commerce Clause power itself.”67  
Other legal scholars also saw no grand constitutional reversal in the Rehnquist Court Commerce 
Clause decisions, but perceived instead that these rulings presented a limited opportunity to 
exclude federal legislation from what had historically been the domain of states and localities, 
the area of criminal law. Ole O. Moen concludes that the Rehnquist Court adoption of a more 
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stringent understanding of federalism constituted a brand of conservative judicial activism that 
enlarged both the power of the states and the authority of the Court itself.68 
Although book-length works published after 1937 focusing on the Commerce Clause are 
few, one such work appeared in 2004. Dan T. Coenen published Constitutional Law: The 
Commerce Clause as part of a “black letter law” series on constitutional law for law students and 
lawyers. Given its intended audience, the book offers few new historical interpretations. But it 
does provide a useful overview of Supreme Court decisions concerning the commerce power 
and, particularly, the twentieth century development of dormant Commerce Clause principles, 
which, as a matter of inference from the Commerce Clause, prohibited a state from passing 
legislation that impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. While concentrating on the then-
current state of Supreme Court doctrine, Coenen presents his discussion of key decisions with an 
eye toward revealing how the New Deal Supreme Court produced Commerce Clause doctrines 
that undergirded the power of Congress to protect the rights of labor, regulate the financial 
industry, and promote the public welfare. He also maps out quite carefully the way that the mid-
twentieth century Civil Rights Movement steadily generated new Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence to protect racial minorities, women, the aged, and persons with disabilities. With 
equal care he describes key rulings of the Court in the 1990s, when “officials in all branches of 
the federal government looked hard at whether sweeping post-New Deal invocations of the 
Commerce Clause had overshot constitutional boundaries.”69   
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In 2006, Tinsley E. Yarbrough concluded that the Rehnquist Court had rendered 
decisions generally in continuity with precedents but with novel modulations commonly marked 
by a conservative outlook. The most significant departure of the Court, he emphasized, was to 
reverse the decades-old trend of ever-widening commerce power to regulate the national 
economy.70 Rosalie Berger Levinson and Lori A. Ringhand showed that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was, quite frequently, joined in this project by justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas.71 Michael Les Benedict took a more cynical view:  
One might expect a commitment to state rights to lead the Court to defer to state 
policy judgments and court decisions, but only O’Connor seemed to fulfill that 
expectation. Both the liberal and the conservative justices tended to praise state 
autonomy when state decisions conformed to their ideological commitments and to 
override it when they did not.72  
 
Donald L. Doernberg, writing in 2005, examined the historical conflict between contending 
theories of sovereign immunity and the rule of law – and their relationship to the New 
                                                 
70 Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). See also Tinsley E. Yarbrough, David Hackett Souter: Traditional Republican on 
the Rehnquist Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See Thomas R. Hensley, The 
Rehnquist Court: Justices, Rulings, and Legacy (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006) 
and Craig M. Bradley, ed., The Rehnquist Legacy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
71 Rosalie Berger Levinson, “Will the New Federalism Be the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?”  
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 589–598; Lori A. Ringhand, 
“The Rehnquist Court: ‘By the Numbers’ Retrospective.” Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 9, 
no. 4 (April 2007).  
72 Michael Less Benedict, The Blessings of Liberty: A Concise History of the Constitution of the 
United States. Second ed. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 413. See 
also ibid., “The Rehnquist Court and Federalism,” 410-413. 
32 
 
Federalism of the Rehnquist Court, with two chapters devoted to the “dormant Commerce 
Clause” and state preemption issues.73 
According to legal historians Kermit L. Hall and Peter Karsten, writing in 2009, the 
Commerce Clause rulings of the Rehnquist Court “applied the brakes on Congress’s use of the 
interstate commerce clause” in a series of decisions that voided several congressional 
enactments, namely the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and the Violence against Women 
Act of 1994. The Rehnquist-led majority found these uses of the Clause to lack genuine 
commercial dimensions. Accordingly, these authors concluded that “the Court upheld Congress’s 
use of the clause in decisions were state statutes were preempted by federal statutes that applied 
the clause to clear issues involving commercial traffic.”74 Christopher P. Banks and John C. 
Blakeman, writing in 2012, readily confirmed that the New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court 
had, indeed, entailed recognizing state sovereignty at the expense of federal power.75 
In 2014, Richard A. Epstein argued that, while United States v. Lopez announced a 
wholly new direction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the significance of the decision 
remained unclear: 
The last stage of constitutional development started in 1995 with the United States v. 
Lopez. . . In one sense the opinion reads as a sea change insofar as it indicated that there 
was at least some outer limit on the scope of federal power, if only because a federal 
statute was actually struck down for exceeding the bounds of the Commerce Clause. But 
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at root, the opinions in Lopez do nothing to unpack the deep contradictions in Commerce 
Clause interpretation. . . .”76 
 
To reach this conclusion, Epstein argues that, in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist reduced key 
Commerce Clause precedents to a tripartite standard, drawn from numerous decisions of the 
Court, without explaining contradictions in the various rationales that had produced them. 
Most Supreme Court analysts presupposed that the Roberts Court would extend the 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court. Initially, at least, 
they concluded that the Court was more conservative than its predecessor. When John Roberts 
was confirmed chief justice in September 2005, eight of the sitting justices had served on the 
Rehnquist Court: John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, 
David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. Most seemed to 
agree that that the Court became even more conservative because of the retirement of 
O’Connor and resulting 2006 appointment of more conservative Justice Samuel Alito.  
But the direction of the Court became less obvious in 2009 and 2010, when President 
Barrack Obama appointed, respectively, Sonya Sotomayor (to replace David Souter) and Elena 
Kagan (to replace John Paul Stevens). With this composition, the Court ruled conservatively in 
some instances and more liberally in others. Mark V. Tushnet describes how, at least through 
2013, the balance of the court was complicated and fluid. The five conservative-oriented justices 
included Alito, Thomas, Kennedy, Roberts, and Scalia, while Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan generally took more liberal positions. But Kennedy sometimes sided with the liberals, 
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while Chief Justice Roberts often served as a swing vote. In doing so he often sought 
compromise or advocated delimited holdings to find consensus.77  Steve V. Mazie argues that the 
justices were commonly willing to break ideological ranks, a tendency particularly pronounced 
among the more conservative justices, including Chief Justice Roberts.78 In this circumstance, as 
Michael C. Gizzi and R. Craig Curtis show regarding the increasingly complicated decisions of 
the Court on electronic privacy in the cyber-age, fathoming the ideological sources of opinion 
writing was not easy.79 According to Justice Antonin Scalia, the willingness of Chief Justice 
Roberts to accommodate his fellow justices to reach consensus set him apart notably from his 
predecessor. This was a tendency that would have a major impact on the Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence of the Court. Many observers came to view Chief Justice Roberts as more of a 
centrist than a conservative – and certainly more moderate than Justice Antonin Scalia (before 
his death in February 2016) and Justice Clarence Thomas.80  
Writing in 2013, Marcia Coyle surmised that Chief Justice Roberts had not demonstrated a 
particularly deep commitment to constitutional originalism. The strongest tendency exhibited by 
the chief justice, albeit certainly in keeping with the New Federalism, was to attempt, through 
moderation, to re-confirm the Supreme Court as a neutral, dispassionate tribunal operating 
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according to orderly processes and the rule of law.81 Jonathan H. Adler observed that, in his first 
seven years as chief justice, in no instance did Roberts display a willingness to depart 
ideologically from his fellow justices to seek middle ground so dramatically as in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012). In this decision, the chief justice 
authored an opinion that engaged deeply, with both liberal and conservative approaches, the 
controversial question of whether the “individual mandate” of the 2010 Patient Care and 
Affordable Care Act could be supported by the Commerce Clause.82 A number of scholars have 
noted that the tendency of the Roberts Court to render decisions pleasing to liberals on some 
occasions and to conservatives on others produced strongly worded critiques from both sides of 
the ideological aisle. This was so especially in response to decisions that upheld Second 
Amendment Rights, corporate financing of political campaigns, and gay marriage and abortion 
rights.83 
Scholars assessing the work of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts  
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before the July 2012 ruling of the Court on the 2010 Affordable Care Act appear to take 
somewhat divergent views on the extent to which the Court embraced Rehnquist Court New 
Federalism or otherwise articulated a viable set of federalism principles and doctrines. 
Christopher Banks and John Blakeman make the case that the federalism decisions of the Court 
depended vitally on the critical swing vote of Justice Anthony Kennedy. By summer 2008, 
however, neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Samuel Alito, who had become an associate 
justice on January 31, 2006, could be counted on to advance consistently particular viewpoints 
on the question.84 In any case, they conclude that the New Federalism “evolved” as the Roberts 
Court seemed to demonstrate a more pro-business orientation and affirm federal government 
power more frequently than its predecessor, with these tendencies exhibiting themselves in cases 
that involved statutory construction and “dormant Commerce Clause” preemption of state 
regulatory power.85 In a more philosophical vein, Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin raise the 
question of whether steadfast constitutional recognition of state and local autonomy can address 
the increasingly complex challenges facing the United States.86 Quite similarly, Erin Ryan makes 
the case that, as of early 2012, at least, the federalism jurisprudence of the Supreme Court had 
become unstable and unpredictable. Considering problems that required coordination of local 
and natural authority, such as those that became evident in Hurricane Katrina and amid efforts to 
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reform health care, Ryan argues that the federalism jurisprudence of the Roberts Court comes up 
woefully short.87 
Scholarly analysis of National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (2012) 
certainly has produced no consensus on the ruling itself or its implications for Commerce Clause 
or federalism jurisprudence. With respect to the “individual mandate” set out in the ACA 
requiring individuals to purchase health insurance, Einer R. Elhauge maintains that the claim 
made by the majority in Sebelius that Congress had never before commanded citizens to 
purchase a product was, simply, not true – pointing to a 1792 congressional enactment requiring 
all able bodied men to own a firearm.88 Alan Brinkley praises the decision, which largely upheld 
the ACA, because it would make it possible for more citizens, including those with low incomes 
and pre-existing health problems, to obtain much-needed health insurance.89 Alternatively, David 
T. Beito, decried the decision of the Court in Sebelius, and regarding the individual mandate in 
particular, concluded that the decision undermined personal liberty.90 
In the introduction to their anthology of essays on Sebelius, Fritz Allhoff and Mark Hall 
emphasize the magnitude of the decision and, to many, the almost shocking positions taken by 
some of the justices. According to them, “Sebelius is a once-in-a-generation decision – perhaps 
even once in a lifetime. No case before it has had such monumental importance for how health 
care is financed and delivered in the United States. . . .” Congress had never used its commerce 
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power to “require the unconditional purchase of a regulated product.” Consequently, the case 
“offered advocates of smaller government a prime opportunity to cabin the expansive federal 
commerce power.” Surprising to observers was the holding of a 5-4 majority that the power of 
Congress to tax authorized the individual mandate “penalty,” which all understood was central to 
the viability of the Affordable Care Act. But equally unexpected was that Chief Justice Roberts 
would turn out to be the swing vote saving the legislation. And “almost no one expected seven of 
the justices to concur that Congress lacked authority under the Constitution to require states to 
expand Medicaid at the risk, in the absence of compliance, of losing their extant Medicaid 
matching funds.”  No less surprising, say Allhoff and Hall, was the dissent by “the other four 
conservative justices,” who signed their opinion jointly, and, in lieu of a concurring opinion, at 
least in part, reiterated key points about the Commerce Clause that the Chief Justice had made in 
one part of his opinion. According to Allhoff and Hall, Chief Justice Roberts “was satisfied to set 
conservative precedent that limited federal powers under both the Commerce Clause and the 
Spending Clause,” not feeling the need to overturn the entire Affordable Care Act, at least when 
it could be salvaged with “tax law technicalities.” “Roberts was Solomonic,” they conclude, 
while “[o]thers harken to Judas.”91  
Marcus Schulzke and Amanda Cortney Carroll maintain that continuing heated arguments 
between liberals and conservatives over the power of the federal government in relation to state 
governments to shape domestic policy must inform any understanding of the Sebelius decision.92 
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Following the line of thought advanced earlier by Freely, Rubin, and Ryan – Cynthia J. Bowling 
and J. Mitchell Pickerill, writing in 2014, advance the view that, as a consequence of intense 
party polarization going back decades, federalism had become fragmented and, consequently, 
dysfunctional. Central to this problem, they argued, was a Supreme Court that protected state 
sovereignty from federal encroachments at times, while approving federal preemption of state 
laws at other times.93  
Jeffrey Rosen took Chief Justice Roberts to task in 2013, it seems, for promising to promote 
a bipartisan legitimacy of the Court at the beginning of his tenure but, to some extent, 
succumbing to ideological agendas. While Roberts sided with the liberal wing of the Court to 
salvage the Affordable Care Act in Sebelius, the decision damaged public approval of the Court 
and confirmed, ironically, the nagging perception that the Court decides cases according to 
politics rather than the requirements of the Constitution.94 
Pointing to the impact of culture wars conflict on constitutional adjudication is a 2002 
anthology titled Courts and Culture Wars, contributors to which include Robert H. Bork, John C. 
Eastman, and Jeremy Rabkin. These jurists emphasize that, for much of the second half of the 
twentieth century, state and federal courts, relying on authority provided by the United States 
Constitution, “injected themselves into what many critics consider to be fundamentally moral or 
political disputes.” By constitutionalizing these disputes, many believed that the courts had 
reduced the ability of Americans to engage in traditional, political modes of settling differences 
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over issues that excite passions, including school prayer, abortion, gay rights, and expressive 
speech.95  
Disputes over the Commerce Clause have produced some of the most profound controversies 
in United States history, especially in the last half of the twentieth century. In the view of Marcus 
Schulzke and Amanda Courtney Carroll, writing in 2014, “the Commerce Clause has repeatedly 
served as a means of enacting progressive policies, by allowing the federal government to 
intercede in politics at the state level to protect workers’ rights, enact economic reforms, and 
eliminate de jure segregation.” According to them, such progressive uses of the commerce power 
have been grounded in a “loose interpretation” of what amounts to interstate commerce. The 
decision of the United States Supreme Court to interpret the Commerce Clause to provide 
Congress a “broad grant of power” has been the foundation of contentious interventions at the 
state and local levels.96  
That United States Supreme Court decisions ruling on the commerce power were central to 
culture wars conflict should not come as any surprise. Writing in 2011, Jamie Raskin maintains 
that, for more than a century, Congress has used the Commerce Clause as a tool for advancing 
social justice, fair competition, equal rights in the marketplace and workplace democracy. He 
also acknowledges that, because the Commerce Clause has been a powerful instrument of social 
reform over the last century, its meaning has provoked deep jurisprudential and political 
controversy. In his view, progressives had, for decades, enacted legislation grounded in the 
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Commerce Clause that compelled corporate commerce to accommodate the agenda and values of 
progressive members of society.   
For three decades following the Civil Rights Act of 1964, says Raskin, Congress acted with 
great energy and ambition to address civil rights, environmental, consumer, labor, trade, housing, 
public accommodations, public safety, education and occupational health and safety concerns. 
Congress acted with confidence that its enumerated constitutional power to regulate commerce, 
in conjunction with its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause, was sufficiently 
expansive to protect and insulate such legislation. The Commerce Clause, Raskin emphasizes, 
had provided foundational authority for Congress not only to pass seminal civil rights legislation 
but also such measures designed to protect the environment and improve the rights of citizens in 
the workplace and marketplace.97 
According to Raskin, the expansive definition of the commerce power set out by the United 
States Supreme Court in its New Deal-era and Great Society-era decisions created the space for 
Congress to enter the “modern era” of legislation. Most prominent among these, he argues, were 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) and United States v. 
Darby Lumber Co. (1941), upholding the power of Congress to regulate employment conditions, 
and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung (1964), which 
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upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 98 Those decisions also 
opened the door for the Supreme Court to begin issuing rulings on congressional legislation that 
steadily expanded Commerce Clause authority to promote liberal-progressive understandings of 
social justice, equality, and progress.  
As indicated, the purpose of this study is not only to trace evolving Commerce Clause 
lawmaking and jurisprudence but also to demonstrate how changing meanings of the Commerce 
Clause were contested in the processes of congressional legislation, Supreme Court adjudication, 
and disputation among ordinary Americans – and proved pivotal in the culture wars conflict that 
engulfed the United States from the mid-1960s through at least 2012. Opening chapters deal 
broadly with socioeconomic, cultural, and political transformations and the contentious 
development of commerce power from 1789 through the New Deal and World War II (1789-
1945); the early Cold War era (1946-1963); the tumultuous social movements of the 1960s and 
1970s, the consolidation of the regulatory state, and the rise of the New Federalism (1964-1998). 
These three chapters, as narrative, set the stage. They also provide critical understandings of 
evolving commerce power and Commerce Clause principles and doctrines for the case-study 
chapters that follow. The first four chapter-length case studies lead off with the seminal 1995 
Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decision, United States v. Lopez and end with the 
controversial 2005 decision of that Court in Gonzales v. Raich. A fifth case study chapter 
examines the extraordinarily controversial “Obamacare” decision NFIB v. Sebelius (2012). Not 
anticipated at the outset of this project, this final case study chapter provides a distinctive 
opportunity to gauge the larger significance of the Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions 
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– and the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, as well as the relationship of Roberts Court adjudication to the New 
Federalism.  
This work largely draws on traditional source documents, including the Congressional 
Record, federal and state statutes, periodicals, federal district, circuit court and United States 
Supreme Court records and published decisions. All eight chapters include discussions of 
constitutional theories, principles, and doctrines quite likely not familiar to some American 
history generalists. The author can only say that politics, law, and policymaking in the United 
States by the mid-twentieth century had become extraordinarily complicated, relative to the 
Founding era, and especially from the perspective of those not formally trained in the law. 
Careful discussion of gargantuan congressional enactments and mercurial, arcane judicial rules 
and doctrines is, however, necessary for illuminating adequately the dynamic interaction of 
socioeconomic and cultural transformations, partisan politics, Commerce Clause-based 
congressional legislation, and United States Supreme Court decisions related thereto.  
As indicated, the “culture wars constitutionalism” to be illuminated in this study focuses 
on the changing meanings and significance of commerce power in the period 1964-2012. As 
such, it proceeds from the proposition that a complete assessment of the development of that 
power, at least from the mid-1960s through 2012, must be understood as involving much more 
than simply a struggle between the federal government and state governments. One operational 
assumption is that, not only Congress, but also federal judges responded to and exerted partisan 
political pressures while rendering Commerce Clause-based law. As such, this study seeks to 
situate the work of both Congress and the Supreme Court in broad and dynamic contexts, 
including public opinion, interest group activity, partisan politics, the influence of organized 
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political parties on Congress and the Supreme Court, and related institutional practices. As well, 
a working rule of thumb will be that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court reflected 
changing judicial philosophies and approaches to decision-making that, to varying degrees, 
entailed a due regard for the text of statutes, the authoritativeness of judicial precedents, and the 
provisions of the Constitution.99 This enquiry accepts that the decision-making of the Supreme 
Court involved periodic conflict over and re-formulation of Commerce Clause doctrines and 
normative constitutional theories.100 The two most prominent constitutional theories in play, as 
discussed above, were ideas associated with the “living Constitution,” near and dear to those 
with liberal-progressive orientations – and the originalist understandings of the Constitution, 
embraced by conservatives and libertarians, commonly associated with the New Federalism of 
the Rehnquist Court.101 
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The case study chapters provide biographical sketches of litigants, defendants, victims, 
and key witnesses, as well as the attorneys and judges involved in each case, including at the 
federal district and appellate court levels. While situating changing constitutional understanding 
and jurisprudence within culture wars conflict in the period 1964-2012 constitute the core of this 
enquiry, the author intends each case-study chapter to render the participants active players in 
dramas whose outcomes were certainly not preordained but, rather, contingent on myriad 
circumstances. The idea is to bring the players to life by situating them deeply in the 
socioeconomic, cultural, and political circumstances in which their controversies arose. Close 
analysis of the circumstances of each case “down on the ground” also usefully reveals the 
relationship of litigation battles with the contentious cultural and political conflicts that roiled the 
intermingling waters of local, state, and national identities. 
Chapter one examines the formulation of the Commerce Clause at the 1787 Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention and its interpretation by the federal courts through 1945. In doing so, 
it examines how Congress and the Supreme Court during the nineteenth century developed 
commerce power suited for a rapidly-transforming nation, one that met the challenges of 
building transportation and communications infrastructure and, then, with unprecedented energy 
and success, embarked on rapid industrialization and urbanization. Equally important, it 
examines how New Deal renditions of “liberalism” in the late 1930s helped Americans perceive 
all these developments in positive terms and generally welcome the wholesale expansion of 
federal authority. In this connection, it investigates how political leaders and ordinary people 
steadily surrendered their local, state, regional, and national identities. Of larger importance, 
chapter one illuminates the fundamental reorientation of congressional and Supreme Court 
power to the exigencies of the Great Depression, New Deal, and Second World War. By 1945, 
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Congress and the Supreme Court had transformed the commerce power into a powerful tool for 
implementing the vision of liberal economists and technocrats bent on creating a stable, wholly-
integrated national economy; controlling the production and prices of agricultural and 
manufactured products; bolstering the status and rights of organized labor; and regulating non-
unionized employee-employer relations. No less important was the creation of a sizable federal 
bureaucracy whose operatives now wielded, often simultaneously, the authority to make 
regulations and enforce them. As had been established before the New Deal, commerce power 
held sway over the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and goods transshipped 
in the flow of interstate commerce. The period 1937-1945, however, saw the most novel 
alteration of Commerce Clause understanding in the history of the United States to that time. 
This radical reorientation in Supreme Court adjudication established that the interstate commerce 
power of Congress and its new agencies could regulate intrastate activities having a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce – and, with the aid of the Necessary and Proper Clause, regulate or 
suppress altogether intrastate activities that undercut a federal regulatory scheme, new 
institutional arrangements that the New Deal produced in abundance. 
The second chapter describes how commerce power from 1946 through 1963, more than 
any other constitutional authority, spurred the emergence of a centralized regulatory state far 
more encompassing and complicated than the federal apparatus that had existed before World 
War II. Party leaders, members of Congress, federal judges, and ordinary citizens affiliated with 
both major political parties energetically embarked on this project. Most Americans, amid rising 
Cold War tensions, viewed these changes with satisfaction, as they seemed, at the least, to be 
emblematic of rising United States wealth, prestige and power. Emerging commitments among 
conservative jurists to judicial restraint and process jurisprudence hardly impeded federal 
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expansion, as substantive liberal jurisprudence, flush with apparent New Deal and post-War 
successes, influenced both federal adjudication and lawmaking. Equipped with a preponderance 
of newly-liberalized Commerce Clause rules and doctrines, Congress and the Supreme Court 
deployed federal power as enthusiastically as in the late 1930s, albeit with novel purposes.  
Americans viewed the rise of federal agencies and comprehensive regulatory schemes, 
variously, as praiseworthy, necessary, or wrong-headed, depending on individual socioeconomic, 
cultural, and political affiliations. Signal new interventions in the period 1946-1963 included 
new wage and hour regulations for non-unionized labor; antitrust measures aimed at corporate 
“bigness”; criminal statutes that targeted corrupt labor unions and their subversion by Soviet-
sponsored communism; and other kinds of organized crime increasingly linked to multistate 
gambling, drug trafficking, and racketeering. More perceptible to most ordinary Americans were 
new agencies advancing marvelous public projects, such as the building of a new interstate 
highway system, or new food and drug regulations, understood by most to provide added safety 
and health for an increasingly affluent and rapidly-growing suburban middle-class. Given the 
astounding gains in employment, income, and the standard of living, relatively few Americans 
had much reason to concern themselves with the constitutional sources of an emerging federal 
bureaucracy. Certainly, under these circumstances, not many dissenters gained attention with 
charges that federal power had begun to encroach on personal liberty. Individuals targeted by 
federal authorities for labor union subversion probably had the most urgent motivations to resent 
expanding Commerce Clause-based federal police power. But entrepreneurs and corporate 
capital also had pressing financial reasons to be discontented with a federal regulatory apparatus 
that steadily increased their costs of doing business and their income tax obligations. The 
Commerce Clause-related Supreme Court decisions of the Warren Court undoubtedly did not 
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gain the attention garnered by important decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education (1954). 
But, by 1963, new commerce power interventions on behalf of environmental protection and 
equal pay for women, in fact, portended a sea change in American society and culture. 
Chapter three explores how, more than any other constitutional authority, commerce power 
served the purpose of rapidly reordering American socioeconomic and political relations in the 
period 1964-1998. Liberal and conservative political operatives worked to actualize their visions 
of progress as quickly as possible with the most effective tool available – central government 
power. Federal authorities, indeed, transformed Commerce Clause authority into a virtual general 
police power that became a prime driver of intensifying culture wars conflict. Supported 
vigorously by a mostly liberal academy and print and electronic media – new congressional 
legislation, administrative agencies, and federal courts underwrote Commerce Clause power to 
ensure equity in hiring and promotion for women and minority members with affirmative action 
directives and end the sex-based harassment of women and members of the LGBT community in 
the work place. New regulatory regimes took aim at environmental hazards and threats to 
endangered species. But conservative initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s also drew media 
coverage. In this connection, the increasing reliance on commerce power by Congress to limit 
the availability of post-viability abortion, crack down on “super predators,” restrain drug-cartel 
trafficking, and restrict gun ownership further intensified partisan conflict.  
Congress and the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist courts in the period 1964-1998 combined to 
establish and sustain most of the Commerce Clause-based legislation that powerfully stoked 
political and cultural conflict. The Warren and Burger courts underwrote pivotal New Deal 
Commerce Clause doctrines, especially the substantial effects and comprehensive regulatory 
scheme rationales. The Supreme Court also declared that it would uphold criminal statutes based 
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on commerce power if the language of such statutes contained a jurisdictional element 
identifying a nexus of the offense to interstate commerce – but reserved to the federal courts the 
right to decide, on a case-by-case basis, if prosecuted activity was, in fact, within the commerce 
power. The Rehnquist Court, which included a steadily increasing number of conservative 
justices, refrained from further expanding the scope of the substantial effects test, rendered 
Commerce Clause decisions upholding the sovereign prerogative of the states to refuse to be 
“commandeered” into federal regulatory schemes, and otherwise calibrated Commerce Clause-
based measures to keep their mandates within the bounds of the New Federalism.  
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, the subject of chapter four, 
worked a substantial doctrinal breakthrough for the New Federalism. In this case, the Rehnquist 
Court held that the Commerce Clause could not support the 1990 Gun Free School Zones Act – 
which had made the possession of a firearm within a 1000-foot radius of a school a criminal 
offense. In and of itself, the GFSZA was a salve to liberal-progressives concerned about growing 
urban gun violence and a call to arms for Second Amendment enthusiasts. The 1992 prosecution 
under the act of San Antonio High School Student Alphonso Lopez, Jr., drove culture wars 
conflict to new levels of acrimony. The Supreme Court decision, authored by Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, affirmed the ruling of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals setting aside the 
conviction of Lopez. In doing so, the chief justice articulated precisely the limits of the decades- 
old Commerce Clause substantial effects test and dispatched the idea that the rule had, for almost 
sixty years, provided an open-ended power of Congress to legislate. And he did so without 
purporting to or, in fact, needing to overturn any important precedents.  
Rehnquist and the majority held that commerce power, under the substantial effects test, 
could reach intrastate activity only if it was commercial activity or, at least, economic activity. 
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Non-commercial activity and non-economic activity, such as simply possessing a firearm, were 
out of bounds. The Court also affirmed its Commerce Clause comprehensive regulatory scheme 
and criminal statue rationales. The decision in Lopez re-animated a longstanding tradition of 
judicial minimalism protective of state sovereignty. In doing so, it effectively articulated 
discernible limits to interstate commerce power. 
The decision in Seminole Tribe v. State of Florida (1996), the subject of chapter five, 
implicated some of the most contentious issues fueling the culture wars of the 1990s – including 
the rising casino gambling industry, federal government environmental protection regulations, 
and the balance of power between the state governments and the federal government. Ultimately, 
five of the nine justices ruled that the so-called “Indian Commerce Clause” did not give 
Congress the power to pass legislation that would authorize Native American tribes to sue state 
officials for not agreeing on demand to contract state-tribal compacts to facilitate the 
establishment of Indian casinos as required by the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  
Equally important, in coming to this result, the Court also reversed a decision it rendered in 1969 
to hold that commerce power did not authorize Congress to allow companies required to pay for 
hazardous waste site cleanups under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act to sue states for their role in creating such environmental 
hazards. Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity protections, under the holding of the Court, 
now also forbade this. The decision in Seminole Tribe constituted a significant victory for the 
New Federalism, as it was symbolic of the determination of the Rehnquist Court to resist efforts 
by the Congress to undercut further state sovereignty with a divergent employment of commerce 
power to “commandeer” the states. Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity holdings in 
Seminole Tribe migrated to decisions that dealt with private lawsuits under the Age 
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Discrimination Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. These rulings, in turn, declared that 
Congress had no authority to establish private causes of action against state governments to 
coerce them into following Commerce-Clause-based employee wage and hour, hiring, and 
promotion policies.  
The subject of chapter six is the decision United States v. Morrison (2000), in which a 
majority of the Rehnquist Court determined that the Commerce Clause did not empower 
Congress to establish a civil remedy for the crime of gender-motivated violence established by 
the 1994 Violence Against Women Act. The highly-publicized action brought by Christy 
Brzonkala against Antonio Morrison and James Crawford for rape shortly after its passage 
stirred controversy over the statute and the related rape prevention movement for the next six 
years. From the perspective of those who strongly supported the civil remedy set out in § 13981 
of the VAWA, federalization of judicial authority over gender-based violence against women 
marked this brutality as a serious national problem. While acknowledging that such criminality 
required stern justice, the Supreme Court declared the VAWA civil remedy and its underlying 
criminal act to be beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause and thus unconstitutional. 
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, gender-motivated violence did not constitute intrastate 
commercial activity nor even intrastate economic activity and, thus, did not meet the baseline 
criteria for regulation under the Commerce Clause substantial effects test articulated in Lopez. 
Gender-motivated violence, moreover, he concluded had no more impact on interstate commerce 
than many other crimes of violence traditionally punished under state criminal codes. Even when 
a given non-economic intrastate activity, aggregated with all other instances of it, had a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce, such activity was beyond the commerce power. Such 
legislation, moreover, constituted an unacceptable encroachment on state sovereignty and was 
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inimical to the dual system of federal government. For good measure, the Court seized the 
opportunity to affirm its Commerce Clause comprehensive regulatory scheme and criminal 
statute rationales. 
Gonzales v. Raich, the subject of chapter seven, arose, in part, because of a decades-long 
nationwide campaign to legalize medical cannabis, which had produced the 1996 California 
Compassionate Use Act and a challenge by California medical marijuana consumers Diane 
Monson and Angel Raich to the proscriptions of such use set out in the 1970 Controlled 
Substances Act. The highly-publicized case pitted advocates of legalized marijuana against law 
enforcement and parent groups fearful about rapidly rising teen-age marijuana consumption and 
drug addiction. Amid much wringing of hands and somewhat exaggerated initial reactions in 
various culture wars encampments, the Rehnquist Court ruled that bona fide users of medical 
marijuana under the California statute were not to be exempted from the proscriptions of the 
federal Schedule I drug ban. In doing so, the Court, simply, affirmed holdings set out in Lopez 
and reiterated in Morrison that the substantial effects rationale permitted Congress to regulate 
intrastate economic activity, including the cultivation and consumption of marijuana, and that 
Congress also was authorized to regulate any kind of intrastate activity if necessary to give effect 
to a federal comprehensive regulatory scheme, including the one enforced with, perhaps, the 
most energy, resources, and coercive federal police power – the Controlled Substances Act. The 
decision, in fact, did not overturn any of the holdings that had constituted the Commerce Clause 
New Federalism jurisprudence of the preceding two decades. Notwithstanding the strenuous 
complaints of some liberals and conservatives, Gonzales v. Raich did not facilitate any kind of 
new threat to well-established areas of state government authority but, rather, held the line 
against the further expansion of commerce power that had commenced during the New Deal – 
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bolstering the New Federalism Commerce Clause doctrines set out by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
Lopez and reaffirmed in Morrison. 
Chapter eight examines the 2012 decision NFIB v. Sebelius. In doing so, it illuminates how 
the passage by Congress and President Barack Obama in March 2010 of the Patient Care and 
Affordable Care Act was the consequence of a distinctive surge in culture wars political 
polarization. The ACA constituted an extraordinary congressional overreach – driven by well-
intended progressive commitments to providing universal health care. That the four most liberal 
members of the Court joined Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB v. Sebelius to uphold, under the 
taxing power, the ACA individual mandate penalty for omitting to acquire health insurance 
constituted a notable departure from the originalist and textualist principles of interpretation and 
the commitments to judicial restraint that had commonly actuated the decisions of the Rehnquist 
Court.  
On the other hand, the holding of a different 5-4 majority, also led by Chief Justice Roberts, 
constituted a firm rejection of the prime legislative feature that fundamentally distinguished the 
ACA – its reliance on commerce power to support the individual mandate. Strongly indicating 
the persistence of Rehnquist Court New Federalism principles was that part of the opinion 
authored by the chief justice holding that the commerce power, under the Court’s substantial 
effects rationale, could not reach inactivity – even in tandem with the ancillary power of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. NFIB v. Sebelius, thus, held that the Commerce Clause did not 
authorize Congress to command the individual to engage in commercial activity because such an 
omission in the aggregate might affect, in any relevant market, the future price of goods or 
services in that market – or because the individual might later become active in that market. On 
the other hand, the four joint dissenters in Sebelius refused to join that part of the opinion 
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authored by the chief justice declaring that, under the Court’s substantial effects rationale, 
intrastate activity of any kind having a substantial effect on interstate commerce was within the 
commerce power of Congress. This part of Chief Justice Robert’s opinion, unsupported by any 
of the other justices, attempted to resurrect well-worn obiter dictum from the New Deal-era that 
had declared an unbounded, plenary commerce power.  
The conclusions segment of this study will assay finally the relationship of culture wars 
contention and the relationship of this strife to congressional deployments of commerce power 
and Supreme Court adjudication in the entire period 1964-2012. It will, particularly, gauge the 
significance of a Rehnquist Court and Roberts Court New Federalism Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence that did not overturn seminal New Deal Supreme Court precedents but, 
nonetheless, established a substantial deterrent to further Commerce Clause-based expansions of 
federal power with a “this far and no further” doctrinal bulwark. As well, this segment will 
assess the prospects for this conservative judicial strategy in a United States that, by 2017, was 
riven by an unprecedented level of cultural and political contention that, in the view of some, 
seemed to threaten the ideological foundations of national unity.  
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Chapter One 
The Long Road to Regulation of Employer-Employee Relations, 1789-1945 
 
In 1787, delegates from the thirteen states convened to revise the Articles of Confederation, 
but ended up crafting a new Constitution for the United States – one based on a novel principle 
of federalism entailing divided sovereign power. One of their primary goals was to form a free 
trade area in which the individual states would cease to lay tariffs on each other’s incoming 
products or otherwise restrain trade. The resultant U.S. Constitution, therefore, includes as one of 
the enumerated powers of Congress, the authority “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”1 At the time of its ratification, the 
framers and American political class saw the Constitution as an instrument that provided the 
“general government” with only the powers enumerated in it; all other governing powers 
(“police powers” concerning health, general welfare, safety, and morals) were retained by the 
individual states, which were deemed to retain the attributes of sovereignty. But the steady 
development of the United States in the next century and a half would radically rework original 
understandings of constitutional federalism. 
This chapter examines congressional deployment of commerce power and United States 
Supreme Court responses thereto from the ratification of the Constitution through the mid-
twentieth century. In this long span of years, the country developed a vibrant market economy 
with technologically-driven transportation and print revolutions; aggressively expanded its 
geographic reach to the Pacific Coast; weathered a traumatic Civil War to maintain the Union 
and end African-American bondage; and became an increasingly urban society amid voluminous 
                                                 
1 U.S. Const. Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3. 
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European immigration, an unprecedented industrial revolution, and an extended period of rapid 
economic expansion – the latter years of which were punctuated by cyclical downturns which 
imposed politically charged hardship for farmers and industrial workers.2 Through these 
tumultuous transformations, however, Congress and the Supreme Court steadily widened the 
commerce power – a process that, by the eve of Black Thursday 1929, had wrought relatively 
little intensive political conflict. This consensus foundered in the depths of the Great Depression 
as a new era of Commerce Clause lawmaking, adjudication, and understanding ensued with 
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, an upheaval in American government and constitutionalism that 
saw little effective opposition through World War II. 
The first discreet period this chapter examines extends from 1801 to 1835, which comprises 
John Marshall’s term as chief justice, during which the Supreme Court, amid rising nationalism, 
often ruled in favor of extending federal power with seminal interpretations of the Commerce 
Clause. Marking the second period, from 1836 to 1888, under chief justices Roger B. Taney, 
Salmon P. Chase, and Morrison Waite, was the concern of the justices with the constitutionality 
of state legislation that worked against an otherwise increasingly integrated national economic 
development. Exemplifying this trend, both before and after the Civil War, were their attempts to 
find the balance or demarcation line between federal and state power and the proper role of 
government, especially in the making of a national economic infrastructure. The third phase 
                                                 
2 While the post-Civil War economic landscape was marked continuously by periods of growth 
and minor recession, historians agrees there were several late nineteenth century downturns that 
were notably severe. These include the five years of crisis brought on by the Panic of 1873, 
which produced the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, and the Panic of January 1893 that produced 
a generally depressed cycle until June 1897. Douglas Steeple and David O. Whitten, Democracy 
in Desperation: The Depression of 1893 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998), 14-42. 
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includes the period from 1888 to 1936.3 This era of fabulous wealth and increasingly visible 
urban poverty was marked by the Court’s narrow view of the Commerce Clause, which 
coincided with conservative political winds favoring as little congressional interference with the 
booming industrial economy as urban-based demands for humanitarian intervention and radical 
political insurgency would allow. And it is during these years that the Supreme Court may be 
said to have tipped the balance of power toward the states. The fourth period commences with 
the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937” and extends through 1945, years in which President 
Roosevelt, a liberal Democratic Congress, and an unusually activist United States Supreme 
Court, eager to provide relief to a struggling nation, devised and consolidated new modes of 
wielding central authority, including, especially, novel employments of the commerce power.  
Although the Supreme Court of the United States began hearing cases in 1789, it was not 
until 1824 that the Court addressed its first case involving the Commerce Clause.  That case, 
Gibbons v. Ogden, was the result of a dispute between two parties of steamboat entrepreneurs 
who both wished to provide passenger service into New York Harbor.4  Ogden operated under 
the auspices of a state granted monopoly that allowed him unchallenged access to New York 
Harbor.  Gibbons, meanwhile, justified his access to the harbor based upon his possession of a 
federal license to participate in the coasting trade and held that a federal sanction trumped the 
state monopoly.  Chief Justice John Marshall adjudicated the case with four others of his own 
Federalist Party as well as with Associate Justice William Johnson, who was a Jefferson 
appointee but had proven to be quite nationalist in his views.  The Court’s decision was a clear 
                                                 
3 This period includes the terms of Chief Justices Melville Fuller (1888 to 1910), Edward D. 
White, Jr. (1910 to 1921), William Howard Taft (1921 to 1930), and Charles Evans Hughes 
(1930 to 1941). 
4 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824). 
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victory for Gibbons and his federal coasting license, with all six justices ruling in his favor.  
Marshall provided the Court’s opinion and Johnson concurred in his own separate view. 
Marshall’s opinion included a careful dissection of the Commerce Clause. Regarding the 
meaning of “commerce,” Marshall was not persuaded by Ogden’s contention that the term meant 
only the trafficking of goods.  Marshall stated, “[c]ommerce, undoubtedly is traffic, but it is 
something more; it is intercourse.  It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and 
parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that 
intercourse.”  He also added “[a]ll America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 
‘commerce’ to comprehend navigation.5  Marshall was stating that commerce did not just include 
goods but all interactions and that included the use of watercraft.  He was then ready to address 
the next part of the clause.  “Among the several states,” to Marshall meant “intermingled with,” 
thus, “commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but 
may be introduced into the interior.”  Marshall wrote that commerce which is “completely 
internal” within a state would fall under that state’s jurisdiction.  However, his definition of 
“completely internal” did not include commercial concerns that would “affect the states 
generally,” as those would still be liable to federal power.6 
The Chief Justice then addressed what this power included.  In his view, the power of 
Congress was “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no 
limitations other than those prescribed in the Constitution.”7  Marshall believed that states 
maintained their sovereignty but that those powers entrusted to the federal government were not 
                                                 
5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824) in Jonathan D. Varat, William Cohen, and 
Vikram D. Amar, Constitutional Law, 13th ed. (New York: Thomson Routers/Foundation Press, 
2009), 151. 
6 Ibid., 152. 
7 Ibid., 153. 
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sharable in the sense that Ogden had argued. The chief justice maintained that the commerce 
power was “plenary” – as to its constitutionally defined object. However, he was careful to say 
that the very language of the Commerce Clause “among the several states” established 
limitations:  
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is 
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between 
different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such 
a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. 
Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may very properly be restricted to that 
commerce which concerns more States than one. . . The enumeration presupposes 
something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language, or the subject 
of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.8 
While reiterating that commerce power was plenary as to its enumerated object, Marshall also 
articulated the duty of Congress to keep its employment within constitutional bounds: 
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the 
influence which their constituents possess at elections are, in this, as in many other 
instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have 
relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must 
often [rely] they solely, in all representative governments.9 
In his separate but concurring opinion, Justice Johnson made an even stronger case for 
centralized commerce powers.  In his view, the idea of the federal licensing law exerting 
dominance over a state law was irrelevant to the case at hand.  He pointed out that, “[i]f there 
was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the 
commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.”10  He 
                                                 
8 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 194-195. 
9 Ibid., 197; Varat, et al., Constitutional Law, 153. 
10 Ibid., 156-57. 
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went on to say that if there had never been a licensing act, Gibbons would still be unrestrained in 
participating in commerce between states.  Williams saw the United States as a free trade area, 
sanctioned by the adoption of the Constitution, with the federal government as the commercial 
authority.  The ramifications of the ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden have been immense and the 
Marshall Court’s precedent is recalled frequently in subsequent Commerce Clause-based rulings. 
Three years after the Marshall Court ruled that the commerce powers of the federal 
government were “plenary” it also ruled on the case of Brown v. Maryland.11 The question to be 
decided in the case was “at what point in the course of trade does the jurisdiction of the state 
begin?”12  The case revolved around a Maryland law that required international importers of 
wholesale goods to purchase a license from the state.  Brown refused to pay the license fee and 
sued, arguing that the state law intruded upon federal power over imports and commerce.  
Maryland’s case, argued by future Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney, was that 
the state license fee applied equally to all wholesalers, importers or otherwise, and that the tax 
only affected imports incidentally.  The Court ruled in favor of Brown, reasoning that a state had 
authority over the police powers to control incoming goods to protect the health, safety, and 
well-being of the citizenry, but it didn’t have the power to tax those goods until they were 
removed from the “original package” and intermingled with other goods for sale.  This doctrine 
still lends itself as useful to adjudicate some cases today based upon the character of the goods 
being brought into a state.  
                                                 
11 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton 419 (1827). 
12 Forrest McDonald, A Constitutional History of the United States (New York: Franklin Watts, 
1982), 82. 
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Two years later, in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Company, the Court refined its earlier 
nationalistic stance in Gibbons v. Ogden.13  The state of Delaware authorized the Black Bird 
Creek Marsh Company to build a dam across Black Bird Creek to dry a marsh.  Willson operated 
a sloop, utilizing a coasting license similar to the one used by Gibbons in the 1824 case.   The 
dam impeded Willson’s ability to navigate on the creek; therefore, he attempted to break through 
the dam, thus damaging it.  The company sued him for trespassing and damages.  Willson argued 
that the state had intruded on federal power by allowing for the construction of the dam on a 
navigable waterway.  The counsel for Delaware downplayed the importance of the waterway, 
however, arguing that the creek was “one of those sluggish reptile streams, that do not run but 
creep, and which, wherever it possess, spreads its venom, and destroys the health of all those 
who inhibit its marshes.”14 Unlike the Gibbons case, in which the Court implied that federal 
power over navigation matters was exclusive, the Court in this case ruled six to zero that since 
Congress had not legislated on the small navigable creeks and since damming the creek to dry 
the marsh probably improved the health of the inhabitants of the area (a valid use of a state’s 
police power), the state’s action was constitutional.15 Willson thus confused the Court’s views 
about the delineation between federal and state powers over interstate commerce; it produced 
what has come to be known as the dormancy doctrine or dormant commerce power, implying 
that states are free to legislate over matters of commerce until Congress exercises its power over 
the same matter.  Marshall stated in his opinion in Willson, “[i]f Congress had passed any act 
                                                 
13 Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829). 
14 Ibid., 249 in G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change: 1815-1835, 
abridged ed. (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 583. 
15 Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) in Jonathan D. Varat, 
William Cohen, and Vikram D. Amar, Constitutional Law, Thirteenth ed. (New York: Thomson 
Routers/Foundation Press, 2009), 157-158. 
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which bore upon the case; any act in execution of the power to regulate commerce . . . . we 
should feel not much difficulty in saying that a state law coming into conflict with such act 
would be void.  But Congress has passed no such act.”16   This statement revealed that states did 
indeed possess “concurrent” power over commerce, particularly in the form of their police 
powers; however, federal laws, once created, superseded state law in the same area.  The ruling 
has since resulted in the problem of whether the Court could also prohibit states from making 
laws that would intrude upon Congress’ commerce power.  There seems to be no clear standard 
except that each individual case receives its own treatment from the Court.17 
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. was the last commerce case upon which Marshall 
ruled, although he did participate in hearing one more before his death in 1835.  In New York v. 
Miln, the Court was challenged with a case that pitted a state’s police power against the federal 
government’s commerce power.18 New York City was faced with an influx of poor immigrants 
who had traveled by ship to the United States.  The state passed a law requiring ships’ captains to 
post bond insuring that immigrants would not become public charges.  Miln refused to post such 
a bond for his passengers and was sued by the state of New York to pay the bond.  Chief Justice 
Marshall thought the state law was unconstitutional, but of the five justices who heard the case, 
three thought the law should be sustained.   Since there were seven justices on the Court at the 
time, and Marshall’s policy was that at least four justices (a majority of the whole Court) must 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 158. 
17 Robert J. Steamer "Commerce Power," The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the 
United States Kermit L. Hall, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005). Oxford Reference 
Online.  Oxford University Press.  University of Missouri - Columbia.  October 20, 2011, 
accessed April 11, 2016, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t184.e0236  
18 New York v. Miln, 8 Peters 120 (1837). 
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agree on a case, he directed a re-argument.  However, Marshall’s action only delayed the states’ 
rights judgment.   Marshall died in 1835; four other justices retired or died before 1837, and, also 
in that year, Congress raised the number of justices from seven to nine.19   
President Andrew Jackson elevated all seven of the new appointees to the court, including 
Marshall’s replacement, Roger B. Taney.  Taney was an advocate of states’ powers and had been 
critical of Marshall’s rulings in the past.  With only two of Marshall’s allies remaining on the 
Court (Justices Joseph Story and Smith Thompson), Taney and company had the ability to 
readdress some of the Marshall court’s judgments in favor of the states.20  Returning to New York 
v. Miln, the Taney Court ruled six to one (Federalist Justice Story dissenting) that the state of 
New York’s sovereign police power would be sustained against the federal government’s 
enumerated power to regulate commerce, particularly since the New York law did not actually 
conflict with any existing federal law.21  The ruling in New York v. Miln was effective until a 
Depression Era ruling occurred, stating that states could not limit a person’s right to travel 
simply because of his low economic status.22  Just one year after the judgment of New York v. 
Miln, the Court ruled on United States v. Coombs.23  Coombs was charged with stealing goods 
from a shipwreck but he argued that his crime was not within federal jurisdiction because the 
goods in question were taken from above the high waterline.  However, Justice Story, who wrote 
the opinion, referred to Gibbons v. Ogden and Marshall’s ruling that interstate commerce “does 
                                                 
19 McDonald, Constitutional History, 83. 
20 Ibid., 83. 
21 Ibid., 83. 
22 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) held that such a law violated conflicted with 
congress’ authority under the commerce clause.  A concurring opinion stated that the law 
violated the rights to equal protection granted by the 14th Amendment. 
23 United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838). 
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not stop at the mere boundary line of a state; nor is it confined to acts done on the water.”24  In 
this case, a strong majority on the Court maintained the Federalist precedent.  
In 1839, the Taney Court ruled on Bank of Augusta v. Earle.25  The case tested the legality of 
a corporation that was incorporated in one state, while doing business in another state.  A 
Georgia bank purchased some bills of exchange from a group within the state of Alabama.  In the 
post-1837 depression, the Alabamians refused to pay their debt to the Georgia bank, claiming 
that the out-of-state corporation had no right to do business in Alabama.  Daniel Webster argued 
for Georgia that a corporation should be entitled to the same interstate commercial rights as an 
individual.  The Court was unwilling to go as far as Webster wished, but it did agree in an eight 
to one decision that harkened back to the doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause formed in 
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., stating that out of state corporations could do business 
within the borders of another state, unless that state had legislated specifically against it.26  
A similar logic was used in Groves v. Slaughter, decided in 1841.27 Mississippi had a 
constitutional prohibition against the importation of slaves for sale from out of state, but had not 
created any legislation to put the state constitutional prohibition into effect.  Slaughter brought 
several slaves into Mississippi and sold them to Groves, whose notes defaulted.  Groves argued 
that Mississippi’s constitutional prohibition on out of state slave sales protected him from the 
lawsuit, while Slaughter claimed that the Commerce Clause made Mississippi’s prohibition 
unconstitutional.  The Court, in a five to two ruling, decided that indeed it was within a state’s 
power to prohibit the importation of slaves for sale, but since Mississippi had not passed such a 
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law the Court ruled in Slaughter’s favor.  Although the five to two ruling appears to show 
somewhat of a consensus, only one justice besides the author agreed with the opinion of the 
court.  Three justices, including Chief Justice Taney, only agreed with the outcome and not the 
opinion because of its anti-slavery overtones.  The Court’s judgments had begun to be 
significantly influenced by the conflict over slavery, thus the members rarely issued judgments 
that achieved the same consensus that had been achieved during the Marshall era.28 
Eight years later, the Taney Court ruled on a consolidated pair of disputes known as the 
Passenger Cases.29  Massachusetts and New York passed laws that imposed a tax on each 
immigrant who landed within their respective jurisdictions.  In its ruling, the Court seemed to 
return to the precedents of Gibbons v. Ogden, only now applied to foreign commerce instead of 
interstate commerce.  The Court ruled that the Massachusetts and New York laws were 
unconstitutional since states had no jurisdiction over foreign commerce, even in the absence of 
federal laws on the subject at hand.  However, the ruling was a five to four decision and eight 
opinions were proffered.  Taney was one of the dissenters, and carrying his previous arguments 
to issues of an international nature, he argued that states had the power to regulate foreign 
commerce unless Congress had legislated on the matter.30   
                                                 
28 Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 67-68 and William M. Wiecek, 
“Groves v. Slaughter,” The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press, 
accessed October 20, 2011 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t184.e0510> 
29 Smith v. Turner, Norris v. Boston, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 283 (1849).  
30 McDonald, Constitutional History, 88 and Donald M. Roper "Passenger Cases," The Oxford 
Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Kermit L. Hall. Ed., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press, accessed October 
24, 2011 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t184.e0903> 
66 
 
It was clear that Chief Justice Taney believed that states had the power to legislate on matters 
of interstate commerce unless Congress had already done so; however, it was also clear that 
many of the Associate Justices on the earlier Marshall Court, and on Taney’s Court as well, 
thought that Congress held exclusive power to legislate in those matters.  The numerous 
conflicting opinions of the Court, even when the numbers seemed to show consensus, illustrated 
the contentiousness of Commerce Clause rulings in the pre-Civil War years.  The issue was 
finally settled, to some degree, in 1852, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, rejecting the idea that 
Congress could decide to re-grant the states a regulatory power that is otherwise exclusive.31   
The case revolved around the Pennsylvania Pilot Act of 1803, a law that required any vessel 
entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia to either hire a local pilot or pay half of the usual 
pilotage fee.   Cooley chose not to comply with the law, arguing that it was a usurpation of 
Congress’ interstate commerce power.  However, the Court found that in 1789, the First 
Congress had written a law indicating that harbor pilots may continue to be regulated by local 
law “until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress.”32  Congress had clearly 
viewed states as having concurrent power to regulate interstate commerce.  The Court ruled six 
to two in favor of the Pennsylvania law and the six all followed a single opinion, written by 
Justice Benjamin Curtis.  The two dissenters were John McLean and James Wayne, who were 
both nominated to the Court by Andrew Jackson.  The case resulted in a doctrine that has since 
been called “selective exclusivity.”  The term means that Congress has exclusive power over 
some aspects of interstate commerce, those that require a national uniform rule, while some 
issues, those of a local nature, and where Congress has not yet acted, may be left to the states to 
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regulate.  It followed, therefore, that the Court would henceforth decide which aspects were of a 
national nature and which ones were to be under state jurisdiction.33 
 The last Commerce Clause case ruled upon before the Civil War was Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.34  The Ohio River forms the boundary between West Virginia 
(still Virginia at the time) and Ohio.  The town of Wheeling is on the east side of the river and 
Bridgeport, Ohio is on the west bank; the National Road runs through both towns on its way 
west. The state of Virginia granted a charter to the Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company to 
build a suspension bridge across the Ohio River at Wheeling to facilitate travelers’ access to 
Ohio.  However, before the waters of the river get to Wheeling, they run through Pittsburgh and 
other points in Pennsylvania.  Once built, the bridge prohibited large steamboat travel.  The state 
of Pennsylvania sued, arguing that the bridge restricted interstate commerce.  The Court agreed 
with Pennsylvania in a seven to two ruling and ordered that the bridge be removed or raised to 
111 feet above the level of the river.   Justice McLean delivered the opinion of the court, while 
Chief Justice Taney dissented.  Taney’s dissent was consistent with his previous views; he said 
that since Congress had not legislated upon obstructions to the Ohio River, the charter and bridge 
were lawful.  Indeed, six months after the case was decided, Congress passed a law declaring 
that the bridge was lawful at its original height; it would not have to be altered.  In 1856, the 
Court again heard the same case, and though the Court was sharply divided, it overturned its first 
judgment and ruled that due to Congress’ law the bridge was not an impediment to interstate 
commerce.35   
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 The pre-Civil War Commerce Clause-related judgments have, in some cases, had great 
impact upon future Supreme Court decisions, mainly those that have provided the foundation for 
an expansive authority.  Marshall’s three cases, Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown v. Maryland, and 
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., each have set precedents that color modern Court 
decisions.  During the Taney Court, the majority attempted to maintain the police powers of the 
states.  Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the case that set the doctrine of selective exclusiveness, has 
never been overruled, nor is it likely to be, because the Court derives a great deal of power in its 
ability to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to defer matters to legislatures or judicially 
intervene; this doctrine also allows the Court to decide where the line of demarcation between 
federal commerce power and state police power resides.  
Another case with lasting impact on future Commerce Clause jurisprudence was decided at 
the end of Reconstruction under the Chief Judgeship of Morrison R. Waite.  In Munn v. Illinois, 
Waite ruled with a 7-2 majority that an Illinois law regulating Chicago granary prices was a 
constitutional use of the state’s police power and was not repugnant to the commerce clause or 
the due process clause of the recently passed Fourteenth Amendment.36  He argued that some 
forms of property take on a public interest, such as bridges, toll roads, and in this case, a granary.  
He furthermore stated that when a private individual submits his “property to a use in which the 
public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to 
be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.”37  
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Writing in 1937, future Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter pointed out that Waite discarded the 
dormant commerce clause notion and also rejected the idea that courts could decide better than a 
legislature what was reasonable compensation for private industry that had a “public interest.”38   
In 1888, with a new Chief Justice presiding, Melville W. Fuller, the Court similarly upheld a 
state’s police power in Kidd v. Pearson.39  The Court recognized that the state of Iowa could 
prohibit the manufacture of alcohol for out of state sales, based solely upon the state’s police 
powers.  This ruling defeated the dormant commerce clause attack but it also illustrated the 
Court’s differentiation between trade and manufacturing.40   
By the late 1880s, the United States Supreme Court had little choice but to begin engaging 
the legislative responses of Congress, under its commerce power, to the emergence of massive, 
multi-state corporate enterprises, holding companies, and vertical and horizontal integration. 
Democrat President Grover Cleveland signed off on the Interstate Commerce Act in early 
February 1887. The act established the Interstate Commerce Commission, which was charged 
with curbing the monopolistic practices of the nation’s railroads. Congress and Republican 
President Benjamin Harrison passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in July 1890, which, on paper, at 
least, set up a regime of regulatory laws intended further to break up anti-competitive trusts. And 
Democrat President Woodrow Wilson and Congress adopted the Clayton Antitrust Act in mid-
October 1914, another antitrust regime that outlawed and provided mechanisms for the 
prosecution of numerous anticompetitive practices, such as price discrimination; “tying,” or 
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exclusive dealings; and mergers and acquisitions deemed to be particularly uncompetitive.41 
Notwithstanding the development of national regulatory regimes based on the Commerce 
Clause, the United States Supreme Court continued to render conservative decisions in cases that 
implicated the growing power of big business. The narrow regulatory view that Chief Justice 
Fuller exhibited in Kidd v. Pearson persisted in the decision of the Court in United States v. E.C. 
Knight, Co. In that case, the Court ruled that the American Sugar Refining Company could 
purchase the stocks of four Philadelphia refineries without violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.42  
Fuller, writing for an 8-1 majority, said that manufacturing is not commerce; manufacturing 
affects commerce “only incidentally and indirectly.  Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is 
not a part of it.”43 
The momentary consistency of commerce clause jurisprudence took an important deviation 
in 1903; in that year, the Court decided Champion v. Ames, one of the more significant rulings in 
the expansion of federal police power.44  As part of the rise of the Progressive movement and its 
concern over the nation’s morality, Congress had passed a law in 1895 prohibiting the transport 
of lottery tickets across state borders.  A five-to-four majority emerged with Associate Justice 
John Marshall Harlan writing that lottery tickets have real value and their transport may be 
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deemed as commerce.  Chief Justice Fuller, writing for the minority, claimed that lottery tickets 
were not commerce, but were instead contracts between the buyers and sellers.  Further, Fuller 
argued that legislating to discourage immorality was not a federal, but a state police power.  The 
case is notable because it opened the door for Congress to legislate in areas that had nothing to 
do with keeping avenues of trade between states open, and a lot to do with establishing a national 
power to regulate in matters of general welfare, morals, health, and safety.45  
Surprising to many at the time, the Court returned to its previously narrow view of commerce 
in Hammer v. Dagenhart, which struck down the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916.46 
Concerned with the mistreatment of children who worked away from the protection of their 
parents in industry, Congress had attempted to prohibit the shipment of goods produced in 
factories that employed children.  However, five members of the Court, including the Chief 
Justice, Edward D. White, ruled that such a law was an unconstitutional act to regulate 
production, not commerce.  Writing for the Court, Justice William Rufus Day stated, 
“[c]ommerce consists of intercourse and traffic, and includes the transportation of persons, land, 
property, as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities." He continued, “If it were 
otherwise, all manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be brought under federal 
control to the practical exclusion of the authority of the States, a result certainly not 
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution when they vested in Congress the authority to 
regulate commerce among the States.”47  In dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated, 
“if an act is within the powers specifically conferred upon Congress, it seems to me that it is not 
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made any less constitutional because of the indirect effects [emphasis added] that it may have, 
however obvious it may be that it will have those effects, and that we are not at liberty upon such 
grounds to hold it void.”48  He continued, “[t]he act does not meddle with anything belonging to 
the States.  They may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like.  
But when they seek to send their products across the state line, they are no longer within their 
rights.  If there were no Constitution and no Congress, their power to cross the line would 
depend upon their neighbors.  Under the Constitution, such commerce belongs not to the States, 
but to Congress to regulate.”49   
Although Holmes’ views would eventually prevail, the narrow view of the Commerce Clause 
was maintained after Hammer v. Dagenhart for the next eighteen years.  The last case in which it 
was used was Carter v. Carter Coal Co. in 1936; moreover, it was during this period that the 
Court was under great pressure to rule in favor of Franklin Roosevelt’s answer to the devastating 
depression that had destroyed markets and rendered millions without the means to make a living 
– the New Deal.50  The case revolved around the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 
which allowed coal industry boards to create minimum prices for coal and employees the right to 
organize and negotiate collectively. Many in Congress operated under the assumption that the 
Commerce Clause allowed them to regulate industry, but a majority on the Court saw things 
otherwise.  Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court’s five-to-four majority to overturn the law.  
Indeed, he warned that a broader view of the Commerce Clause was a slippery slope, saying,  
[e]very journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step, and the danger of 
such a step by the federal government in the direction of taking over the powers 
of the states is that the end of the journey may find the states so despoiled of 
their powers, or – what may amount to the same thing – so relieved of the 
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responsibilities which possession of the powers necessarily enjoins, as to reduce 
them to little more than geographical subdivisions of the national domain. It is 
safe to say that, if, when the Constitution was under consideration, it had been 
thought that any such danger lurked behind its plain words, it would never have 
been ratified.51   
 
In response, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing the dissenting opinion and taking a broad view of 
the Clause, addressed the idea of “direct” and “indirect” effects on commerce.  He wrote, “[a]t 
all events, ‘direct’ and ‘indirect,’ even if accepted as sufficient, must not be read too narrowly. . . 
. A survey of the cases shows that the words have been interpreted with suppleness of adaptation 
and flexibility of meaning.  The power is as broad as the need that evokes it.”52  Indeed, many 
Americans agreed with President Roosevelt that the Great Depression presented such a need. 
Eventually, as the Depression dragged on, and with the President’s belief that federal 
intervention was required to alleviate the country’s poor economic conditions, the Court made a 
dramatic shift from its former views about federal commerce power.  After Roosevelt’s landslide 
reelection in 1936, he felt confident enough to put forth legislation that would have raised the 
number of Supreme Court justices from nine to fifteen so that he could “pack” the Court with 
justices friendly to his New Deal programs.  Consequently, the Court issued several rulings in 
1937 indicating that two justices had broadened their interpretations of the Constitution.  Four 
justices had maintained a narrow understanding of the Commerce Clause, while three others 
generally took the broader view.53  Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Associate Justice 
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Owen Roberts had been considered the “swing” voters on the Court; Hughes was more likely to 
vote liberally, while Roberts often voted with the Court’s more conservative members.  
However, in 1937, both justices began to consistently rule in favor of New Deal legislation, even 
overturning previous judgments to do so, thus enabling President Roosevelt to greatly expand 
federal power.  This rapid change in the Court’s point of view has been tagged as “the 
constitutional revolution of 1937” with good reason.54  The change in the Court’s view allowed 
Congress to create laws that encompassed nearly every aspect of American lives.  Whether the 
Court buckled to political pressure, evolved its previous views, or was steered by some 
combination of the two factors, it became clear that the power relationship between the federal 
government and the states was changed for the foreseeable future.55   
The impact of the Court’s new outlook was evident in the 1937 case of National Labor 
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.56 The new National Relations Labor Board, 
established by the 1935 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, instituted proceedings against 
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation for, at its plant in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, having fired 
ten employees who sought to join the Steel Workers Organizing Committee – in direct 
contravention of the act.  The NLRB ordered the company to rehire the workers and give them 
back pay, and Jones & Laughlin Steel refused. NLRB, consequently, brought before the Supreme 
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Court the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act as applied to an attempt to 
impede unionizing efforts at a plant operated by one of the largest steel companies in the United 
States. The lower court found this application of the act unconstitutional because it concerned 
only manufacturing activity.57 In a five to four ruling, issued on April 12, 1937, the Court 
reversed its previously narrow definition of commerce as trade or intercourse and concluded 
instead that any activity that “affects” commerce (including manufacturing wholly within an 
individual state) is, indeed, commerce. 58     
Writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice Hughes articulated succinctly the modern 
“substantial effects test.” First, he cautioned that the commerce power “must be considered in the 
light of our dual system of government, and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon 
interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex 
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local 
and create a completely centralized government.”59  But, according to Chief Justice Hughes, the 
“unfair labor practices” of the respondent, insofar as they reasonably could be expected to lead to 
a strike and stoppage of its operations “would have a most serious effect upon interstate 
commerce.”60 The commerce power was to have full sway within its domain: 
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they 
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is 
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, 
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.61   
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With references to the Necessary and Proper Clause set out in Article I, Section 8, Chief Justice 
Hughes also indicated that Congress could regulate purely intrastate labor practices because such 
was “essential” or “necessary or appropriate,” under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to ensure 
the efficacy of the National Labor Relations Act.62 With its holding Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp, the Supreme Court sustained the authority of the National Labor Relations Board to 
regulate union-employer bargaining in the steel industry by upholding the National Labor 
Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act) of 1935.   
Equally important, the decision Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp swept away the principle 
laid down thirty-two years earlier in E.C. Knight and reaffirmed one year earlier in Carter v. 
Carter Coal Company. “[T]he fact that the employees here concerned were engaged in 
production,” Chief Justice Hughes declared, “is not determinative.”63 On behalf of the four 
dissenters, Justice McReynolds could barely contain himself. “Whatever effect any cause of 
[labor] discontent may ultimately have upon commerce is far too indirect to justify 
Congressional regulation. Almost anything – marriage, birth, or death – may in some fashion 
affect commerce.”64 Justice McReynolds certainly could reasonably complain that employer-
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employee relations did not constitute commerce, much less interstate commerce. But this should 
not obscure the fact that the regulation of employer-employee relations involved activities that 
were, fundamentally, economic in nature – and, thus, of a wholly different order from the 
activities of getting married, being born, or dying. 
On the same day the Court rendered its decision in NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, it 
issued its ruling in National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, with 
Chief Justice Hughes authoring the majority opinion. In this case, the National Labor Relations 
Board had required the Virginia-based Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Company to cease and 
desist from firing its employees, threatening to do so, or discriminating against them in response 
to their having joined the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America or otherwise having 
engaged in union activity. The Board had also required the clothing company to reinstate 
wrongfully discharged employees and pay them back wages. The Court reversed the decision of 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denying the workers the relief ordered by the NLRB. Chief 
Justice Hughes declared that, to some extent, the challenged NLRA was authorized by the 
commerce power because the clothing company imported its cloth from other states and sold 
almost all its finished garments in other states. He otherwise relied on the rationale set out in 
NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel to conclude that the claims of the clothing company that the 
National Labor Relations Board, under the Commerce Clause, had no authority to issue its 
ruling, were “without merit.” 
Justice McReynolds vigorously dissented and was joined by justices Van Devanter, 
Sutherland, and Butler. Invoking Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States (1935) and 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936), the dissenters insisted that the commerce power did not, 
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categorically, extend to relations between employers and their employees engaged in 
manufacturing. Unlike the situation in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, unfair labor practices 
producing a strike at the clothing manufacturing plant would have no significant effect on 
interstate commerce – given the relatively small productive capacity of the industry. And the fact 
that Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing used (perfectly legal) raw materials from states other than 
Virginia and that it regularly carried its (perfectly legal) products to other states did not change 
this. Whether the owner of the company bargained collectively with his employees, or not, did 
not directly affect interstate commerce.”65  
Less than a year after the seminal 1937 rulings in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel and 
NLRB. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, the Hughes Court handed down, in February 1938, a 
ruling in South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros. that narrowed slightly 
dormant Commerce Clause principles by recognizing the power of states to regulate the width 
and weight of semi-trailer trucks on their own highways. The district court upheld the South 
Carolina regulations because Congress had omitted to regulate this area of interstate commerce, 
leaving all regulation of heavy, long-bed trucks to the individual states. The Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court. With Justice Stone authoring the majority ruling, the Supreme Court 
reversed that ruling with a measured response. According to Stone, in the absence of federal 
legislation on the subject, the regulations at issue were generally with the competency of the 
state. Judicial enquiry into their validity under the Commerce Clause, under the circumstances, 
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was limited to the question of whether the restrictions were reasonably calculated to the end 
sought and in a way that did not discriminate against interstate commerce.66 
According to Herbert Wechsler, the April 1939 decision of the Court in National Labor 
Relations Board v. Fainblatt demonstrated that Justice Stone was adamant that the prior 
decisions of the Court dealing with the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 were, before the 
NLRB, to be taken with the utmost seriousness – and that the act was certainly applicable to 
unfair labor practices regardless of the extent of their effects on interstate commerce. In his 
words, “The language of the National Labor Relations Act seems to make it plain that Congress 
has set no restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the Board to be determined or fixed exclusively by 
reference to the volume of interstate commerce involved.” The term “affecting commerce,” 
meant “in commerce,” or burdening commerce, or restricting the flow of commerce or “having 
lead or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of 
commerce.”67  
On the other hand, the Court issued rulings that required regularity in the proceedings of 
both the NLRB and the federal courts to which the board sometimes turned to enforce its orders. 
In the March 3, 1941, decision NLRB. v. Express Publishing Co., with Justice Stone writing the 
majority opinion, the Court dealt with a case arising from the refusal of the Express Publishing 
Company to discuss the proposals of the San Antonio Newspaper Guild for changes in work 
arrangements. According to Justice Stone, an employer deemed by the NLRB to have refused to 
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bargain collectively in violation of the NLRA was to obey the order of the board to cease and 
desist. On the other hand, the Court held that an order by the NLRB, to warrant judicial 
confirmation, was, like the injunction order of a court, to state with reasonable specificity the 
acts that the employer was to do or refrain from doing.68 In the decision of the Court returned 
later the same month, NLRB v. White Swan Co., Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, quite 
similarly ruled invalid questions certified by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case pitting 
the NLRB against a laundry and dry cleaning business in Wheeling, West Virginia. The flaw 
certified questions arose from the order of the NLRB requiring the laundry to cease and desist 
from unfair labor practices, rehire terminated employees, and award them back pay. The 
damning deficiency of the certified questions was their “objectionable generality” – the omission 
to include the precise findings and conclusions of the NLRB.69 
 In the period 1938-1941, Associate Justice Stone wrote majority opinions that expanded 
the regulatory power of Congress under its Commerce Clause authority to prohibit flawed or 
otherwise problematic products from interstate commerce – rulings that also substantially 
advanced the fundamental liberties of minorities and fair labor employment practices. United 
States v. Carolene Products Company, handed down in April 1938, ruled on the constitutionality 
of the Filled Milk Act of Congress of 1923. Carolene Products Company, a Michigan 
Corporation, was indicted for shipping interstate packages of an article deemed by the act to 
constitute an impermissible adulterated food. The company argued that the act could not 
constitutionally be authorized by the Commerce Clause and that it violated the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment, denying defendant of its property rights. The company also 
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argued that the act violated the Fifth Amendment due process clause insofar as that amendment 
embraced the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reversed the 
judgment of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to the indictment. It also upheld the Filled Milk 
Act under the power of Congress to exclude from interstate commerce products reasonably 
shown to be injurious to the public health, relying on a long line of decisions, most recently, at 
the time, Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1937)70  
 Of considerable importance was that part of the majority opinion announcing the 
appropriate parameters for judicial review in the case of regulations affecting ordinary 
commercial transactions. Justice Stone declared the Filled Milk Act was “presumptively 
constitutional” and properly within the discretion of Congress because it was based on ample 
evidence showing the public health benefits of the act and was not arbitrary or irrational. As 
many constitutional scholars have pointed out, this appears to have been the first overt 
articulation by the Court of what came to be called the “rational basis” test. This test declared 
that, for economic regulatory legislation to meet constitutional muster, it must be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest. In this inaugural formulation of the test, the legitimate end 
was the protection of public health. The power to enact this legislation, however, was grounded 
in the so-called “commerce prohibiting” rationale for legislation based on the Commerce Clause. 
In his famous Footnote Four, however, Justice Stone declared that review of legislation aimed at 
“discrete and insular minorities,” in the absence of normal safeguards of the political process, 
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would not enjoy the rational-basis presumption of constitutionality – but rather require a higher 
level of scrutiny:  
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally 
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . .71 
 
By 1940, President Roosevelt had the opportunity to appoint seven new justices to the 
Supreme Court, including Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and William O. Douglas, all of whom 
he believed would be amenable to his New Deal legislation.  In that year the Court heard the case 
of United States v. Darby Lumber Co., handed down its decision on February 3, 1941.72 The case 
involved the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (also known as the Wages and Hours Act), which 
prohibited interstate shipment of products manufactured by firms that did not comply with the 
Act’s wage and work hour requirements. The defendant in the case, Darby Lumber Company, 
was situated in Statesboro, Georgia.73   
                                                 
71 Footnote Four suggested a higher level of judicial scrutiny for legislation that, on its face, 
violated a provision of the Constitution; attempted to derange the political process; or 
discriminated against minorities, particular those with numbers insufficient to obtain redress 
through the political process. This higher level of scrutiny, now dubbed “strict scrutiny,” was 
first articulated by Justice Hugo Black in the December 18, 1944 decision Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 
(1938); Herbert Wechsler, “Stone and the Constitution.” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 46, no. 5 
(September 1946): 764-800, 781; Jack M. Balkin, “The Footnote.” Northwestern University Law 
Review, Vol. 83 (1988): 275; Robert A. Levy and William H. Mellor, “Earning an Honest 
Living”: The Dirty Dozen: How Twelve Supreme Court Cases Radically Expanded Government 
and Eroded Freedom (New York: Sentinel, 2008), 187-197.  
72 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
73 Robert H. Bork and Daniel E. Troy, “Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’ Power 
to Legislate Commerce,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2002), 881. 
83 
 
Under the original 1938 Federal Labor Standards Act, one whose work was in the channels 
of interstate commerce was covered as an individual. According to the legislation, Congress 
imposed the new standards to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general wellbeing of workers.” 
Thus, while invoking constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause, Congress targeted 
practices that caused commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used 
to propagate unfair labor conditions in the several states; burdened commerce and the free flow 
of goods in commerce; constituted unfair method of competition in commerce; led to labor 
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and/or 
interfered with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. The act adopted an eight-
hour day and a forty-hour workweek, while allowing workers to earn wages for an extra four 
hours of overtime. The act required employers to pay a minimum wage and to provide overtime 
pay at the rate of one-and-a-half times regular pay. Of considerable importance for assessing the 
widening scope of the FLSA in coming decades, its initial version exempted numerous 
categories of employees, including persons employed 1) in a bona fide executive, administrative, 
or professional capacity; 2) in a local retailing capacity; 3) in the capacity of outside salesman; 4) 
in any retail or service establishment the greater part of whose selling or servicing was in 
intrastate commerce; 5) as a seaman; 6) as a railway worker [with some exceptions]; 7) in the 
harvesting, cultivating, or farming of any kind of aquatic animal and vegetable life; 8) in 
agriculture; 9) in connection with the publication of a newspaper [those with a defined limited 
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readership]; 10) in the processing or packing of various agricultural or horticultural commodities 
for market; and 11) in making cheese, butter, other dairy products.74 
In Darby, a unanimous Court referred to Dagenhart as “a departure from the principles 
which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause,” the justices overturned the 
opinion of Dagenhart, and ruled instead that the Wages and Hours Act was within the bounds of 
Congress’ commerce power.75  Writing the opinion of the Court, which characterized the FLSA 
as a “comprehensive legislative scheme,” was Justice Harlan F. Stone. In his view, “[w]hile 
manufacture is not, of itself, interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods interstate 
is such commerce, and the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation 
of commerce.”76  Justice Sone embraced the prime rationale Congress employed to justify the 
FLSA – “that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the 
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is 
injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows.”77  
Another key component of the decision, according to Herbert Wechsler, was the direct 
application of the FLSA standards to all employees engaged in production for commerce 
interstate. According to Justice Stone, “The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not 
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate 
which so affect interstate commerce . . . as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the 
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 . . . exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.78  
According to Dan T. Coenen, the Court recognized that its rationale in Darby, insofar as it 
relied on the well-established commerce-prohibiting approach, was problematic. For the first 
time, the Court upheld the use by Congress of its commerce prohibiting power to ban the 
interstate shipment of products that were, in and of themselves, perfectly legal, indeed, 
extraordinarily useful and valuable – that is, finished planks and boards for construction 
purposes. The Congress and the Court justified this novel ban by condemning the production 
processes that had produced the innocuous goods. After all, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court 
had declared that Congress, with the Child Labor Act of 1916, could not prohibit from interstate 
shipment goods, otherwise harmless, simply, because they were manufactured impermissibly by 
children. The commerce-prohibiting approach required “bad goods.” In Darby, the Court dealt 
with this difficulty by, simply overruling Hammer. It declared that, thereafter, the Court would 
allow Congress to employ the commerce-prohibiting approach whether the goods transported 
across state lines were inherently “harmful or deleterious” or not.79 Gerald Gunther, writing in 
1985, emphasized that this rationale entailed a kind of “bootstrapping” that raised large questions 
about just how far Congress could go in leveraging the commerce-prohibiting technique to 
regulate intrastate behavior.80   
Of considerable importance is that the Darby Court, independent of its prohibition of 
interstate shipment of proscribed goods, held that provisions of the FLSA designed to suppress 
illegal employer activities involved in their production were also within the commerce power of 
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Congress.81 Justice Stone deployed a “substantial effects” rationale for the purpose. He conceded 
that state governments might pass laws that affected interstate commerce, but emphatically 
declared that “it does not follow that Congress may not, by appropriate legislation, regulate 
intrastate activities where they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”82 Justice Stone 
cited Jones & Laughlin Steel and a 1937 decision of the Court, Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. 
National Labor Relations Board, which had affirmed an order of the NLRB ordering the packing 
company to reinstate workers who had been fired for union organizing. With Chief Justice 
Hughes writing for the majority in Santa Cruz, he discounted all challenges to the commerce 
authority of Congress to regulate labor union-management relations. And he made clear the 
requisite nexus of intrastate activities not amounting to commerce that were, nonetheless, within 
the reach of the commerce power:  
It is also clear that, where federal control is sought to be exercised over activities which 
separately considered are intrastate, it must appear that there is a close and substantial 
relation to interstate commerce in order to justify the federal intervention for its 
protection. However difficult in application, this principle is essential to the maintenance 
of our constitutional system.83  
 
Based on the Necessary and Proper Clause, the ruling in Darby, moreover, upheld the 
power of Congress to establish the FLSA wage and hours mandates even though the statute did 
not provide that courts might find, in particular cases, that violations of work and hours 
regulations did not substantially affect interstate commerce. This regulatory power, said the 
Court, extended to intrastate activities that “so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the 
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power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them “appropriate means to a legitimate end” 
– that is, the regulation of interstate commerce.84  
As indicated, the decision in Darby ratified that part of the FLSA that transmuted what an 
earlier Supreme Court would have deemed intrastate manufacturing (and thus, not interstate 
commerce) into an activity properly within the ambit of the Commerce Clause. And it did so 
with, in addition to the renovated “commerce prohibiting” rationale, a new “affecting interstate 
commerce” rationale – one that imaginatively (and, in some cases, fictively) tied the 
manufacturing process of all lumber in a venue to the sale of some of the lumber so produced in 
another state. According to the Court, “the evils. . . of substandard labor conditions” had the 
consequence of dislocating commerce and “driving down labor conditions in [other] states.” In 
the words of Justice Stone:  
“Congress, having by the present Act adopted the policy of excluding from interstate 
commerce all goods produced for the [interstate] commerce which do not conform to the 
specified labor standards. . . may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment 
to [the] permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities.”85 
 
On the same day as the Supreme Court ruled in Darby, it returned its decision in Opp 
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, which involved a challenge by the Opp Cotton Mill, an Alabama 
corporation, to the order of the FLSA Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor. The order required textile mill owners to pay its employees a thirty-two 
and one-half cents per hour wage, which an industry committee had, in coordination with the 
administrator, made uniform in the textile industry. In addition to complaints that the proceeding 
before the administrator violated due process, a primary complaint of the owners was that 
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Congress, with the FLSA, had unconstitutionally delegated to the administrator, in cooperation 
with an industry committee, essentially legislative power to set industry wage scales.86 Justice 
Stone, writing for the majority, invoked Darby, to conclude that the FLSA, as applied to textile 
manufacturers, was certainly within the Commerce Power of Congress and did not violate the 
Tenth Amendment.87 The Court approved that part of the FLSA allowing an industry committee 
and the administrator to establish wage scales “as rapidly as economically feasible without 
substantially curtailing employment.”  There was no “failure of legislative function” insofar as 
Congress had provided standards, guidelines, procedures, and record keeping requirements for 
the administrator, including the keeping of hearing records.88 As well, the Court held that the 
proceedings involving Opp Cotton Mill were entirely within constitutional bounds, as they 
satisfied the requirements of due process of a hearing on notice. And there was no error or want 
of due process in permitting the industry committee to appear before the Administrator and to 
offer evidence in support of its recommendations. Nor was there want of due process in 
permitting members of the staff of the Wage and Hour Division to give testimony.89 As Wechsler 
pointed out, “attacks upon delegation had, indeed, lost their old magic as the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938, the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 and the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act were successively sustained.” In this context, the solid practical judgment of 
Justice Stone met the challenge, now, of adjusting legislative mandates for regulation and 
oversight to the need for flexible administrative implementation:  
The Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be 
interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable. The essentials of the 
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legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a 
rule of conduct. These essentials are preserved when Congress specifies the basic 
conclusions of fact upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data by a designated 
administrative agency, it ordains that its statutory command is to be effective.90   
 
Coenen argues that, just as Darby registered that Congress could regulate intrastate 
manufacturing activities with its commerce-prohibiting approach, the January 1939 decision of 
the Court in Currin v. Wallace announced that Congress could reach intrastate sales activities 
with an “in commerce” approach – that is, when such was necessary to regulate the sale of 
products ultimately involved in interstate commerce, whether or not interstate sale was the 
intention of their manufacturers.91 Plaintiffs were tobacco warehousemen and auctioneers in 
Oxford, North Carolina, who sought a declaratory judgment that the Tobacco Inspection Act of 
August 12, 1935, was unconstitutional and an injunction restraining Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace from enforcing it. The act authorized the secretary to establish standards of 
tobacco quality and to designate those auction markets where tobacco bought and sold moved in 
interstate or foreign commerce. It also provided, under penalty, that at a market so designated, no 
tobacco was to be offered for interstate or intrastate sale at auction until it had been inspected 
and certified by an authorized representative of the secretary. This regulatory apparatus had been 
developed to deal with numerous sharp practices and “an unusual degree of uncertainty in . . . 
prices,” typically resulting from a lack of accurate information about the quality of tobacco at the 
time of auction. 92 
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With Chief Justice Hughes delivering the majority opinion, the Court declared it was 
“idle to contend” that the case did not concern “sales in interstate or foreign commerce” because 
“[w]here goods are purchased in one State for transportation to another the commerce includes 
the purchase quite as much as it does the transportation.”93 It made no difference that “inspection 
and grading of the tobacco took place before the auction” because “it is obvious that the 
inspection and grading have immediate relation to the sales in interstate and foreign commerce.” 
94 Equally important, the Court held that the tobacco inspection scheme was within the 
commerce power, even though the act required inspection before auction in the case of tobacco 
bound both for interstate shipment and intrastate use.95 The Court declared that practical 
considerations authorized Congress to impose inspection requirements on tobacco sold for 
intrastate use. In its view, “the transactions on the tobacco market were conducted 
indiscriminately at virtually the same time, and in a manner that made it necessary, if the 
congressional rule were to be applied, to make it govern all the tobaccos thus offered for sale.”96  
In April 1939, in Mulford v. Smith, the Court further elaborated its “in commerce” 
jurisprudence to regulate the intrastate production and sale of tobacco. Producers of flue-cured 
tobacco in Georgia and Florida challenged the constitutionality of provisions of Title III of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1938 that authorized warehousemen to deduct penalties 
from the sales price of tobacco grown in amounts that exceeded producer quotas and held by the 
warehousemen to be sold on behalf of the producers. The appellant-producers maintained that 
the AAA was unconstitutional on a number of grounds, including the argument that its 
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regulatory scheme was beyond the powers of Congress and, most certainly, beyond its commerce 
power.97 With Chief Justice Owen Roberts authoring the majority opinion, the Court held, 
contrary to the claims of the producers, that the act did not purport to control production, did not 
amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the secretary of agriculture, 
nor did it deprive the producers of due process. More important for present purposes, the Court 
held that Congress was authorized to regulate the volume of tobacco produced to protect and 
conserve interstate commerce. Where marketing conditions were such that regulation as to sales 
in interstate and foreign commerce could not be effective unless extended to sales in intrastate 
commerce also, such extension of regulation was constitutional. According to Justice Roberts, 
the rule reached interstate commerce “at the throat where the tobacco enters the stream of 
commerce – the marketing warehouse.” Citing Currin, the Court also declared “In markets 
where tobacco is sold to both interstate and intrastate purchasers it is not known, when the 
grower places his tobacco on the warehouse floor for sale, whether it is destined for interstate or 
intrastate commerce. Regulation, to be effective, must, and therefore may constitutionally, apply 
to all sales.”98 And Coenen observes that Justice Roberts supplemented his “in-commerce” 
justification of the act by invoking a commerce-prohibiting rationale, holding that, if Congress 
was authorized to prohibit all interstate movements of a commodity, this power extended “a 
fortiori to limitation on the amount of a given commodity which may be transported in such 
commerce.”99  
In June 1939, the Court returned its decision in United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 
Inc., which further articulated “in commerce” jurisprudence and extended the commerce power 
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to the intrastate production and sale of milk.100 Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
(AMAA) of 1937, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace issued an order fixing minimum 
prices to be paid the producers of milk to dealers, or “handlers,” and sold by the latter within a 
“marketing area” encompassing New York City and adjacent counties. Two-thirds of the milk to 
be regulated in the marketing area came from other states where it had been produced or from 
the New York area through other states. One third of the milk to be sold to consumers in the New 
York City marketing area was produced exclusively in the state of New York. According to the 
secretary, this milk became “physically and inextricably intermingled” with the “interstate milk.” 
The federal government brought a suit to enforce the order against Rock Royal Cooperative, an 
association of milk producers, who had objected to the order and its underlying congressional 
legislation – because the AMAA exceeded the power of Congress generally and, especially, its 
commerce power. The Supreme Court, with a majority opinion authored by Justice Stanley F. 
Reed, relied on Currin and Mulford to declare that the AMAA passed constitutional muster. 
According to Justice Reed, where milk sold by dairy farmers locally and milk from other states 
were drawn into a general plan for “protecting interstate commerce in the commodity from 
interferences, burdens, and obstructions,” and from “the social and sanitary evils” created by 
impermissibly low prices, the commerce power of Congress to establish milk prices extended to 
the local, intrastate production and sale of milk.101 
Justices McReynolds and Butler dutifully, it seems, registered their dissent. In the view of 
the two associate justices, “the challenged order of the Secretary must succumb to two manifest 
objections.” These were, simply put, an impermissible employment by Congress of its commerce 
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power and impermissible delegation by Congress of its legislative authority. According to the 
dissenters, “Congress possesses the powers delegated by the Constitution – no others.” In the 
estimation of McReynolds and Butler, the decision of the Court in Schechter Poultry had made it 
abundantly clear that Congress did not possess “authority to manage private business affairs 
under the transparent guise of regulating interstate commerce.” The dissenters conceded that the 
production and distribution of milk were important enterprises but pointed out that “so is 
breeding the cows, authors of the commodity; also, sowing and reaping the fodder which inspires 
them.” The second objection entailed some equally pithy language:  
If perchance Congress possesses power to manage the milk business within the various 
states, authority so to do cannot be committed to another. A cursory examination of the 
statute shows clearly enough the design to allow a secretary to prescribe according to his 
own errant will and then to execute. This is not government by law, but by caprice. 
Whimseys may displace deliberate action by chosen representatives and become rules of 
conduct. To us, the outcome seems wholly incompatible with the system under which we 
are supposed to live.102  
 
 
Under the circumstances, Justice McReynolds undoubtedly was gratified to join the 
majority of the Court in FTC. v. Bunte Bros, handed down in February 1941, only a few weeks 
subsequent to the decision of the Court in Darby.103 FTC v. Bunte Bros. was a decision that set 
up something of a restraint to the rapidly growing “in commerce” jurisdiction of Congress and its 
agencies. This case involved a challenge brought by a candy manufacturer in Illinois to the order 
of the Federal Trade Commission, under Section 5(a) of the 1914 Federal Trade Commission 
Act, to cease and desist from selling “break and take” assortments of candy to retailers situated 
in the State of Illinois. “Break and take” bundles made the amount of candy the retailer received 
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dependent upon chance and, according to the FTC, allowed Illinois manufacturers who used this 
mode of packaging an unfair advantage in competition with manufacturers of candy outside the 
State of Illinois who marketed their products within that state. The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court that had affirmed the order of the 
commission. And the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. According to 
the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the “unfair 
competition” to be suppressed by the Federal Trade Commission was “designed by Congress as a 
flexible concept with evolving content.”104 On the other hand, “in ascertaining the scope of 
congressional legislation, a due regard for a proper adjustment of the local and national interests 
in our federal scheme must always be in the background. . . .”105 Justice Frankfurter pointed out 
that the Trade Commission Report for 1939 “listed as ‘unfair competition’ thirty-one diverse 
types of business practices which run the gamut from bribing employees of prospective 
customers to selling below cost.” In his estimation, the construction of Section 5 of the 1914 act 
urged by the commission in the present case would “give a federal agency pervasive control over 
myriads of local businesses in matters heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local 
law.”106  
In FTC v. Bunte Bros., the Court appears to have suggested that, when the relationship 
between intrastate commerce and interstate commerce was excessively tenuous – “in commerce” 
frameworks of assessment were insufficient; only explicit legislation by Congress could reach 
such intrastate commerce.  Justice Frankfurter seemed to point to the “substantial effects test” 
first articulated in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel four years earlier. In his view, “to read 
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‘unfair methods of competition in commerce’ as though it meant “unfair methods of competition 
in any way affecting interstate commerce” required, in view of all the relevant considerations, 
much clearer manifestation of intention than Congress had furnished in the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.107 One passage of the dissent authored by Justice Douglas, and joined in by 
justices Black and Reed, similarly seemed to invoke a “substantial effects” argument in favor of 
upholding the decision of the FTC:  
The Commission found that respondent's use of chance assortments in the sale and 
distribution of its candies in Illinois has a direct and powerful burdensome effect upon 
interstate commerce in candies from other states to the Illinois, and gives respondent an 
undue and unreasonable preference over competitors located in other states. 
 
Yet Justice Douglas followed this observation with the point that “The only question . . . is 
whether respondent’s practices constitute unfair methods of competition ‘in commerce’ within 
the meaning of § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”108 
The Great Depression, the New Deal, and post-1936 changed direction of the United 
States Supreme Court brought to fruition what many commentators have dubbed “liberal legal 
culture.” Central to its emergence was the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, which 
had emphasized the actual socioeconomic effects of law and its institutions and reflected 
the social reform activism of early twentieth-century progressives.109 Equally important 
was a body of thought that built on these ideas in the 1920s and 1930s – “legal realism,” 
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whose most influential proponents were Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. Thinkers such as 
these stressed the flexibility and artificiality of legal rules and principles. The realists proposed to 
bring aggregate social data, sociological analysis, and theories of behavioral psychology into the 
operation of the judiciary – ahead of older, “formalistic” concerns about coherence, certainty, 
and predictability.110 Legal realists believed in general legal principles, but they insisted that the 
traditional deference accorded to precedent was merely a screen that shielded the inherently 
conservative biases of judges. In 1930, Frank published Law and the Modern Mind, which 
proposed that judicial decisions were motivated primarily by the influence of psychological 
factors of the individual judge, a proposition that created no small amount of controversy among 
jurists who remained committed to the now-hidebound notion that legal principles and rules, 
more than any other considerations, shaped judicial decisions.111  
Liberal legal culture fully embraced New Deal commitments to the regulatory state.112 
Amid an almost continuous popular perception of deep national crisis, Congress and the 
president delegated a growing segment of the increasing federal regulatory power into the hands 
of administrative agencies, whose rules and procedures steadily replaced Anglo-American 
common law principles and courts of law as the framework for managing a national capitalist 
economy. The aim was to reduce wide swings in the business cycle and address the ill 
socioeconomic effects of such patterns as efficiently and rationally as possible. This innovation 
                                                 
110 Karsten and Hall, The Magic Mirror, 292-294; Edward G. White, Patterns of American Legal 
Thought (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978), 123.  
111 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Transaction Publishers, 1930); Lon Luvois Fuller 
and Thomas W. Bechtler, Law in a Social Context: Liber Amicorum Honouring Professor Lon 
L. Fuller (1978), 17; N.E.H. Hull, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: Searching for an American 
Jurisprudence (1997), 197, 200, 316.  
112 Karsten and Hall, The Magic Mirror, 309; Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), 295.  
97 
 
featured powerful interventions into decisions about the allocation of resources; prices and 
production levels of farm products and other commodities; and employee-employer relations, 
while creating the rise of a substantial social welfare apparatus.113 
The involvement of the United States in World War II substantially shaped the contours 
of liberal legalism in the United States Supreme Court. President Franklin Roosevelt 
undoubtedly appointed Harlan F. Stone as chief justice, who took office on July 3, 1941, in part, 
at least, for his demonstrated commitment to New Deal reforms as an associate justice of the 
Court. After Chief Justice Stone had presided for only five months, however, Congress 
responded to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with a declaration of war against Japan 
followed shortly by a declaration of war against Germany in response to that country’s 
declaration against the United States. Congress and the president worked quickly to put the 
United States on a war footing. Key enactments included the War Powers Act of 1941 and the 
War Powers Act of 1942, both of which authorized the executive branch to organize industrial 
production for the two-front war effort.114 The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 established 
the Office of Price Administration, which was charged with the task of controlling inflation and 
regulating agricultural commodities and an array of goods and services.115 
Some commentators have concluded that consensus among the justices of the Stone Court 
steadily deteriorated through World War II. But most scholars agree that the Court remained 
friendly to Roosevelt policies.116 In any case, the Court proved serviceable for bolstering 
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necessary wartime enhancements of federal power. In July 1942, for example, Chief Justice 
Stone wrote the per curiam opinion of the Court in Ex Parte Quirin, which upheld the authority 
of the president to try by military tribunal Nazi saboteurs captured in the United States.117 In 
Yakus v. United States, decided in March 1944, with Chief Justice Stone again writing for the 
majority, the Court affirmed an overly-broad congressional delegation of authority to the Office 
of Price Administration (OPA). According to the Court, the OPA could stand because it could 
“save” an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of power to set prices through a narrowing 
construction that constrained the discretion of the agency.118 Chief Justice Stone, in 1942, 
authored the majority opinion in Hirabayashi v. United States, sustaining against constitutional 
challenge the application of curfew restrictions targeting persons with Japanese ancestry. The 
next year, he wrote the majority opinion in Korematsu v. United States, which ratified the order 
by President Roosevelt to inter Japanese Americans for the preservation of national security.119  
Notwithstanding Hirabayashi and Korematsu, legal scholars credit the Stone Court with 
otherwise advancing enlightened understandings of ordered liberty. Melvin I. Urofsky argues its 
decisions, as well as those of the Vinson Court (1946-1953), signaled a fundamental shift in 
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jurisprudence – from protection of private property to the enhancement of individual liberties.120 
Chief Justice Stone worked both to vindicate centralizing power and, paradoxically, to develop 
new areas of constitutional protection. For example, he authored the majority opinion in the 1942 
decision Hill v. Texas, which held that evidence showing that state grand jury commissioners had 
consciously omitted to place any African American on a county grand jury list constituted 
a prima facie case of systematic racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.121 More well-known is the April 1944 decision of the Court in Smith v. Allwright, 
which overturned a Texas statute that authorized the Democrat Party of that state to hold all 
white primary elections. The Court held that the restricted primary denied black citizens equal 
protection under the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.122 
According to Wechsler, some of Justice Harlan Stone’s most important contributions to 
Supreme Court jurisprudence engaged the problem of “determining the boundaries and 
distribution of power under the federal constitution.” In particular, he was deeply committed to 
overturning doctrines that limited congressional power under the Commerce Clause, first, as an 
associate justice and then as chief justice.123 According to Melvin I. Urofsky and Peter Renstrom, 
notwithstanding occasional differences on the parameters of federalism among justices Hugo 
Black, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, and Robert H. Jackson, all of whom were 
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confirmed as associate justices in the period 1937-1941, the Stone Court generally supported the 
steady extension by Congress of its commerce power.124 
Decisions of the Supreme Court ruling on the implementation of the National Labor 
Relations Act, which came in abundance after Pearl Harbor and through 1942, persistently dealt 
with the challenge of delineating the authority, discretion, and duties of the NLRB. In NLRB v. 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. (1941), with Justice Murphy writing the majority opinion, the Court 
recognized the power of the board to determine if an employer had interfered with, restrained, or 
coerced employees in contravention of their right to organize. But it also required the board to 
take into account, not only impermissible communications of an employer to its employees, but 
also the actual course of conduct engaged in by company officials.125 In January 1942, the Court 
rendered a per curiam opinion in NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., which affirmed the prerogative of the 
board to decide which of two competing labor unions actually represented the majority of 
employees at the time the board determined that the employer was to be cited for refusing to 
bargain collectively.126 In March of that year, with Justice Reed delivering the majority opinion, 
the Court held in NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. that the determination by the board that 
a closed shop agreement between an employer and a labor union was not valid because, prior to 
such agreement, the union had been assisted by cooperation of the employer – was a proper 
ruling if supported by substantial evidence.127 
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  In a per curiam opinion rendered in April 1942, NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated. Copper 
Corp., the Court again addressed the scope of the decision-making power of the NLRB – this 
time in a case involving allegations of labor union misconduct. The board determined that the 
respondent was, for discouraging union organizing, guilty of unfair labor practices, that is, of 
refusing to reemploy former employees and employ two new applicants. The Court determined 
that there was “substantial evidence” before the board showing that the refusal of the respondent 
to hire the men was “motivated by its belief that they had engaged or threatened to engage in 
destruction of respondent's property and had threatened to injure some of respondent's 
managerial employees and members of their families.” But the Court upheld the determination of 
the board because “there was also substantial evidence . . . that respondent’s motive for refusing 
the employment was discouragement of membership in a labor union.” Since the determination 
of the board had evidentiary support, its determination was not to be disturbed.128  
New Deal collective bargaining rights and the work of the NLRB appear to have 
encouraged aggressive tactics among some labor union members, which more than a few justices 
of the Supreme Court viewed with a notable amount of understanding and toleration. In early 
March 1942, the Court rendered its decision in United States v. Teamsters Local 807, which 
entailed review of the racketeering conspiracy convictions of New York City Local 807 of 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America – and 
twenty-six members of the union.129 Evidence presented at the trial showed that union 
“delegates” for the west side of Manhattan and other union members waylaid trucks passing 
from New Jersey to New York, forced their way onto the trucks and, with threats of beating and 
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actual beatings, obtained payments from the drivers or employers of $9.42 for a large truck and 
$8.41 for a small one, which they claimed to be, in each case, the equivalent of the union wage 
scale for a day’s work. After payment, they sometimes assisted in unloading the besieged trucks, 
sometimes they did not. The convictions came under the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act, which 
held “any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act . . . affecting interstate 
commerce or any article or commodity moving in such commerce . . . Obtains or attempts to 
obtain, by the use of or . . . threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money. . . 
shall be guilty of felony.”130 But, in a majority opinion authored by Justice James F. Byrnes, the 
Court reversed the convictions. First, the Court observed that Congress intended the Anti-
Racketeering Act to suppress the terroristic activities of professional gangsters – not to interfere 
with “traditional labor union activities.” More important, Section Two of the act declared an 
exception: force, violence or coercion employed to obtain “the payment of wages by a bona 
fide employer to a bona fide employee.” Clearly, concluded Justice Byrnes, the convicted 
Teamsters intended to obtain payment for services, not protection money.131 Justices Roberts and 
Jackson took no part in the decision, but Chief Justice Stone authored a dissent, which included 
this comment: 
When the Anti-Racketeering Act was under consideration by Congress, no member of 
Congress and no labor leader had the temerity to suggest that such payments, made only 
to secure immunity from violence and intentionally compelled by assault and battery, 
could be regarded as the payment of “wages by a bona fide employer,” or that the 
compulsion of such payments is a legitimate object of a labor union, or was ever made so 
by any statute of the United States. I am unable to concur in that suggestion now. It 
follows that all the defendants who conspired to compel such payments by force and 
                                                 
130 Section Two, Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 979; Craig M. Bradley, “Anti-Racketeering 
Legislation in America,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 54 (2006): 671-692. 
131 United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 531-532. 
103 
 
violence, regardless of the willingness of the victims to accept them as employees, were 
rightly convicted.132 
In January 1943, the Court dealt with the February 1940 judicial petition of Indiana & 
Michigan Electric Company to reopen a case heard before the NLRB, in which the board had 
determined that the electric company had engaged in unfair labor practices, namely coercing its 
employees to join a company-controlled labor union, Michigana Association. The difficulty, 
however, was that leaders of Local B-9 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
had attempted to coerce officers of the electric company to compel its employees to join their 
union. In this connection, officers of Local B-9 had employed extortion and sabotage to achieve 
their goal during the extended pendency of proceedings before the board. Two B-9 officials and 
one regular member were tried and convicted in state court of, on at least five separate occasions, 
sawing off high-voltage transmission line poles and dynamiting high-voltage transmission line 
towers owned by Indiana & Michigan Electric. Some of the sabotage occurred along public 
highways and railroad tracks. According to the Court in NLRB v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 
it was incumbent on the NLRB to reopen the case and consider the possibility that the union 
misconduct and the testimony of the saboteurs improperly influenced the outcome of its ruling. 
According to the majority, the NLRB had relied heavily, if not primarily, on the testimony of the 
two union officials convicted of sabotage to arrive at its determination.133 The concurrence of 
justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, however, admonished the majority for its 
presumptuousness:  
A desire to punish dynamiters does not justify a failure to protect respondent’s 
employees, innocent of wrongdoing, in their freedom either to bargain collectively 
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through representatives of their own choosing or to be represented by no one at all. 
Without relying in the slightest degree on the evidence of persons convicted of or charged 
with dynamiting, the Board found the [Michigana] Association to be company-
dominated. Its order gave no benefit to anyone even remotely suspected of complicity in 
the crimes charged. Instead, it carefully eliminated such individuals, and the Union, from 
the scope of its award, and gave no credence to the suspect witnesses.134  
 
Decisions regarding the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act reflected the pronounced 
sympathy of most of the justices of the Supreme Court. In Kirschbaum v. Walling, handed down 
in June 1942, the Court ruled that FLSA wage and hour rules extended to all workers employed 
by companies engaged “in the production of goods for interstate commerce.” With this further 
elaboration of “in commerce” doctrine, Justice Frankfurter, who authored the majority opinion, 
declared that even employees not directly involved in the production process of a company were 
to be covered, at least if they were engaged in an “occupation necessary to the production.”135  
In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, the Court dealt with 
lower court rulings that had denied three iron ore mining companies operating twelve 
underground mines in Jefferson County, Alabama, a declaratory judgment that time spent by 
miners traveling underground to their work sites did not constitute compensable employment 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. With a majority opinion authored by Justice Frank Murphy 
in March 1944, the Court held that the travel time of the miners, indeed, constituted “work” 
under the FLSA – that the act was a “remedial and humanitarian” measure and “must not be 
interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.”  In a dissent authored by Justice Roberts, 
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and joined by Chief Justice Stone, the holding of the majority was overly expansive. In the words 
of Justice Roberts,  
The question for decision in this case should be approached not on the basis of any broad 
humanitarian prepossessions we may all entertain, not with a desire to construe 
legislation so as to accomplish what we deem worthy objects, but in the traditional and, if 
we are to have a government of laws, the essential attitude of ascertaining what Congress 
has enacted, rather than what we wish it had enacted.136 
 
In a decision rendered in early May 1945, the Court dealt with the petition of the Jewell 
Ridge Coal Corporation, which operated two bituminous coal mines in Virginia, for a 
declaratory judgement against the United Mine Workers of America and other unions that time 
spent traveling by coal miners between the underground portals of the mines and the working 
faces counted as compensable work under the FLSA. With a majority opinion rendered by 
Justice Murphy, the Court decided that, indeed, such travel time was compensable, referring to 
its decision in Tennessee Coal. In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Jackson maintained 
that the majority opinion both violated and ignored collective bargaining agreements between 
unions and employers and was contrary to the intent of the FLSA.137 
In February 1946, the Court ruled on the refusal of the Oklahoma Press Publishing Company 
to provide company records in response to a subpoena issued by the administrator of the FLSA – 
to determine if the company was violating the wage and hours requirements of the act. In a 
majority opinion delivered by Justice Rutledge, the Court held that the FLSA, as applied to the 
                                                 
136 Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 607 (1944). 
137 Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); Dennis 
Hutchison, “The Black-Jackson Feud.” Supreme Court Review (1988): 203-243; Theodore J. St. 
Antoine, “Justice Frank Murphy and American Labor Law.” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 100, 
no. 7 (2002): 1900-1926. 
106 
 
business of publishing and distributing newspapers, did not violate the First or Fifth Amendment 
or exceed the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. The Court refused the demand by 
the press that the question of FLSA coverage be adjudicated, in a court of law, before being 
required to comply with the subpoena of the administrator. According to the Court in Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor was entitled to issue his subpoena duces tecum and to judicial enforcement 
of the subpoena without a prior federal court ruling authorizing it. Congress had explicitly 
authorized the administrator, rather than the federal district courts, in the first instance, to 
investigate the question of FLSA coverage by obtaining the production of relevant books, 
records, and papers.138 
In early February 1942, the Court further elaborated its “affecting interstate commerce” 
rationale to justify New Deal regulations of intrastate industries. In United States v. Wrightwood 
Dairy Company, the Court dealt with yet another challenge to the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937, particularly its sections authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture Henry  
A. Wallace to issue marketing orders fixing minimum prices to be paid to producers of milk by 
handlers or dealers. Wrightwood Dairy, a handler of milk in the Chicago marketing area, 
objected to the order of the secretary requiring the payment of a uniform price to producers and 
other regulatory mandates – because its milk business was entirely local, that is, intrastate, in 
nature. At the same time, the company argued that the AMAA did not, under a proper reading of 
the Commerce Clause, apply to its operations. With a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice 
Stone, the Court declared that the federal power to regulate intrastate transactions was not 
limited to those who were engaged also in interstate commerce. “It is the effect upon interstate 
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commerce or its regulation. . . which is the test of federal power.”139 Thus the Court 
supplemented the “in commerce” rationale set out in Rock Royal, which upheld the AMAA in 
1939, with an “affecting commerce” rationale similar to that which the Court employed in Darby 
to justify the extension of FLSA wage and hour coverage to employees of intrastate 
enterprises.140 
 In Wrightwood Dairy, Chief Justice Stone also declared the commerce power could 
reach intrastate activity that, in a substantial way, interfered with a federal interstate commerce 
regulatory regime. Again, the issue before the Court was the power of Congress to regulate the 
price of milk moving intrastate into the Chicago, Illinois, marketing area as part of its larger 
interstate regulation of milk production, pricing, and distribution. Invoking the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and a long line of relevant Commerce Clause decisions of the Court, Chief Justice 
Stone was adamant that Congress could control local buy-sale transactions to effectuate the 
proper regulation of interstate milk transactions.  
The commerce power . . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of 
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of 
the granted power to regulate interstate commerce . . . . It follows that no form of state 
activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause 
to Congress. Hence, the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities which in 
a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.141 
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Dan A. Akenhead points to Wrightwood Dairy as the first United States Supreme Court 
decision to employ a “comprehensive regulatory scheme” rationale.142 As discussed, however, 
the Supreme Court, in Jones & Laughlin Steel and Darby, first upheld legislation suppressing 
regulatory noncompliant intrastate activity that competed with or undercut activity in compliance 
with the strictures of what, in fact, amounted to a comprehensive regulatory scheme. In none of 
these cases, did the Supreme Court employ the phraseology “comprehensive regulatory scheme.” 
In all three, the noncompliant intrastate activity at issue was either commercial or economic 
activity. But the Court, in each case, conveyed that the commerce power, aided by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, could reach noncompliant intrastate activity of any kind, even if not 
commercial or economic activity – but only if necessary to preserve the integrity and viability of 
the larger comprehensive interstate regulatory scheme.143  
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the New Deal expansion of commerce power came 
on December 9, 1942, when the Court decided Wickard v. Filburn.144  In an attempt to raise 
wheat prices by reducing the supply of wheat while many Americans were going hungry, the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) placed limits on how many acres of wheat each 
farmer could grow.  Roscoe Filburn was a farmer who grew wheat to sell, but he also set aside a 
few acres to be harvested for his own use.  However, the total acreage that he grew (twenty-three 
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acres) exceeded the number AAA administrators allowed him to grow (11.9 acres).145 The Court 
ruled that the restriction was constitutional under the Commerce Clause. The actions of Filburn 
alone, the Court reasoned, might not affect interstate commerce, but the effect of other farmers 
acting similarly, taken in the aggregate, would certainly become substantial. According to the 
majority opinion authored by Justice Robert H. Jackson,  
Whether the subject of the regulation in question was “production,” “consumption,” or 
“marketing,” is, therefore, not material for purposes of deciding the question of federal 
power before us. That an activity is of local character may help in a doubtful case to 
determine whether Congress intended to reach it. . . . But even if appellee’s activity be 
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and 
this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been 
defined as “direct” or “indirect.” 
 
Thus, the Court articulated the most expansive version to date of its “substantial effects test,” 
emphatically rejecting the erstwhile distinctions between “direct” and “indirect” effects. Justice 
Jackson also made it clear that, in the view of the Court, the regulation of local production of 
wheat was rationally related to the goal of Congress set out in the AAA: to stabilize prices by 
limiting the supply of wheat produced.146  
One passage in the holding by Justice Jackson, quoted above, if taken alone, suggests a 
scope for commerce power under the substantial relations test that federal courts could not 
challenge: “But even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.” Indeed, for decades to come, constitutional law 
textbooks and casebooks and federal courts eager to support such congressional authority homed 
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in on this statement time and time again. After all, it was crystal clear and, in and of itself, with 
no qualification.147 On the other hand, Justice Jackson made this declaration in the context of 
upholding the “comprehensive regulatory scheme” at hand, the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment 
Act.148 As well, he quoted from Wrightwood Dairy to make the point that the commerce power, 
aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause, was sufficient to reach “intrastate activities which in a 
substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.”149 He brought the 
rule to bear on the question before the Court:  
This record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat 
consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would 
have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein 
at increased prices.150 
It is worth noting that the employment of “comprehensive regulatory scheme” reasoning in 
Wickard was somewhat different from its use in Wrightwood Dairy. The AMAA regulatory 
regime the Court dealt with in Wrightwood Dairy set up a sanction to bring intrastate milk 
pricing practices into compliance a national regulatory scheme. In that eventuality, AMAA 
permitted compliant intrastate milk businesses to continue operations. In Wickard, the AAA 
regulatory scheme empowered administrators to prohibit, or ban entirely, the intrastate 
production of wheat for home consumption. Under one statutory regime Congress regularized 
economic and commercial activity. Under the other, Congress, simply, proscribed an economic 
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activity, with the adjective “economic” defined, in this case, in its most basic sense, as that which 
relates to the production and consumption of goods.151  
As indicated, a distinction between the words “commerce” and “economic” is in order. 
Constitutional originalist Randy E. Barnett, who argued before the Court in Gonzales v. Raich, 
who had written extensively the Commerce Clause, supports the contention that the term 
“commerce” was, in the words of Justice Clarence Thomas, “used in contradistinction to 
productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture” and that “commerce” had a much 
narrower definition -- the trade or exchange of goods (including the means of transporting 
them).152 Barnett researched the usage of the word “commerce” in the records of the 
Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates and discovered that the term “commerce” 
was consistently used in the narrow sense and that there is no surviving example of it being used 
in either source in any broader sense.”153 That understanding, as a matter of semantics, at least, 
would certainly preclude the liberal post-1937 view of commerce as being “all gainful activity” 
or the idea that Congress may pass laws regulating any activity that “affects” interstate 
commerce.  If the framers had intended the Commerce Clause to refer to intrastate activity that 
affected interstate commerce, says Barnett, they should have included “affects” or “affected” in 
the passage.  Clearly, adding the term “affects” would have, from the beginning, substantially 
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broadened Congress’ power to extend to intrastate activity.154 Taking an opposing view to that of 
Barnett is Herbert Hovenkamp.155 Hovenkamp argues that the term “commerce” encompassed 
far more than mere trade to the Founders, but instead included such things as manufacturing and 
agriculture.  Why else, he argues, would the Constitution’s framers frequently speak of “trade 
and commerce” if the two words meant the same thing?156 He also notes that, “Noah Webster’s 
influential American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) gave ‘trade’ or ‘interchange’ as 
its first meaning of ‘commerce,’” but its second meaning was “intercourse between individuals; 
interchange of work, business.”157  Certainly the argument is a significant one if the meaning of 
the word “commerce” remained completely unchanged for four decades in the rapidly evolving 
republic. Additionally, on the point of enumerated powers, Hovenkamp takes issue with 
originalists such as Justice Thomas who maintain that Congress’ powers enumerated in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution were listed there to define the limits of federal power.  Instead, 
Hovenkamp argues, “The purpose of the enumeration of power that Justice Thomas recites was 
not to grant these powers as opposed to the states, but to grant them to Congress as opposed to 
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the President.”158  It’s a thought provoking view; however, Federalist 45 would seem to clarify 
the issue beyond doubt.159   
In any case, liberal commentators in the next five decades would insist that Wickard, in 
tandem with other New Deal decisions, recognized a broad and virtually boundless power in the 
hands of Congress to regulate aggregated intrastate activity of any kind – whether commercial, 
economic, or not – limited, it would seem, only by constitutional protections of individual 
liberties and civil rights.160  
The Stone Court jettisoned a longstanding exclusion from the reach of the commerce power 
with its June 1944 decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association. This 
case dealt with the prosecution of an insurance company group situated in northern Georgia for 
fixing non-competitive rates in violation of the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The group 
controlled ninety percent of the insurance market for fire insurance in six southern states and had 
employed coercion and intimidation to advance its operations. At trial, South-Eastern 
Underwriters set up as its defense the argument that the insurance business did not fall within the 
purview of the Sherman Act because it was “not commerce, either intrastate or interstate”; in so 
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doing, it invoked the 1869 holding of the Supreme Court to that effect in Paul v. Virginia. 161 
According to Justice Black, who rendered the majority opinion, to hold that the word 
“commerce,” as used in the Commerce Clause, did not include “business such as insurance” 
would give the word a meaning narrower than would “common parlance” at the time of the 
framing of Constitution. According to the Court: 
The power granted Congress is a positive power. It is the power to legislate concerning 
transactions which, reaching across state boundaries, affect the people of more states than 
one; — to govern affairs which the individual states, with their limited territorial 
jurisdictions, are not fully capable of governing.162 
 
Relying, in part, on Wickard, the Court held that a fire insurance company conducting a 
substantial part of its business transactions across state lines was engaged in “commerce among 
the several States” and, thus, subject to the commerce power of Congress.163 Chief Justice Stone, 
one of three justices who all dissented for similar reasons, declared he had no doubt that the 
business of insurance “as presently conducted, has in many aspects such interstate manifestations 
and such effects on interstate commerce as may subject it to the appropriate exercise of federal 
power.” His objection to the holding of the majority was its interpretation of the Sherman Act: 
“Nothing in its legislative history,” said the chief justice, “suggests that it was intended to apply 
to the business of insurance.”164 
The decision of the Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association stirred 
more than few members of Congress to action. In early March 1945, Congress passed the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which was enacted on March 9, 1945. This measure, sponsored by 
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Democrat Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada and Republican Senator Homer Ferguson of 
Michigan, constituted a notable reaction; pro-New Deal rulings of the Supreme Court had gone 
largely unchecked by the national political process for eight years. According to the legislation, 
acts of Congress that did not explicitly purport to regulate the business of insurance, such as the 
Sherman Act, were not to preempt state statutes that did regulate the business. The act also 
declared that federal antitrust laws would not apply to the business of insurance in any state if 
that state had already regulated this industry, although federal anti-trust laws were to apply in 
cases of boycott, coercion, and intimidation.165 
The rebuke made by Congress in March 1945 does not appear to have deterred the Supreme 
Court from further consolidating congressional commerce power over the transportation 
infrastructure of the nation. In Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona, decided in June 1945, the 
Court held that, under the “dormant commerce clause,” the Arizona Train Limit Law of 1912, 
which limited the number of passenger and freight cars operating in Arizona, placed an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Even though Congress had not established a 
national standard for the number of cars acceptable along the railways of the country, the 
Arizona statute was unacceptable. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Stone surmised from 
the available evidence that virtually all rail activity in Arizona was interstate traffic. 
Consequently, trains with cars numbering in excess of the state limit were stopped or rerouted, 
and more trains meeting the state standard were required to move people and products out of the 
state than would have been the case without the state restriction. Under the circumstances, the 
                                                 
165 Pub. L. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33, enacted March 9, 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015; Jonathan R. 
Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, “The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal 
Role in Insurance Regulation.” New York University Law Review, Vol. 68 (April 1993): 13-88.  
116 
 
train law provided few if any health and safety benefits, while substantially burdening interstate 
commerce. In his words 
The unchallenged findings leave no doubt that the Arizona Train Limit Law imposes a 
serious burden on the interstate commerce conducted by appellant. It materially impedes 
the movement of appellant's interstate trains through that state, and interposes a 
substantial obstruction to the national policy proclaimed by Congress, to promote 
adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation service.166 
 
Stone further concluded that “The state interest cannot be preserved at the expense of the 
national interest by an enactment which regulates interstate train lengths without securing such 
control, which is a matter of national concern. To this, the interest of the state here asserted is 
subordinate.”167 But several dissents seemed to show a due regard for the police power of the 
states and some hesitancy about the intervention favored by the majority. In his dissent, Justice 
Black took the view that the Arizona statute was “unwise” but that legislatures rather than the 
Supreme Court should take the lead in repealing such measures.168 And, in his dissent, Justice 
Douglas maintained that the negative commerce clause doctrine should extend only to state 
statutes that discriminated against interstate commerce, not merely ones that burdened it.169  
During the tenure of Chief Justice Stone, the Court did not appear to retreat in the least from 
employing its commerce prohibiting approach to uphold the use by Congress of its commerce 
power over intrastate manufacturing and its authority to preempt conflicting state regulation 
thereof. In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, the federal district court enjoined Alabama 
officials, from inspecting, seizing, or detaining the stock butter of the petitioner company 
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because, it decreed, federal regulations concerning the process for renovated butter preempted 
such state action. Cloverleaf Butter Company, situated in Birmingham, Alabama, obtained 
twenty-five percent of its packing stock butter from the farmers and country merchants of 
Alabama and seventy-five percent of it from other states, while shipping ninety percent of its 
finished renovated butter out of the state. With Justice Reed writing the majority opinion, in 
February 1942, the Court upheld federal authority over the manufacturing process of renovated 
butter under the Commerce Clause – as well as its authority to preempt state laws authorizing 
pre-shipment seizures of deficient products. In the view of the Court, federal preemption of pre-
shipment seizures by state officials was one of several “appropriate means” that Congress could 
employ – in tandem with its power to ban the movement of the product across state lines. Where 
Congress had exercise its power over interstate commerce by legislation that conflicted with a 
state regulatory regime, such state regulations became inoperative and the federal legislation 
exclusive in its operation.170 In dissent, Chief Justice Stone, joined by justices Frankfurter, 
Murphy, and Byrnes, took the view that the majority had gone too far. In his words: 
The decision of the Court appears to me to depart radically from the salutary principle 
that Congress, in enacting legislation within its constitutional authority, will not be 
deemed to have intended to strike down a state statute designed to protect the health and 
safety of the public unless the state act, in terms or in its practical administration, 
conflicts with the act of Congress or plainly and palpably infringes its policy.171 
 
In its April 1946 ruling in North America Co. v. SEC, the Court further extended the 
authority of Congress under its commerce prohibiting power to regulate public utility holding 
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companies. In this case, the Securities and Exchange Commission, under authority of the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ordered North America Company to divest itself of 
electric and gas utility operations across the United States, many of which served large cities and 
contiguous regions. With control of some eighty corporations, North America had an aggregate 
capitalized value in excess of $2,300,000,000. The idea was to bring the holding company into 
compliance, that is, to limit its operations to a single integrated public utility system. North 
America challenged this action because, it argued, the 1935 Act and order of the SEC were not 
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
According to the Court, with Justice Murphy rendering the majority opinion, the 
commerce clause did “not operate so as to render the nation powerless to defend itself against 
economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of the national economy. Rather, it 
is an affirmative power commensurate with the national needs.” According to the Court, the 
Commerce Clause authorized the Congress to impose conditions and restraints on those who use 
the channels of interstate commerce so that such “will not become the means of promoting evil, 
whether of a physical, moral or economic nature. Justice Murphy concluded this way: 
This power permits Congress to attack an evil directly at its source, provided that the evil 
bears a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Congress thus has power to make 
direct assault upon such economic evils as those relating to labor relations. . .to wages 
and hours. . . to market transactions. . . and to monopolistic practices. . . Northern 
Securities Co. v. United States, supra. The fact that an evil may involve a corporation's 
financial practices, its business structure, or its security portfolio does not detract from 
the power of Congress under the commerce clause to promulgate rules in order to destroy 
that evil. Once it is established that the evil concerns or affects commerce in more states 
that one, Congress may act.172 
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From the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 through 1936, congressional legislation and 
Supreme Court interpretation worked a steady expansion of commerce power. Ever-broadening 
employments of such authority by Congress considered, first, the needs of a national market 
economy and increasingly complex transportation systems, steamboats and then railroads; by the 
turn of the twentieth century, the requirements of a rapidly industrializing national economy; and 
by early 1930s, the felt needs of industrial laborers who struggled more than ever to make a 
living during the Great Depression. In the same way, Congress and the Supreme Court, over 
many decades, produced an application and jurisprudence of commerce power that extended 
beyond the regulation of simple exchange – to expanding federal authority over the channels and 
instrumentalities of commerce; limiting the authority of state governments that interfered with 
federal regulation of those channels and instrumentalities; and then to the restraining of 
monopoly corporate power and the prohibiting of interstate trade in products deemed unhealthy, 
immoral, or unsafe. 
Commerce power took a quantum leap during the New Deal, which culminated a long-term 
trend toward greater centralization of law-making and judicial power in the national government 
and a declining role for the states as primary centers of policy making. Beginning in the early 
1930s, political leaders and ordinary people exchanged their regional ties for more nationalistic 
orientations. Certainly, the New Deal radically and quickly augmented presidential power, a 
development underscored by the fact that Franklin D. Roosevelt served as president from 1933 to 
1945. To a larger extent than ever before, lawmakers, judges, and administrators emerged as a 
college-educated elite caste of social engineers, who sincerely believed that government had both 
a responsibility and a right to ensure progress according to their own understandings of the 
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concept. Legal liberalism announced the death of the traditional liberal ideals of laissez-faire and 
individualism. Its leaders placed a premium on broad-scale “social justice,” which included 
prominently the redistribution of income for the benefit of ordinary people, especially unionized 
workers.  
Meanwhile, the idea of “liberalism” came to denote a level of concentrated government 
power and regimentation largely inconsistent with its eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
meanings and almost entirely at odds with understandings of individual liberty that had, more 
than any other single set of ideas, inspired Americans to fight for independence from Great 
Britain a century and a half earlier. President Franklin Roosevelt, the Democrat Congress, and 
the “reformed” United States Supreme Court after 1936 succeeded in presenting New Deal 
policy as a breakthrough for freedom. That they succeeded so well in this project suggests rather 
strongly the extent to which many Americans came to place a greater value on the economic 
security offered by New Deal parens patriae than a personal autonomy all too often besieged by 
modern economic uncertainties far beyond their control. Such was the choice made by a 
persistent electoral majority. Learning how to lend new, inverted meanings to familiar political 
terminology was, it seems, not so difficult and, very likely, quite comforting amid a 
transformation that was, in any case, massive in its depth and breadth. 
In response to the Great Depression, New Deal enactments and Supreme Court rulings turned 
the commerce power into a powerful tool for implementing the vision of liberal economists and 
technocrats bent on creating a stable, wholly-integrated national economy. Decisions such as 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, United States v. Darby, and Wickard v. Filburn clearly showed 
that the broad view of the Commerce Clause would now prevail. These rulings, in tandem with 
others less pivotal, refashioned commerce authority to reach, for the first time, intrastate 
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manufacturing and other local economic activity. In doing so, they established the power of 
Congress to bolster the status and rights of organized labor, regulate employer-employee 
relations, and control the production and prices of agricultural and manufactured products. A 
critical and contentious aspect of the more extensive regulatory power was the creation by 
Congress of a vast bureaucracy of administrators who now wielded, often simultaneously, the 
authority to make regulations and enforce them. The new administrative machinery featured 
knowledgeable experts largely insulated from the judgments of democratic politics and, thus, 
electoral accountability, much like the federal judges who generally defended the new agencies 
against constitutional challenges. 
During World War II, commerce power continued to expand, perhaps more rapidly than 
before in some ways, to meet the needs of wartime. But through the entire period of 1937-1945, 
previously developed judicial doctrines, such as those allowing the commerce power to reach the 
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and to regulate or prohibit the interstate 
movement of products, were critical in achieving the purposes of New Deal legal liberalism. The 
most striking new Commerce Clause doctrines developed by the Supreme Court in the period 
1937-1945, however, were those that buttressed the power of Congress to regulate intrastate 
activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce – and, with the aid of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, to regulate or suppress altogether intrastate activities that undercut a federal 
regulatory scheme. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 Cold War Regulatory Vistas: From Labor Union Subversion 
 to Equal Pay for Women, 1946-1963 
 
At the end of World War II, the United States and its former ally, the Soviet Union, became 
rivals in what came to be known as the Cold War. Although the two superpowers never directly 
confronted each other, they did engage in proxy wars across the globe as they vied to gain the 
upper hand on each other by influencing smaller nations to align with them.  In the United States, 
the Cold War had a great deal of influence on politics as Republicans and Democrats settled into 
an era of political consensus to thwart the threat of communism.  Indeed, Republicans and 
Democrats attempted to sway voters by proclaiming each was the better at defending the world 
from the Soviets. The result was a further centralization of federal power and the growth of a 
“military-industrial complex,” described by President Eisenhower in his farewell address in 
1961.1  Certainly the 1954 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education declaring racial segregation in public schools a denial of Fourteenth Amendment 
rights employed federal power to bring about a much needed and long overdue change. It was, to 
say the least, problematic for the United States to claim to be a beacon of freedom to the world 
while a large number of Americans were walled off in many ways from the rest of society simply 
because of their race.   
Far less, however, have students of the Cold War considered the way Congress and the 
United States Supreme Court deployed centralizing Commerce Clause power from 1946 through 
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1963 to begin remaking post-World War II America in ways that could undercut the freedom of  
all its citizens – whether it be the consolidation of federal authority to control the wages and 
work hours of employees or otherwise reconfigure the operations of large- and small-scale 
business enterprises; leverage economically problematic attacks on mergers and vertically-
integrated corporations; virulently suppress communist influence within the labor unions; or vest 
power in the federal government at the expense of traditional state and local authority. Such 
inquiries show that Commerce Clause authority in the period 1946-1963 increasingly functioned 
as a general police power, even if the federal government did, to good effect, bring it to bear on 
several national problems, such as labor union racketeering and other novel kinds of organized 
crime. As well, careful assessment of the expanding deployment of Commerce Clause authority 
in the period 1946-1963 points to the rise of several controversies that would help produce 
strident culture war conflict in the coming decades – congressional legislation to combat air 
pollution and a 1963 FLSA amendment mandating equal pay for women.  
 Scholarly assessments of the interstate commerce policies of Congress and the United States 
Supreme Court from the end of World War II through the 1950s engage an extensive set of 
interpretations describing “Cold War liberalism.” As James MacGregor Burns, Alonzo L. 
Hamby, and many others have argued, federal government domestic policy in this contentious 
period featured a liberal consensus fueled by rising concerns over the growing influence of 
communism across the globe.2 Hamby, along with scholars such as Richard Parker, Herbert 
Stein, and Richard M. Abrams, show, more or less, that the basic principles of Cold War 
liberalism, at least in its initial incarnation, were set out in Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four 
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Freedoms” (1941). Freedom of speech, worship and freedom from fear (tyranny) were rooted in 
classical understandings of liberty. Roosevelt and his New Deal coalition grounded the fourth 
freedom, “freedom from want,” in a new conception of the American political system that made 
room for positive government action in managing the relationship of organized labor and capital 
and otherwise providing for the economic needs of citizens. Such core beliefs inspired increased 
spending on education, science, infrastructure, and resources for the aged and the poor. Liberal 
central planners, who were generally disciples of Keynesian economics, favored increased 
government expenditures to stimulate the economy, which included spending on a potent 
conventional military force and a vast arsenal of nuclear weaponry to contain Soviet expansion.3 
James T. Patterson concludes that, notwithstanding conservative reactions, Cold War 
liberalism remained the dominant political ideology in the United States through the victory of 
Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson over Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964.4 Beginning in about 
1948, during the administration of President Harry Truman, Cold War liberalism began to 
embrace the civil rights movement. This commitment to improving the status and rights of 
African Americans alienated more than a few leading southern Democrats. Neil Jumonville, 
Richard M. Fried, and Alexander Bloom show that Cold War liberals generally opposed what 
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they perceived to be over-zealous loyalty programs associated with McCarthyism.5 In the last 
several decades a number of scholars, including Manfred Berg, Mary L. Dudziak, and Eric 
Arnesen, among others, have posited a not entirely admirable connection between the legislative 
and judicial expansion of civil rights for African Americans in the 1950s and 1960s and concern 
among United States political leaders about criticisms of American race relations advanced by 
the propaganda organs of the Soviet Union.6 
The genesis of Cold War liberalism may be seen in the immediate aftermath of World War 
II.  Harry S. Truman had replaced Franklin Roosevelt after Roosevelt died in April 1945.   World 
War II ended in August 1945, and in February the following year, Joseph Stalin proclaimed 
publicly that capitalism and communism were incompatible.  In March 1946 Winston Churchill 
claimed that an “Iron Curtain” had descended over Europe and one year later Truman advocated 
political, military, and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey in their fights against 
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communist insurgents.  Communist insurgencies became a major concern of Americans as the 
Cold War heated up.   
Fearing insurgency within the United States, in 1948, Truman utilized the Alien Registration 
Act of 1940 (the Smith Act) to indict and convict twelve members of the Communist Party of the 
United States, whom the prosecution claimed advocated the overthrow of the United States 
government.7  In 1951 the Supreme Court confirmed the convictions handed down by lower 
courts as well at the constitutionality of the Smith Act.  The Smith Act continued to be used by 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which had been formed in 1938. Indeed, 
Congress strengthened its hand against communists within the United States with the McCarren 
Act of 1950.8  That law created the Subversive Activities Control Board, which broadened 
existing loyalty programs. It also tightened controls on communists by forcing them to register 
with the government, revoking the passports of those suspected of being communists, and 
stipulated the creation of concentration camps for suspected subversives in the case of a national 
emergency.9 
President Truman’s nominations to the Court, and their receptions by the Senate, reflected 
the Cold War consensus as well. Truman nominated Harold Burton to replace Owen Roberts, 
who retired in 1945. Burton was a United States Senator from Ohio and a Republican.  Truman 
nominated him as a gesture of goodwill and bipartisanship and Burton was confirmed by the 
Senate unanimously in one day with no hearings.10 Burton tended to rule for less expansion of 
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government in the commercial realm than his New Deal cohorts on the Court but joined them on 
many cases in other areas of law. In 1946, Truman nominated Frederick Vinson to be the Chief 
Justice of the United States.  Vinson was a former United States Representative (D-KY) and was 
Truman’s Secretary of the Treasury as well. He was easily confirmed by a voice vote in the 
Senate.11    
In 1949, Truman’s nominee, Tom C. Clark, was confirmed to the Supreme Court.  Clark had 
worked as a prosecutor with then-Senator Truman to investigate war frauds.  Truman appointed 
him as Attorney General in 1945 and, when Roosevelt appointee Frank Murphy died in office, 
Clark was nominated to the Court. Clark refused to testify before the Senate since he believed it 
would “[jeopardize] his future effectiveness on the Court.”12 Clark is difficult to define as either 
a conservative or liberal based upon his record, although he was a strong advocate of racial 
equality.  He was known to practice judicial restraint but also held a broad view of government 
powers.13 
Also in 1949, Sherman Minton replaced Roosevelt appointee Wiley Rutledge, who died in 
office. Minton and Truman sat next to each other when both were senators, and Minton was a 
strong back backer of Roosevelt’s “court packing” plan. Minton lost his seat in 1940 and 
Roosevelt appointed him to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. When Truman nominated him 
to the Supreme Court, similarly to Clark, Minton refused the Senate’s request for him to appear 
before them, claiming that his record on the circuit court should suffice to show his competence.  
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He was confirmed 48-16. Although he was a liberal Senator, he proved to be somewhat 
conservative on the Court and typically deferred to the other branches of government.14   
Ideologically, there were significant differences among the Vinson Court justices. Michael R. 
Belknap maintains that the decisions of the Vinson Court reflected a persistent ideological battle 
between the conservativism, and resulting judicial restraint, of Justice Felix Frankfurter and the 
civil rights activism of justices William O. Douglas and Hugo Black; dissents authored by the 
latter two justices laid the foundation for major civil rights breakthroughs during the tenure of 
Chief Justice Earl Warren. But Roosevelt appointees on the Court energetically supported New 
Deal regulations grounded in an expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause. 
Alternatively, the chief justice was reluctant to oppose such economic legislation amid rising 
Cold War concerns.15 Russell Galloway, Jr., similarly concludes that the Vinson Court generally 
took more conservative positions than its predecessor, especially after 1949.16   
Legal thought among many jurists returned with special energy to concerns about 
doctrine and rules after World War II, as appellate judges, law school professors and others 
embraced the policy-making functions of lawmaking and adjudication. In the face of 
conservative charges that New Deal judges who had embraced legal realism had also discounted 
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the power of rules to shape judicial outcomes, the new emphasis was on “reason” rather than 
fiat.17 The era of “post-realism,” a number of scholars conclude, began with the publication in 
1943 of an influential article by Yale professors Harold D. Lasswell, a political scientist, and 
Myres S. McDougal, a professor of property law. “Legal Education and Public Policy: 
Professional Training in the Public Interest” debuted in The Yale Law Journal.18 The two 
innovators purported to integrate developments in jurisprudence dating back to World War I into 
approaches that came to be associated with “policy science” and “process jurisprudence” – the 
latter of which placed a premium on carefully defined roles for legislators, courts, and 
administrative agencies. While the new adherents of process jurisprudence continued to value 
highly the knowledge provided by the social sciences, they looked askance at the willingness of 
judicial realists to discount precedents, rules, and legal principles to achieve preferred policy 
outcomes. Process jurisprudents took the view that lawmakers and judges could and should 
respect legal rules and principles – while also maintaining social responsibility. The most 
conspicuous adherent of process jurisprudence, perhaps, was Roosevelt appointee to the United 
States Supreme Court Felix Frankfurter, who emphasized the ideal of judicial restraint, regarding 
the Commerce Clause and otherwise.19 However, some critics of process jurisprudence and 
policy science were quick to associate these new intellectual currents with the fierce 
conservatism attendant on the growing Cold War.20  
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Perhaps the most contentious decision of the Vinson Supreme Court to develop further 
the meaning of the Commerce Clause-based Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was Anderson v. 
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. This controversy arose when seven workers of Mt. Clemens, situated in 
Michigan, filed a class action suit under the FLSA. Plaintiffs alleged that the record keeping of 
the company, which employed about 1,200 workers, did not accurately reflect the time that 
workers labored and that they had not received minimum wages for this work or overtime 
compensation when due. Complainants alleged that, on average, each worker was denied credit 
for fifty-six minutes each working day. Management determined work duration with time in and 
time out shown on punched cards and by deducting a standard number of minutes for walking to 
and preparing to work at their work benches – that is, fourteen minutes per shift. More precisely, 
compensable working time extended from the succeeding even quarter hour after employees 
punched in to the quarter hour immediately preceding the time when they punched out.21 
Litigation in the lower courts brought to a whole new level the time consciousness that 
had emerged in the United States with the advent of the modern mechanized workplace more 
than a century earlier. A special master appointed by the district court recommended that the suit 
against Mt. Clemens be dismissed because the complainants “have not established by a fair 
preponderance of evidence” a violation of the FLSA. He found that the employees were not 
required to, and did not, work fifty-six minutes more per day than the clocked work time for 
which they were paid. He also determined that the plaintiffs “have not sustained their burden to 
prove that all the time between the punched entries on the clock was spent in working, and that, 
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conversely, none of the time in advance of the starting time spent by employees arriving early 
was their own time.” Production work, he surmised, did not customarily include time walking 
from the time clock to the work bench – and “did not regularly commence until the established 
starting time, and, if in some instances it was commenced shortly prior thereto, it was 
counterbalanced by occasions when it was started after the hour and by admitted occasions when 
it was stopped several minutes before quitting time.”22 
The district court affirmed the findings of the master – but with one important 
reservation. It concluded that the evidence adduced before the master showed that, as a practical 
matter, employees punched in, walked to their work benches, and were situated for productive 
work from five to seven minutes before start time – and that it was probable that the employees 
usually began work as soon as they were situated to do so. From this supposition, the court 
constructed a formula, applicable to all workers, for computing this supposedly uncompensated 
time. Operationalizing the formula, the court calculated a judgement against Mt. Clemens 
amounting to $2,415.74 in compensatory damages. Mt. Clemens appealed to the Sixth Circuit 
Court.23 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the findings of the special master were 
supported by substantial evidence – and that the district court had erred by failing to accept the 
determination of the master that productive work did not actually start until the scheduled time. 
The Sixth Circuit Court also held that the formula the district court had devised for computing 
the supposed uncompensated work was invalid because it was based on mere presupposition and 
conjecture. Equally important, the court held that the burden rested upon the employees to 
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demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not receive the wages to which 
they were entitled – and to do so with “evidence, rather than conjecture, the extent of overtime 
worked, it being insufficient for them merely to offer an estimated average of overtime worked.” 
With these holdings, the Circuit Court dismissed the action.24 
With a 6-2 decision rendered on June 10, 1846, the Supreme Court held that preliminary 
work activities, when controlled by company officials and for the benefit of the company, were 
properly included in the statutory workweek defined by the FLSA. Writing for the majority was 
Justice Frank Murphy, by then well-known as a liberal champion of individual liberties, if not 
one to render decisions in this regard sometimes based more on passion than strict logic.25 In any 
case, the majority ruled that the Sixth Court of Appeals correctly held that the district court erred 
in failing to accept the findings of the master that, at St. Clemens, work generally began and 
ended at the scheduled hours – and in crafting a formula of compensation based upon 
presuppositions and conjecture. On the other hand, Justice Murphy held that the time necessarily 
spent by St. Clemens employees in walking from the time clock to their work benches, and vice 
versa, was working time within the scope of § 7(a) of the FLSA. “Without such walking on the 
part of the employees, the productive aims of the employer could not have been achieved. The 
employees’ convenience and necessity, moreover, bore no relation whatever to this walking 
time; they walked on the employer’s premises only because they were compelled to do so by the 
necessities of the employer’s business.” Allowing that “minimal walking time,” need not be 
compensated, Justice Murphy held that “[t]ime necessarily spent by the employees in walking to 
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work on the employer’s premises is working time within the scope of § 7(a), and must be 
compensated accordingly, regardless of contrary custom or contract.” As well, he clarified the 
meaning of “compensable work”: “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) 
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of 
the employer.”26 
Equally innovative was the holding of the Supreme Court that the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals had employed an improper standard of proof to the detriment of the Mt. Clemens 
employees. According to Justice Murphy, the FSLA imposed upon the employer, not the worker, 
the duty to keep proper records of hours worked. In cases where an employer omitted to keep 
adequate records, the law was not to deny recovery because the employee was unable to prove 
the precise amount of wrongfully uncompensated work. Murphy insisted that “an employee has 
carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was 
improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of 
that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”  The employer may rebut such claims by 
producing records that document precisely the amount of work performed. But, lacking such 
evidence in rebuttal, the court was authorized to award damages to the complaining employee, 
notwithstanding that the amount determined was only approximate.  
In support of its holding on the burden of proof, it seems, Justice Murphy concluded that, 
even though work at Mt. Clemens typically began and ended as scheduled, time clock evidence 
was not reliable.27 “[Time] clocks do not necessarily record the actual time worked by 
employees.” Since it took eight minutes for the lined-up workers of one shift to punch in, it 
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would be unfair to credit the first worker in line for eight minutes of work. As well, he pointed 
out, time clocks could not show the actual amount of time that workers were required to be at the 
work site or at their work benches. With justices Harold Burton and Felix Frankfurter dissenting, 
the Court reversed and remanded the case, ordering the district court to determine how much 
time the complaining St. Clemens workers spent walking to and from their work benches and 
how much time they spent in preparations for work and – in keeping with all the new guidelines 
set out in its decision – to arrive at a proper compensatory award.28 
Justice Harold Burton, similarly to Justice Frankfurter, believed in a philosophy of 
judicial restraint. But pragmatism seemed to mark his dissent in Anderson v. Mt. Clements more 
than any other approach. In his view, the Court should have affirmed the decision of the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals to dismiss the case. In particular, he pointed out that the amounts of 
compensation at issue “might not average as much as five to ten minutes a day a person, and 
would not apply at all to many of the employees.” More important, the decision of the majority, 
he argued, would impose costly and unjustified expenses for employers across the country: “The 
futility of requiring an employer to record these minutes, and the unfairness of penalizing him for 
failure to do a futile thing, by imposing arbitrary allowances for ‘overtime’ and liquidated 
damages is apparent.” He conceded that, in certain industries, precise record keeping about 
“preliminary activities” or “walking time” may be appropriate. But, in the case at hand, he 
stressed “the obvious, long established, and simple way to compensate an employee for such 
activities is to recognize those activities in the rate of pay for the particular job.” Justice Burton 
belabored the point that, with the passage of the FLSA, that Congress had not meant to redefine 
the meaning of “work week” or “to set aside long-established contracts or customs which had 
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absorbed in the rate of pay of the respective jobs recognition of whatever preliminary activities 
might be required of the worker by that particular job.” As well, Burton complained, the decision 
of the majority omitted to consider the disruptive and costly effects that it would certainly have 
on “hundreds of thousands of small business . . . where the recording of occasional minutes of 
preliminary activities and walking time would be highly impractical, and the penalties of 
liquidated damages for a neglect to do so would be unreasonable.” He stressed, “such a universal 
requirement of recording would lead to innumerable unnecessary minor controversies between 
employers and employees.”29  
The leaders of organized labor perceived the decision in Anderson v. Clemens Pottery to 
be yet another New Deal victory. The leadership of the American Federation of Labor, which 
remained committed to maintaining workable labor-management relations, took the view that the 
new FLSA definition of “work week” should be carefully integrated into future collective 
bargaining efforts. Bosses of the somewhat more aggressive Congress of Industrial 
Organizations called for member unions to employ the new standard for calculating compensable 
work in class-action law suits for back wages. The managers of large corporations, as well as 
owners of smaller enterprises, responded powerfully to all these changes, which seemed to 
portend an avalanche of costly new book keeping procedures, management difficulties, worksite 
conflicts, and litigation. They mobilized rapidly to lobby the Congress after it came under 
Republican control in early 1947.  
One of the consequences of having established an expansive commerce power to regulate 
employer-employee relations that New Deal operatives appear not to have fully anticipated was 
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its energetic employment by federal lawmakers and a president with more conservative bearings. 
The Republican Congress and President Harry Truman, indeed, passed signal legislation in 
response to the widespread calls among business leaders that something be done about the 
decision in Anderson v. Clemens Pottery Co. The response came in the form of the Portal-to-
Portal Act, approved on May 14, 1947.30 The title of the legislation was misleading, as it hardly 
represented confirmation of the principle that all time spent within the doors of a workplace was 
to be compensated under the FLSA. Section four of the act, in fact, made it quite clear that 
whether time spent in preliminary or post-liminary activities was compensable depended on 
contract, custom, or practice. To put it another way, the 1947 act declared that travel to work, 
walking to work areas on a job site, and time preparing for work were not compensable under the 
FLSA – if such had been the customary practice in an industry and if no new contract between 
management and labor of a company said otherwise. According to Richard Morgan, the Portal-
to-Portal Act constituted “one of the harshest statutory rebuses ever directed to the Court.”31 
 On June 23, 1947, business won another significant victory with the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act.  After World War II, unions were released from their wartime promises not to strike 
and they quickly took advantage of their new freedom. In response, Congress passed the act, 
over President Truman’s veto, to prohibit closed shops, in which being a union member was a 
condition of employment. The act also stipulated that unions had to abide by a sixty-day cooling 
off period before striking in order to allow employers or even the president time to negotiate a 
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settlement. 32 Formally named the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, the Taft-Hartley 
Act was sponsored by Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft and New Jersey Representative Fred A. 
Hartley, Jr. The bill was one of more than two-hundred bills dealing with labor unions 
introduced in Congress in 1947. The measure, however, worked a major amendment of the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Grounded solidly in the commerce power, the broad 
purposes of the act were set out in its first section: 
[T]o promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both 
employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and 
peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of 
the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor 
organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the 
part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general 
welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting 
commerce. 33 
To say the least, the Taft-Hartley Act included a robust array of measures reflecting 
intense Cold War pressures. These undoubtedly included a list of prohibited activities 
advantageous to corporate capital. Duly banned were unfair labor practices on the part of labor 
unions (and now not only on the part of management); secondary boycotts; monetary donations 
by labor unions to federal political campaigns; jurisdictional strikes; “wildcat strikes”; and, 
perhaps most critically, “solidarity strikes,” – that is, political strikes. The act also declared the 
right of states to pass right-to-work laws and of the federal executive branch to obtain 
strikebreaking injunctions from federal judges. More to the point, Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hatley 
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Act required labor union officers to sign affidavits, and file them with the Department of Labor, 
declaring that they were not supporters of the Communist Party and were not affiliated with any 
organization that sought the “overthrow of the United States government by force or by any 
illegal or unconstitutional means.” Such affidavits were made an unavoidable and absolute 
condition for labor union leaders to participate in NLRB proceedings. And any union having an 
officer who omitted to file the required affidavit would not enjoy the protection of the NLRA.34  
The May 1950 decision of the United States Supreme Court in American 
Communications Association v. Douds arose directly from the actual implementation of Section 
9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act. American Communications Association leaders, most of whom 
were members of the Communist Party USA, refused to sign anti-communist affidavits. In 
October 1947, regional director of the National Labor Relations Board in New York City Charles 
Douds banned the ACA from a NLRB-supervised union organizing election. The union promptly 
sued, arguing that Section 9(h) of the Taft Hartley Act, which underwrote the action taken by 
Douds, was a violation of the First Amendment rights of its leadership. After little success in the 
Southern District Court of New York, the ACA appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
where the labor union fared no better.  
With a splintered set of opinions, a majority of the Supreme Court ultimately held that the 
anti-communist affidavit required by the Taft-Hartley Act did not violate the First Amendment 
or Article VI of the Constitution (which proscribes bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, “test 
oaths,” and religious tests). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson explained that 
a great deal of evidence had been presented to Congress to show that “Communist leaders of 
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labor unions had in the past, and would continue in the future, to subordinate legitimate trade 
union objectives to obstructive strikes when dictated by Party leaders, often in support of the 
policies of a foreign government.”35 Justice Vinson took his stand with a rationale that privileged 
the protection of interstate commerce from communist-inspired general strikes over First 
Amendment rights:  
There can be no doubt that Congress may, under its constitutional power to regulate 
commerce among the several States, attempt to prevent political strikes and other kinds of 
direct action designed to burden and interrupt the free flow of commerce. We think it is 
clear, in addition, that the remedy provided by § 9(h) bears reasonable relation to the evil 
which the statute was designed to reach. Congress could rationally find that the 
Communist Party is not like other political parties in its utilization of positions of union 
leadership as means by which to bring about strikes and other obstructions of commerce 
for purposes of political advantage, and that many persons who believe in overthrow of 
the Government by force and violence are also likely to resort to such tactics when, as 
officers, they formulate union policy.36 
Hindsight surely might spur thoughtful persons to ponder the solemn certainties 
articulated by Justice Vinson, even if one agrees that international communism in 1950, indeed, 
posed a dire threat to free nations. The scathing dissent that Justice Hugo Black authored in ACA 
v. Douds registered the outrage of many civil libertarians. According to him, “No case cited by 
the Court provides the least vestige of support for thus holding that the Commerce Clause 
restricts the right to think.” In his view, Section 9(h) amounted to an unconstitutional “test 
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oath.”37 Certainly his views portended the decision of the Court fifteen years later that 
eviscerated Section 9(h) by declaring it an unconstitutional bill of attainder.38 But the majority 
opinion also presents an opportunity to reflect on the commerce power wrought by New Deal 
labor-management innovations. For the purposes of this study, the vexed decision in ACA v. 
Douds displays rather clearly how well-intended, highly-educated American legislators and 
jurists could employ a radically-expanded commerce power in ways that more than a few 
reasonable citizens deemed utterly inimical to cherished fundamental liberties. More important 
for present purposes, the decision demonstrates the vast extent to which Commerce Clause 
power had grown in little more than a decade—and the extent to which the highest echelon of the 
federal judiciary could expect the America public to acquiesce dutifully to its imperatives.39  
One of the most contentious utilizations of Commerce Clause power in the period 1946-
1963 was antitrust law, the benefits and demerits of which even policymakers who still clung to 
New Deal principles had conflicting views. Through the era of substantial New Deal reform, the 
prime statutes governing antitrust in the United States remained the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890, the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.40 The 
short-lived National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 had promulgated controversial industrial 
codes for “fair competition” but, according to some analysts, actually promoted harmful 
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monopolistic practices.41 It would seem that, to New Deal architects, at least, the command and 
control power over wages, prices, and production levels, a hallmark of the typical holding 
company, was entirely salutary – as long as right-minded government officials were in charge. In 
any case, the New Deal Congress and President Roosevelt ultimately passed the Robinson-
Putman Act of 1936, an antitrust statute with less ambitious designs – to shield independent 
retailers from competition from better capitalized retail stores with multiple locations – by 
making it illegal for such larger operators to lower the prices of their goods to customers.42   
To fathom the peculiar ability of post-war liberal policymakers to discount the interest of 
ordinary Americans in enjoying reasonably priced commodities, one might peruse the dissenting 
opinion of Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in the 1948 decision United States v. 
Columbia Steel Co. In that case, the majority held, with moderate Justice Stanley Reed writing 
its opinion, that it was not a violation of the Sherman Act for United States Steel Corporation to 
acquire the assets of Consolidated Steel Corporation, the largest independent steel fabricator on 
the West Coast – because there was no statute or doctrine that forbade “per se, an expansion of 
facilities of an existing company to meet the needs of new markets . . . .”43 Justice Douglas made 
it all too clear that the problem of accepting any kind of vertical integration was the inevitable, 
looming threat posed by concentrated private wealth.44 According to him, a principle statutory 
purpose of the Sherman Act was to prohibit the use of power to control the marketplace.  
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We have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should by now have been burned into our 
memory by Brandeis. The Curse of Bigness shows how size can become a menace--both 
industrial and social. It can be an industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities 
against existing or putative competitors. It can be a social menace. . . . In final analysis, 
size in steel is the measure of the power of a handful of men over our economy. . . . The 
philosophy of the Sherman Act is that it should not exist. . . . Industrial power should be 
decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people 
will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional 
stability of a few self-appointed men. . . . That is the philosophy and the command of the 
Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands 
of power so great that only a government of the people should have it.45 
 
By the early 1950s, “Chicago School” innovators had begun to promote effectively the 
idea that corporate bigness offered some substantial advantages: most prominently, efficiency 
and cost savings that primarily benefitted consumers. Judge Richard A. Posner, writing in 1979, 
said that distinctive antitrust views developed at the University of Chicago began gaining 
traction piecemeal, initially, because of the teaching of University of Chicago economist Aaron 
Director, whose ideas, beginning in the mid-1950s, were rapidly elaborated more 
comprehensively by his students and colleagues, including Ward S. Bowman, Robert H. Bork, 
John S. McGee, and Lester G. Telser.46 A highly influential article published in 1956 on trade 
                                                 
United States v. Corn Product Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y., 1916). Roger D. Blair and 
David L. Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control (New York and 
London: Academic Press, 1983), 140 
45 Dissenting opinion of Justice William O. Douglas in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 
U.S. 495, 535-36 (1948); Osmond K. Fraenkel, ed., The Curse of Bigness: Miscellaneous Papers 
of Louis D. Brandeis (New York: The Viking Press, 1934).  
46 Richard A. Posner, “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,” University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Vol. 127 (1979): 925-948; Robert H. Bork, “Vertical Integration and the Sherman 
Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception,” Vol. 22, U. Ch. L. Rev. 157 (1954); 
Ward S. Bowman, Jr., “Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,” Vol. 67 Yale L.J. 19 
(1957); John S. McGee, “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case,” Vol. 1 J.L. & 
144 
 
regulation by Director and Dean of the University of Chicago School of Law and future United 
States Attorney General Edward H. Levi frontally attacked the supposed antitrust justification 
that monopolists frequently sought to spread their monopoly power to adjacent markets. While 
Chicago School proponents criticized judicial precedents that undercut mergers in 
unconcentrated markets, as Danial A. Crane puts it, “they saved their strongest fire for 
interventionist antitrust norms on unilateral exclusionary conduct such as tying, predatory 
pricing, and related practices.” The heyday of Chicago School influence was yet to come. But the 
foundation had been laid for the wider impact of its various ideas concerning antitrust in the 
1960s and 1970s and beyond, such as the publication of  Judge Robert H. Bork’s 1978 book The 
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, which reiterated his argument that federal courts 
in the United States had been unwisely hostile toward vertical integration and vertical mergers 
since the advent of federal antitrust law.47 The scholarly publications of numerous other 
influential economists and legal experts, such as Thomas Sowell, Milton Friedman, and Richard 
A. Posner by then, touted free market ideas that reoriented antitrust thinking to the best interests 
of consumers.48  
Notwithstanding the challenge to antitrust orthodoxy posed by Chicago School “law and 
economics” theorists, a new Democrat Congress and President Harry S. Truman found common 
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ground to place some additional limitations on vertical mergers. This came with the Celler–
Kefauver Act of 1950, also known as the “Anti-Merger Act.” To this point, the United States 
government had no choice but to rely on the Sherman Antitrust Act to prosecute unlawful 
vertical mergers. The Celler-Kefauver amended the Clayton Act of 1914 to extend its ambit to 
vertical and conglomerate mergers. Under the terms of the new legislation, it was no longer legal 
for one company to take control of a market by simply acquiring the assets of its competitors – a 
commonly employed way for corporate owners to work around the Clayton Act ban on stock 
purchase mergers. And language of the Celler-Kefauver Act claimed that its implementation 
would prevent combinations and concentrated wealth that foreclosed competition to the 
detriment of the people.49   
It should be kept in mind that, through the 1950s (and later), federal antitrust laws did not 
apply, in whole or in part, to several categories of industry, most notably professional sports 
teams, print and broadcast media companies, utilities, and banks. The rationale for these 
exemptions, which dated back decades through both Democrat and Republican periods of 
national dominance, was that exempted organizations required extraordinarily large amounts of 
capital and unusually careful management to sustain them. For corporations that provided critical 
public infrastructure, sometimes called “government franchises,” unbridled competition was 
unfeasible, or at least, put the public interest at risk. As discussed in chapter one, the insurance 
industry was allowed extensive antitrust exemptions under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. 
But exemption from antitrust law came with a price, in most cases – heavy regulation, a subject 
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that increasingly divided those who feared concentrated private wealth and those who believed it 
provided valuable advantages to American society.50 
United States Supreme Court decisions innovated seminal antitrust doctrines grounded in 
the commerce power from the end of World War II through the early 1960s (and at least for 
another decade thereafter).51 The Court was deeply fractured between supporters of Justice Hugo 
Black (Rutledge, Douglas, and Murphy) and Justice Felix Frankfurter (Jackson, Burton, and 
sometimes Reed) when President Truman made Fred Vinson chief justice in July 1946. 
Notwithstanding the relatively conservative bearings of the new chief justice, he made efforts to 
find consensus among his colleagues. His replacement in fall 1953, Eisenhower-appointee Earl 
Warren, similarly dealt with a divided Court for the first eight years of his tenure. The members 
of the Court who coalesced around Justice Black were surely more willing than their more 
conservative counterparts to bring the full weight of antitrust law down on the heads of violators. 
The antitrust rulings of the Court dealt with several identifiable categories of problematic 
practices, most notably group boycotts of competitors, tacit collusion, vertical mergers, 
monopolization, exclusive dealing, tying products, and predatory pricing.52 This array, of course, 
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reflected as much the emerging challenges of a complex, rapidly-evolving post-war economy, 
federal antitrust statutes, and the prosecutorial agendas of the Department of Justice as the 
ideological preferences of Supreme Court justices.   
Economically sound or not, the June 1947 decision of the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Yellow Cab Co. reflected persistent concerns among the justices with vertical integration. The 
Chicago-based Checker Cab Manufacturing Co. acquired control of the Yellow Cab Co. and 
several other taxi companies in Chicago, New York City, Pittsburgh and Minneapolis. Following 
the acquisitions, Checker required these subsidiaries to purchase their cabs from it. The Justice 
Department filed suit under the Sherman Act on the theory that Checker’s actions illegally 
foreclosed a substantial fraction of the market for selling taxi cabs. The district court, however, 
sustained the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint. According to legal scholars 
Roger D. Blair and David L. Kaserman, “the lower court observed quite sensibly that such 
foreclosure was commonplace in vertically integrated firms.”53 But U.S. attorneys appealed the 
dismissal directly to the United States Supreme Court. All the litigants agreed that the selling of 
taxis by Checker to its subsidiaries amounted to “interstate commerce.” According to Justice 
Frank Murphy, writing for the majority, “[b]y excluding all cab manufacturers other than 
[Checker] from that part of the market represented by the cab operating companies under their 
control, the appellees effectively limit the outlets through which cabs may be sold in interstate 
commerce.” In his view, the “conspiracy” had the effect of excluding manufacturers of taxicabs 
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U.S. 392 (1947) [also predatory pricing]; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 US 131 
(1948); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
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other than Checker from eighty-six percent of the Chicago market, fifteen percent of the New 
York market, one hundred percent of the Pittsburgh market, and fifty-eight percent of the 
Minneapolis market. As for the economic injustice resulting from the conspiracy, Judge Murphy 
could only say that “[t]he result allegedly is that these companies must pay more for cabs than 
they would otherwise pay, their other expenditures are increased unnecessarily, and the public is 
charged high rates for the transportation services rendered.” The Court reversed and remanded 
the case.54 
More important for the purposes of this study are several other Commerce Clause 
holdings in Yellow Cab, one of which declared a dubious signal expansion of the commerce 
power. In addition to the vertical integration charges, the case involved the prosecution of a 
conspiracy not to compete among two defendant taxi companies in Chicago (Yellow and Cab 
Sales) that were subsidiaries of defendant Checker and a third defendant taxi company in 
Chicago (Parmelee), also a subsidiary of Checker. Multiple non-competition contracts required 
Yellow and Cab Sales not to compete with Parmelee for contracts with Chicago railroads and 
railroad terminal associations to transport passengers and their luggage between the railroad 
stations. According to Justice Murphy in Part II of his opinion, “[t]he transportation of such 
passengers and their luggage between stations in Chicago is clearly a part of the stream of 
interstate commerce.” Justice Murphy conceded that the exclusive contracts the defendants 
sealed were not, in and of themselves, illegal. “But a conspiracy to eliminate competition in 
obtaining those exclusive contracts is what is alleged in this case, and it is a conspiracy of that 
type that runs afoul of the Sherman Act.55 The only difficulty was that Justice Murphy and the 
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majority laid claimed to new Commerce Clause power under the guise of solid precedential 
authority when, in fact, there was very little.  
The holding of the Court in Yellow Cab that taxi service between train terminals in a 
Chicago was “clearly a part of the stream of interstate commerce” amounted largely to judicial 
fiat, as the ruling was based on prior decisions of the Court dealing exclusively with the business 
of shipping goods and cattle. According to Justice Murphy in Part II of the decision, “[w]hen 
persons or goods move from a point of origin in one state to a point of destination in another, the 
fact that a part of that journey consists of transportation by an independent agency solely within 
the boundaries of one state does not make that portion of the trip any less interstate in 
character.”56  But the prior decisions of the Court that Justice Murphy cited in support of this 
proposition did not, in fact, deal with the business of transporting passengers. One of two 
precedents to which he pointed was the 1870 decision The Daniel Bell. In that case, the Court 
held that the activities of river-going vessels that transported goods intrastate were within the 
commerce power of Congress if the goods were “destined for other states.” “The fact that several 
different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting 
entirely in one state and some acting through two or more states, does in no respect affect the 
character of the transaction.”57 The other case upon which Justice Murphy relied was Stafford v. 
Wallace (1922), which held that the commerce power reached the business of intrastate 
transportation of cattle and their sale in a stockyard of the same state “with the expectation that 
they will end their transit, after purchase, in another. . . and when in effect they do so.”58 
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It is difficult to imagine that Justice Murphy and the majority in Yellow Cab did not at 
least consider in this part of the decision the substantial differences between the business of 
shipping commodities and cattle and the business of local taxi service for train passengers. 
Surely it mattered at the most basic level of comparison that passengers were not insensible 
objects or beasts to be bought and sold, that the prime cash nexus in local taxi service was 
largely the fares paid by passengers to taxi operators, and that the economic policy implications 
of moving passengers from one train terminal to another were considerably different from those 
attendant on the transport of marketable freight and livestock. Perhaps Part II of Yellow Cab 
makes more sense if one considers, simply, the effort of the post-war Supreme Court to revitalize 
its “in-interstate commerce” or “stream of interstate commerce” rationales more generally. As 
discussed in chapter one, the conservative rulings in Schechter Poultry (1933) and Carter Coal 
(1936) had certainly undercut this approach. But in the decade and a half following the judicial 
revolution of 1937, the Court returned a series of “in-interstate commerce” decisions that, amid 
new regulatory schemes, granted Congress authority over the local sale of products intended to 
be transshipped for sale across state lines – or that were, in fact, transshipped for sale across state 
lines.59  
Under the circumstances, one is left to parse carefully the final holding of the Court set 
out in Part III of Yellow Cab – which held that the commerce power was insufficient to justify a 
Sherman Act prosecution of a conspiracy based on contracts requiring Yellow and Cab Sales not 
to compete with Parmelee for the business of transporting interstate travelers and their luggage 
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from their Chicago-area homes to the Chicago railroad stations and vice versa upon their return 
trips. In this connection, Justice Murphy was forthright in identifying the inexorable implications 
of his other holdings in the opinion. 
In a sense, of course, a traveler starts an interstate journey when he boards a conveyance 
near his home, office, or hotel to travel to the railroad station, from which the journey is 
continued by train, and such a journey ends when he alights from a conveyance near the 
home, office, or hotel which constitutes his ultimate destination. Indeed, the terminal 
points of an interstate journey may be traced even further to the moment when the 
traveler leaves or enters his room or office and descends or ascends the building by 
elevator.60 
But the Court resorted to time-tested approaches to make the necessary distinction. First, Justice 
Murphy said, “[I]nterstate commerce is an intensely practical concept drawn from the normal 
and accepted course of business.61 Interstate journeys were to be identified by “the commonly 
accepted sense of the transportation concept.”62 In the view of the Court, “what may fairly be 
said to be the limits of an interstate shipment of goods and chattels may not necessarily be the 
commonly accepted limits of an individual's interstate journey.” As one of several “practical 
considerations,” Justice Murphy concluded “we believe that the common understanding is that a 
traveler intending to make an interstate rail journey begins his interstate movement when he 
boards the train at the station, and that his journey ends when he disembarks at the station in the 
city of destination.”63 There was, however, no discussion of any evidence in the record that 
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might have shed light on the understandings of actual interstate travelers in Chicago or elsewhere 
about taxi rides from their homes to the train stations or vice versa. 
The holding set out in Part III of Yellow Cab at least forestalled another expansion of 
Commerce Clause power. The Supreme Court held that intrastate taxi trips that immediately 
preceded or followed interstate train travel were “too unrelated to interstate commerce to 
constitute a part thereof within the meaning of the Sherman Act.”64 But the position of some of 
the justices on this holding hinted strongly at the ideological fault lines at work in the case. 
Justices Hugo Black and Wiley B. Rutledge dissented from this part of the decision without 
explanation, while Justice Harold H. Burton concurred with it, also without explanation, but 
otherwise took the position that the judgment of the district court to dismiss the case should be 
affirmed because “the complaint as a whole fails to state a cause of action.” Justice William O. 
Douglas took no part in the decision.65 
The Vinson Court steadily modulated its “commerce prohibiting approach” to extend the 
reach of federal regulatory power on behalf of consumers, albeit in ways increasingly 
complicated. In United States v. Walsh, decided in 1947, the Court sustained a statutory ban set 
out in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 on the making, by a manufacturer, of a false 
guaranty that a product was not misbranded or adulterated per the requirements of the act to “one 
engaged wholly or partly in an interstate business.” According to the Court, the prohibition was a 
proper means to block interstate shipments of mislabeled medications because, absent the 
prohibition, the purchaser was “more likely to engage in interstate distribution without making 
an independent check of the product.” In so doing, the Court upheld the statute even though 
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wrongful sales to be penalized might involve only intrastate transactions and that the statute did 
not require a showing that a purchaser had the intent to resell the mislabeled product out of 
state.66 Consider also United States v. Sullivan (1948), handed down in 1948. In this case a 
Chicago laboratory had consigned a bottle of sulfathiazole tablets, labeled in accordance with the 
1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, to a distributer in Atlanta, Georgia – from whom 
Columbus, Georgia, pharmacist James Sullivan purchased a bottle of the pills. Sullivan, on two 
separate occasions, removed twelve tablets from the bottle, placed these in pill boxes for sale to 
customers, and “misbranded” them by affixing to each pill box a label that said “sulfathiazole” 
but which lacked the federally mandated directions for use and warnings. For this, Sullivan was 
prosecuted and convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court did not address the question of whether 
pharmacists might be trusted orally to advise their customers as to the proper use and dangers of 
the medication or that customers might be entrusted to inform themselves in this regard. 
Upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court held that Congress, under the 1938 Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act and its underlying commerce power, could impose a ban on intrastate 
relabeling of a medication required to be specifically labelled by the act even in the case of a 
licensed pharmacist who (1) had not been involved in the drug’s interstate shipment; 2) had 
obtained the drugs in a purely intrastate purchase, and (3) had violated the law, not by removing 
the label from any container shipped across state lines but, instead, by failing to re-affix federally 
required label information to separate smaller containers used in repackaging the drug for retail 
sale.67 
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Certainly, the Vinson Court was entirely capable of employing an expansive 
understanding of its “commerce prohibiting approach” to reach outcomes on behalf of 
mainstream understandings of law and order and what most Americans deemed common 
morality. An example of the Court’s social conservatism, even while advancing Commerce 
Clause-based legislation, may be seen in Cleveland v. United States, decided in 1946.68  At issue 
was a Mormon group that was attempting to take young women across state lines for the 
purposes of marriage in polygamous relationships. The government claimed that such action was 
a violation of the Mann Act, which stipulated that women could not be taken across state lines 
for immoral practices (like prostitution). The question was whether the Mann Act applied in this 
case and whether such an application was authorized by the commerce power. The Court 
declared that “[t]he fact that the regulation of marriage is a state matter does not, of course, make 
the Mann Act. . . unconstitutional” and that the commerce-prohibiting power “may be used to 
defeat what are deemed to be immoral practices” even if the means used “have ‘the quality of 
police regulations.’”69    
With its decision Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, the Vinson Court invoked the so-
called “dormant commerce clause” to sustain further the expansion of federal regulatory power, 
this time, it would seem, at the expense of public health. Illinois milk producer Dean Milk filed 
suit against the city of Madison, Wisconsin, alleging the impropriety of its ordinance requiring 
all milk sold in the city be pasteurized at a facility within five miles of the municipality. 
According to the plaintiff, the purpose of the ordinance, ostensibly for the health of city 
residents, was, in fact, to protect local milk producers from non-local and out-of-state 
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competition. The decision of the Supreme Court, rendered in January 1951, overturned the 
ordinance. Justice Tom C. Clark, writing for the majority, explained the majority position:  
In thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition 
from without the state, Madison plainly discriminates against interstate commerce. This it 
cannot do, even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety 
of the people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. . . are available. 
 
Congress had not yet attempted to legislate on the processes of local milk production. That the 
ordinance also discriminated against in-state producers was not germane to the decision. The 
majority further staked out the commerce power of Congress, but the alignment of the justices in 
the outcome does not suggest that either conservative federalism principles or the impulse to 
centralize power were determinative. Conservative justices Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson, 
and Harold H. Burton joined with the majority, along with Chief Justice Fred Vinson and Justice 
Stanley F. Reed. The more liberal justices, that is, Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, along 
with Sherman Minton, dissented. It may well be that, in the dissent, at least, public health 
concerns trumped the impulse to consolidate congressional commerce power. Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Minton argued that the imposition on interstate commerce by the Madison milk 
ordinance was insubstantial in comparison to the need of the city to insure safe milk for its 
residents without unduly burdening inspectors.70 
As indicated, the post war years saw significant growth in federal regulation based upon 
Congress’ power provided by the Commerce Clause.  For example, the atomic energy acts of 
1946 and 1954, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, and the Federal Coal Mine 
Safety Act of 1952 all established new federal level bureaucracies and regulations that would 
                                                 
70 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
156 
 
expand radically in the decades to come. Increasingly, these administrative bodies became a 
ubiquitous part of the American legal system.  New Deal lawyers, most comfortable with the 
emerging regulatory state, often went into private practice where their expertise proved quite 
valuable to businesses burdened with new rules.  “Washington lawyers” came to rival “Wall 
Street” lawyers for dominance in the legal system.71  
Illustrative of the Court’s determination to advance an enlarged administrative state are the 
two cases of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery decided in 1943 and again in 
1947. Due to the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, public utility holding companies had to 
reorganize their corporate structures to limit them to single businesses rather than large trusts.  
The New Deal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), created in 1934, was given the task 
to approve the organization plans, but neither the law nor the SEC made specific standards about 
the reorganization plans.  In its effort to reorganize and maintain control of its water utility 
company, the C. T. Chenery Corporation went to the open market to purchase preferred stock in 
its own company.  However, the SEC disallowed Chenery from that action as it decided that it 
didn’t want a company to purchase stock during a reorganization.  As described by researcher 
Ronald Pestritto,  
This was not a prohibition that was part of any law, rule, or regulation when 
the Chenery Corporation made the purchase.  Nor was it a prohibition that 
applied to any company other than Chenery.  Nor was it a prohibition that the 
SEC ever employed again in the future.  It was, instead, a standard that the 
SEC invented on the spot and applied retroactively to this one company.”72   
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Chenery sued of course and in 1943 the Court agreed with the company that “before transactions 
otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied their usual business consequences, they must fall 
under the ban of some standards of conduct prescribed by an agency or government.” 73   
By 1947, however, the composition of the Court had changed, even as past reluctance to 
accept administrative fiat dissipated. The case continued to be litigated on remand to the lower 
court with the SEC making charges on different grounds of its own making.  On the Court’s 
second review it found in favor of the SEC deciding that because the Commission had now 
created applicable standards, Chenery would have to abide by them.  The majority (5-2) 
explained that ad hoc policy making in an administration was actually advantageous; “any rigid 
requirements,” wrote Justice Frank Murphy “would make the administrative process inflexible 
and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise.”74  Ad hoc, expert, 
policy creation, in this case, was deemed superior to following a set rule of law.    
Contributing to the rise of the administrative state and the use of the commerce clause to 
expand federal power came in the form of federal grants-in-aid programs.   The federal grants-in-
aid to state and local governments approach to shaping national policy arose in the early 
twentieth century. A number of scholars maintain that the Weeks Act of 1911, which dealt with 
agriculture, was the first modern grant-in-aid. This legislation, signed into law by President 
Theodore Roosevelt, contained features that would become common, including the conditioning 
of the receipt of federal monies on approval of state plans, mandatory matching state funds, and 
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an oversight role for unelected federal officials.75 Through the 1920s, the federal government 
awarded grants for highway construction, vocational education, public health, and maternity care 
– largess and centralizing authority that the new federal income tax substantially enhanced, 
beginning in 1913.76 Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal accelerated and transformed the federal 
grants approach. The Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, for example, was the first grant to 
the states for the express purpose of providing public relief.77 More important for future policy 
making was the adoption of the so-called “categorical” grant, which Congress typically tailored 
for carefully-defined purposes.78 During the Truman Administration, the federal government 
began to employ the grants- in-aid approach in several relatively new areas, including grants 
designed to improve public health and provide more public housing.79  Consequent 
administrations and congresses have continued the trend to the point that there are very few areas 
in which the federal government cannot dictate how local governments can be run if those local 
governments wish to obtain federal tax dollars. 
Besides the grants-in-aid expansion of federal control, Congress also used its commerce 
power to fight the growing problem of organized crime.  Congress first passed the Anti-
Racketeering Act in 1934.80  The act stipulated heavy penalties for acts of robbery or extortion 
that could be found to affect interstate commerce.  However, in the 1942 decision United States 
                                                 
75 Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Government in the United States 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 36.  
76 United States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Condition of 
Contemporary Federalism: Conflicting Theories and Collapsing Constraints (Washington, D.C.: 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981), 68. The Sixteenth Amendment 
first authorized the personal income tax. David B. Walker, The Rebirth of Federalism: 
Slouching Toward Washington, 2nd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000), 33.  
77 Pub. L. 73-15; 48 Stat. 55, enacted May 12, 1933.  
78 Walker, The Rebirth of Federalism, 33.  
79 Ibid., 103. 
80 18 U.S.C. § 371.     
159 
 
v. Teamsters Local 807 produced a loophole in the law.81 The case involved a New York 
trucking union that used threats of force to make out-of-town truckers pay to enter its city.  In 
return for the payments, the out of town truckers were to receive assistance from the union 
members, although no actual work was performed.  While the case appeared to show a clear act 
of extortion, the Court found the payments demanded of the out-of-town truckers to be “wages” 
to the union members.  Since wage payments were exempted under the act, the Court held that 
the law was inapplicable to the case at hand. In response to this surprising outcome, Congress 
immediately set forth to close the wage loophole that the Court created.  The result was the 
Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act of 1946, which amended the original act to eliminate the wage 
exception.82 The legislation also removed language from the original act that instructed courts 
not to interpret the law in a manner that would “impair, diminish, or in any manner affect the 
rights of bona-fide labor organizations in lawfully carrying out” union objectives.  The Hobbs 
Act remained in effect at least through the early twenty-first century, although the 1970 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act) was, by the second decade of 
the twenty-first century, often employed to fight organized crime.83   
As had been the case in the run up to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress 
resorted to Commerce Clause power to deal with the growing public perception in the mid-to-
late 1950s that something was deeply amiss with the nation’s labor unions – the result of which 
was the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, also known as the Landrum-
Griffin Act. Senate investigations had pointed to widespread racketeering, corruption, and other 
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serious criminality in the unions, especially among the leadership of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, United Mine Workers, and International Longshoremen’s 
Association. According to historian R. Alton Lee, business interests certainly advanced a 
campaign to curb the power of organized labor. But growing public distrust of the unions spurred 
national political leaders, such as John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Barry Goldwater, to join 
the movement. Southern conservatives and northern Republicans lent their support, even as 
Republican President Dwight Eisenhower drew on his widespread popular appeal, leadership, 
and managerial skills to mobilize legislative action. Co-sponsoring the first iteration of the bill 
were Democrat Representative Phil Landrum of Georgia and Republican Representative Robert 
P. Griffin of Michigan.84 The act, which was approved in September 1959, applied to employees 
and unions covered by the National Labor Relations Act, as well as those in the railroad and 
airline industries. It required union officials to provide extensive financial reports and disclosures 
to the Department of Labor concerning their internal operations, especially the rules and 
safeguards for electing officers. The act required unions to hold secret elections. Barred from 
holding union offices were convicted felons and members of the Communist Party. The act 
tightened the Taft-Hartley prohibitions against secondary boycotts and authorized the general 
counsel of the NLRB to obtain an injunction against a union that, to obtain recognition, 
organized picketing of an employer for more than thirty days without filing a petition for 
representation with the agency.85 
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As labor unions became mired in public mistrust, the regulatory regime of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, which had put commerce power to work for non-unionized labor, became 
the site of growing contention among business owners, employees, and their respective 
representatives. After post-World War II inflation had subsided, advocates for labor in Congress 
pushed for an amended version of the 1938 FLSA, arguing that a raise in the federally mandated 
minimum wage would boost the purchasing power of workers and spur economic growth.  
Opponents, who were usually Republican legislators backed by lobbyists for agriculture and 
industry, employed a key line of argumentation that would recur for decades into the future. A 
federally-mandated minimum wage increase would compel companies to lay off employees and 
put small businesses in danger of insolvency. Debate was intense, the resulting legislation 
constituted a compromise, and President Truman signed the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Amendments of 1949 into law, effective January 24, 1950. The act raised the minimum wage 
from forty to seventy-five cents an hour for covered workers and added the specification that 
employees were covered by the FLSA only if they were “directly essential” to production of 
goods for interstate commerce. It also increased the earnings threshold for executive, 
administrative, and professional employees to be exempted from coverage.86  
The 1949 FLSA amendments did little to improve the lot of a substantial number of 
working women on the low end of the pay scale. Vivien Hart shows that the FLSA of 1938 
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exempted from wage and hour coverage several occupational categories specific mostly to 
women, such as office secretary, retail clerk, and dairy processing operative -- creating a 
gendered division in the law that, on the face of the FLSA, appeared gender neutral. Suzanne B. 
Mettler similarly argues that the 1938 FLSA had ensured new commerce-clause-based rights for 
working men but left a disproportionate number of women under regimes of state law that were 
parochial and paternalistic – a species of gendered federalism. The 1949 FLSA amendments 
extended virtually all the wage and hour coverage exemptions set out in the original act but 
conspicuously added a new seemingly gender-neutral category: “any employee employed by an 
establishment engaged in laundering, cleaning or repairing clothing or fabrics, more than 50 per 
centum of which establishment’s annual dollar volume of sales of such services is made within 
the State in which the establishment is located.” Here was yet another category of exempted 
worker whose members were far more likely to be women than men, given the gender 
prescriptions prevailing in the United States at the time. On the other hand, there was some hope 
for such workers under the 1949 FLSA. According to the act, whatever its impact, laundresses 
and seamstresses were covered by wage and hour rules if more than twenty-five percent of their 
employers’ annual dollar volume of services was provided to customers engaged in the business 
of mining, manufacturing, transportation, or communications – at the time, largely NLRA-
protected union labor dominated by men.87 
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New federal criminal statutes adopted in the period 1946-1963 were enmeshed with 
several discordant institutional developments within the rapidly expanding federal criminal 
justice bureaucracy. Crime control in the period emphasized efficiency, technical expertise, and 
training, with the methods established by FBI Director J. Edgard Hoover serving as a model. 
Countervailing pressures came from the rising demand among jurists and criminal justice experts 
for fairness and due process, which were to serve as protection for the individual liberties of 
suspects and defendants, especially those who were members of racial minorities. Federal 
corrections officials had special difficulty deflecting charges of entrenched institutionalized 
racism as prison populations became increasingly Hispanic and African American.88  
The war on organized crime the federal government waged in the period increasingly 
relied on the commerce power. Take, for example, the Wire Fraud Act of 1953, signed into law 
by President Eisenhower, which prohibited “interstate wire, radio, or television” transmissions to 
effectuate “any scheme or artifice to defraud.”89 Equally reliant on commerce power was the 
Narcotic Control Act of 1956, whose text recognized the growing interstate and international 
dynamics of the trafficking in addictive substances.90 President John F. Kennedy, on the 
initiative of United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, signed into law on September 
13, 1961, the Interstate Wire Act of 1961, which targeted persons who “engaged in the business 
of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in 
interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers.”91 According to Attorney General Robert F. 
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Kennedy at the time, “It is quite evident that modern, organized, commercial gambling 
operations are so completely intertwined with the Nation's communications systems that denial 
of their use to the gambling fraternity would be a mortal blow to their operations.”92 Also on 
September 13, 1961, President Kennedy signed the Interstate and Foreign Travel or 
Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises Act, which targeted any interstate “business 
enterprise involving gambling, illegal liquor sales, trade in banned narcotics, and prostitution.”93 
On the same day, he signed into law the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act 
of 1961, which penalized the transportation across state lines or in foreign commerce “any 
record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing, or other device” for 
bookmaking, “wagering pools with respect to a sporting event, or “numbers, policy, bolita, or 
similar game. . .” 94 
While Congress continued with its reshaping of the federal-state relationship via Commerce 
Clause legislation, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren dramatically changed its 
jurisprudence in this regard. Warren was nominated by President Eisenhower and was appointed 
on October 5, 1953 after Chief Justice Vinson died suddenly the previous month.  Warren had 
been elected three times as governor of California and was the Republican vice-presidential 
nominee in Thomas Dewey’s run in 1948.  Eisenhower believed he would bring “integrity, 
uprightness, and courage” to the Court.95   
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The appointment by President Eisenhower of Earl Warren to the office of chief justice of 
the Supreme Court, which he assumed in October 1953, put in motion changes on the high bench 
that would ultimately shift the balance of power of the Court decisively in the direction of more 
liberal, instrumental decision making – and pave the wave for Congress to employ its commerce 
power in wholly unprecedented ways. Warren was deeply committed to the belief that the Court 
had a social responsibility to deal with the problems facing the United States at the time but did 
not have much faith in the capacity of democratic legislative processes to do so. The persistence 
of all white legislatures in the southern states seemed to portend the endless persistence of Jim 
Crow and other kinds of racial oppression in the South. Analysts commonly associate the work 
of the Warren Court with “substantive liberal jurisprudence,” which harked back to the era of 
judicial realism, at least to the extent that it privileged outcomes over the processes from which 
they derived. And to this extent, Chief Justice Warren was at odds with associate justices Felix 
Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson, although the chief justice had strong allies in justices Hugo 
Black and William O. Douglas.96 The approach employed by Chief Justice Warren and his 
ideological brothers entailed also the belief in a “living Constitution,” that is, the idea that the 
meaning of the foundational document had changed and was intended to change over time, 
through the deliberate power of judicial review, to meet the ever-changing exigencies of 
fundamental justice. According to Yale law professor Eugene Rostow, writing in January 1952, 
“[t]he power of judicial review stands. . . as an integral feature of the living constitution, long 
since established as a working part of the democratic political life of the nation.”97  
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Scholarship on the Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren includes 
relatively little systematic discussion of its responses to the increasingly pervasive employment 
by Congress of the commerce power in the period 1954-1963. By and large, scholars cast the 
Warren Court as a powerful engine for progress – extending New Deal liberalism in numerous 
new directions. Morton J. Horwitz for example, details how, with landmark decisions such as 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Court initiated a revolution in race relations and, 
among other things, expanded the constitutional guarantee of “equal protection of the laws.98 
Lucas A. Powe refutes the view that the decisions of the Warren Court were intended, simply, to 
protect vulnerable minorities. According to him, the Warren Court, at least in the 1960s, was, in 
fact, a partner in “Kennedy-Johnson liberalism” – imposing national liberal-elite values on 
groups he calls “outliers”: rural populations, the white South, and areas of Roman Catholic 
dominance.99 A collection of essays edited by Harry N. Scheiber suggest that the activism of the 
Warren Court spurred a reconsideration of the judicial role in many areas of the world – one that 
advanced substantive human rights.100 Writing in 2004, Michal R. Belknap revisits the 
accomplishments of the Warren Court but explores with special care the highly controversial 
political and cultural effects of its rulings.101 
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The judicial activism of the Warren Court that first appeared in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) took eight years to reach full strength. While the Supreme Court rendered the 
landmark decision on May 17, 1954, with a unanimous opinion – that result owed a great deal to 
the leadership and determination of its author, Chief Justice Warren. Justices Felix Frankfurter 
and Robert H. Jackson loathed racial segregation. But they, as well as Justice Stanley F. Reed, 
were convinced that “separate but equal” was not unconstitutional under the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And many liberal Court watchers were relieved and elated 
that Justice Reed agreed not to write a dissent to this effect.102 The balance of power on the 
Court, from the perspective of its liberal justices, was not at all improved when President 
Eisenhower appointed John Marshal Harlan II, who took office in March 1955, to replace the 
retiring Justice Felix Frankfurter. Similarly to Frankfurter, Justice Harlan was a strong proponent 
of process jurisprudence and judicial restraint, routinely making it known that the Supreme Court 
ought not to do what only legislators were authorized to do.103 Eisenhower appointee liberal 
Democrat William J. Brennan, Jr., who took office in October 1956, led the faction that included 
justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas. Brennan complemented the leadership and 
consensus-building skills of the chief justice with a solid understanding of the constitutional 
jurisprudence pertinent to the issues that the liberal justices deemed most important. 
Appointments by President John F. Kennedy in his second year in office helped Chief Justice 
Warren undergird his approach to changing the law. Giving the liberal wing a solid 5-4 majority 
was the addition of former college football and NFL great, Rhodes Scholar, World War II hero, 
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commercial lawyer, and Kennedy supporter Byron White, who replaced Charles Evans 
Whittaker in April 1962. In September of that year, the addition of labor union lawyer, Kennedy 
administration secretary of labor, and Democrat party wheel horse Arthur Goldberg reinforced 
the dominance of what Felix Frankfurter once dubbed “the liberal axis.”104  
 Having established his winning coalition, Chief Justice Earl Warren spurred the Supreme 
Court to render another ruling, unrelated to commerce power, that combined with the 1954 
Brown decision both further to alienate and, ultimately, placate a substantial segment of the 
white South. The May 1955 decision Brown v. Board of Education, dubbed “Brown II,” 
reiterated Brown I and required racially segregated school districts to desegregate with “all 
deliberate speed.”105 But this vague mandate gave Jim Crow die-hards a bit of hope; recalcitrant 
southern political leaders and school authorities interpreted the ruling to mean that there was no 
urgency to include black children in their public schools. To the end of the Eisenhower 
administration, federal district courts bolstered this perception by refraining, with a few 
exceptions, from taking aggressive action. Strident reaction to Brown I and Brown II was limited 
largely to the Deep South.106 According Lawrence A. Welsch, writing about his experience in  
the late 1950s, “Impeach Earl Warren” yard signs became increasingly visible as one traveled by 
car through Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and then into a bastion of the 
movement – Georgia.107 Southern governors such as Orval Faubus of Arkansas in 1957 and 
George Wallace of Alabama in 1963 tapped into rising white anger against federal court ordered 
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school desegregation to advance their political careers. But many Americans, including moderate 
southerners, approved cautious federal action to end racial injustice. And, according to historian 
David E. Kyvig, even those who did not approve such action generally believed that the Deep 
South campaign to impeach Earl Warren was “a little bizarre.”108   
Several other liberal Warren Court decisions unrelated to Commerce Clause power 
rendered in 1962 and 1963, it should be observed, roiled political waters. The decision in Baker 
v. Carr (1962), which made legislative apportionment, as between overrepresented rural districts 
and rapidly growing urban centers, a justiciable question was certainly controversial. Less 
contentious, but important, was the 1963 ruling of the Court in Gideon v Wainwright, which held 
that the Sixth Amendment required states to provide indigent criminal defendants with publicly 
funded counsel.109 But most Americans, including many white southerners, did not immediately 
connect these rulings to the controversies surrounding racially segregated schools or the civil 
rights of black southerners. More than a few conservatives, in the South and elsewhere, were 
certainly disturbed or even angered by the 1962 First Amendment decision Engel v. Vitale, 
which outlawed mandatory school prayer, and the 1963 First Amendment ruling Abington 
School District v. Schempp, which imposed a total ban on prayer and Bible reading in public 
schools.110 But the “school question” was not new, as it had arisen initially in the mid-nineteenth 
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century, when massive Catholic immigration had swelled urban populations and began to make 
Protestant Bible reading in public schools a constitutional issue – under state constitution 
freedom and establishment of religion protections. Great respect for the First Amendment and its 
principles prompted thoughtful conservatives, at least initially, to react cautiously to the two 
Warren Court decisions.111 
More than a few Warren Court decisions that underwrote an expanding commerce power 
were, to some extent, politically invisible because few Americans could disagree with their 
salutary policy objectives. Consider United States v. Five Gambling Devices (1953). In this case, 
the Court confronted a law in which Congress (1) outlawed cross-border shipments of gambling 
machines into states that had not specifically exempted themselves from the act’s coverage; and 
(2) to effectuate this prohibition, also required all sellers of gambling devices to file monthly 
reports with federal authorities detailing each sale of a device.112 One issue presented by the case 
was whether the reporting requirement extended to purely intrastate sales. In considering this 
question, four Justices were prepared to say that the reporting provision did apply to intrastate 
sales and that, thus applied, it was constitutional because it helped “make effective and 
enforceable the interstate shipment ban” by complicating efforts to evade the ban through 
“straw-man transactions. . . and the like.”113 Three Justices, however, argued that application of 
the law to purely intrastate transfers raised “serious constitutional questions” and accordingly 
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interpreted the reporting requirement to apply only to interstate transfers.114 The other two 
Justices did not speak to commerce-power issues because they focused instead on constitutional 
vagueness problems.  Perhaps the most important implication of the decision was that it 
advanced the proposition that Congress had the power to regulate intrastate behavior involving 
any object that had previously crossed a state line. “Justice Clark, writing for the only four 
Justices who reached the commerce power issue, found it “clearly established” that “activities 
local in nature may be regulated . . . if local goods . . . were previously in interstate 
commerce.”115  
The Warren Court expanded the boundaries of FLSA coverage through the early 1960s (and 
later), particularly in the construction industry. In its 1955 decision Mitchell v. Vollmer, the 
Court overturned lower court decisions interpreting the FLSA to deny overtime pay to 
employees working on the Algiers Lock and Canal, in Orleans Parish, Louisiana, which was 
“new construction” and not yet physically connected to the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. 
Defendant Vollmer had taken the position that its employees working on the Algiers Lock were, 
under the circumstances, not engaged in interstate commerce and, thus, not covered by the wage 
and hour provisions of the act. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, did not 
agree. In his view, “[t]he question whether an employee is engaged ‘in commerce’ within the 
meaning of the present Act is determined by practical considerations, not by technical 
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conceptions.” According to him, “the test is whether the work is so directly and vitally related to 
the functioning of an instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce as to be, in practical 
effect, a part of it, rather than isolated local activity.” This ruling summarily dismissed earlier 
precedents to the contrary and constituted something of a breakthrough for extending the FLSA 
to virtually all interstate transportation-related construction.116 In January 1959, the Court ruled 
on the disputed FLSA wage and hour claims demands brought by the nearly seventy employees 
of the architectural and consulting engineering firm Lublin, McGaughy, and Associates, which 
had offices in Norfolk, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., and which routinely contracted with the 
Department of Defense and had clients in multiple states. Writing for the majority was Chief 
Justice Warren, who, first, declared that the decision of Congress not to extend FLSA coverage 
to all employees whose work merely “affected interstate commerce” did not require the Court to 
narrowly circumscribe the key FLSA coverage rubric “engaged in commerce.” According to 
him, “’the activities of the employees show clearly that they are 'engaged in commerce' and thus 
are eligible for the protections afforded by the Act.”117 
In a March 1959, the Warren Court rendered a decision that established rather clearly the 
growing power of the “dormant commerce clause.” Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines dealt with an 
Illinois statute requiring long-bed trucks to have a distinctive type of curved mudguard behind 
wheel wells, which the state insisted was safer than the straight ones that at multitude of other 
states required. Plaintiffs, who were multi-state trucking companies, objected to the 
inconvenience of having to change their equipment when entering Illinois. On appeal from 
several rulings against the plaintiffs, the only question for the Supreme Court was whether, in the 
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absence of a federal regulation, one state, Illinois in this case, could mandate irregular equipment 
standards consistent with the imperatives of the “dormant commerce clause.” Writing for the 
majority, Justice William O. Douglas, declared that the Court could not sustain the Illinois 
statute unless it could conclude that “the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing 
accidents and casualties” outweighed “the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free 
from interferences which seriously impede it . . .” A unanimous Court held the statute 
unconstitutional. Most observers probably agreed that a uniform mudguard regulation was best. 
But the decision set an important precedent and, equally important, clearly signaled state 
governments that Congress would exercise considerable jurisdiction over the nation’s 
increasingly busy highways and, especially, those comprising its emerging interstate highway 
system.118  
Congress employed its commerce power innovatively to pass the Clean Air Act of 1955, 
raising some of the key issues that would help define the cultural and political conflicts 
powerfully marking the decades after 1963: industrial environmental degradation and the 
allocation of authority among local, state, and federal governments to address the problem. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, similarly to his cousin Theodore, had been deeply committed to 
conservation and promoted numerous federal program to advance this cause. After World War 
II, conservationists in the United States mobilized to thwart several industrial projects 
threatening to wilderness lands. In the mid-1940s, residents of Los Angeles began to complain of 
“smog,” widely understood to be substantially produced by automobile emissions. In October 
1948, a temperature inversion produced heavy smog in Donora, Pennsylvania, for five days, 
killing twenty people and making hundreds more seriously ill. Publicity surrounding this tragic 
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event and other similar ones, in part, a consequence of industrial labor activism, substantially 
increased public concerns about atmospheric contamination.119 On the heels of a National Air 
Pollution Symposium held at Stanford Research Institute in November 1949, congressional 
committees began crafting a complicated piece of legislation that would became the Clean Air 
Act of 1955. The Democrat-controlled Congress and President Eisenhower, however, ultimately 
employed an approach that quite gingerly deferred to the traditional sovereign authority of 
individual states. Passed on July 14th of that year, the preamble of the act declared that it was 
designed to “provide research and technical assistance relating to air pollution control,” which 
the surgeon general of the United States would coordinate. It further declared that air pollution 
was a hazard to public health but reserved “the primary responsibilities and rights of the states 
and local government in controlling air pollution.” Section 7 of the act, however, stipulated 
rather pointedly that none of the provisions of the act “shall . . .  limit the authority of any 
department or agency of the United States to conduct or make grants-in-aid or contracts for 
research and experiments relating to air pollution under the authority of any other law.”120  
In April 1960, a notable Supreme Court decision articulated the federal preemption 
doctrine and dormant commerce power in ways that further pointed to the looming controversies 
over industrial environmental contamination and the competing claims of federal and state 
authorities to jurisdiction over the problem. In December 1955, the City of Detroit prosecuted the 
Huron Portland Cement Co. in its municipal Recorder’s Court for violating the Detroit Smoke 
Abatement Act by allowing excessive boiler emissions from company ships during loading and 
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unloading at its cement mill. The company sued in the state circuit court to enjoin the city from 
further prosecution and from otherwise enforcing the smoke ordinance against its vessels, 
“except where the emission of smoke is caused by the improper firing or the improper use of the 
equipment upon said vessels.” The circuit court refused to grant relief, the Supreme Court of 
Michigan affirmed the refusal, and the cement company appealed the decision to the United 
States Supreme Court.121 There, the appellants argued that, since their vessels and equipment had 
been federally inspected, approved, and licensed to operate in interstate commerce “in 
accordance with a comprehensive system of regulation enacted by Congress,” the City of Detroit 
could not constitutionally legislate to impose “additional or inconsistent standards.” In so doing, 
Huron Portland Cement invoked the long-established “preemption doctrine.” Second, the 
company argued that, even if Congress had not expressly preempted the field of regulating air 
quality, the Smoke Abatement Act “materially affects interstate commerce in matters where 
uniformity is necessary” and that, under the “dormant commerce power,” the ordinance could 
not stand.122 
In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, writing for the majority was Justice 
Potter Stewart, an Eisenhower appointee who replaced Justice Harold H. Burton and a moderate 
pragmatist who sometimes followed strict construction principles. The decision was one that 
necessarily had to allow that, as of early 1960, many Americans had grown deeply concerned 
about air pollution in the more populous industrial cities of the United States and that Congress 
had not yet ventured to impose clean air regulations on industry.123 
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The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting the health and welfare 
of the city’s inhabitants. Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that 
people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of 
what is compendiously known as the police power.124 
 
Justice Stewart conceded that “[e]venhanded local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest is valid unless preempted by federal action.” In his view, however, no such 
preemption had occurred in this case; in his words, “such intent is not to be implied unless the 
act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.” On the other 
hand, he seemed to leave the door open for new regulatory arrangements by saying that, in the 
exercise of its police power, “the states and their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of 
interstate commerce and maritime activities, concurrently with the federal government.”125  
The majority, it seems, more easily dismissed the argument of the appellants that “the 
Detroit ordinance, quite apart from the effect of federal legislation,” imposed an undue burden on 
interstate commerce. The dormant commerce clause would have no place in the decision. 
According to the majority, this argument “needs no extended discussion. State regulation, based 
on the police power, which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to 
disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand.” The judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Michigan was affirmed.126   
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That the majority in Huron Portland Cement had found a way to sustain enforcement of 
the Detroit Smoke Abatement Act was entirely unacceptable to Justice William O. Douglas. 
Ensnared in the contradictions raised by commitments to clean air and the perceived need to 
expand federal regulatory authority, the champion of liberal causes appears to have decided it 
would be best to err on the side of centralizing power. In his dissent, which Justice Frankfurter 
joined, he declared that the ordinance was in direct conflict with the federal statute that had 
required inspection of the ships owned by Huron Portland Cement, indeed, with federal action 
that had, in fact, licensed them to operate on the waterways of the United States. Clearly, federal 
legislation had preempted the field of regulation into which the Smoke Abatement Code 
intruded. “Here, we have a criminal prosecution against a shipowner and officers of two of its 
vessels for using the very equipment on these vessels which the Federal Government says may 
be used.” Justice Douglas was vehement in his view that the Detroit ordinance was “squarely in 
conflict with the federal statute.” Allowing its enforcement would be “crippling” to the federal 
ship licensing apparatus. Harking back to an 1851 decision of the Court, Justice Douglas intoned: 
“What we do today is in disregard of the doctrine long accepted . . .  ‘No State law can hinder or 
obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act of Congress.’”127  
The Clean Air Act of 1963, signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson in December of 
that year, increased considerably federal Commerce Clause authority to impose clean air 
standards. The act extended authorization for federal officials to cooperate with their state and 
local counterparts in the areas of research and technology; the act even reiterated the claim that 
“prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and 
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local governments.”128 But the new legislation also announced that “urbanization, industrial 
development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles” had created air pollution in major urban 
areas that “generally cross the Boundary lines of local jurisdictions and often extend into two or 
more states.” Air pollution that wafted across state lines was creating “mounting dangers to the 
public health and welfare, including injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the 
deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation.”129 The act lent the power 
of the Justice Department to individual states and municipalities who could not, on their own, 
ensure clean air standards within their own jurisdictions. More important for the purposes of this 
discussion, was a new dispensation to deal with the problem of air contaminants released in one 
state that threatened the health of persons in one or more other states; upon the request of any 
governor or state or municipal pollution control authority in adversely affected jurisdictions, the 
secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was “authorized to request the 
Attorney General to bring a suit on behalf of the United States to secure abatement of pollution” 
– at least after mandatory consultations with all interested state and local agencies and the failure 
of those having jurisdiction over violators to take recommended remedial action.130 The process 
was cumbersome. When the next major revision of the Clean Air Act came on November 21, 
1967, Johnson administration secretaries of HEW Anthony J. Celebrezze and John W. Garner 
had received only three requests for interstate pollution abatement. But they had instituted five 
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such actions on their own recognizance.131 And major amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1963, 
from 1965 through 1970, would ramp up substantially the power of HEW functionaries and the 
Department of Justice to impose unilaterally clean air standards on myriad industries and the 
manufacturers of motor vehicles.132 
Portending the rise of culture war conflict no less than liberal Warren Court rulings and 
the advance of federal authority to impose environmental controls was the passage of the 1963 
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, also known as the Equal Pay Act. As discussed, 
the 1949 FLSA Amendments Act had exempted from wage and hour coverage numerous 
categories of employment in which women were far more likely to be included than men. But 
advocates for women’s rights had not remained mute. During floor debate in the House, 
Democrat Representative from California Helen Gahagan Douglas declared that she was 
speaking for all women and that unless the act was amended to do away with sex-specific 
exemptions, “10,000 women will be uncovered.” Historians have noted the hilarity this 
phraseology produced among her male colleagues on the scene and their unwillingness to abide 
by her admonitions. But such complaints would not go away. The 1955 FLSA, similarly to 
earlier revisions, continued to exempt categories in which women were substantially 
overrepresented133 The 1961 FLSA amendments expanded the scope of the act by providing 
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“enterprise coverage” to all employees working for companies that grossed annually more than 
$500,000, while also extending coverage to those employed by schools, hospitals, and nursing 
homes. And it said nothing about the continued exemptions that affected women 
disproportionately or the problem of women receiving less compensation for the same kinds of 
employment than men.134 But these were injustices that a new generation of feminists publicly 
decried in unrestrained terms and that President John Kennedy, accordingly, sought to repair. 
By spring 1963, the legislative processes connected to amending the FLSA provided an 
important arena for competing interests to hash out its wage, hour, and coverage mandates. The 
voices of women’s rights activists were heard – and in clarion tones. April 1963 hearings before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Labor featured the testimony of at least eight prominent women, 
including U.S. Senator of Oregon Maurine Neuberger, who was a member of President 
Kennedy’s Commission on the Status of Women; Caroline Davis, director of the Women’s 
Department of the UAW, and staff attorney for the ACLU Sonia Pressman. Assistant Secretary 
of Labor Esther Peterson commanded considerable attention on the first day of hearings by, as 
her first order of business, bluntly denouncing the injustice of unequal pay for women, especially 
those who were not members of unions. She offered written testimonials penned by ordinary 
women workers and statistical reports documenting inequitable pay scales and other kinds of sex 
discrimination in employment, including unequal initial hire pay and differential promotion 
practices.135 President Kennedy signed the bill into law on June 10, 1963. According to the act, 
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Congress had concluded that sex discrimination depressed wages and living standards necessary 
for the health and efficiency of employees; had the effect of creating labor disputes, which 
adversely affected and obstructed commerce; otherwise burdened commerce and the free flow of 
goods; and constituted an unfair method of competition.136 
Statute by statute, Congress pushed the commerce power envelope in the period 1946-
1963, and the Supreme Court, through both Republican and Democratic administrations, 
generally ratified such innovations. Tensions in the Supreme Court between process 
jurisprudence and substantive liberal jurisprudence significantly modulated but did not thwart 
this powerful trajectory. Through the period, the Supreme Court continued to underwrite 
expanded employment of commerce power with no less enthusiasm than had the 1937 New Deal 
Court, notwithstanding that some measures appealed more or less to individual justices staked 
out along the ideological spectrum. Through the very height of the Cold War, the Supreme Court 
ratified wage and hour regulations and antitrust measures in ways that warmed the hearts of 
liberals, while sometimes approving measures that especially met the approval of conservatives, 
such as criminal statutes aimed at weakening organized labor and purging its leadership of 
communism. Congressional enactments that won the imprimatur of the Court sometimes took 
aim at national ills that Americans across the political spectrum could, to some extent, approve, 
such as food and drug regulations to protect consumers or those that empowered federal 
authorities to ferret out multistate organized crime. In any case, measures that, in novel ways, 
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regulated local economic activity in the name of interstate commerce and imposed new costs on 
business most often raised the eyebrows of conservatives jealous of local power, regardless of 
the extent to which ordinary Americans understood such innovations as encroachments on their 
personal liberty.  
Most informed commenters, by fall 1963, understood very well that President John F. 
Kennedy and the Warren Court were charting new liberal territory. Certainly, right-wing 
opponents railed against Kennedy and his politics.137 Instrumental Warren Court decisions 
related to and unconnected to commerce power through 1963 were certainly sometimes 
controversial. New commerce power interventions on behalf of environmental protection and 
equal pay for women from 1960 through 1963 portended a sea change in federal relations. But 
they only hinted at the coming political and cultural tsunami that would owe much to a limited 
constitutional power that post-war lawmakers and judges could not resist employing as a general 
police power. 
In the period 1946-1963, commerce power, more than any other constitutional authority, 
fueled the rise of a regulatory state that was far more voluminous and complex than in the pre-
World War II era. Well-intended lawmakers and jurists set about this task on behalf of causes 
perceived variously by Americans as heroic, necessary, or reprehensible. But they did so in a 
time of affluence, when the problems of excessive deficit spending, crippling national debt, and 
the extensive socioeconomic and cultural costs of compliance with regulatory measures 
grounded in the commerce power remained largely unrecognized and unimagined.  
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Chapter Three  
 
Remaking the Country with a Virtual Police Power, 1964-1998 
 
The “Great Society” programs of President Lyndon Johnson built upon the New Deal 
foundations that Franklin Roosevelt had established, and, in doing so, effectively tied an 
increasing number of individuals directly to the welfare and reform initiatives of the federal 
government. But such programs affected far more than the autonomy of impoverished 
unfortunates, the lives of struggling workers, and the civil rights of long-oppressed racial 
minorities.  In the period 1964-1998, the rapidly growing volume of federal statutes, regulations, 
and administrative agencies produced among a substantial segment of American society a deep 
apprehension about an increasingly powerful central government both out of control and out of 
touch with ordinary people on numerous sensitive issues. Of no little consequence to the brewing 
culture wars was a growing bureaucracy of federal operatives, often with few or no personal ties 
to constituent communities. The rapid pace of elite-driven liberal-progressive reform spurred 
reaction among many Americans uneasy with the increasing size, expense, and intrusiveness of 
government into intimate relations, family matters, and local institutions, such as public 
elementary and secondary schools, previously deemed to be at least responsive to community 
preferences. Such dissatisfaction rose steadily as ever-more-aggressive law enforcement tactics 
advanced by conservatives spurred complaints, especially among African Americans, of an 
emerging police state. More than a few “from-the-top-down” reforms left families and 
communities feeling far away from the centers of state and federal power. Equally disturbing to 
such people were federal legislative and judicial encroachments on personal liberties, such as the 
right to bear arms and the thoroughgoing secularization of public schools. 
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Congressional legislation and resulting Supreme Court decisions that implicated commerce 
power and state-federal relations powerfully roiled the ideological conflicts constituting the 
“culture wars” from the beginning of the period under study in this chapter. Partisan pressures 
produced congressional legislation based on the Commerce Clause aimed at improving the rights 
of racial and ethnic minorities, as well as women of any race and members of the LGBT 
community. Other measures based on commerce power reconfigured customary individual 
liberties. In addition to enlarging the scope of New Deal measures aimed at raising the wages 
and limiting the hours of ordinary workers – new regulatory regimes also imposed increasing 
costs and regimentation on private businesses and whole industries to protect endangered species 
and reduce despoliation of the environment. Particularly controversial were the efforts of liberals 
in Congress to enlist commerce power to limit Second Amendment rights, especially the 
availability of handguns and so-called “assault rifles.” Conservatives in Congress produced 
statutes designed to combat crime, especially to police more aggressively “controlled 
substances” and the growing traffic in narcotic drugs that increasingly spanned the borders of 
states and of the United States. Intensifying partisan conflict even more was conservative 
legislation based on commerce power that sought to impose limits on the availability of post-
viability abortion. 
For the most part, Congress and the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist courts in the period 
1964-1998 combined, in a dialectical fashion, to establish and sustain most Commerce Clause-
based legislation that powerfully stoked political and cultural conflict. Some of the more 
contentious measures regulated or criminally penalized activities that bore no discernible 
connection to interstate commerce and seemed to encroach on the traditional criminal 
jurisdiction of the state governments. But the growing proportion of conservative justices on the 
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Court increasingly produced decisions that calibrated Commerce Clause-based measures to keep 
their mandates within the bounds of the New Federalism, which emerged full-blown during the 
tenure of Chief Justice William Rehnquist. While the Warren and Burger courts underwrote the 
seemingly open-ended “substantial effects test” first articulated in the New Deal Era, the 
Rehnquist Court refrained from further expanding the categorical scope of this potent source of 
centralizing power and, in keeping with New Federalism principles, rendered Commerce Clause 
decisions upholding the sovereign prerogative of the states to refuse to be “commandeered” into 
federal regulatory schemes. 
Historical assessment of legislative and judicial development of Commerce Clause power so 
intense as to figure centrally in the “culture wars” is supported by an expansive body of 
scholarship. Numerous historians, such as Samuel P. Huntington and Michael Ignatieff, have 
investigated the noisy debates over difference, acceptable behavior, rights and privileges of 
citizenship, indeed, what it actually meant to be an American in the last few decades of the 
twentieth century and opening years of the twenty-first century.1 Many of these debates were 
rooted in the civil rights movement, the resulting larger individual rights revolution, and the 
evolving rules that prescribed race, gender, and sexual orientations. Other contention arose over 
the renewal of unregulated illegal immigration during the 1980s and 1990s. Rapidly changing 
demography, in the context of an internet information revolution, produced competition over 
whose representations of American-ness were to be accepted and respected. Exacerbating such 
tensions were the increasing commitment of government agencies, including public schools, to 
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eliminating all references to religion – and the consequences of de-industrialization, an increase 
in lower-paying service jobs, and other changes brought on by post-Cold War “globalization.” 
The scholarship of Martha Minow reveals carefully the many ways the American legal system 
dealt unfairly with people facing such changes because of race, gender, religion, ethnicity, age, 
and disability. Drawing on literary and feminist theories, as well as social history and 
anthropology, Minow identifies an array of unstated assumptions that tended to regenerate legal 
discrimination.2  Her work also illuminates the myriad legalities bearing on explosive issues such 
as affirmative action, LGBT rights, racial segregation and redistricting, and “identity politics.”3 
Timothy J. Conlan argues that, from about 1970 through the early 1990s, Republican Party 
leaders launched several initiatives to reduce federal authority that liberal activists viewed as 
essential for progress. The Republican goal of advancing decentralization had divergent policy 
objectives and drew on diverse philosophical positions, but certainly rolling back the so-called 
“welfare state” and returning power to state and local governments was of critical important to 
the “new federalism” that such conservatives sought to advance.4 
Steven Schier demonstrates how, after the close of the Cold War, the disintegration of the 
Democrat Party New Deal coalition and the growing strength of a Republican-forged alliance of 
social and business moderates fundamentally shaped the politics of the 1990s and early twenty-
first centuries.5 During the 1990s, the so-called “new Democrats,” led by President Bill Clinton, 
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aimed to replace the older and shrinking industrial and agricultural ranks of their party with a 
new, if not unwieldy, coalition of women, racial and ethnic minorities, social liberals, and 
technological progressives, whose greatest concentrations were in the larger urban centers of the 
country. Both the Democratic and Republican parties paid their respects to older voters – but 
both parties strove energetically to improve their attraction to younger ones – anticipating the 
expected mass exodus of the “baby boomers” from public life. The work of Joseph E. Stiglitz 
demonstrates rather well how the leadership of both major parties in the United States at least 
purported to be interested in coming to terms with the various ways that globalization, the 
offshoring of jobs, and the decreasing availability of well-paying employment was reorganizing 
the contours of the economy, social relations, and domestic politics.6 
Thomas Frank shows how, in 1994, Republicans captured control of Congress by promising 
a Republican “Contract with America” that suggested the Democrats in Congress had abandoned 
basic principles of moral and responsible government. Although Bill Clinton had won election in 
1992 by stressing economic problems, “cultural issues,” in fact, drove the political agendas of 
the two national parties – issues such as gun control, abortion, LGBT rights, rising urban crime 
rates and seemingly unlimited welfare program spending. The ensuing struggle between Clinton 
and the Republicans, indeed, the conflict giving rise to the popular usage of the phrase “culture 
wars,” became so acrimonious that it even led to a brief shut down of the government in the 
winter of 1995-1996.7 According to Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, during the 
Clinton administration, powerful currents reshaped the fundamental character of American 
politics and civil life – in particular, the continued decline of political party organization and of 
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longstanding civic institutions that had once helped to mediate political conflict. Equally 
problematic was the increasing dominance of an interconnected electronic media and 
professional political class that seemed, increasingly, to dominate elections and government 
policy making.8  
James Davison Hunter introduced the expression “culture wars” in his 1991 publication 
Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Hunter described what he saw as a dramatic 
realignment and polarization that had transformed American culture and politics. He argued that 
an increasing number of inflammatory issues powerfully generated two antagonistic political 
polarities. Among the most polarizing were divergent views regarding such explosive issues as 
abortion, gun ownership and violence, religious freedom, recreational drug use, and 
homosexuality. As well, maintains Hunter, American society had divided along these same lines 
to produce two warring camps of partisans who defined themselves primarily by ideological 
world views, rather than by nominal religion, ethnicity, social class, or even political party 
affiliation. Hunter defines the opposite poles of this polarity in terms of “progressivism” and 
“orthodoxy.”9 
According to Andrew Hartman, Pat Buchanan’s 1992 speech at the Republican National 
Convention marked a high point in the growing cultural polarization. In 1990, Buchanan had 
launched a campaign for the Republican Party nomination for president against incumbent 
George H. W. Bush. His “prime time” televised address at the Republican convention gave the 
political trope “culture war” its most powerful impetus. According to Buchanan, “There is a 
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religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to 
the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself.” While giving due coverage to 
problems he identified with extremist forms of environmentalism and feminism, he cast the 
defining issue of the moment as, fundamentally, a crisis in public morality. The agenda [Bill] 
Clinton and [Hillary] Clinton would impose on America, he declared — “abortion on demand, a 
litmus test for the Supreme Court, homosexual rights, discrimination against religious schools, 
women in combat units—that's change, all right.  But it is not the kind of change America wants. 
It is not the kind of change America needs. And it is not the kind of change we can tolerate in a 
nation that we still call God’s country.” A month later, Buchanan characterized the conflict as 
struggle over power and American society’s definition of right and wrong.  
But, of considerable importance for this study, Hartman argues that the origins of the culture 
wars lay in the upheavals of the 1960s. Far more than a contemporaneous political clash limited 
to the early 1990s, the culture wars constituted the “public face” of  protracted struggle in the 
United States over changes in norms that had long governed American life, alterations that 
ushered in, over decades, an openness to different ideas, identities, and articulations of what it 
meant to be an American. The “hot button” issues of abortion, affirmative action, art, censorship, 
feminism, and gay and lesbian rights that dominated politics in the early 1990s were, in fact, 
symptoms of a larger struggle commenced in the Civil Rights movement, when conservative 
citizens gradually began to deal with—if initially through strident rejection—many fundamental 
transformations of American life.10 
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Matthew C. Moen and Donna M. Binkiewicz demonstrate that “culture wars” contention 
over the national endowments for the arts and humanities had a significant impact on national 
politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Front page controversy plagued the NEA throughout 
the presidency of George H. W. Bush and that of Bill Clinton, as conservative critics publicized 
the work of NEA-funded artists that a substantial segment of the general public found distasteful, 
if not shocking in some instances. Perhaps the most controversial NEA-sponsored museum 
exhibitions were the “homoerotic” photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano’s 
crucifix-in-urine photograph titled “Piss Christ.” In 1990, after further public debates drawing 
into question the volume of federal tax dollars spent on what many conservatives deemed to be 
obscenity and blasphemy, Congress installed stricter procedures to exert more oversight. 
Critiques of the policies of the NEA grew louder in 1991. Conservative academics complained 
publicly about the threat that “political correctness” posed to their standing and the scholarly 
subject matter they researched and sought to teach. Conservative dissenters insisted that left-
leaning academics were attempting totally to silence their voices by decrying conservative 
intellectual arguments and viewpoints as entirely outside the bounds of decent, acceptable 
debate. Conservatives charged that “multiculturalism,” while reasonable and good when 
presented in the abstract, in academic practice, amounted to an attack on foundational ideas of 
the western literary and philosophical tradition, not to mention millennium-old ideas about 
marriage, sexuality, family, work, religion, and community life.11  
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Richard Jensen reveals how liberal-left partisans declared that 1994 was the year of the 
“angry white male” — responding, it seems, to the determined resistance of some to the excesses 
of increasingly aggressive efforts to eliminate the expression of conservative ideas. In the wake 
of several ambitious programs advanced by the Clinton administration, such as the controversial 
1993 Health Security Bill, conservatives began to express the view loudly that Washington, 
D.C., had grown too culturally distant from the people residing outside “the beltway.” The 
election swept into power an aggressive Republican majority led by university professor and 
House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA), who boldly and publicly dedicated himself to 
instituting substantial cuts in federal spending. Gingrich, it seems, had few qualms about tying 
this campaign to a felt need among conservative Republicans to recover “fiscal sanity,” downsize 
expensive and ineffective government bureaucracy, and, basically, bring the entrenched political 
elite to heel.12  
Andrew Hartman, Eric Foner, Gary B Nash, and others show that the rhetoric of conservative 
culture warriors such as Gingrich and Republican control of Congress beginning in early 1994 
spurred open debates over the development of national educational standards, including the 
question of whether the study of United States history should be advanced as a reasonable 
avenue to promoting a knowledgeable, loyal citizenry or in a fashion more “critical,” that is, one 
that would give more attention, or even exclusive attention, to the oppressiveness of American 
slavery, racism, patriarchy, imperialism, capitalism, sexism, and homophobia.13 As a 
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consequence, the “culture wars” reached an unprecedented level of intensity in 1995 as the 
newly empowered Republicans in Congress set out to defund or privatize the National 
Endowment for the Humanities, the National Endowment for the Arts, and the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting.  
Philip N. Howard and Gary W. Selnow reveal how the “culture wars,” by the turn of the new 
millennium, raged endlessly on 24/7 cable television, internet webpages, and blogs, and had 
become especially heated in election seasons. Through the presidency of George H. W. Bush, 
and for most of the presidency of Bill Clinton, Congress remained in the hands of the Republican 
Party – locked in a culture wars stalemate that, by the end of 1998, seemed, at times, to turn on 
the veracity of the charge that the president had permitted himself illicit sexual liberties with a 
White House aide.14  
Mapping the steady legislative extension of Commerce Clause power to achieve dearly-held 
partisan goals, statute by statute, and case-by-case is unfeasible. Such a catalogue, even with the 
briefest of entries, could easily run on for hundreds of pages, if not thousands. But a description 
of the most contentious and well-known congressional legislation and Supreme Court decisions 
serves to illustrate the exponential growth and concentration of power by the federal government 
– a development that was central to growing political and cultural polarization in the period 
under study. However, it should be kept in mind that congressional statutes and federal court 
decisions treated specifically herein constituted but a fraction of similar initiatives giving rise to 
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a massive federal regulatory apparatus, or “administrative state,” a key point of partisan 
contention in the period. A progressive school of interpretation emphasizes that the 
administrative state, which had its beginnings as least as early as World War I, comported with 
democratic principles, was entirely consistent with the United States Constitution, and offered 
efficiency, scientific expertise, and an array of economic, health, and safety benefits to the 
American public.15 But ordinary citizens with less faith in the mere mortals who wielded 
government power commonly begged to differ. Congress implemented myriad new regulatory 
schemes and created new administrative agencies, most of which employed summary 
proceedings without jury trials and standards of due process and proof thought to be 
unconstitutional; administrative agencies required only a preponderance of evidence to assign 
guilt and commonly imposed “civil penalties,” which only those with law-school training could 
differentiate from fines traditionally levied for conviction of misdemeanor and felony offenses.16 
According to Kermit L. Hall and Peter Karsten, “[o]f the seventy-seven federal regulatory 
agencies existing in 1976, fifty had been created since 1960.” Even after the onset of 
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“stagflation” in the 1970s and, after 1980, a continuously growing multi-trillion-dollar national 
debt, the administrative state extended its reach.17   
Inaugurating the new era of contentious socioeconomic and political reordering via the 
instrumental deployment of commerce power was the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the culmination 
of the centuries-old struggle of African Americans for freedom and equality. President Kennedy 
initiated the act and President Johnson brought it to fruition. There had been an attempt to pass a 
civil rights law eighty years before--the Civil Rights Act of 1875--but the act was rarely enforced 
and when it was challenged, the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional.18 The 1875 act had 
been based upon  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that no state may “deprive 
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”19 The Supreme Court ruled that the amendment 
applied only to state action, not discrimination by private individuals or groups.  In the 1960s, 
therefore, Congress constructed new civil rights measures on its commerce power, along with the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.20 Title I put an end to the unequal application of voter registration requirements.  
Title II, based on the Commerce Clause, prohibited discrimination in lodging facilities, 
restaurants or dining facilities, theaters or entertainment facility. Title III gave access to everyone 
in state and municipal public facilities.  Title IV provided “carrots and sticks” for desegregating 
public schools. Title VII, based on the Commerce Clause, prevented discrimination in the 
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19 U.S. Constitution, amend. 14, sec. 1. 
20 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, enacted July 2, 1964. 
195 
 
workplace by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations. Title VII also 
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). That body was charged 
with investigating complaints of unlawful employment practices. Under Section 706 of Title VII, 
a state or federal court, upon finding that a respondent was or had been intentionally engaging in 
an unlawful employment practice, was authorized to “enjoin the respondent from engaging in 
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action [emphasis added] as may 
be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back 
pay. . . .”21  
Notwithstanding its thoroughly democratic and high moral purpose, the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act made it clear to all that champions of equality in the United States intended to use commerce 
power in a way far beyond the understanding of the Framers and of the most liberal-minded New 
Deal legislators. The 1964 Civil Rights Act produced a long-overdue and direly-needed reform, 
and it garnered approval among most liberals and moderates and, more than a few conservatives. 
But its key provisions relied on Commerce Clause power to skirt the state action limitations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The objective of Title II and Title VII of the act was not primarily to 
regulate interstate commerce but rather to provide equal rights for African Americans in 
privately-owned “public accommodations” and in the private employment sector. In passing 
Title II and Title VII, at least, Congress ceded, all at once, an unprecedented measure of fidelity 
to original understandings of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to achieve an unprecedented 
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241, enacted July 2, 1964). 
196 
 
purpose strenuously demanded by a sizable and vocal segment of the electorate – securing the 
equal status and rights of an oppressed minority.22 
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Executive Order 11246, which established 
requirements for non-discriminatory practices in hiring and employment on the part of United 
States government contractors, with a primary concern being the amelioration of racial 
discrimination in employment. The order required contractors with fifty-one or more employees 
and contracts of $50,000 or more to implement affirmative action plans to increase the 
participation of racial minorities in the workplace if a workforce analysis demonstrated their 
under-representation. Federal regulations adopted pursuant to the order required affirmative 
action plans to include an equal opportunity policy statement to identify deficiencies in the 
composition of the workforce and provide the informational means to implement ameliorating 
employment practices.23 
Congress, by passage of Title VII, strongly encouraged employers, labor organizations, and 
other persons “to act on a voluntary basis to modify racially discriminatory employment 
practices and systems which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity.” The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 expanded Title VII jurisdiction to include employee-
employer relations in local, state and federal agencies, a change that brought ten million more 
persons within its ambit.24 Title VII established conciliation and persuasion as the primary 
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processes for amelioration, which was reaffirmed in 1972. But federal courts, the EEOC, the 
Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice soon became quite active in enforcing 
affirmative action guidelines in cases where voluntary action had not taken place and 
conciliation had failed.25 This activity on behalf of race-based affirmative action spurred 
contention in the political arena almost immediately.26  
Signed into law by Lyndon B. Johnson on the heels of the assassination of the Reverend Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, based on the commerce 
power, provided for equal housing opportunities regardless of race, creed, or national origin. The 
1966 Chicago Open Housing Movement, the passage of the 1963 Rumford Fair Housing Act in 
California, and the 1967 fair housing campaigns in Milwaukee were also powerful spurs to the 
passage of the act. Title VIII prohibited 1) the refusal to sell or rent a dwelling to any person 
because of her or his race, color, religion, or national origin; 2) discrimination against another on 
such bases in the terms or conditions of the sale or rental of a dwelling; 3) advertising for the sale 
or rental of a dwelling so as to indicate a preference based on race, color, religion, or national 
origin; and 4) and interference with a person’s enjoyment or exercise of house rights for 
discriminatory reasons or retaliated against a person or organization that aids or encourages the 
exercise or enjoyment of fair housing rights. A victim of discrimination in the context of 
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attempting to purchase or rent a residence was also authorized to bring a civil action to obtain 
redress.27 
A series of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act in the period 1974-1986 featured 
ever-widening federal control of minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime pay standards, as 
well as growing conservative resistance in Congress on behalf of business owners who resented 
these mandatory increased payroll expenditures. The 1974 amendments extended coverage to 
domestic workers, while the 1985 amendments permitted state and local governments to pay 
their employees a higher wage for overtime work. In 1986, however, Congress and President 
Ronald Reagan amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to allow the secretary of labor to issue 
special certificates allowing employers to pay less than the minimum wage to persons with 
“productive capacity” limited by age, physical or mental deficiency, or injury. In 1989, Congress 
passed a bill raising the minimum wage to $4.55 per hour, but President George H.W. Bush 
vetoed the increase, declaring it “excessive.” Republican senators agreed to a revised bill with a 
lower minimum wage. The president ultimately signed the revised bill, notwithstanding the 
unsuccessful efforts of Republican senators to have included in it minimum-wage exemptions for 
small businesses and farmers who employed migrant workers.28  
Returning to the administration of President Johnson, his “War on Poverty,” with forty 
programs that aimed to improve living conditions and help impoverished people lift themselves 
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out of poverty, took the Constitution’s meaning of “promote the General Welfare” far outside of 
what the founders had in mind 1789. The Food Stamp Act of 1964, the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1965, The Child Nutrition Act of 1966, and others have all had only the 
most tenuous connection to interstate commerce; however, none has been found to be an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce power by the Supreme Court.29  However, the 
“war” has certainly proved to be controversial. 
Johnson’s welfare programs that promoted the hope of eliminating poverty, such as Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children and the Food Stamp Program, led to claims by conservative 
economists such as Walter Williams and Thomas Sowell that the programs were, in fact, 
detrimental to poor black families and kept them in poverty.  Williams’ and Sowell’s reasoning 
was that, since welfare extended to a single mother and, thus, without the assistance of a wage-
earning husband, the institution of marriage broke down in poor black communities; single-
mother birth rates skyrocketed, matched by accelerating crime, since black youngsters grew up 
without the sustained and coordinated residential guidance of both a father and a mother.30 The 
liberal-progressive side of the argument held invariably that the root of crime was poverty and, 
once poverty was no longer a concern, crime would diminish; therefore, welfare programs were 
deemed to be entirely necessary to alleviate the conditions of poverty, and, hence, criminal 
activity would be reduced as well.   
In 1965 Congress legislated the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. As part of his 
“Great Society” legislation, President Johnson hoped to improve the plight of economically 
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disadvantaged students while fighting the Cold War as well.31  Since it was deemed that the level 
of education in the population has a significant effect upon the nation’s commerce, Congress 
could again use its constitutional power as justification for passing the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act.  President Johnson succeeded in achieving passage of the law rather 
easily because Democrats had significantly increased their numbers in Congress during a 
landslide win in 1964 and no one wished to vote against education and fighting the Cold War.  In 
the House, Democrats outnumbered Republicans 295 to 140, while in the Senate the margin was 
62 to 38; the legislation cleared both houses with substantial Republican support.32    
Although the Act’s efficacy has been criticized, its constitutionality has never been 
questioned in the Supreme Court based upon Commerce Clause related grounds.33  This is a 
rather significant result when considered, as Georgetown historian Lawrence J. McAndrews did, 
that “President Johnson and the Eighty-ninth Congress had all but rewritten the Constitution, 
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elevating elementary and secondary schools to a permanent place at the table of Washington 
politics and policy.”34  
The serviceability of the Commerce Clause to the crime control agendas of conservative 
federal lawmakers after 1964 is impressive. Amid growing turmoil over the Vietnam War and 
unruly civil rights protests, the Commerce Clause came to the aid of law enforcement officials 
and federal prosecutors who were eager to clamp down on what conservatives deemed to be a 
virtual explosion of urban criminality and white-collar crime. Congress, in tandem with state 
legislatures, radically expanded criminal legislation designed to deal with the challenge of rising 
crime, or at least reports of its rapidly increasing incidence, especially in the turbulent inner 
cities of the nation. In 1965, Congress expanded the role of the FBI in criminal law enforcement 
with the establishment of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance and, in 1968, with the 
passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.35 By this time, heightened judicial 
concerns for providing criminal justice free of racism gave way to the impulse to reassert “law 
and order,” a campaign that reached its zenith early in the administration of Richard M. Nixon, 
who, in 1970, signed into law the Controlled Substances Act, which established federal drug 
policy with myriad measures regulating the importation, manufacture, possession, and 
distribution of illegal drugs set out in five “schedules.”36   President Nixon also established the 
Drug Enforcement Administration three years later.37 
The turmoil of the 1960s, the political crisis attendant on the political demise of President 
Richard M. Nixon, and a national economy by the mid-1970s beset by “stagflation” did not deter 
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political activism aimed at spurring congressional action. An array of federal enactments relied 
on Commerce Clause authority to advance causes that liberal-minded Americans believed to be 
for the benefit of all. Such measures ranged from the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967 to the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty and Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1968, which 
established the Consumer Product Safety Commission, a producer of regulations that rather 
rapidly compelled substantial retooling among many, if not most, major American manufacturers 
of consumer products. 38 By the 1970s, Congress employed the Commerce Clause to protect 
people from themselves and the environment from people. There was, for example, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), created by President Jimmy Carter in 1977, 
which called for passenger restraint devices on all automobiles in the United States by 1984. The 
sources of congressional power exerted in the pursuit of environmental protection, in the view of 
some, derived from treaty rights and obligations. But a substantial number of federal 
environmental laws adopted in the 1970s were based exclusively on the Commerce Clause.39 
One such measure was the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which, 
essentially, dictated mining practices for open-space mining and required restoration of damaged 
surface soil and flora after mining operations were concluded on a site.40  
Numerous congressional enactments based on Commerce Clause power spurred controversy 
in the 1980s amid rising public concerns about environmental threats to health. The Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, for example, declared that each state was responsible for 
safely disposing of radioactive waste, typically the spent fuel of nuclear power reactors. But state 
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governments were slow to form the required multi-state compacts, or consortiums, or start 
construction of disposal sites. Consequently, they failed to take steps ensuring compliance with a 
1986 federal deadline. This failure was a direct response to growing public trepidation about 
complex multi-state projects that sent eighteen-wheel tanker trucks full of radioactive waste 
hurtling across the interstate highway system in search of dumping grounds. Multi-state compact 
leaders had planned to commence excluding radioactive waste from outside their respective 
regions when Congress approved their charters. But more populous and wealthy states outside of 
the authorized seven regions worked effectively to prevent congressional approval of such 
exclusionary plans. Consequently, compact states failed to obtain congressional permission to 
refuse to receive out-of-region radioactive waste. The states of Nevada, Washington, and South 
Carolina threatened to close their sites unless Congress granted them increased control. To deal 
with the problem, Congress legislated the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
Act of 1985, which proved to be an unwieldy solution at best. The act sought to create federal 
incentives for states to comply with the 1980 plan, allowing compact states to gradually increase 
surcharges for waste received from other states; allowing compact states to deny access to 
noncomplying states; and requiring states to “take title” and assume liability for radioactive 
waste generated within their borders if they failed to comply. The 1985 act authorized the three 
then-existing disposal sites to continue operations until the end of 1992, after which time they 
could lawfully exclude radioactive waste originating from outside their respective compact 
areas.41 
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Passed by Congress and President Jimmy Carter in December 1980, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, a.k.a. the Superfund Act) 
was designed to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. The act, which Congress based 
on its commerce power, targeted those that posed an immediate threat to safety and health. Its 
myriad provisions were designed to ensure that polluters were held financially responsible for 
cleanup operations. CERCLA granted the president broad powers to command the remediation 
of hazardous waste sites, although the EPA was designated to oversee routine cleanup 
operations. Under the statute and its 1986 revision, the EPA was authorized to clean up 
hazardous waste sites, obtain reimbursement for such operations, or compel responsible parties 
to remediate such sites. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) 
also authorized companies compelled to ameliorate their hazardous waste sites to sue state 
governments to obtain reimbursement for their role in creating waste sites required to be cleaned 
up under the act.42 
Returning to the era of the Great Society, Congressional civil rights reforms based on the 
Commerce Clause were certainly not limited to improving the lives of African Americans. As 
discussed, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 proscribed wage disparities based on sex difference alone. 
After 1964, Congress and various presidents enlisted Commerce Clause power more frequently 
to bolster the status and rights of women and increase employment opportunities for them. 
Inspired by the civil rights movement, and backed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, women’s 
rights activists fought for equal employment opportunities. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
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1964, which prohibited discrimination in hiring and promotion based on race, also included 
discriminatory employment practices based on sex.43 Quite similarly, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), established by Title VII, charged the agency with 
investigating complaints of unlawful employment practices targeting women, authorizing such 
victims, when mediation between female employees and employers failed, to bring a civil action 
for relief. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 expanded Title VII jurisdiction to 
include employee-employer relations in local, state and federal agencies included within its 
scope women who had been subjected to employment discrimination based on their sex. Also in 
1972, Congress expanded the coverage of the 1963 Equal Pay Act, which had amended the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, to include professionals and other white color employees, thus extending 
the sex discrimination protections of the 1963 legislation to women in the upper echelons of 
employment.44 
Federal courts, the EEOC, and the departments of Labor and Justice combined to advance 
vigorously the application of affirmative action guidelines for women in cases where “voluntary” 
compliance had failed.45  This activity spurred no less political controversy than federal 
government support of race-based affirmative action.46  Such programs shook the status quo of 
the roles and traditional duties of men and women that had seemed to work for humans 
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throughout recorded history. Support of such changes was bolstered by the feminist argument 
that men weren’t needed in a home anyway.  As Gloria Steinem famously put it, “A woman 
needs a man like a fish needs a bicycle.”47 Women pressed successfully for a widening scope of 
rights equal to those enjoyed by men. They gained athletic scholarship opportunities on college 
campuses through Title IX of the Higher Education Act of 1965.48   
Commerce Clause-based legislation steadily brought to bear federal jurisdiction on an array 
of previously unaddressed problems that women’s rights activists identified as particularly 
intolerable for them. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to “prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,” defined as a 
temporary non-occupational disability, at least in the case of businesses that employed fifteen or 
more persons.49 The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, signed by President George H.W. 
Bush, made it possible for women to obtain relief against the fathers of their children who had 
evaded child support obligations by absconding across state lines. Willful failure to pay past due 
support was made punishable by six months in prison and a subsequent violation by 
imprisonment for up to two years. Authorized to investigate were agents of the F.B.I. and special 
agents of the Inspector General of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services.50 Signed into law by President Bill Clinton on February 5, 1993, was the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), applicable to businesses with fifty or more employees, which 
granted up to four months of leave from employment to care for infants, sick children, or aged 
parents. Some advocates of women’s rights, however, disputed the advantages supposed by 
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many to accrue to women under the FMLA, given the domestic work disparities that persisted in 
household arrangements between men and women.51  
Some of the most expansive deployments of commerce power on behalf of national crime 
control to date were set out in the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 
drafted by Senator Joe Biden of Delaware and signed by President Bill Clinton on September 13, 
1994.52 This measure was, in fact, the lengthiest crime bill in the history of the United States, 
which came in response to intense partisan pressure produced by the mass San Francisco 
shooting in July 1993 committed by Gian Luigi Ferri; the deadly April 1993 federal siege of 
Branch Davidians at Waco; and growing concerns about urban youth crime committed by a 
supposed new generation of what First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton called “super-predators.”53  
The act enlisted the Commerce Clause inventively to penalize an array of undoubtedly dangerous 
violent criminality – but heretofore understood to be exclusively within the scope of state police 
power and criminal codes. Targeted criminality ranged from drunk driving, possession of assault 
weapons, youth violence, criminal street gangs, child pornography, and crimes against children, 
provisions regarding the last of which included the creation of a sexually violent offender 
registry. More contentious was a section that required the United States Sentencing Commission 
to increase the penalties for anyone convicted of a “hate crime,” defined as “a crime in which the 
defendant intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of a property crime, the property that is the 
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object of the crime, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.”54 No less controversial, as will 
be discussed further in a subsequent chapter, was “Title IV – Violence Against Women,” 
commonly called the Violence Against Women Act. This measure established the Office on 
Violence Against Women within the Department of Justice, provided $1.6 billion for the 
investigation and prosecution of violent crimes against women and established mandatory 
restitution for victims. The act also established a civil action for damages against suspects whom 
United States attorneys refrained from criminally prosecuting.55  
No piece of congressional action in the 1990s spurred more widespread partisan controversy 
than the Health Care Security Bill advanced by President Bill Clinton beginning in September 
1993, a proposal that promised to catapult Commerce Clause power to a whole new level. 
Taking charge of the plan’s advancement, almost from the beginning, was First Lady Hillary 
Clinton, for whom the bill was soon dubbed “Hillarycare.” The Clinton health care plan was a 
complicated proposal over 1,000 pages in length, and it constituted nothing less than a sweeping 
reform of the entire health care system of the United States, replete with state-run agencies called 
“regional alliances” that would, in each state, hold a monopoly on the brokering of health 
insurance policies. Mandates set out in the plan required sizable employers to purchase health 
insurance for their employees and individuals earning sufficient incomes to purchase health care 
insurance for themselves and their dependents if such were not provided by an employer. 
Government subsidies would provide coverage for the impoverished. The Clinton health care 
plan also specified what types of coverage all health insurance policies were to provide and 
                                                 
54 § 280003, Title XXVIII, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 
2096. 
55 Title IV, VCCLEA, 108 Stat. 1902-1955, Pub. L. 103-322; 42 U.S.C., §§ 13701-14040. 
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denied health insurance companies the right to decline coverage of individuals with pre-existing 
health conditions.56 While the bill left methods of insuring compliance by individuals up to the 
discretion of the “regional alliances,” the measure almost immediately set off a firestorm.57 
Conservative commentator William Kristol and his think tank Project for the Republican Future 
led fierce opposition. Conservatives, libertarians, and representatives of the health insurance 
industry insisted that there was, in fact, no health care crisis. They howled publicly at the 
prospect of a top-heavy, command-and-control government bureaucracy, including “death 
panels,” on the verge of sending the United States pell-mell into the clutches of socialism. 
Democrat Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell of Maine, notwithstanding his strenuous 
efforts to secure votes for a palatable revised bill, declared the plan dead in August 1994. The 
national elections in the fall of that year became nothing less than a full-fledge culture wars 
referendum on “big government.”58  
                                                 
56 H.R.3600, Health Security Act, 103rd Congress (1993-1994), introduced on November 20, 
1993 by Democrat Representative Rep. Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri. 
57 Title I, Subtitle A, Universal Coverage and Individual Responsibility, Section 1002(a) was 
written as follows: “In General. – In accordance with this Act, each eligible individual (other 
than a Medicare-eligible individual) – (1) must enroll in an applicable health plan for the         
individual, and (2) must pay any premium required, consistent with this Act, with respect to such 
enrollment.”  
Title I, Subtitle D, Health Alliances, Section 1323(a) was written as follows: “In General. – Each 
regional alliance shall assure that each regional alliance eligible individual who resides in the 
alliance area is enrolled in a regional alliance health plan and shall establish and maintain 
methods and procedures, consistent with this section, sufficient to assure such enrollment. Such 
methods and procedures shall assure the enrollment of alliance eligible individuals at the time 
they first become eligible enrollees in the alliance area, including individuals at the time of birth, 
at the time they move into the alliance area, and at the time of reaching the age of individual 
eligibility as an eligible enrollee (and not merely as a family member). Each regional alliance 
shall establish procedures, consistent with subtitle A, for the selection of a single health plan in 
which all members of a family are enrolled.” 
58 Robert Moffit, “A Guide to the Clinton Health Plan,” Heritage Foundation, November 19, 
1993; Derek Bok, “Political Leadership in the Great Health Care Debate of 1993-1994,” pp. 96-
210 
 
Likewise, growing demands by liberal activists for the regulation of handguns, in the face of 
strenuous opposition by conservative Second Amendment stalwarts, spurred acute controversy 
over Commerce Clause-based gun legislation in the 1990s. In addition to placing limits on the 
availability of handguns, the Gun Control Act of 1968 made it a crime for anyone who had been 
convicted of domestic violence to “‘possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” The 
federalization of domestic violence in this way was somewhat unprecedented. But the flood of 
federal criminal legislation in the late 1960s made it difficult for those favoring gun ownership 
rights to coordinate their criticism of the relatively ancillary provision of the Gun Control Act, 
especially since it benefitted a newly-identified and now protected minority.59 As will be 
discussed at length in a subsequent chapter, causing no little contention was the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990, signed into law by President George H. W. Bush in November of that year. 
Introduced in the Senate by Democrat Joseph R. Biden, and originally passed as a section of the 
Crime Control act of 1990, the act prohibited any unauthorized person from possessing a firearm 
in an elementary or secondary school zone. Those convicted were to be fined not more than 
$5,000 and imprisoned not more than five years or both. As well, anyone convicted was to be 
                                                 
105, in Public Discourse in America: Conversation and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 
eds. Stephen P. Steinberg and Judith Rodin (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2003); Kant Pantel and Mark Rushefsky, Politics, Power, and Policy Making: The Case of 
Health Care Reform in the 1990s (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). 
59 Pub. L. 90-618; 82 Stat. 1213; 18 U.S.C. Section 922 (a) (2); Thomas Lundmark, Power & 
Rights in U.S. Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2008), 36. 
211 
 
classified as a “prohibited person” under the Gun Control Act of 1968, barring her or him from 
owning a fire arm for the rest of his or her life.60 
Stoking the ire of Second Amendment adherents even more was the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act of 1993, a measure commonly called “the Brady Act,” grounded 
squarely in Commerce Clause authority. First introduced into the Congress in February 1987, the 
bill was titled in honor of Press Secretary to President Ronald Reagan, James S. Brady, who had 
been shot and severely wounded by John Hinckley, Jr., during his attempt to assassinate the 
president in March 1981. President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law in November 1993 with 
the vocal support of Sarah Brady, the wife of James Brady, President Reagan himself, and 
organizations such as the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence and Handgun Control, Inc. The 
act required that background checks be conducted on an individual before she or he was 
permitted to purchase a firearm from a federally licensed dealer, manufacturer or importer. 
Spurring objections from organizations such as the National Rifle Association, among other 
complaints, was the extensive list of disqualifications from purchasing a firearm, which ranged 
from being a fugitive from justice to having been the subject of a court order restraining one 
from harassing an intimate partner. N.R.A. opposition to the bill ultimately spurred a final 
version of the legislation providing that, no later than 1998, the mandatory five-day waiting 
period for the purchase of a firearm would be replaced by an instant computerized background 
check, which was subsequently facilitated by the establishment of the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS), a database maintained by the F.B.I.61   
                                                 
60 Section 1702 of the Crime Control Act of 1990; Pub. L. 101-647; 104 Stat. 4789; 18 U.S.C. § 
922(q); Robert A. Martinez, “S.O.S.—Saving Our Schools: The Constitutionality of the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990.” Am J. Crim. L., Vol. 22 (1994-1995): 512. 
61 Pub. L. 103-159; 107 Stat. 1536; 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922; Ronald Reagan, “Why I’m for the 
Brady Bill, The New York Times, March 29, 1991; Sarah Brady with Merrill McLoughlin, A 
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Perhaps the most contentious instance in which conservative Republicans in Congress sought 
to employ its commerce power in novel ways was the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Bill of 1995. 
The act defined a “partial-birth abortion” as one in which a person partially delivered a living 
“fetus” before killing it and then fully extracting the remains. The act, among other things, would 
subject any physician who knowingly performed a partial-birth abortion “in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce” to a fine or imprisonment for not more than two years or both, 
except where such an abortion was necessary to save the life of a mother endangered by a 
physical disorder, illness, or injury, and provided that no other medical procedure would suffice 
to eliminate the threat to the mother.62   
Strenuous opposition by women’s rights activists and Democrat party leaders focused not on 
the Commerce Clause jurisdictional element of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Bill, but, rather on 
the question of whether the bill, if passed, would infringe on the right of a woman to obtain an 
abortion, as set out initially in Roe v. Wade (1973).63 Indeed, heated culture wars contention over 
the bill seemed to obscure almost entirely the constitutional issue of whether commerce power 
could reach the thoroughly intrastate activity of providing or obtaining a partial-birth abortion. In 
any case, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Bill passed both houses of Congress, President Bill 
Clinton vetoed the measure, and the House overrode the veto in September 1996. But the Senate 
fell eight votes short of the required two-thirds to override the veto. Conservatives in Congress, 
                                                 
Good Fight (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); Osha Gray Davidson, Under Fire: The NRA and 
the Battle for Gun Control (New York: H. Holt, 1993).  
62 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
63 Roe v. Wade declared that a right to privacy under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment extended to the decision of an expectant mother to have an abortion. The 
constitutionality of a state abortion statute turned on a balancing test weighing the interest of the 
state in protecting the potentiality of human life and protecting the health of a mother, a rationale 
that permitted states to limit substantially legal abortion in the third trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. 
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however, persisted, and with success seven years later. Partisan ideological acrimony on the 
question of abortion rights continued to grow.64   
The role of federal judges in the culture wars that emerged after 1963 was substantial, given 
the judicial activism that increasingly interspersed the work of the Supreme Court. For better or 
worse, the justices of the United States Supreme Court determined the winners and losers, or at 
least this was the way their decisions were understood.65  Indeed, as has been shown, the balance 
of federal to state power had been steadily tipping towards Washington throughout the Twentieth 
Century.   Because decisions made at the federal level affected every state and locality, nearly 
any issue, policy, legislation, or court case had the potential to become a highly contentious 
national contest.   
The Warren Court was at the forefront of these contests as so much national legislation was 
being contested at the time.  Beginning in about 1964, the rulings of the Warren Court appear to 
have produced a more widespread conservative reaction, one that reached much further than the 
                                                 
64 A similar bill, also grounded in Commerce Clause power, was later passed in 2003 as the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, which was signed by President George W. Bush. And, on April 
18, 2007, the Supreme Court, ruled 5-4, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) that the act 
did not violate the Constitution, distinguishing the case at hand from the state statute upon which 
the Court ruled in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). In that decision, the Court struck 
down a Nebraska partial-birth abortion statute, because it did not properly consider the health 
needs of an expectant mother and authorized the state to revoke the medical licenses of 
physicians who performed partial-birth abortion, all of which was held to violate the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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John O. Shimabukuro, Abortion: Judicial History and Legislative Response (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2014). 
65 Bradley C. S. Watson, ed., Courts and the Culture Wars (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington 
Books, 2002), ix-xxv. 
214 
 
white South and its decade old strident objection to federal court-ordered school desegregation 
based on Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and its follow-up, Brown II (1955)–indeed, a 
popular national response emerged that figured critically in growing “culture wars” 
polarization.66 
After its passage on July 2, 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was immediately challenged 
in the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.67 The case revolved 
around Heart of Atlanta Motel owner Moreton Rolleston, who refused to rent rooms to black 
patrons – in defiance of Title II of the act.  Title II declared that no discrimination or segregation 
based upon “race color or national origin” may be allowed in any “public accommodation . . . if 
its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation is supported by State 
action.”68  Rolleston argued that his actions were local in nature so Title II did not apply to him.  
In addition, he argued that his Fifth Amendment property rights gave him the right to choose his 
customers and that forcing him to do otherwise without due process was an unauthorized taking 
by the federal government.69  Finally, Rolleston argued that by forcing him to operate a motel 
against his wishes, the government was putting him a position of servitude in violation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.70 
                                                 
66 347 U.S 483 and 349 U.S. 294 
67 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, (1964) in Jonathan D. Varat, 
William Cohen, and Vikram D. Amar, Constitutional Law, Thirteenth ed. (New York: Thomson 
Routers/Foundation Press, 2009), 173. 
68 Ibid., 174. 
69 No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
70 Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject 
to their jurisdiction.  Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
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In a 9-0 ruling, with Justice Tom C. Clark writing for the Court, it determined that the 
movement, or travel, of persons certainly qualified as commerce. (Commerce was defined as 
“intercourse” in Gibbons.)  The Court also determined that the commerce in question was not 
simply “local” but reasoned instead, “[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not 
matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.”71 According to Justice Clark, “the 
determinative test of the exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause was 
simply whether the activity sought to be regulated was ‘commerce which concerns more States 
than one’ and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest.”72 As well, he said, the 
fact “[t]hat Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its 
enactments no less valid.”73 Reflecting the growing frequency with which the Court explicitly 
relied on its multi-tiered standard of review calculus, Justice Clark held that the only question 
was “whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels 
affected commerce, and . . .  if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that 
evil are reasonable and appropriate.”74 The prime holding of the Court was that “the power of 
Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate. . . local activities 
                                                 
71 Ibid, 176, quoting United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U.S. 460, 464 
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72 Ibid., 255.  
73 Ibid., 257. 
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in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect 
upon that commerce.”75 
Upholding Title II of the act, the Court made it clear that federal laws aimed at racial 
discrimination were constitutional when applied to lodging facilities. In addition, the Court did 
not find the Fifth Amendment defense compelling; finding instead that the increased number of 
potential patrons would not likely cause a financial burden to Rolleston.76  Likewise, the Court 
dispensed with the Thirteenth Amendment argument noting that the Civil Rights Act was an 
attempt to undo the evils of slavery in America.77  Justice Douglas, who concurred with the 
judgement but wrote a separate concurrence, wanted the decision to be based upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s section five which states, “The Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”  He reasoned that basing the decision on 
the Commerce Clause would hamstring the Court into finding a connection with interstate 
commerce in future Title II cases while the Fourteenth Amendment basis “would put an end to 
all obstructionist strategies, and finally close one door on a bitter chapter in American history.”78 
While the Court ruled on the Heart of Atlanta case, it was also reviewing the matter of racial 
discrimination in restaurants and reached a similar conclusion.  In Katzenbach v. McClung, also 
decided on December 14, 1964, a restaurant owner in Birmingham, Alabama, Ollie McClung, 
Sr., refused to serve black patrons in defiance of the new civil rights act. He objected to the 
expansive employment by Congress of its commerce power. McClung claimed that his business 
was of a strictly intrastate nature since he purchased locally the ingredients, including about 
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76 Ibid., 260 
77 Ibid., 261 
78 Ibid., 280 
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$70,000 worth of meat a year, for the dishes he served.79 In addition, the Government, at trial, 
had made no claim that interstate travelers frequented Ollie’s Barbecue. However, the Supreme 
Court ruled that it was in the power of Congress to prohibit racial discrimination at local 
restaurants, in part, because such discrimination discouraged travel by African Americans and, in 
part, because such discrimination, taken in the aggregate, could reasonably be expected to affect 
purchases of food and supplies from states other than Alabama.80 Justice Tom Clark expressed 
his view on this point with characteristic candor: 
It goes without saying that, viewed in isolation, the volume of food purchased by Ollie’s 
Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state was insignificant when compared with 
the total foodstuffs moving in commerce. But, as our late Brother Jackson said for the 
Court in Wickard v. Filburn, “That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat 
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation 
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly 
situated, is far from trivial.”81 
 
Since McClung purchased meat from a local supplier who purchased his meat from out of state, 
the transactions and the operation of the restaurant itself fell within the legislative domain of 
interstate commerce. The Court was saying, in effect, that Congress had the prerogative of 
reasonably determining what kinds of regulation under the Commerce Clause were 
constitutional. With this calibrated iteration of the substantial effects test, the Court only wanted 
to see that Congress had a rational basis for creating the legislation it had crafted. 
While the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung certainly marked a 
watershed in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these decisions, alone, did not spur the partisan 
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polarization shaping the decades to come.  One of the major decisions outside not hinging upon 
the Commerce Clause was Reynolds v. Sims, decided in that big year of change, 1964.82  This 
case revolved around how state legislative districts were apportioned.  Many states had not 
changed their house or senate borders in decades even through their populations may have 
changed significantly.  Indeed, several states mirrored the United States Constitution by 
providing a state senator for each county.  However, the growth of manufacturing in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to many more people living in cities than in rural areas.  In 
the case, residents of Birmingham, Alabama sought to reapportion the state senatorial districts 
more equally since their county only had one state senator even though their county far 
outnumbered others in Alabama.  The Warren Court agreed in an eight to one decision.  The 
Chief Justice wrote, “The weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives. 
This is the clear and strong command of our Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.”  However, 
Associate Justice John Marshall Harland made the point that even at the federal level the “one 
person one vote” principal is not practiced.  United States Senators are voted into their positions 
by greatly varying numbers of people depending upon the size of their respective states.  Indeed, 
in Wesberry v. Sanders, decided (7-2) only months previously, the Court ruled that United States 
Representative Districts had to be redrawn to represent equally-sized populations so that each 
person’s vote would have an equal impact.83  The United States Senate, however, remained 
unaffected since the Constitution specifies that two senators will represent each state.   
The results of these cases were significant and filled with controversy.  Cities gained a great 
deal more influence over the rural areas of states and hence urban concerns shot to the forefront 
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of budgets and legislative concerns.  Likewise, the decision was advantageous to many blacks 
who had moved to cities from rural areas and desired greater representation. In response to the 
ruling, an attempt was made to pass a constitutional amendment that would expressly allow for 
unequal apportionment for rural areas to maintain influence; however, the attempt never gained 
the momentum to achieve a two thirds majority.84 The results of the decision are apparent in the 
continuing culture wars as rural people in many ways feel that their needs and values are 
squashed under the weight of the political power of the major population centers.   
Three other Warren Court cases are critical to the Genesis of the culture wars as well.  In 
1966, the Court issued its decision in Miranda v. Arizona.85  The ruling charged law enforcement 
officials to explain to a person being interrogated their rights, including the right to remain silent 
and have an attorney, now known as a “Miranda warning.”  Alternatively, in 1968 in the case of 
Terry v. Ohio, police officers were given the authority to stop and frisk a suspect they believed to 
be carrying weapons.86  Outside of law enforcement, the case of Griswold v. Connecticut 
resulted in a ruling which stated that a state could not outlaw the use of contraceptives because 
such a law would violate the “right to marital privacy.”87  Griswold v. Connecticut would open 
the Pandora’s Box to the sexual revolution that would overturn state laws outlawing the purchase 
of birth control by unmarried people, abortion, the practice of sodomy, and homosexual 
marriage.88   
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Meanwhile, further expansion of Congress’ commerce power continued under the Warren 
Court in its decisions dealing with employee-employer relationships. The Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 allowed the federal government to set national minimum wage and maximum work 
hours for employees involved in the production of goods affecting interstate commerce. As 
discussed, the 1961 FLSA amendment established “enterprise coverage” to non-manufacturing 
employees for companies grossing over $500,000 and widened the law to include the employees 
of state and local government schools and hospitals. A 1966 FLSA amendment modified the 
definition of “employer” to remove the exemption of state and local governments with respect to 
employees of such government institutions.89 In 1968 twenty-eight states and a school district 
sued the government and argued that the extension of FLSA coverage to the employees of state 
hospitals and schools was beyond Congress’ commerce power since they were neither 
manufacturing products or engaged in commerce.  Indeed, they argued that new FLSA language 
permitting such employees to sue in federal court conflicted with the Eleventh Amendment, 
which declared the sovereign immunity of the states from such actions.  The ruling in the case, 
Maryland v. Wirtz, was authored by Justice John Marshall Harlan who wrote that labor 
conditions in state institutions could still affect commerce and thus fell under Congress’ 
commerce power. State sovereign immunity questions under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court 
held, were best reserved for “appropriate concrete cases.”90  
Justice Harlan also asserted, with no apparent ground, a categorical rule purporting to 
deny the federal courts the authority to declare that Congress had, in any given case, cast its 
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commerce power too wide in establishing a class of activities to be regulated under a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme. In holding that state hospitals and schools were not to be, as a 
class, excluded from the larger class of organizations to be affected by FLSA enterprise 
coverage, Justice Harlan pointed out that United States v. Darby had established unequivocally 
the power of Congress to declare that “an entire class of activities affects commerce.” This left to 
the courts only the question of “whether the class is ‘within the reach of the federal power.’” But 
then, relying foremost on Wickard v. Filburn, he announced that “[t]he contention in Commerce 
Clause cases, the courts have power to excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a 
rationally defined class of activities has been put entirely to rest.”91 The prime difficulty here is 
that Wickard made no such holding. In that decision, with Justice Robert H. Jackson writing for 
the majority, the Supreme Court, in fact, made a carefully reasoned independent determination 
that Congress had “properly” considered that the activity of growing wheat only for 
consumption, if excised from the reach of the AAA, would defeat the purposes of that 
comprehensive regulatory scheme.92 According to Justice Jackson, the only deference owed by 
the federal courts to Congress in such cases was to allow it to decide who should benefit 
economically from a regulatory scheme:  
It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the self-interest of the 
regulated, and that advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others. The conflicts 
of economic interest between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left 
under our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible 
legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination. And 
with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation, we have nothing to 
do.93 
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None of the other Supreme Court decisions that Justice Harlan referenced in Wirtz even 
suggested that the federal courts were powerless to make an independent judgment as to whether 
an individual instance or several instances constituting a discreet class of activities might be 
excised from a larger class of activities declared by Congress to be subject to a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme under the commerce power. And, certainly, neither Article I nor Article III of 
the Constitution declared such powerlessness.94  
Substantial changes in the personnel of the United Supreme Court beginning in 1968 set the 
stage for the entry of the Court into the thicket of the “culture wars.”  By 1968, the Vietnam War 
had exhausted President Lyndon Johnson and he decided not to run for office again.  In a definite 
gesture of public intent, Richard Nixon was elected based primarily upon his promise to 
honorably end the war in Vietnam.  During his campaign, Nixon also argued that the justices of 
the Supreme Court had strayed from the original intents of the Constitution; instead, he believed 
that the justices were in fact practicing judicial activism in support of liberal causes.  Nixon 
promised to appoint judges who were more likely to practice judicial restraint than some of the 
justices currently on the bench, and he also pledged to propose legislation to correct three recent 
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Court decisions that Nixon felt were encouraging crime.95  He stated, “[s]ome of our courts have 
gone too far in weakening our peace forces as against our criminal forces.”96  In the summer 
prior to Nixon’s election, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Earl Warren, hinted that he 
was ready to retire, and he wished to do so before Nixon was elected so that President Johnson 
might replace him with a like-minded justice.  However, Johnson’s pick, Associate Justice Abe 
Fortas, was not well-received by the Senate in his confirmation hearings and in the end, newly-
elected President Nixon was able to place conservative-minded federal appellate judge Warren 
Burger into the critical position of Chief Justice.97  
In addition to replacing the Chief Justice, President Nixon was also able to appoint three new 
conservative associate justices to the Court in his first term. In 1970, he replaced the liberal Abe 
Fortas with Harry Blackmun, who proved to be more liberal over time. In 1971, Nixon made two 
additional appointments: moderate Lewis Powell and conservative William Rehnquist replaced 
Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan, respectively.  In addition to these appointments, after 
Nixon resigned in 1974, President Gerald Ford replaced William Douglas, a 1937 Roosevelt 
appointee, with the moderately conservative John Paul Stevens. Thus, the Court evolved from 
one comprised of six liberal justices, three moderates, and no conservatives to one having a more 
balanced mix.98   
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During President Nixon’s time in office, he introduced a new term to political phraseology— 
“New Federalism.” Unlike his Democratic predecessors who had used large federal 
bureaucracies and regulations to administer funds for federal projects, Nixon proposed providing 
block grants of federal funds to states so that the states might determine the best use of the 
money within federal restraints. Nixon’s idea of New Federalism was, particularly, a response to 
the Great Society of President Johnson.  Nixon wasn’t especially opposed to the growing welfare 
state; indeed, there was a steady increase in welfare funding during the late 1970’s.  However, he 
did believe that states were more efficient in their use of funds than the federal government.  The 
idea appealed to conservative voters, especially in the South, who had long maintained their 
regard for states’ rights.  Nixon used the idea when campaigning in the south during the midterm 
elections.  One writer likened Nixon’s idea of New Federalism to “a pursuit of Hamiltonian ends 
by Jeffersonian means.”99  The term would come to be used in a more all-encompassing manner 
a decade later by President Reagan and the conservative movement that became prominent in the 
1980s. 
Although President Nixon succeeded in making the Supreme Court a more conservative 
tribunal, the Watergate debacle and the president’s subsequent resignation was devastating to the 
Republican Party and the nation.  As discussed, President Ford succeeded in appointing John 
Paul Stevens to the Court, but Ford was rather moderate himself and as an unelected President, 
he was somewhat obliged to offer a non-controversial nominee.100  After Stevens was appointed, 
the Court’s composition would not be changed again until 1981. 
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After President Ford completed President Nixon’s term, Ford ran again for the Presidency in 
1976 but was defeated in a narrow victory by Jimmy Carter.   Carter won the South as a 
southerner and as a Democrat, but the solid Democratic South was evolving.  One historian 
noted that through the 1970s, Mississippi conservatives (and by extension, those in several other 
southern states) began to slowly but surely dump the Democratic Party, which had mostly sided 
with the civil rights movement but seemed to lack support in religious issues, and instead began 
to back the Republican Party, which was evolving into the more conservative party and as the 
party that reflected their religious values.  In response to federal civil rights rulings on school 
integration, white Mississippians were at the forefront of establishing religion-based schools.  
Some of the schools were simply a retreat from forced integration; others were sincere attempts 
to include a Christian worldview that liberal educational doctrines had severely discounted.  As 
religion-based schools became more commonplace in Mississippi and across the South, it was 
inevitable that the federal government would check to ensure that the schools receiving federal 
funds were not racially exclusive.  The Internal Revenue Service as well as the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare began to intrude on religion-based schools until Christian 
families, who had fought to isolate themselves from the government, now became activists to 
maintain their prerogatives.  These activists’ legacy and influence can be seen in such recent 
Republican Party leaders as Trent Lott and Haley Barbour, both from Mississippi.101  The 
movement’s impact can also be seen in the rise of the religious right on a nationwide level.   
After observing the phenomenon in the state of Mississippi, it becomes obvious that one 
segment of the population had grown tired of federal government intervention.  Many people 
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began to feel as if they had no control over their lives or their property, as federal government 
agencies and courts dictated everything from not allowing prayer in schools to whether a farmer 
could drain a swamp to grow crops.  Instead, many people desired to return to the federalism of 
the pre-New Deal years, or at least a “New Federalism” where they would have more local 
control over government intervention.  
Amid a period of growing dissatisfaction with an intrusive, ever-expanding federal 
government, a majority of the electorate voted Ronald Reagan into office.  President Carter’s 
years as president had resulted in a recession, high inflation, and nine percent unemployment in 
1975, as well as an inconclusive hostage crisis in Iran that served to break national morale.102  
Combined with the perceived excesses of the federal government, many people were ready to 
follow Reagan’s free market policies and defense-oriented prescriptions into the 1980s. 
In President Reagan’s initial year in office, he had the chance to make his first impact on the 
Supreme Court.  Potter Stewart was a moderate Republican who was appointed by President 
Eisenhower and retired in 1981.  As his replacement, President Reagan appointed the first 
woman to the Court, Sandra Day O’Connor, a conservative-libertarian from Arizona.  Once 
O’Connor was in place, Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall were the only 
liberal remnants from the Warren Court, while Justices Blackmun and Stevens evolved into more 
liberal voters over time.  Justice Lewis Powell was the Court’s swing voter.  The Court might be 
said to have had a 4-1-4 ratio of conservatives, moderates, and liberals, respectively.  But that 
ratio would only last for five years. 
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The position of the Supreme Court on the scope of commerce power during the tenure of 
Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969-1986) largely comports with the early scholarly assessment 
of it – a mildly conservative tribunal that served as something of a transition between the liberal 
constitutionalism of the Warren Court and the more conservative Court presided over by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist. In this interpretation, Burger symbolized the policy of 
“retrenchment” favored by Republican President Richard M. Nixon. According to Albert 
Alschuler, the jurisprudence of the Warren Court persisted, although its rulings in areas of due 
process and criminal law were sometimes less generous.103 Quite similarly, Russell Galloway, 
Jr., concludes that the Burger Court shifted to the right after the seating of Nixon appointees 
Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist; Ford appointee John Paul Stevens; and 
Reagan appointee Sandra Day O’Conner. But the rightward shift he describes is complicated. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas generally took liberal positions. After replacing Justice 
Douglas in 1975, Justice Stevens, along with justices Stewart and White, commonly staked out 
centrist positions, and justices Rehnquist and Powell, and, to some extent, Chief Justice Burger, 
made up the conservative bloc of the court. Justice Blackmun, however, shifted from the right 
towards the center, allowing liberals to claim more victories in the 1970s. But the conservative 
bloc of the court grew stronger in 1981 when Justice Stewart was replaced by the more 
conservative Justice O'Connor.104  
Several scholarly works indicate the nuanced transformation in the economic policies of the 
Burger Court that correlated to its ideologically dizzying personnel changes. Craig R. Ducat and 
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Robert L. Dudley suggest that, on the whole, the Court became increasingly concerned with 
federalism issues and less concerned with contending liberal and conservative views on 
regulation of the economy and the scope of administrative agency authority.105 Timothy M. 
Hagle and Harold J. Spaeth similarly maintain that the more ideologically-mixed composition of 
the Court produced outcomes in cases involving economic questions no longer predictably 
liberal, that is, categorically supportive of regulation.106 
More recent scholarship suggests far less agreement on the ideological bearings of the Burger 
Court. Michael J. Graetz and Linda Greenhouse, for example, challenge the thesis that the 
Burger court was moderate or transitional. According to them, the Court rendered numerous 
landmark decisions; and it was usually conservative, veering to the right in numerous areas, such 
as criminal law, civil rights and desegregation, and the influence of money on politics. In this 
interpretation, the Court reinforced the power of corporations and the presidency itself, although 
helping to bring down Richard Nixon. But Graetz and Greenhouse do allow that the Burger 
Court returned important decisions that balanced conservative and liberal views in complex 
ways, such as in the controversial abortion case Roe v. Wade (1973) and the foundational 
affirmative action ruling in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1976).107 
The Burger court was certainly more conservative than its processor and the cases which it 
had to decide, amid a growing rights consciousness, meant that the outcomes were going to be 
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contentious in whatever manner it ruled.  There were, for example, a string of decisions that 
further articulated the limits of public support of religion in elementary and secondary schools, 
including the question of school prayer, beginning with Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), which 
established what has come to be known as the “Lemon Test.”  This standard came to be applied 
to any government action.  The test held that, for a law to be considered constitutional in terms of 
complying with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, it must 1) have a legitimate 
secular purpose, 2) the law’s primary effect must not be to advance or inhibit religion, and 3) the 
law must not result in “excessive entanglement of government and religion.”108 Lemon would 
not be the last religious conflict case of course; nor was the Lemon Test always straightforward.  
In 1984 the Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly in which the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island had a 
Christmas display including a nativity scene located in its shopping district as it had done for 
over forty years.  One of the city’s citizens, Daniel Donnelly sued Mayor Dennis Lynch over the 
display.  The Burger Court found in a 5-4 decision that the display was constitutional following 
the Lemon Test noting that the display merely conveyed the historical reason for the holiday, that 
the display did not pose a danger of establishing a state religion, and stating that it was “far too 
late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country.” 109  
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With justices William O. Douglas, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell close to but not yet in 
retirement, the Burger Court that rendered its April 1971 decision in Perez v. United States 
remained a predominantly liberal tribunal. In that 8-1 decision, the Court expanded the scope of 
its substantial effects test and commerce power Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence in a 
manner that was unsettling to at least one of its more conservative justices. Under Title II of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 (CCPA), the Court upheld the criminal conviction of 
Alcides Perez of New York City for extortionate credit transactions, defined as the use of 
violence or the threat of violence or other criminal means to enforce the repayment of high-
interest, short term loans, commonly referred to as “loansharking.”110 Appellant contended that 
Title II was unconstitutional “in prohibiting all extortionate credit transactions, without requiring 
a showing in a particular case of effect on interstate commerce. . . .”111 With a majority opinion 
authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court upheld the conviction and Title II. First, the 
Court drew on its decisions dealing with enforcement of non-criminal comprehensive regulatory 
regimes – that is, Darby, Wickard, and Wrightwood Diary – to conclude that Congress could 
have reasonably concluded that intrastate loansharking, taken as a class of activities, had a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.112 Next, Justice Douglas invoked Maryland v. Wirtz, 
which dealt with enforcement of the FLSA, another non-criminal regulatory regime, to declare 
that “[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal 
power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.” As had 
been the case when the Warren Court issued its decision in Wirtz, this proposition was bereft of 
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reasoned explanation or grounding in any holding of the Court.113 The lone dissent of Justice 
Potter Stewart conveyed a palpable uneasiness with the majority opinion: 
Congress surely has power under the Commerce Clause to enact criminal laws to protect 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, to prohibit the misuse of the channels or 
facilities of interstate commerce, and to prohibit or regulate those intrastate activities that 
have a demonstrably substantial effect on interstate commerce. But, under the statute 
before us, a man can be convicted without any proof of interstate movement, of the use of 
the facilities of interstate commerce, or of facts showing that his conduct affected 
interstate commerce. I think the Framers of the Constitution never intended that the 
National Government might define as a crime and prosecute such wholly local activity 
through the enactment of federal criminal laws.114 
 
In United States v. Bass (1971), handed down nine months after Perez, the Supreme Court 
reviewed a criminal conviction based on the newly-created federal crime of firearm possession 
by a felon, set out in § 1202(a)(1) Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968. In Bass, with the composition of the Court unchanged since its ruling in Perez, it held 
that, when Congress passed a criminal statute penalizing misconduct customarily within the 
jurisdiction of the states, the statute could only be upheld under the commerce power if it 
included a statutory jurisdictional element identifying a nexus of the offense to interstate 
commerce with “in commerce” or “affecting commerce” language. With this provision, the 
federal courts were to make an independent judgment of whether a conviction and the statute 
could be upheld, on a case-by-case basis, as a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power.115  
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The Commerce Clause decisions of the more fully assembled Burger Court were sometimes 
caught up in the conservative reaction to the federal regulatory state that arose powerfully during 
the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Strong reaction to new regulatory regime imposed upon 
the coal mining industry produced a veritable uprising amongst an association of Virginia coal 
producers, who challenged the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act of 1977.116  In the case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. 
(1981),117 the Association argued that the mining law, which stipulated that mined land on “steep 
slopes” must be returned to its former contour after mining, did not fall under the commerce 
power of congress to legislate, that the law was an unconstitutional taking of property, and that it 
did not comport with the Tenth Amendment insofar as the law overstepped its federal bounds. 
However, the Burger Court, in a unanimous decision (with Justice Rehnquist concurring 
separately), returned on June 15, 1981, upheld the SMCRA. The Court emphasized that that 
Congress had held hearings and had a rational basis to pass the law to ease environmental 
impacts in industries that affected interstate commerce.   
Here, Congress rationally determined that regulation of surface coal mining is necessary 
to protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may result from that activity. 
This congressional finding is sufficient to sustain the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' 
power under the Commerce Clause.118 
 
With Justice Thurgood Marshall authoring the majority opinion, the Court held that “the power 
conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit congressional regulation of 
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activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in 
more than one State.”119 Among those hazards were intrastate activities that adversely affected 
“public welfare” by “creating hazards dangerous to life and . . .  degrading the quality of life in 
local communities,” such as environmental despoliation that “reduced recreational values. . .”120 
As well, relying on Darby, the Court held that interstate commerce was not to be made the 
instrument of competition injurious to it.121 According to the Court, the SMCRA was also well 
grounded in the commerce power because surface mining and reclamation standards were 
essential to insure competition among sellers of coal produced in different states would not be 
used to undermine the ability of states that followed mandates set out in the act “to improve and 
maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their borders."122 The Court also 
held that the Tenth Amendment argument didn’t apply, said the Court, because the law didn’t 
interrupt state actions and the law was not an unconstitutional taking since the suit was a pre-
enforcement challenge which occurred before any fines had been assessed; thus, the case was not 
ripe for such a challenge.123  
Akenhead maintains that the decision in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and a related 
decision the Court handed down the same day, Hodel v. Indiana, further identified the kinds of 
intrastate activity Congress could regulate as a part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.124 
Hodel v. Indiana, like its companion case, dealt with an array of constitutional challenges to the 
SMCRA of 1977, with the specific provisions at issue being those sections mandating special 
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requirements, such as the promulgation to administrators of advance mining and reclamation 
plans, for surface mining on land deemed to be prime farmland.125 With Justice Marshall again 
writing for the majority, the Court upheld the statute, this time with a holding that declared the 
power of Congress extended to all activities affecting interstate commerce no matter “how great 
or small.”126 As well, the Court reiterated its broad holding in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
that Congress had, consistent with its commerce power, passed the SMCRA to ensure that 
surface mining for interstate commerce did not occur at the expense of agriculture, the 
environment, or public health and safety – and that the act reflected “the congressional goal of 
protecting mine operators in States adhering to high performance and reclamation standards from 
disadvantageous competition with operators in States with less rigorous regulatory programs.”127 
Also addressing environmental concerns, in National Association of Homebuilders v. Babbitt 
(1997), the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the Endangered Species Act.  In a 2-1 ruling, the D. C. 
Circuit Court found that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service could stop the construction of an 
intersection giving emergency access to a hospital because the road would affect a colony of 
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Flies, which the FWS had placed on its endangered species list.  The 
court reasoned that protecting the fly was an effort “to keep the channels of interstate commerce 
free from immoral or injurious uses.”128  In 1998, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case.129  
As illustrated, after the 1942 ruling in Wickard v. Filburn, there had been no significant 
attempt by the United States Supreme Court to restrain Congress’ power to legislate on matters 
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pertaining to commerce for the next thirty-four years. However, one issue continued to be fought 
over in the Court several times with the Justices divided on the issue.  In 1968 the Warren Court 
decided that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was applicable to state school and hospital 
employees even though they were not involved in private enterprises.   In 1974 Congress 
amended the act to include virtually all employees of states and their political subdivisions. 
Several states subsequently sued and in 1976 the court delivered its opinion, written by William 
Rehnquist, in National League of Cities v. Usery. This time the majority ruled that Congress had 
overstepped its bounds by interfering with the “traditional” functioning of state governments in 
contravention to the Tenth Amendment and the commerce power.  The decision temporarily 
overturned Maryland v. Wirtz, but League of Cities v. Usery was not the last word on the 
issue.130   
In 1985, a year before the end of Burger’s term as Chief Justice, the Court reversed itself 
a second time.  In 1979 Joe Garcia, an employee of the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (SAMTA), sued his employer for failing to give him overtime pay in accordance with 
the Fair Labor Standards Act.  SAMTA argued that, since it served a “traditional” government 
function, the ruling in League of Cities applied.  However, two justices, Blackmun and White, 
switched their votes and the 5-4 majority concluded that the idea of differentiating “traditional 
government functions” from non-traditional functions (like schools or hospitals) was not 
practical.  The 5-4 decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, written by 
Blackmun, established that the federal government could dictate employer-employee relations to 
state and local governments.131 This case certainly proved to be one of the most expansive uses 
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of commerce clause power, firmly tipping the state and federal balance of power toward the 
federal government.  Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a strong dissent, concurred with by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and William Rehnquist, in which he castigated 
the majority not recognizing any limits on federal power posed by the Tenth Amendment. He 
Wrote, “The State’s role in our system of government is a matter of Constitutional law, not 
legislative grace.”132  His sentiments would be echoed in many ways by many others who 
believed that federal power was growing out of control. 
Affirmative action was one of those areas in which perceived out of control federal power 
manifested itself.  Based upon Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Kaiser Aluminum and 
Chemical Corporation along with the United Steelworkers of America formulated a training 
program in which the classes would be composed of an equal number of white and black 
workers.  However, there were far more white applicants and when Brian Weber, a white 
worker, was passed over for the training he sued for reverse discrimination. His case, United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, was decided by a 5-2 margin against him.133  Justice William 
J. Brennan wrote for the majority and held that since the program, as well as the law, was 
intended to cure the evils of past discrimination then the selection process was constitutional.  
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, found little to support the majority’s opinion, 
writing, “Thus, by a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes, 
but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory language . . . and uniform 
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precedent in concluding that employers are, after all, permitted to consider race in making 
employment decisions.”134  
Civil rights continued to be an issue with the Burger Court in the 1986 case Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson.135 In this case the Court answered the question of whether sexual 
harassment in the workplace was a violation of Title VII.  Mechelle Vinson was a teller for four 
years at the Meritor Savings Bank.  Her supervisor, Sydney Taylor, coerced her into having 
sexual relations with him, demanded sexual favors on the job, exposed himself to her, touched 
her in public, and forcibly raped her several times. When she was relieved of her job she sued the 
bank for “creating a hostile work environment.”  The Justices had to decide whether 
discrimination under Title VII only resulted when there were economic disparities, lost wages, or 
other such things or is discrimination more encompassing. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the 
unanimous majority that indeed Title VII was not limited to lost earnings, finding instead that the 
intention of Congress was “to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women” in employment relations.136 
As the culture wars became more heated, social conservatives cheered a victory in the 1986 
case of Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that 
criminalized oral and anal sex between consenting adults.137   Justice Byron White authored the 
5-4 opinion noting that while the Court attempted to discover rights not specifically noted in the 
Constitution from previous cases, history, or tradition it found no “fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”  He noted that “Sodomy was a criminal offense at common 
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law, and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of 
Rights.”  Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote dissents.  Stevens questioned how the decision 
could stand since it only upheld the power of Georgia to punish homosexual sodomy since 
Griswold v. Connecticut provided a right to marital privacy and Eisenstadt v. Baird allowed the 
same for unmarried couples.138  Indeed, Hardwick would be overturned in 2003 in the case 
Lawrence v. Texas.139  
In the same year as the Hardwick case, President Reagan made his second input into the 
Court’s composition when Chief Justice Burger resigned.  In response, President Reagan 
promoted Associate Justice Rehnquist to the chief justice’s position and added Antonin Scalia to 
the Court as an associate justice to fill Justice Rehnquist’s spot.   
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s confirmation was the closest one in the nation’s history, 65-33.  
The Democratically-controlled Senate was concerned with the Justice’s opposition to the ruling 
in Roe v. Wade as well as a memo Rehnquist wrote while still a law clerk for Justice Robert 
Jackson, in which Rehnquist argued for maintaining the “separate but equal” doctrine established 
in Plessy v. Ferguson.140  Rehnquist explained that he wrote the memo at the request of his boss, 
but several in the Senate were skeptical.  In the end, Rehnquist was confirmed.  Interestingly, 
Justice Scalia was confirmed by a unanimous vote since members of the Senate deemed him 
qualified and believed his addition would not upset the 4-1-4 balance of the Court.141  
Given the service of William Rehnquist in the Justice Department (1969-1971) and as an 
associate justice of the Supreme Court (1971-1986), most jurists, commentators, and politicians 
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were familiar with the conservative judicial philosophy he brought to his work as chief justice. 
To some extent it, reflected the influence of the “process jurisprudence” that emerged after 
World War II, that is, a certain distain for judicial realism and a professed commitment to the 
importance of precedents, the authority of legislative texts, and of the Constitution itself. 
Principles of “judicial restraint” he embraced included also deciding cases on the narrowest 
possible grounds and avoiding deciding cases on constitutional grounds when possible. Of 
course, intimately related to the New Federalism that commentators rightly associated with 
Rehnquist was his belief that the Constitution prescribed a distinctive federal structure, 
distributing power between the states and the general government, while also placing important 
limitations on governmental powers. His understanding of judicial review entailed, it seems, a 
faithfulness to the text of the Constitution and the meanings it had in historical context.142  
In 1987, however, Associate Justice Powell chose to retire.  As the historic swing voter 
on the Court, his replacement by a conservative would have had a significant impact on the 
Court.  President Reagan’s nominee, Federal Circuit Court Judge Robert Bork, was certainly not 
perceived as a moderate of any sort.  His approach to constitutional law was one he called 
“original understanding;” the Constitution’s verbiage would be interpreted as it was generally 
understood when the framers crafted the document.  The fight in the Senate over Judge Bork’s 
nomination was intense; and, in the end, he was defeated by a 58-42 vote.  The search for a 
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conservative appointee would continue.  President Reagan’s next nominee was Harvard law 
professor Douglas Ginsburg, but it was discovered that the professor had smoked marijuana with 
his law school students and the Senate rejected him.  The Senate finally settled unanimously on 
Circuit Court Judge Anthony Kennedy in 1988.  The court now had a 5-4 conservative-liberal 
ratio and had the potential to readdress some of the Warren Court’s decisions on abortion, civil 
rights, and criminal procedure.143 
In the election of 1988, George H. W. Bush defeated his democratic challenger, Michael 
Dukakis, on a pledge of “no new taxes,” prayer in schools, gun rights, and capital punishment.  
The message appealed to the electorate and he won the popular vote by a comfortable 54% to 
46% margin.144  In 1990, Justice William Brennan announced his retirement, so President Bush 
nominated former New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice David Souter to the Bench.  Souter’s 
views were relatively unknown and the Senate confirmed him with a vote of 90-9.  In his first 
year on the Court, he tended to vote considerably more conservatively than his predecessor, but 
over time he became more liberal in his decisions.  In 1991, Justice Marshall decided to retire as 
well.  President Bush nominated U.S. District Court of Appeals Judge Clarence Thomas to 
replace Justice Marshall.   Like Judge Bork’s nomination, Judge Thomas’ was critical to the 
composition of the Court.  Justice Marshall was one of the most liberal voters on the Court and 
Judge Thomas was well known for his conservative views.  After a contentious nomination 
process, Judge Thomas was confirmed by a slim margin of 52-48.145  
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In the election of 1992, the electorate showed its disapproval of George H.W. Bush’s broken 
promise to not raise taxes. President Bush’s broken promise, in fact, opened the door for the 
independent candidate, Ross Perot, to make a significant bid for the presidency.  Perot based his 
candidacy on a promise to reduce the national debt, which in 1992 exceeded $4 trillion.146  Bill 
Clinton won the election, but with only 43% of the popular vote; the remainder of the tally was 
divided between President Bush and Mr. Perot.   Clearly, the nation was still in a fiscally 
conservative state of mind while concerned about the economy, but significant numbers of voters 
were also excited about the prospects of a youthful president once again occupying the White 
House, just as John F. Kennedy had done thirty years prior.147  Also significant, both houses of 
Congress remained in Democratic hands after the 1992 election. 
With the Senate controlled by the Democratic Party, President Clinton succeeded in having 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg appointed to the Court when Justice White decided to retire in 1993.  
Ginsburg had served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; she was 
also a professor at both Rutgers and Columbia Law Schools, and she had been a leader in the 
American Civil Liberties Union Women’s Rights Project in the 1970s.  Her confirmation was a 
forgone conclusion; she received a 96-3 vote in her favor.  The following year, Justice Blackmun 
retired and President Clinton nominated former U.S. Court of Appeals judge and Harvard law 
professor Stephen Breyer.148  Both of President Clinton’s appointees have proven to be 
moderately liberal voters.  However, given the justices whom they replaced, their impact did not 
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change the balance of the Court significantly.  During the years 1995 to 2005, the justices settled 
into their roles and evolved in their voting; the court was composed of roughly four 
conservatives (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas), one swing voter with conservative 
tendencies (O’Connor), and four more liberal justices (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens).  
The Rehnquist Court may be characterized, in part, for decisions that, when viewed 
collectively, refined prior doctrines to be more inclusive of religion into public life than in the 
previous decades.  Among the always contentious issues the Court faced were government-
sponsored religious displays,149 religion in public education,150 prayer in public schools,151 
governmental aid to church-related schools, including the question of school vouchers,152 and 
free exercise of religion in public education.153 
Other contentious culture war cases concerned defining the limits on civil rights legislation.  
An example of this could be seen in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, (1988).  In the case, 
Brenda Patterson, a black woman, attempted to sue for damages caused by racial harassment 
under Section 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  She asserted that her white supervisor stared at 
her often, gave her more work than white employees, and passed her over for promotion. 
However, Section 1981 merely stated that all persons shall have the right to make and enforce 
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contracts—it said nothing about harassment after the contract was agreed to.  Why then rely on 
the 1866 Act?  Because Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights act explicitly required a showing that 
racial harassment had caused a loss of wages.  Neither law was precisely applicable, nor was the 
Court willing to contort the 1866 law to make it apply to what appeared to be unfair treatment.154 
Equally controversial was the more highly-publicized decision of City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co. (1989).   The City of Richmond put into place an affirmative action program to set 
aside thirty percent of city construction contracts to minority business enterprises (MBEs).  In a 
6-3 plurality decision with the majority opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Court declared 
that the city’s program ran counter to the Fourteenth Amendment:   
To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis 
for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for “remedial 
relief” for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a 
society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in 
a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past 
wrongs.155 
 
Not all Affirmative Action programs were found unconstitutional of course.  In Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2003) the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s enrollment policy 
that had an affirmative action element.  Again, in an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the 
Court decided (5-4) that the school had a compelling interest in having a diverse student body 
and the policy of including race as part of the candidate evaluation process would stand as long 
no quotas were established.  This upheld the previous decision in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke (1978).  Why then the dissents by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin 
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist? According to the Chief Justice, the 
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“plus system” employed at the law school was, in fact, “a thinly veiled and unconstitutional 
quota system.”156 
The Court’s efforts to deal with the most explosive issues of the era, the legal parameters of 
abortion and LGBT rights, quite similarly, produced nuanced and sometimes contradictory 
results that, in some quarters, earned extraordinarily low marks for the justices. Take, for 
example, Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), which upheld the constitutional right of a woman 
to have an abortion established in Roe v. Wade (1973) – but with a less stringent standard of 
review, giving state legislatures more leeway to place restrictions on the procedure in some 
circumstances.157 In Romer v. Evans (1996), in a 6-3 decision, the Court held that a state 
constitutional amendment in Colorado that prohibited protected status based upon homosexuality 
or bisexuality was impermissible under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.158 Far less publicized was Lawrence v. Texas (2003), a 5-3 decision, in which the 
Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), which had upheld state statutes criminalizing gay 
sexual behaviors.159 
At least five major Commerce Clause decisions of the Rehnquist Court engaged substantially 
the expanding scope of Title VII protections against employment discrimination based on race 
and sex. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987), the Court dealt with the complaint of Paul 
Johnson, a Santa Clara Transportation Agency employee, who had been passed over for 
promotion in favor of Diane Joyce, who, he claimed, was less qualified. Joyce had been 
promoted, furthermore, in accordance with the affirmative action plan of the agency. By a vote 
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of 6-3, the Supreme Court upheld the plan under the test set out in initially in United 
Steelworkers v. Weber (1979), requiring that such a plan must be aimed at eliminating clear 
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. As well, the plan must not “unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of” male employees and be temporary. Justice Scalia authored a dissent, 
which was joined by justices Rehnquist and White. In the view of Scalia, “The Court today 
completes the process of converting [Title VII] from a guarantee that race or sex will not be the 
basis for employment determinations, to a guarantee that it often will.”160 
A month later, the Court dealt with a Title VII case involving allegations of discrimination 
based on race, in one of the more controversial cases involving the “disparate impact” of 
employment practices on a person belonging to a minority – Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio 
(1989). A group of cannery workers in Alaska, who identified as “nonwhite,” complained that 
the Wards Cove Packing Company, which operated several salmon canneries, had employed 
discriminatory hiring practices that had the effect of awarding skilled permanent jobs, which did 
not involve actual canning, mostly to white employees. Wards Cove argued that its selection of 
non-cannery jobs turned on the business necessity of employing only individuals with suitable 
education and skill for such positions. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 
nonwhite cannery workers had made out a prima facie case of race discrimination, a decision 
based on data showing a higher percentage of nonwhite workers in the cannery jobs and a lower 
percentage of nonwhite workers in the non-cannery, skilled positions. In a 5-4 decision, with 
Justice White writing for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, 
Scalia, and Kennedy, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals had erred. The Court 
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declared, particularly, that the Court of Appeals should have based its decision on a comparison 
of the percentage of nonwhite workers in non-cannery, skilled jobs with the percentage of the 
available labor pool that were nonwhite and possessed of the appropriate skills to perform such 
jobs.161 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989), the Court dealt with the issue of “prescriptive sex 
discrimination” in a complaint brought by a female employee under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Plaintiff Anne Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse, her former employer, alleging that 
the firm denied her partnership because of sex discrimination, particularly alleging that the 
partners took the view that she did not dress, adorn herself, and behave in a feminine manner. 
Price Waterhouse insisted that, under Title VII, Hopkins was required to prove that the firm gave 
“decisive consideration to an employee's gender, race, national origin, or religion” in making its 
partnership decision for it to be held liable. Hopkins maintained that the use by Price Waterhouse 
of any discriminatory considerations based on her sex was sufficient to warrant a finding of 
liability. In early May 1989, the Supreme Court rendered a 6-3 decision in favor of Hopkins, 
constituted by a plurality opinion authored by Justice Brennan, joined by justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, and a concurring opinion by Justice White. The Court fashioned a 
compromise rule. According to the majority, an employer in the position of Price Waterhouse 
could only escape liability under Title VII if it proved that it would have made the same 
employment decision had sex discrimination not played any role in the process. Under this rule, 
the burden of proving that sex discrimination had not been the decisive factor in the employment 
decision, by a “preponderance of the evidence,” shifted to the employer after the complainant 
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had proved that sex discrimination had, in fact, figured into the employment decision to some 
extent.162  
President George H.W. Bush signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991, championed by 
liberal Republican Senator John Danforth of Missouri, on November 21st of that year in 
response to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing and Price 
Waterhouse. Among other provisions, the statute, which amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, made it possible for an employee to prove a case of sex (as well as race) 
discrimination by showing that an employment hiring or promotion practice resulted in “a 
disparate impact” on women (or persons of color) – if the respondent-employer failed to 
demonstrate that such practice was required by business necessity. The act also made it possible 
for women employees to recover not only compensatory damages in a civil suit against their 
employers for discrimination based on sex, but also punitive damages for emotional distress 
resulting from such mistreatment, although the amendment placed a cap on such punitive 
damages. As well, it permitted women plaintiffs to recover attorney fees when able, at trial, to 
prove that sex discrimination had played some role in an adverse employment decision, even if 
defendants proved that the adverse decision would have been made without the sex 
discrimination.163 
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Even one of the most conservative justices ever to serve on the Supreme Court, it seems, had 
little difficulty by 1998 to supporting Title VII guidelines for cases involving employment 
discrimination based on sex – and expanding the application of the law to meet new exigencies. 
The 1998 decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services arose out of a Title VII 
discrimination case brought by Joseph Oncale, who alleged that, while employed by Sundowner 
Offshore Services as a roustabout on a Gulf of Mexico oil rig, he was sexually abused by several 
of his fellow workers. In his complaint, Oncale alleged that his co-workers had called him 
disparaging names because of his presumed homosexuality, sodomized him with a bar of soap, 
humiliated him openly, and threatened him with rape. Both a federal district court and court of 
appeals declared that Title VII provided him no cause of action. The Supreme Court thought 
otherwise. Justice Scalia, who wrote for a unanimous court (Justice Thomas concurred), reversed 
the decision of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The opinion 
included the instruction that, under Title VII, a male can be discriminated against by members of 
the same sex, establishing an important precedent for same-sex employment discrimination. 
Certainly, in 1998, Title VII said nothing about employment discrimination based on gender or 
sexual orientation. But, in the view of the Court, any discrimination “based on sex” was 
actionable if it placed the victim in an objectively disadvantageous working condition. And the 
sex of either the victim or the abuser was immaterial.164  
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In 1992, the conservative justices of the Rehnquist Court scored a major victory for the New 
Federalism and, in doing so, made a powerful statement on behalf of state sovereignty. In New 
York v. United States (1992), the Court dealt with the problematic Low Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 – in particular, the so-called “take title” provision intended by 
Congress as an incentive for states to comply with the mandates of the Low Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act of 1980. The State of New York had made strenuous efforts to negotiate a 
regional, multi-state compact with neighboring states. But public protests and demonstrations 
against the establishment of any storage site, a consequence of the extraordinarily large volume 
of radioactive waste produced by New York, spurred the governor to abandon further efforts. 
New York challenged the “take title” provision of the 1985 act, which would have required the 
state, because of its firm noncompliance, to take ownership and responsibility for all its low-level 
radioactive waste, as a violation of state sovereignty. With Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing 
for the majority, the Court found that the “take title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act, indeed, had exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause. After noting the constitutionality of the first two incentives, Justice O'Connor 
characterized the "take title" incentive as an attempt to “commandeer” the state governments by 
directly compelling them to participate in the federal regulatory program. According to her, 
Congress had “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.” Such coercion, she 
insisted, would be inconsistent with the federal structure of government, in which a “core of state 
sovereignty” is enshrined in the Tenth Amendment. The Court did, however, declare that the 
“take title” provision was severable, allowing the rest of the act to stand.165 
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Strenuous, high profile complaints by gun owners and Second Amendment enthusiasts 
succeeded in having the Supreme Court grind down at least one of the hard edges of the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993. The National Rifle Association organized and helped 
to fund lawsuits in Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Texas, Vermont and Wyoming to have the legislation declared unconstitutional. The challenges 
reached the Supreme Court in Printz v. United States (1997). The main issue was that part of the 
act requiring local law enforcement officers to examine and verify mandatory background checks 
for each firearm purchase, that is, before the completion of the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS) to be made available to firearm sellers at the point of 
purchase. Writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision was Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence 
Thomas.  Justice Scalia conceded that no constitutional text dealt with the precise question. The 
solution to the problem could only be found “in historical understanding and practice, the 
structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.” And, in this view, the 
interim provision commanding the “chief law enforcement officer” of each local jurisdiction to 
verify the detailed information contained in the completed “Brady form” required for each 
firearm sale, was far too burdensome to impose on state officials, in a word, unconstitutional as a 
violation of state sovereignty.166 
In the three decades following the advent of the Great Society, all socioeconomic and 
political relations in the United States came under scrutiny for instances of unequal treatment—
and unequal outcomes. Racial tensions continued as African Americans, Native Americans, 
                                                 
166 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
251 
 
Hispanic peoples, and members of other racial and ethnic groups struggled to ensure they were 
the beneficiaries of social and economic progress, which some increasingly associated with the 
redistributive politics of “social justice.”167 New generations of women insisted upon respect and 
equal opportunities in all fields of endeavor. As to intimate relations, the idea of culturally 
constructed gender roles gained traction and legal effect. Congressional legislation and Supreme 
Court rulings made many controversial issues national and, thus, the stakes at election times 
became a “winner takes all” proposition.  With the capacity of central power to spur change 
clearly established, victory seemed imperative for partisan combatants; many believed that 
moving from one region or state to another would, ultimately, make little difference. Due to the 
enormous implications of most policy questions central to culture wars conflict, the vitriol 
between conservatives and liberals grew so intense as to produce the perception that very little 
common ground remained.   
More than any other constitutional authority in the period 1964-1998, the commerce power 
served the purpose of rapidly reordering socioeconomic and political relations in the United 
States – and its deployment was central to intensifying political and cultural conflict. Certain that 
theirs was the correct and most moral vision of America, partisan political operatives sought to 
actualize their visions with the most effective tool available – central government power. 
Commencing with the instrumental use of Commerce Clause authority to ameliorate the racial 
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injustice that African Americans had suffered for centuries, well-intended federal lawmakers and 
judges resorted increasingly to this potent instrument of change. Supported vigorously by a 
largely liberal academy and mass print and electronic media – new legislation, administrative 
agencies, and federal courts underwrote Commerce Clause power to raise wages and limit the 
hours of workers, ensure equity in hiring and promotion for women and minority members with 
affirmative action directives, and end the sex-based harassment of women and members of the 
LGBT community in the work place. The rapid deployment of federal authority on behalf of 
liberal understandings of progress entailed the imposition of new regulatory regimes that took 
aim at environmental hazards, unsafe products, and threats to endangered species. The increasing 
reliance on commerce power to limit the availability of post-viability abortion, crack down on 
“super predators,” restrain drug-cartel trafficking, and restrict gun ownership exponentially 
intensified partisan conflict. Many business owners and consumers, however, resented deeply the 
rising costs of regulation, while others simply wanted to be free of federal government dictates 
and regimentation they deemed both unnecessary and in violation of fundamental freedoms.  
Congress and the Supreme Court interacted dialectically to generate Commerce Clause-based 
law that steadily re-arranged the balance of power between states and the federal government. 
Some of the more controversial measures regulated or criminally penalized activities that bore no 
clear relationship to interstate commerce and seemed to invade the customary and, indeed, 
constitutionally reserved criminal jurisdiction of the states. These developments spurred deep 
trepidation among many “outside the beltway” that federal authority knew no bounds and that 
the capacity of state and local governments to manage their affairs in keeping with the 
preferences of constituents was fast becoming a thing of the past. A provision of the Constitution 
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originally intended to bring the states together, by the mid-1990s, in the view of some, seemed to 
be tearing many communities apart.  
As indicated, the period 1964-1998 saw the rapid proliferation of comprehensive regulatory 
schemes based on the commerce power. More explicitly than ever before, the Warren and Burger 
courts held that Congress could regulate or entirely suppress an intrastate activity if Congress 
had reasonably concluded that such regulation was necessary to uphold such a scheme. This was 
so even if an activity, taken in the aggregate, did not have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.  In the case of a comprehensive regulatory regime, Congress could employ the 
commerce power to regulate intrastate activities no matter “how great or small” – and even ban 
intrastate activities if necessary to uphold such a regime. As well, Congress could pass criminal 
statutes based on commerce power if the language of such statutes contained a jurisdictional 
element identifying a nexus of the offense, in each case, to interstate commerce. Such a linkage 
permitted a federal court to decide, on a case-by-case basis, if the statute met Commerce Clause 
muster for the purposes of enforcement. 
On the other hand, the growing number of conservative justices appointed to the Supreme 
Court increasingly generated decisions that refrained from enlarging the scope of the substantial 
effects test and in other ways calibrated Commerce Clause-based measures to contain them 
within the limits of the New Federalism, which gathered something of a critical mass during the 
tenure of Chief Justice William Rehnquist. In this connection, the Rehnquist Court produced 
Commerce Clause decisions that assertively staked out the sovereign prerogative of the states to 
refuse to be “commandeered” into federal regulatory schemes. 
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Chapter Four 
Stop Sign: Gun-Free School Zones and 
United States v. Lopez (1995) 
 
 
On March 10, 1992 Alphonso Lopez, Jr. was arrested in his San Antonio High School; he 
had been caught carrying a .38 caliber revolver to the institution.  The initial arrest was 
conducted by the San Antonio Police Department and was based upon violations of Texas state 
law.  Later, those charges were dropped and Lopez was handed over to federal authorities to be 
indicted under the Gun-Free Schools Zone Act of 1990 (GFSZA).1  The District Court in San 
Antonio denied his motion to dismiss the indictment based upon Lopez’s claim that the law was 
an unconstitutional use of Congress’ commerce power.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed that decision and agreed with the defendant.  The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling; for the first time in nearly sixty years, the Court struck down a law based upon 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 
First among the four Rehnquist Court decisions that had, among hopeful conservatives, 
raised the question of whether that tribunal might revamp the scope of commerce power to 
produce a “constitutional revolution” similar to that of 1937 was United States v. Lopez. That 
decision raised the hopes of constitutional originalists and gave concern to those who viewed the 
document more expansively.2 Lopez and others convicted under the GFSZA had their 
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convictions reversed, while defense attorneys nationwide now found a new avenue to defend 
their clients.3  Other suits, based on the argument that Congress had no power to use the 
Commerce Clause to legislate in non-commercial and non-economic areas raised the question of 
just how influential the ruling in Lopez would be. Congress responded by rewriting the law to 
make it less vulnerable to legal assaults.   
A significant number of scholars commented about the impact of Lopez in its immediate 
aftermath. But relatively little systematic study has been conducted of the evolution of the 
GFSZA or the related proceedings of the case in the lower federal courts and the sociocultural 
and political contexts of the case. This chapter examines, first, the history of federal gun control 
laws in the twentieth century, the legislative processes and motivations for passing the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 and its subsequent amendments. Next, it will explain the impact of the 
GFSZA on an average citizen, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., as his case moves from the federal district 
court, through the federal appeals court, and finally to the United States Supreme Court. Equally 
important, discussion throughout will gauge the GFSZA and the decision in Lopez for their 
constitutional import and relationship to the culture wars conflict that intensified in the mid-
1990s. 
While the ruling in Lopez was a surprise because Commerce Clause-based legislation had not 
been ruled unconstitutional since 1936, the ruling did not overturn any precedent.  The Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 was a previously unchallenged use of the Commerce Clause, in which 
intrastate criminal activity was brought under federal jurisdiction.  The Court was ruling on an 
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area of federal law that it had never been ruled upon before—a case of first impression with no 
previous decisions precisely on point to bind it.4  The case became notable as much because of 
its uniqueness as its actual impact.  Notwithstanding this, the Lopez decision sent shock waves 
among Court-watchers.  Since no law based upon Congress’ commerce power had been struck 
down in over sixty years, the surprise was understandable, as was the resulting focus on the case 
in the legal literature.  Some authors clearly, but cautiously, hoped that the case indicated the 
beginnings of a return to pre-1937 commerce jurisprudence, while others feared such a return.  
Many were hesitant to view the ruling as a “constitutional revolution” and instead saw that it was 
merely the response to a poorly written law or perhaps a symbolic statement by a prickly Court 
that Congress needed to better justify its rationale when writing future laws. 
As is true of the writings about many cases decided by the Supreme Court, idealism abounds 
in the legal literature about Lopez.  Originalists hoped to overturn the precedents that had 
dominated the Court’s rulings since 1937 and return to a view of the Commerce Clause that 
limited the federal government’s intrusiveness into what they perceived to be the domains of the 
individual states.  Conversely, progressive thinkers hoped to maintain and build a stronger 
centralized government with laws that could be standardized across the United States.  As a 
result, Lopez was often perceived, initially at least, as either a hopeful beginning or the 
commencement of a national catastrophe.   
 
Looking back to the roots of federal gun legislation, the federal government did not concern 
itself significantly in gun control until the twentieth century.  State and local communities 
certainly maintained the power to place all kinds of stipulations on gun ownership and use, but 
                                                 
4 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), 3. 
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the Second Amendment was seen as a barrier to the federal government from such legislation.5  
The first such endeavors to control firearms at the federal level was based not on the Commerce 
Clause, but instead on Congress’ other enumerated powers; it was only later that congress used 
the power of the Commerce Clause to support federal gun legislation.6  
In 1919, as part of a larger War Revenue Act, a ten percent manufacturers’ excise tax was 
placed on firearms.  The legislative history of the act indicates that the primary motive of the 
legislation was to generate revenue, but a secondary motive was a concern over handguns as a 
public safety problem.  Although the rationale for the tax was financing America’s expenses in 
World War I, the tax survived and Congress has since amended the law several times.  Proceeds 
from the current eleven-percent tax on firearms, bows, crossbows, and accessories are used to 
finance state wildlife preservation programs.  The act also established the Treasury Department 
as the primary federal authority over firearms issues.7  
Even though guns as a public safety issue had not become an issue addressed by the federal 
government, there was certainly concern at the state level.  Also, one of the characteristics that 
arose along with America’s increasing industrialization and interconnection in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century was the desire for standardization.  Indeed, by 1892 several states sent 
delegations of attorneys to meet and attempt to standardize state laws at the first annual meeting 
                                                 
5 See for example William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth 
Century America (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) 47, 57 and 
Franklin E. Zimring, “Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,” The Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan. 1975), 135. 
6 U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8. 
7 Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, The Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan. 1975), 135; Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 
September 2, 1937, 16 U.S.C 669-669i; 50 Stat 917, Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest 
to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/FAWILD.HTML 
(accessed January 13, 2012).  
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of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  By 1912, all existing 
U.S. states and territories were represented.8  One of the ideas of the organization was to draft 
uniform laws in areas “where Congress had no jurisdiction,” and as a result, the primary 
emphasis of gun control advocates during the 1920s was standardizing state and local laws.9 The 
focus of those efforts at that time was the regulation, possession, and use of concealable 
“pistols;” i.e., any gun with a barrel less than twelve inches in length, and specifically revolvers 
and sawed-off shotguns.  The United States Revolver Association, hoping to preempt the actions 
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, presented a draft for a 
uniform revolver law in 1923.  The resultant “Uniform Firearms Act” was adopted by the 
conference of commissioners in 1926 and included among other stipulations: provisions 
outlawing the carrying of a “pistol” without a license (no license was required if the weapon 
remained on its owner’s property or business), additional penalties for crimes committed with the 
use of a “pistol,” a required forty-eight hour waiting period to purchase a handgun, and 
prohibitions on sales to “drug addicts, habitual drunkards and minors under eighteen.”  The 
substance of the act was adopted by seventeen states, including California, North Dakota, New 
Hampshire, and Pennsylvania; Congress then adopted the measure for the District of Columbia 
in 1932.  Other states considered the proposed law either too restrictive or too lenient.  The 
Governor of Arizona vetoed the law as too restrictive, for example, while Franklin Roosevelt, 
                                                 
8 Kim Quaile Hill and Patricia A. Hurley, “Uniform State Law Adoptions in the American 
States: An Explanatory Analysis,” Publius, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter, 1988), 117. 
9 Allison Dunham, “A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring, 1965), 237. 
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governor of New York, (the state with the most restrictive gun laws in the nation at the time) 
vetoed the version of the bill placed before him and instead advocated for federal regulation.10 
Not addressed by the Uniform Firearms Act was the issue of machine guns.  When the act 
was first conceived in the early 1920s, only handguns and sawed-off shotguns were of interest.  
But as the decade progressed and the effects of prohibition spread, the “the infant industry of 
racketeering grew to monstrous size,” and semi-automatic pistols and machine guns replaced 
revolvers and sawed-off shotguns as the most feared firearms in America.11   In response, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws introduced the Uniform Machine 
Gun Act in 1932.  The proposed legislation made it a crime to possess or use a machine gun for 
an offensive purpose.  Therefore, possession was not allowed except on premises owned or 
rented by the gun’s possessor or user.  Unnaturalized citizens or persons previously convicted of 
a violent crime were not allowed to own or possess the weapons; the registration of some types 
of machine guns was required as well.  Eventually, federal law would come to supersede the 
need for the Uniform Machine Gun Act, although a few states did legislate some forms of the 
act.12  
                                                 
10 W. H., Legislation: The Uniform Firearms Act,” Virginia Law Review, 18 (1932), 904.  John 
Brabner-Smith, “Firearm Regulation,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 1 (1933-34), 401. 
“Governor Vetoes Gun Law Changes,” The New York Times, March 29, 1932, 4. Michael A. 
Bellesiles, “Firearms Regulation: A Historical Overview,” Crime and Justice, Vol. 28 (2001), 
172. 
11 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Machine Gun Act of 
1932, Prefatory Note. 
12 Brabner-Smith, “Firearm Regulation,” 405. 
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In 1927, Congress passed its first law aimed at controlling guns by prohibiting the shipment 
of concealable firearms to private individuals through the U.S. postal system.13  This was an 
effort to curtail the proliferation of handguns and sawed-off shotguns.  It was also designed to 
thwart the efforts of citizens denied the ability to purchase firearms in one state from buying 
them from another state.  Of course, sellers and buyers could easily thwart the law by utilizing 
private shippers for their commerce.14  Just four years later, by the time Franklin Roosevelt was 
elected in 1932, during the depths of the Great Depression, there were increasing calls for federal 
solutions to what had previously been considered local problems.  In 1934, Congress passed the 
National Firearms Act to control “gangster-type” weapons like machine guns, sawed-off 
shotguns, and silencers.15  Organized crime expanded dramatically during the prohibition era and 
Hollywood was seen as exacerbating the problem with sensationalized violence in movies such 
as Little Caesar (1930), The Public Enemy (1931), and Scarface (1932).16   Congress and the 
President responded by trying to curb the use of the specific weapons that were considered most 
effective and spectacular, those weapons used by mobsters in their unlawful actions.  Congress 
again used its power to “lay and collect taxes” to place a $200 tax on transfers of the offending 
weapons.17   Although President Roosevelt’s first Attorney General, Homer Cummings, had 
wanted a provision for handgun registration in the bill, he could not sell Congress on the idea.  
                                                 
13 James B. Jacobs, Can Gun Control Work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 20.  This 
law remained in effect until passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968, Zimring, “Firearms and 
Federal Law,”136. 
14 Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, The Citizen’s Guide to Gun Control (New York: 
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 132. 
15 National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. Sec. 5801-5872 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)).  See also Zimring and Hawkins, The Citizen’s 
Guide, 132-133. 
16 Michael A. Bellesiles, “Firearms Regulation,” 174. 
17 U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl.1. 
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However, Congress did provide for registration of all weapons covered in the act—even if 
illegally owned!  That aspect of the act stood as written until the 1968 case of Haynes v. United 
States, when the Supreme Court decided that the law infringed upon the right not to incriminate 
oneself.18  Also, the act provided for the defining and annual federal registration of firearm 
importers, manufacturers, dealers, and pawnbrokers.  At the time it was being considered, 
legislators decided that basing the law on Congress’ taxing power was preferable to using its 
commerce power for three reasons: first, it would provide revenue; second, through registration 
for tax purposes, the federal government would eventually be able to amass the identifications of 
legal owners of the affected firearms and be able to punish those in illegal possession if they 
were arrested for some other crime; third, there was a precedent of similar legislation regarding 
narcotics that had been upheld by the Supreme Court.19 
Four years after the National Firearms Act was passed, Congress followed up with the 
Federal Firearms Act of 1938.20  This was the first gun control law based upon Congress’ 
expanded commerce powers in the wake of the Court rulings from 1937.  Now secure in being 
able to legislate broadly under its commerce authority, Congress and the Roosevelt 
Administration aimed to keep firearms out of the hands of those within certain groups of citizens, 
most especially those convicted of felonies, those judged mentally incompetent, and those 
residing illegally in the United States, by prohibiting interstate shipment of firearms to them.   It 
                                                 
18 Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).  Franklin E. Zimring, “Firearms and Federal 
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also required now-registered gun dealers to keep records of every transaction as well as the 
name, age, and address of every firearm buyer and the transaction.21   
By this time, the constitutionality of federal gun control had become largely unquestioned.  
Congress clearly had the power to lay and collect taxes.  It also had the authority to regulate what 
was sent through its own mail system.  States, as long as they were acting within their own 
constitutions, had the sovereign power to regulate firearms within their borders as well.  Finally, 
the Supreme Court, with its expanded view of Commerce Clause-based legislation, seemed 
unlikely to overturn a law based upon those powers.  However, the question reasonably might be 
asked, “Why wouldn’t a gun-control law, based upon the Congress’ enumerated powers, be 
simply struck down as repugnant to the Second Amendment?”22  After all, Congress’ enumerated 
powers fall under the main body of the Constitution, while the Second Amendment, ratified at a 
later date, should hold precedence.  The answer may be found in the 1939 case, United States v. 
Miller, which challenged the 1934 Federal Firearms Act on Second Amendment grounds.23  The 
case involved Jack Miller and Frank Layton, two thugs who took an unregistered sawed-off 
shotgun from Oklahoma into Arkansas.  There is some evidence that the Roosevelt 
administration pushed the case to the Supreme Court to assure the validity of the law in the 
“post-revolution” Supreme Court.  On May 3, 1938, in the federal district court in Ft. Smith, 
Arkansas, District Judge Hiram Heartsill Ragon, a former Arkansas congressman appointed by 
                                                 
21 “Six Decades of Gun Legislation,” The New York Times, May 24, 1990, B12, col. 5.  Franklin 
E. Zimring, “Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,” The Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan. 1975), 140. 
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President Roosevelt to the federal bench in 1933, ruled the law unconstitutional.24  Consequently, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, bypassing the circuit court level of appeal, and reversed 
the lower court ruling by sustaining the law.  However, the opinion in the case was very narrow 
and both gun control advocates and Second Amendment supporters use the ruling to support 
their views.  The Court ruled that the Second Amendment does not guarantee the right of an 
individual to keep and bear a sawed-off shotgun.  The Court’s opinion was based on the justices’ 
understanding that such a weapon was not one that would generally be used by an organized 
military force, i.e. “a well-regulated militia.”  The Court made no sweeping judgment that 
firearms ownership was an individual or a collective right.  What was important was that the 
National Firearms Act was upheld; thus, both Congress and the Roosevelt Administration could 
feel secure in crafting future firearms legislation.25 
After 1934, the incidence of sensational machine gun-related crimes decreased.  The National 
Firearms Act, with the heavy taxes, may have made machine gun use prohibitive.  However, 
adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933, ending prohibition, also caused mobsters to 
                                                 
24 Hiram Heartsill Ragon (1885-1940), Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 
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enter less public arenas for crime and this may have been a cause of the decrease as well; even 
Hollywood may have been a factor.  As a result of a 1933 book by Henry James Forman entitled 
Our Movie Made Children, which suggested that movies were making young Americans more 
violent, the Catholic Church threatened a national boycott unless the film industry reduced the 
level of violence in its productions.  The threat worked, and the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America created a code that didn’t allow films to display nor show the details of 
firearms; neither displays of, or even could the sounds made by machine guns be featured in 
films.  Additionally, criminals could not be shown killing policemen, and movies depicting 
crimes had to result in the criminals being apprehended and punished.26  Whatever the cause of 
the reduced prominence of machine gun-related crimes, Congress seemed satisfied with its 
existing gun control legislation for the next three decades and focused instead on economic 
recovery, World War II, and the Cold War.  
This status quo was disrupted when the turbulent 1960s resulted in demands for more gun 
laws.  The tragic assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 reignited calls for 
stricter gun control at the federal level.  The circumstances under which Lyndon Johnson 
assumed the presidency paved the way for the Gun Control Act of 1968.  Kennedy’s assassin had 
purchased his weapon via mail order from an advertisement in the NRA’s American Rifleman 
magazine.27  Although a few members of Congress had discussed it even before Kennedy’s 
assassination, that event spurred others in Congress to immediately move to outlaw interstate 
purchases of firearms and ammunition by individuals though the U.S. Postal Service.  However, 
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the bill never made it out of committee until 1968.28  After the assassination of President 
Kennedy, Congress immediately embarked on an attempt to ban mail-order purchases of 
shotguns and rifles.  However, the bill crafted never left the Senate Judiciary Committee due to 
pressure from the National Rifle Association.  The next motivating factor pushing Congress 
toward restricting weapons occurred with the assassinations of the Reverend Martin Luther King, 
Jr. on April 4, 1968, and of Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.) on June 6, 1968.  The 
combination of these two events made a new attempt to legislate wide-ranging gun control 
legislation viable.   After four and half months of contentious debate and compromise, Congress 
passed the Omnibus Crime Control Safe Streets Act and the Gun Control Act of 1968.29  These 
laws repealed the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, but incorporated its provisions into the new laws 
along with other offenses as well.  Whereas the 1938 law instituted licensing requirements to 
those engaged in selling firearms in interstate commerce, the new law extended those 
requirements to all dealers, regardless of their markets.30  The Gun Control Act of 1968 
prohibited any firearm sales to, or even their possession by, those convicted of felonies, those 
judged mentally incompetent, etc., groups of individuals who were formerly only excluded from 
interstate shipments of guns.  It was also intended to provide federal support to state and local 
law enforcement officials.31  These acts remain amended but in effect still today. 
Based upon the federal government’s commerce power, combined with the power of 
Congress to tax, and further enriched by the afore-mentioned authority given to the United States 
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Postal Service, the new law regulated the sales of guns by prohibiting their sale to minors, felons, 
and incompetents.  It also regulated the shipment of guns as well as allocating the licensing of 
dealers; additionally, the law further served to increase the penalties for federal crimes involving 
the use of guns.  The same law also covered a variety of other explosives, though it did not 
include gun registration, as Johnson had wanted.32 
The attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 30, 1981 resulted in calls for 
more federal gun control legislation.  The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act imposed a 
five-day waiting period on certain handgun purchases to ensure that those people prohibited from 
owning handguns by the 1968 Gun Control Act were not allowed to purchase them.33  The law 
stipulated that during the five-day waiting period, local law enforcement was to perform a 
background check on the purchaser.  The act was successfully challenged in the Supreme Court 
case of Printz v. United States, when the Court ruled that the federal government could not 
compel states to enforce a federal regulatory program.34  The case was perhaps more significant 
from a Tenth Amendment perspective than a gun control issue since a federal database can now 
provide instant background checks to accomplish the same objective as the five-day waiting 
period.  The case is mentioned briefly here because in Justice Clarence Thomas’ concurrence he 
used the same rationale for striking down the Brady Act as he did to strike down the Gun-Free 
School Zone Act.35  
Some of the stipulations of the Gun Control Act of 1968 were modified in 1986.  The 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act was originally an attempt to remove some of the regulations 
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Congress had passed previously.36  On the whole, its effects were negligible for handguns—
nearly all pre-1986 handgun regulations remained in effect.  But the law did slightly loosen 
regulations for long guns and eased the recordkeeping required by federal firearms licensees.37  
Perhaps the law’s most notable feature resulted from the public’s fear of what came to be known 
as “assault rifles,” i.e. rifles that appeared to have military applications.  The law made it illegal 
for anyone to own or transfer ownership of a machine gun that was not made and registered 
before May 19, 1986, without express authorization by federal or state governments.38   
Throughout the 1980s, Congress increasingly had greater concerns about gun-related attacks 
in schools.   A series of shootings had highlighted citizens’ fears for their children as well as 
concerns for teachers and other school workers.  Two events were particularly enraging.  In May 
1988, thirty-year-old Laurie Dann entered a second-grade public school classroom in Winnetka, 
Illinois (a wealthy suburb north of Chicago) and opened fire, killing an eight-year old student 
and wounding five others.  She later shot a twenty-year-old man before killing herself.39  In 
January 1989, a man in his mid-twenties named Patrick Edward Purdy of Lodi, California used 
an AK-47 rifle to kill five elementary school students; he also wounded a teacher and twenty-
nine other students before shooting himself in the head.40  Other less dramatic events, like 
shootings in school cafeterias in the Bronx and Washington D.C., only heightened the political 
motivation for Congress to respond. 
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With the school shootings in mind, U.S. Representative Edward F. Feighan (D-OH) 
introduced H. R. 3757, the “Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990” in late November 1989.  His 
legislation would prohibit anyone not specifically exempted, such as law enforcement officials, 
from bringing any sort of firearm within 1,000 feet of a public or private school.  Feighan 
gathered nine cosponsors composed of seven Democrats and two Republicans—indicating the 
bill had bipartisan support.  The companion Senate version was introduced as S. 3266 the 
following February by Herbert H. Kohl (D-WI), former president of the Kohl’s retail chain and 
owner of the Milwaukee Bucks.41  Citing a report from the National School Safety Center that 
estimated in 1987 “270,000 students carried handguns to school at least once,” the bill’s 
supporters in turn had the backing of the National Education Association, The American 
Association of School Administrators, the National School Boards Association, and the 
American Academy of Pediatrics.42 
With the many supporters on hand, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime held a 
hearing on September 6, 1990, just after the school year commenced and two months prior to the 
November mid-term elections.  The subcommittee heard from several interested parties, 
including a police chief, a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms official, representatives 
from the National Education Association, National PTA, the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
and the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence.  Each witness laid out a litany of compelling 
evidence that death, injury, and hostage situations involving firearms were critical threats and 
events that were happening with increased frequency across America.  “Firearms are a problem 
                                                 
41 Karen J. Cohen, “Kohl Defines Niche in the Senate,” States News Service, June 25, 1993. 
42 “Introduction of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990” U.S. Congress, Congressional 
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of epidemic proportions,” stated one M.D. who argued that keeping children away from firearms 
is simply a form of preventative medicine.43  The Center to Prevent Handgun Violence 
representative presented a four-year study that detailed the deaths of seventy-one people, the 
wounding of 201, and how 242 other individuals were held hostage at gunpoint all within and 
around America’s schools.44  All commenting subcommittee members agreed that schools had 
become dangerous places and that something had to be done to stop the violence.  However, 
Chuck Douglass (R-NH) wondered how creating a law aimed at adults would help the problem 
of school violence, since the vast majority of the crimes were committed by people under the age 
of eighteen.  He also asked how the BATF, with only 1,800 special agents, could possibly be 
effective as the primary law enforcement arm in 100,000 schools across the country.  He posited 
that either the BATF would have to grow considerably or that state and local law enforcement 
would have to retain their primary police powers.  Finally, he wondered what was “magic” about 
the 1,000-foot distance from a school ground.  He described how in many rural areas, a 1,000-
foot radius could encompass an entire community.  The law would, therefore, create a situation 
in which every hunting season could result in a town full of potential federal felons.  Feighan, the 
bill’s sponsor, assured Douglas on the matter, “I am not so sure that it could happen.  But beside 
the point, it certainly is not something that is going to lead to prosecution.”45  
During testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, BATF official 
Richard Cook advised that the bill as presented needed a constitutional reference.  He stated, 
“We would note that the source of constitutional authority to enact the legislation is not manifest 
on the face of the bill.  By contrast, when Congress first enacted the prohibitions against 
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possession of firearms by felons, mental incompetents and others, the legislation contained 
specific findings relating to the Commerce Clause and other constitutional bases, and the 
unlawful acts specifically included a commerce element.”46 
The National Rifle Association also presented its views on the legislation.  In a statement 
written by James Jay Baker, the director NRA’s Institute for Legislative Action, the NRA echoed 
Representative Douglas’ concern about the 1,000-foot perimeter.  Such a large boundary would 
surely cause otherwise law-abiding citizens to inadvertently become potential federal criminals.  
Furthermore, Baker also suggested that the new law was merely a political exercise with no 
useful impact.  He wrote, “There is no state in which the carrying of a loaded firearm with 
criminal intent is not a crime…Indeed, it may be taking what the state constitution interprets as a 
guaranteed right and making it a federal felony.”47  He proposed also that from a due process 
requirement, an appropriate notice would have to be posted along a perimeter established 1,000 
feet from each of the nation’s 80,000 public schools, indicating that travelers were entering a 
gun-free school zone.  Clearly, there were as significant practical and constitutional concerns 
against passage of the law even in the political environment that called for action.  
 Eventually, however, the Senate version of the bill was enacted as part of the broader Crime 
Control Act of 1990.  The Senate passed the broader bill with an easy voice vote; in the house, 
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the vote to pass the act was 313-1.48  The House Report accompanying the act states that the 
intention was “to provide a legislative response to various aspects of the problem of crime in the 
United States.”49  However, the legislators did not heed BATF official Cook’s advice to include 
a constitutional reference, as the report made did not mention the impact upon commerce of 
firearms in schools.50  Additionally, while President George Bush signed the act into law on 
November 29, 1990, he had misgivings about portions of the legislation that appeared to him to 
tip the balance between federal and state power.  He noted,  
I am also disturbed by provisions in S. 3266 [the Crime Control Act of 1990] 
that unnecessarily constrain the discretion of State and local governments. . . . 
Most egregiously, section 1702 [the Gun Free School Zones Act] 
inappropriately overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new and 
unnecessary Federal law. The policies reflected in these provisions could 
legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be imposed on the 
States by the Congress.51 
 
President Bush had little choice in signing the bill, however.  Even in the interim between 
congressional passage and Bush’s signing of the law, shootings involving school students 
continued to motivate officials to “do something” against schoolyard crime.  Over a ten-day 
period in Herb Kohl’s home of Milwaukee, a school bus carrying eleven elementary school 
pupils was “caught in a hail of gunfire during a street battle;” a man was shot on an elementary 
school playground; and a fifteen-year-old boy was shot outside another elementary school during 
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a parent-teacher conference.52   With such violence making the headlines passage of the law 
inevitable. 
Once the law was passed, officials were quick to make political hay of their accomplishment.  
In December, Senator Phil Graham (R-TX) led students in putting up “Gun-Free” signs in 
various high schools in Dallas, El Paso, San Antonio, and Houston to announce the new law.53  
Several states, including Maryland, Virginia, Wisconsin, and New Jersey, as well as smaller 
municipalities, were emboldened by the new law and proposed their own versions.54  Not to be 
outdone, in Connecticut, the Governor proposed a state law enlarging the gun-free school zone 
perimeter to 1,500 feet.55  In discussions over the proposed legislation, anti-gun advocates were 
generally supported in their efforts to create gun-free school zones.  While some pro-gun 
supporters pointed out that laws were already on the books that prohibited guns from being taken 
to school as well as punishing crimes committed with guns, many others backed the new 
legislation.  The NRA was often quiet on the matter; many “tough-on-crime” Republicans 
considered the laws to be a much better solution than general gun bans or other forms of gun 
control. 
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Emboldened with the legislative success of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, by early 1993 
the National Education Association was publicly urging stronger enforcement of the law, as well 
as demanding increased legislation to curb school violence.  Regarding the recently passed 
legislation, the association argued that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms “has done 
little even to make school officials aware of its existence,” implying that the agency was doing 
little to enforce the law.  The NEA also urged Congress to pass a “Violence Free Schools Act” 
that would provide $100 million annually, over a five-year period, to supply schools with metal 
detectors, cameras, and other security enhancements.   It was evident that infusing federal power 
into local school crime control was politically popular among many Americans.56 
The rather even ideological division of the Court in the period 1995-2005 set the stage for its 
first major Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause ruling – which was focused on the 1990 Gun-Free 
School Zones Act.  During the period 1995-2005, the Court was composed of roughly four 
conservatives (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas), one swing voter with conservative 
tendencies (O’Connor), and four more liberal justices (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens).   
Under this composition, the Supreme Court made four significant rulings regarding the 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  The significance of the cases decided results from the 
fact that no law based upon the commerce powers of Congress had been ruled unconstitutional 
since 1937.  Under the Rehnquist Court, three such laws were rejected by the Court with another 
severely threatened. 
The first successful prosecutions under the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act occurred two 
years after its passage. By February 1992, the first man convicted of violating the law, a 23-year-
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old who fired a shot randomly outside a football stadium in Waskom, Texas, was sent to prison 
for an eight-year term.57  Two months later, the Western District of Texas had its first conviction 
as well, by getting a plea bargain from a twenty-year-old resident of San Antonio who had fired 
three shots near a playground occupied by 100 to 200 students.  He fired the shots claiming his 
intention was to scare his friend’s former girlfriend; his plea bargain was for a one- to two-year 
sentence.58   
In the Spring of 1992, Alphonso Lopez was entering the final semester of his senior year at 
Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas; he was described by his attorney as “your basic 
normal kid in high school” who had never been in trouble before.59  His school records showed 
no disciplinary problems prior to 1992.  Indeed, Lopez was a C student, whom friends and 
former classmates said was a popular senior but not a gang member or a troublemaker.  Quite to 
the contrary, he looked forward to making a career in the United States Marine Corps.60  
Additionally, Edison High School was not considered a hub of gang activity.  Students at the 
school said that there was only one gang associated with the campus, and its activities were 
mostly limited to spraying graffiti on signs in the school parking lot.  Local police had a fairly 
firm handle on criminal activity at the school.  Instead of intrusive police patrols or metal 
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detectors in on campus, the police had been able to develop sources within the student body that 
kept authorities informed of criminal or gang-related activities.61   
It was one of these inside sources that informed police that Lopez was carrying a handgun to 
campus on March 10, 1992.  Lopez was summoned to the principal’s office; indeed, he was 
found to be carrying an unloaded .38 Smith and Wesson revolver in the waistband of his jeans.  
He also carried five rounds of ammunition in one of his pockets.  According to Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms officials, Lopez first claimed that he needed the gun to protect 
himself from gangs.62  He later confessed that “Gilbert” had offered him $40 to deliver the gun 
after school to “Jason” who planned to use the gun in a “gang war.”63  Whatever the reason that 
Lopez brought the gun to school, San Antonio police arrested him for his actions.  Texas had a 
state law that made carrying a gun to school a felony; if he had been a minor at the time of his 
arrest, the matter might have remained with local authorities.  However, because Lopez was 
eighteen years old, federal prosecutors suggested that the state charges be dropped and that he 
instead be remanded into federal BATF custody and charged with a violation of the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act.64 
Unable to afford a lawyer, Lopez was assigned a court-appointed defense attorney.  The 
attorney, John “Jack” R. Carter, was faced with a daunting case before him: Lopez had obviously 
broken the law, and the minimum sentence for his crime was six months in prison.  Carter was 
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also well aware that others had been successfully convicted under the law.  He decided to 
concede that his client had broken the law, but he also determined to fight the legality of the law 
itself.65  Thus before the United States District Court of the Western District of Texas, Lopez’s 
attorney entered a plea of “not guilty” and moved to dismiss the indictment.  He argued that the 
Gun Free School Zones Act was “unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to 
legislate control over our public schools” and that the law “does not appear to have been enacted 
in furtherance of any of those enumerated powers” of the federal government.66 
Adjudicating the case was U.S. District Court Judge Hipolito F. “Hippo” Garcia.  Known as 
an easy-going jurist with a relaxed style, Garcia was the son of Mexican immigrants and a 
veteran of World War II.  He attended law school after the war with help from the G.I. Bill and 
by working as a janitor.  Garcia began his career as an assistant district attorney and was the first 
Hispanic in the modern era to be elected as a county court-at-law judge in 1964, furthermore, he 
was also the first Hispanic to be appointed to the federal bench in the Western District, when 
President Carter made that appointment in 1980.67  Despite Judge Garcia’s reputation in the 
media as being “laid-back,” he was unmoved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional 
grounds.  His court concluded that the law “is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ well-defined 
power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the ‘business’ of elementary, middle, 
and high school . . . affects interstate commerce.”68  Lopez then waived his right to a trial before 
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a jury and was instead tried “to the bench upon stipulated evidence.”  The bench trial occurred on 
June 16, 1992, when Lopez was found guilty.  The following day he was sentenced to six months 
of imprisonment followed by two years of probation and a fifty-dollar fine.69 
In September 1993, Lopez appealed his case in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New 
Orleans, which handles all federal appeals from Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi.  The Fifth 
Circuit panel that Lopez faced was composed of three judges: Thomas Morrow Reavley, Carolyn 
Dineen King, and William Lockhart Garwood.  Judge Reavley was a World War II veteran who 
served in the Navy, having graduated from Harvard in 1948, he was the Texas’ Secretary of State 
from 1955-57; in 1979, President Jimmy Carter nominated him to enter the federal judiciary on 
the Fifth Circuit.  President Carter also nominated Judge Reavley’s future bride, Judge King.  
King, a 1962 graduate of Yale and a private practitioner in Texas, joined the Fifth Circuit in 
1979.  Reflecting on her nomination she said, “Only in America would a Southern Baptist male 
Democrat President appoint a Yankee Catholic female Republican transactions lawyer to the 
federal appeals court for the South."70 The third jurist on the panel was Judge Garwood, who 
graduated from the University of Texas in 1955 and clerked for the Fifth Circuit for a year after 
graduation.  He had previously served for three years in the Judge Advocate General Corps in the 
Pentagon before entering private practice for twenty years.  In 1979, he became the first 
Republican since reconstruction to serve on the Texas Supreme Court; subsequently, two years 
later, President Reagan appointed him to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  In addition, Judge 
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Garwood was a member of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, an 
organization founded in 1982 with the goal of reintroducing strict constructionist principles into 
the legal order.71 
With a panel of three conservative judges during a period of time when federalism and its 
implications were frequently discussed, the circuit court overturned the conviction because 
Congress never proved that it had the authority to set school safety policies.72  Judge Garwood 
wrote the opinion for the court and he pointed out that Lopez’s challenge to the constitutionality 
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was the first that had been attempted in federal courts 
and instructed that the question was one of “first impression;” hence no precedent had been set 
on such a matter.73  He continued, outlining the controversy by noting that the case pitted “the 
states’ traditional authority over education and schooling against the [federal] government’s 
acknowledged power to regulate firearms in or affecting commerce.”74  Garwood reviewed 
previously sustained federal Commerce Clause-based laws, noting how each law could be shown 
to have some “substantial” connection to commerce that was either obvious or could be traced to 
congressional findings on the matter.  He acknowledged that defining “substantial” was certainly 
imprecise, and “generally renders decision making in this area peculiarly within the province of 
Congress rather than the Courts.”75  He continued, “the Supreme Court has consistently deferred 
to Congressional findings in this respect, both formal findings in the legislation itself and 
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findings that can be inferred from committee reports, testimony before Congress, or statutory 
terms expressly providing for some nexus to interstate commerce.”76  However, Garwood 
cautioned that although Congress was given great latitude in making laws based upon its 
commerce power, those powers are not unlimited; he supported his assertion with Marshall’s 
ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden:  
The subject to which power is next applied, is to commerce ‘among the several 
states’. . . . Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may very properly be 
restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than one…The 
enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the power was to 
be extended, would not have been made had the intention been to extend the 
power to every description.  The enumeration presupposes something not 
enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the 
sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a state.  The genius and 
character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is the be applied 
to all the external concerns which affect the states generally; but not to those 
which are completely within a particular state, which do not affect other states, 
and with which it is not necessarily to interfere, for the purpose of executing 
some of the general powers of the government.  The completely internal 
commerce of a state, then, may be considered as reserved for the state itself.”77 
 
Garwood argued that the power of Congress power certainly had limits: “Indeed, it could not 
be otherwise as the chain of causation is virtually infinite, and hence there is no private activity, 
no matter how local the matter and insignificant, the ripple effect from which is not in some 
theoretical measure ultimately felt beyond the borders of the state in which it took place.”78  It is 
therefore incumbent upon Congress to show the manner in which an activity or class of activities 
affects interstate commerce.  “When Congress has made findings, formal or informal, that 
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the courts must defer ‘if there is any 
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rational basis’ for the finding.”79  However, without findings, Garwood reasoned that courts 
cannot determine if Congress is acting with a rational basis.  In a similar vein, Garwood argued 
that anytime Congress exceeds its power, it infringes on powers reserved to the states.  The judge 
pointed out that the Tenth Amendment is, after all, “as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the 
First.”80  Thus, when Congress decides that it wishes to change the current balance of power 
between the states and the federal government, it must make its intentions known to the courts; 
otherwise, the courts may inadvertently change the balance that had thus far been based on the 
political system, rather than the judicial system.  
Garwood rejected the two most significant arguments offered by the government.  First, the 
prosecution asserted that the “business” of schools affects interstate commerce, and that a federal 
statue addressing drug offenses occurring within 1,000 feet of school, the schoolyard statute,” 
has been found valid.81  Second, the government claimed that since federal funds are used to 
support schools, the federal government is entitled to “protect its investment.”  In rebuttal to the 
first argument, the Court stated that the schoolyard statute had been legislated in response to 
extensive Congressional findings that connected drug trafficking to interstate commerce; 
apparently the Court was unwilling to concede that the mere possession of a weapon had a like 
impact without Congressional findings.  In response to the second argument, Garwood retorted 
that Congress in no way tied the Gun Free School Zones Act to federal funding; therefore, the 
government could not make that claim.  Garwood then asserted that following the historic 
responsibility of states and localities to educate their children, Congress could not make such 
impositions on local law.  “If Congress can thus bar firearms possession because of such a nexus 
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to the grounds of any public or private school, and can do so without supportive findings or 
legislative history, on the theory that education affects commerce, then it could also similarly ban 
lead pencils, “sneakers,” Game Boys, or slide rules.”  The Court therefore ruled that the law was 
unsustainable and reversed the District Court’s decision.82 
While the Fifth Circuit Court issued its ruling on the Lopez case, the Ninth Circuit in San 
Francisco was considering the case of U.S. v. Edwards III,83 another challenge to the Gun Free 
School Zones Act.  On December 11, 1991, Ray Harold Edwards, III came under suspicion when 
he and four companions were standing outside Edward’s car in the Grant Union High School 
parking lot in Sacramento, California.  Detective Mike Lopez described the five males as being 
“dressed like gang members.”  After a short conversation, Edwards allowed Lopez to look into 
his trunk where the detective found a .22 rifle and a sawed-off bolt-action rifle.  Edwards was 
charged with the unlawful possession of an unregistered sawed-off rifle under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 
5861(d), and for unlawful possession of firearms in a school zone under the Gun Free School 
Zones Act.84  Edwards argued that the Act was unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment and 
that the law was overbroad. 
The three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court took an opposing view to the Fifth, 
however, and the Gun Free School Zones Act was found to be a legitimate exercise of 
Congressional authority.85  The judges, nominees of Presidents Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. 
Bush, ruled that unlike the Fifth Circuit Court, a previous Ninth Circuit ruling, United States v. 
Evans, concerning the possession of an unregistered machine gun, governed them in their 
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decision.86  The ruling stated, “In reaching our conclusion in this matter, we reiterate our holding 
from Evans that is it unnecessary for Congress to make express finding that a particular activity 
or class of activities affects interstate commerce in order to exercise its legislative authority 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”87  Additionally, the Court ruled, “Since Congress has 
frequently relied upon the Commerce Clause as authority for the enactment of statutes regulating 
the use and possession of firearms, Congress was not required to conduct additional hearings and 
make new findings which would merely repeat its prior findings concerning the detrimental 
effect of firearms.”88 Finally, the Court ruled that Edwards lacked sufficient standing to 
challenge the Act as unconstitutionally overbroad.  Edwards argued that the law criminalized 
merely driving past a school on the way to a skeet shooting range with a gun in the trunk of a car.  
Since Edwards had purposely brought a gun to school, his case did not qualify him to challenge 
that aspect of the law. 
The repercussions of the two cases were immediate.  A host of interested parties demanded 
that the Supreme Court address the issue; among the interested parties were the Clinton 
Administration’s Solicitor General’s office and the bill’s author, Senator Kohl.89  On April 18, 
1994 the Supreme Court issued an announcement that it had agreed to hear the case.   Senator 
Kohl looked forward to the Supreme Court’s review; in an interview with the States News 
Service on the day the Court made its announcement, Kohl said, “Lopez threatens a whole host 
of federal firearms and other crime statutes.  Simply put, Lopez is a bad decision that goes 
against common sense and precedent.  Every day, more than two hundred thousand kids carry 
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firearms to school.  Congress tried to do something about it, and I’m hopeful the Court will 
ensure our authority to legislate in this area.”90  By June, Kohl and twelve other senators, along 
with 34 U.S. representatives, filed a brief with the Supreme Court to uphold their law.91  Just as 
Kohl foresaw a series of federal gun legislation falling in the wake of the Lopez decisions, others 
wondered how the ruling might affect other non-commercial federal laws.  Environmental laws 
might certainly be affected since their intentions often had no obvious commercial connection.92  
The case was certainly looked forward to with great concern by both sides of the political aisle. 
The case of United States v. Lopez was argued on Tuesday, November 8, 1994.  Jack Carter 
argued the case yet again for Alfonso Lopez, while Drew S. Days, the Solicitor General of the 
United States, argued for the government.  Solicitor General Days argued his case first and had 
hardly begun his brief before being interrupted by the justices querying him about the limits of 
Congress’ commerce power.  Justice O’Connor wanted to know if “simple possession of 
something at or near a school is commerce at all?”  Days answered that it was and O’Connor 
responded, “If this is covered, what’s left of enumerated powers?”  Justice Scalia pressed him to 
find a boundary of where Congress’ power ended.  He asked, “What cases of ours would stand in 
the way of a stricter. . . Commerce Clause jurisprudence where the activity in question is not 
commercial activity.”  Days responded, “. . . . I think that what this court has operated upon as an 
initial assumption is that Congress was given the power under the Constitution to legislate 
directly upon private individuals, and that there are no built in limitations on the Constitution.”  
Justice Ginsburg sought the line of demarcation in the area of criminal law, “. . . . do I 
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understand your position to be, your rationale for this—that all violent crime, if Congress so 
desired, could be placed under a Federal wing, could be placed in the Federal court for 
prosecution, all violent crime, or is there any stopping point?”  Days answered that, as long as 
Congress had a rational basis for making the law, there was no limit.  Justice Souter pursued yet 
another avenue, asking Days if it was true that the ineffective schools were a threat to America’s 
commercial activity, then would it not be justifiable under the Commerce Clause to nationalize 
the schools and “provide a Federal public school education from kindergarten on up?”  Days 
again could see no Constitutional limitation as long as a nexus to interstate commerce could be 
determined.  Souter continued with his line of reasoning, suggesting that since another factor in 
the education of children was the stability of their families, then perhaps under Day’s rubric, 
Congress could enact Federal domestic relations laws regarding marriage, divorce, etc.  Days 
responded that Congress indeed dealt with matters such as missing children and interstate 
divorce, to which Justice Scalia whimsically pondered whether it had dealt with them 
constitutionally.  Although it was not part of Solicitor General Days’ argument, the justices 
finally reached the point of questioning whether the court system had the tools to define the 
limit, or whether the balance between state and federal power was simply a political question that 
could only be decided by the legislative process.  Justice Kennedy summarized: “None of us at 
least can think of anything under our present case law, or at least under your argument, that 
Congress can’t do if it chooses under the Commerce Clause, so if the Federal system must be 
preserved by someone, and the Commerce Clause is the means by which the Federal structure 
can be obliterated, and if we have no tools or analytic techniques to make these distinctions, then 
it follows that the Federal balance is remitted to the political judgment of Congress.” 
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Jack Carter then presented his argument before the Court.  Carter faced the task of arguing 
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an unconstitutional use of Congress’ commerce power 
when sixty years of case law indicated that the Supreme Court was averse to questioning that 
power as long as Congress could show some rationale for their legislation—a thus far infinitely 
broad interpretation of the commerce power.  Therefore, he argued his position very narrowly, 
not suggesting to the Court that its precedents were incorrectly determined or that its rational 
basis doctrine was too broad an interpretation.  Instead, he followed the Court’s rational basis 
test and posited that since Congress had not provided any findings to support the idea that the 
mere possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of a school had a negative relationship on commerce, 
then there was, in fact, no rational basis for making the law; therefore, Congress was acting 
outside of its authority and the law was unconstitutional.  Carter’s argument was precisely the 
conclusion that had been reached by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, although he did not 
mention that fact in his argument.  Justice Ginsburg inquired of Carter, “Does it make sense for 
us to say that the only flaw in this legislation is the one you’re pushing, because it’s so obviously 
easy to get up a set of findings?  It would be diminishing the Constitution, I think, if you impose 
that kind of, almost school-ma’am requirement on Congress.”  Justice Scalia agreed. “Can we 
tell Congress how it must legislate?  Where do we get the authority to say that?”  Carter carefully 
skirted the fact that it was actually the Supreme Court who had come up with authority through 
its previous rulings; he stated, “It . . . . I wouldn’t view it as . . . in quite the same sense as you do 
Justice Scalia.  The requirement of findings ensures that Congress addresses problems that this 
Court has recognized.  In the Bass case, the Court speaks of being sure that Congress has indeed 
addressed the problem and thought about the State-Federal balance.” 93   Presaging the future 
                                                 
93 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). 
287 
 
case of Raich v. Gonzales, Justice Stevens wondered if Carter would apply his theory to the 
possession of marijuana.  Carter answered that Congress would indeed have the power to 
regulate marijuana possession in schools based upon both Congress’ previous findings and the 
unlikelihood of distinguishing between marijuana that was grown within a state, within the 
country, or marijuana that was brought in from outside the country.  Carter concluded his 
argument by emphasizing that laws made with only implied findings would allow any lines 
limiting Congress’ Commerce Clause powers to vanish.94   
It became evident that the oral argument in the Lopez case could be reduced to the justices 
searching for some limit to Congress’ commerce power.  Solicitor General Days argued that 
because Congress has power over commerce and that everything can be found to have a 
connection to commerce if rationalized enough, then the Gun-Free School Zones Act was 
constitutional.  Jack Carter merely wanted to keep his client out of jail, for this reason, he did not 
argue for or expect the justices to overturn any of their previous rulings.  He did not argue that 
federal laws prohibiting selling or even discharging a gun near a school was unconstitutional, 
and he did not argue that federal law prohibiting mere possession of marijuana near a school was 
unconstitutional.  He only suggested that a law proscribing possession of a gun near a school was 
unconstitutional because at the time it was written, Congress had made no findings showing that 
a rational basis existed for making the law. 
The Court did not seem satisfied with either argument.  Regarding Days’ view of Congress’ 
plenary commerce powers, Justice O’Connor wondered, “If this is covered, what’s left of 
enumerated powers?”  Justice Souter agreed, “Presumably there is nothing left if Congress can 
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do this, no recognizable limit.”  Likewise, Carter’s argument about findings seemed less than 
persuasive to the Court since as Justice Ginsburg suggested, findings could be readily produced; 
also, as several justices noted, the argument held little sway because the Supreme Court had no 
Constitutional authority to tell Congress how to legislate in the first place.  Confined as they 
were by their previous “generous” decisions, as Justice Scalia called them, the Court was left to 
make its decision about how to handle the case.   
On April 26, 1995, the Court rendered its decision on the Lopez case.  The Court ruled five 
to four sustaining the judgment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, thus ruling that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act was an unconstitutional use of Congress’ commerce power.  Voting with 
the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.  
Voting in the minority were Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist filed the Court’s opinion while Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion joined by 
Justice O’Connor.  Justice Thomas filed a separate concurring opinion.  The four dissenting 
justices filed a dissent; in addition, Justices Stevens and Souter filed their own separate dissents 
as well.   
The Chief Justice began his opinion with a discussion of previous Commerce Clause case 
law.  He noted that in the century after the Gibbons v. Ogden ruling, “the Court’s Commerce 
Clause decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress’ power, and almost entirely with the 
Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that discriminated against interstate 
commerce.”95  He added, under this line of precedent, the Court held that certain categories of 
activity such as “production,” “manufacturing,” and “mining,” were within the province of state 
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governments, and thus beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.”96  However, 
after Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act (1887) and the Sherman Antitrust Act 
(1890), the Court began to rule over aspects of commerce that were so mingled “that full 
regulation of interstate commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate commerce.”97  He 
further noted that the 1935 case of A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, in which the 
Court overturned the National Industrial Recovery Act, established the doctrine that Congress 
could only legislate activities that had a “direct” effect on commerce but that the watershed case 
of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation two years later blurred the distinction between 
direct and indirect affects speaking instead to activities that have a “close and substantial relation 
to interstate commerce.”98  Wickard v. Filburn erased the distinction entirely and replaced it with 
activities that exert “a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”99 [emphasis added].   
Rehnquist added that since that time, the Court has “undertaken to decide whether a rational 
basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate 
commerce.”100 
Rehnquist identified three broad categories of activities that are within Congress’ commerce 
power to regulate.  First are the channels of interstate commerce, such as roads, rivers, railroads, 
etc.  Second are the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including persons and things.  
Finally, it is within Congress’ power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to 
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interstate commerce, “i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”101  
Rehnquist admitted that the Court’s past decisions were unclear if an activity needed to “affect” 
or “substantially affect” interstate commerce to fall under Congress’ power.  According to the 
Chief Justice, “[w]e conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that the proper 
test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate 
commerce.”102 
Drawing on key decisions of the Court dating back decades, United States v. Lopez clarified 
substantially the scope of the “substantial relations test” – holding that the only intrastate activity 
within the scope of this rule was economic activity. Chief Justice Rehnquist first determined that 
bringing a pistol within 1,000 feet of a school was activity that did not fall under either the first 
or second broad broach categories of interstate commerce jurisprudence, that is, channels or 
instrumentalities of commerce.  If the Court was to sustain the operative section of the Gun Free 
School Zones Act, that is, § 922(q), it would have to be “under the third category as a regulation 
of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.” The Court pointed out that it had 
upheld a wide variety of congressional acts regulating intrastate economic activity because the 
regulated activity was found to have substantially affected interstate commerce.” Prime 
examples, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, were the regulation of surface coal mining, in 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining; extortionate credit transactions, in Perez v. United States; 
purchase of restaurant supplies, in Katzenbach v. McClung; and catering to inns and hotels, in 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States. But the regulation at hand could not be upheld as it had 
been in these cases: 
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These examples are by no means exhaustive, but the pattern is clear. Where economic 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be 
sustained. 
Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause 
authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a 
gun in a school zone does not.103  
 
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, one of the prime purposes of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act under review in Wickard had been to limit the volume of marketable wheat and, thereby, 
increase its market price. “Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in 
commerce."104 Making the distinction between economic activity and non-economic activity – 
and relying also on the comprehensive regulatory scheme component of the substantial effects 
test developed in Wrightwood Dairy, Wickard, Perez and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining –  
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained why the Court could not uphold § 922(q) of the GFSZA: 
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” 
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. 
Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of 
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed 
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.105 
 
Precedents dating to the New Deal established that commerce power could reach intrastate non-
economic activity to prevent such from undercutting a comprehensive regulatory regime. But 
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since Section 922(q) was not so integrated, the provision could not stand under the authority of 
the Commerce Clause.106  
Chief Justice Rehnquist also held § 922(q) invalid as a criminal statute because it 
contained “no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the 
firearm possession in question had a nexus with interstate commerce.”107 In plain terms, § 922(q) 
was bereft of any language tying the possession of a firearm in a school zone to interstate 
commerce, declaring only “[i]t shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a 
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school 
zone.”108 The Court referenced several of its decisions dating back to 1945 to declare that, under 
“our federal system,” the states possess the primary authority for establishing the criminal law 
and enforcing it – unless Congress, within its delegated powers, seeks to create offenses against 
the United States.109 The chief justice hastened to emphasize that the government acknowledged 
that § 922(q) displaced state policy determinations and that its proscriptions applied even in 
States that had not outlawed the possession of a firearm in a school zone. “Most egregiously,” 
said Chief Justice Rehnquist, “section [922(q)] inappropriately overrides legitimate State 
firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law. The policies reflected in these provisions 
could legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be imposed upon the States by 
the Congress.110 The chief justice pointed out that in United States v. Bass (1971), the Court had 
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expressed the view that in the case of a federal statute criminalizing misconduct customarily 
within the jurisdiction of the state, the Court had required explicit statutory language tying the 
offenses to interstate commerce, such that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will 
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance."111  
The Court also emphatically rejected the independent contention of the government that, 
notwithstanding a bare legislative record on § 922(q), it should uphold that section under the 
Commerce Clause because possession of a firearm in a school zone, in fact, substantially 
affected interstate commerce.112 Solicitor General Drew S. Days argued that violent crime in a 
school zone could be expected to affect the functioning of the United States economy, citing the 
costs of handgun-related violent crime that were invariably shared by Americans through 
increased insurance premiums. As well, he maintained that violent crimes committed with 
handguns deterred individuals from traveling in locales supposed to be unsafe in this regard, 
which negatively impacted the economy of such areas. Last, the government argued that the 
simple presence of guns in schools posed a “substantial threat to the education process” and, as 
such, posed a threat to the learning environment and the productivity of the citizens of the 
country, which would have deleterious effects on its well-being.113 The Court was certainly 
aware that the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 had amended § 922(q) 
to include an interstate commerce jurisdictional element that recited an “in commerce” and 
“affecting commerce” nexus to the offense.114 But, given the decision of the government not to 
rely formally on the revised version of § 922(q) or the legislative committee findings 
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undergirding it, the Court took the opportunity to air out the problem with employing commerce 
power to uphold the provision in its original form: 
Under the theories that the Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to 
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement 
or education where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the 
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that 
Congress is without power to regulate.115 
Responding to Justice Breyer’s dissent, the Chief Justice pointed out that if the government’s 
argument is true that local criminal activity threatened education, thus later impacting the 
economy, then other factors that affect students could come to fall under federal control as well, 
such as family law and eventually direct regulation of education.  Quoting Chief Justice Marshall 
in Gibbons v. Ogden, regarding Congress’ enumerated powers, “The enumeration presupposes 
something not enumerated.”116  Rehnquist concluded by stating that, “To uphold the 
Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that 
would bid air to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States.”  Although some prior cases had indeed made great 
leaps in that direction, he said, “we decline here to proceed any further.”117 
The decision of the majority in Lopez suggests the new lines of battle between the Court 
and Congress over the extent to which the latter might deploy the Commerce Clause to advance 
its ever-widening agendas.  The revision of § 922(q) made by Congress and President Clinton 
seven and a half months before the ruling in Lopez had conspicuously wielded House and Senate 
committee findings to support a judicial ruling that there was, in fact, a nexus between the 
                                                 
115 Ibid., 564. 
116 Ibid., 566, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 195. 
117 Ibid., 567. 
295 
 
possession of a gun in a school zone and interstate commerce – findings, however, pitched 
primarily to the “in commerce” basis for deploying commerce power.118 The 1994 revision did 
not redefine the crime described originally in § 922(q).119 But it did insert a lengthy preliminary 
paragraph to the GFSZA holding that “[t]he Congress finds and declares that. . . crime, 
particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nationwide problem” which “at the 
local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs, guns, and criminal gangs” and 
that “firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been found in 
increasing numbers in and around schools, as documented in numerous hearings in both the 
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives and Judiciary Committee of the Senate 
 . . . .” The new section went on to declare that “in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, 
its component parts, ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made have 
considerably moved in interstate commerce . . . .”120 The revisers certainly attempted to hedge 
their bets, including in the new introductory paragraph declarations, sans committee findings, 
that gun possession in a school zone adversely affected the “quality of education in the country” 
and, consequently, interstate commerce.121 According to the majority in Lopez, however, the 
unrevised section of the GFSZA at issue could certainly not be upheld under the Commerce 
Clause as a non-criminal regulation of interstate commerce. Chief Justice Rehnquist could not 
have been more succinct or emphatic on the latter point: 
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§ 922(q) is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an 
attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of 
commerce; nor can § 922(q) be justified as a regulation by which Congress has sought to 
protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce.122 
 
 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justice O’Connor, noted that the state-centered 
economic system the Founders knew had changed dramatically into a “single national market 
still emergent in our own era.”123  He concurred, but not wholeheartedly with the majority 
opinion.  While admiring the federal system in which general and state governments competed 
with one another to ensure the liberty of the individual, he admitted difficulty in finding the line 
that separated national from state power.  Based upon his reading of The Federalist Papers, he 
observed, “the balance between national and state power is entrusted in its entirety to the 
political process.”124  Indeed, Kennedy had made the same point during the oral arguments of 
Solicitor General Days.  Kennedy also reasoned that a change in the political line of demarcation 
between federal and state responsibility required a notification that such a change was occurring.  
It was therefore incumbent upon Congress, in this instance of non-commercial activity, to make 
its intention clear.  Since Congress had not done that, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice 
O’Connor, sided with the majority. 
According to Justice Kennedy  
Were the federal government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional 
state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial 
activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and  
State authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.125  
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If Justices Kennedy and O’Connor were agreeable to the majority’s “necessary though 
limited holding” (as Kennedy described it), Justice Thomas was not only ready to throw out the 
Gun-Free School Zones act, but he was also prepared to overhaul much of the Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, given a proper case with which to adjudicate.  Justice Thomas 
joined with the majority but wrote separately “to observe that our case law has drifted far from 
the original understanding of the Commerce Clause.”126  Echoing arguments from originalists 
such as Richard Epstein and others, Justice Thomas noted that at the time of its ratification, the 
term “commerce” consisted of selling, buying, and bartering only, activities distinct from 
agriculture and mining.  Addressing the Court’s “substantial effects” formula, Thomas noted, “I 
am aware of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from the 
Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our substantial effects test.”127  If the “substantial 
effects” test was legitimate, argued Thomas, then there would be no need to enumerate 
Congress’ powers since all of those powers “substantially affect” commerce.128  Thomas’ point 
seems valid, considering that the other enumerated powers include such activities as coining 
money, making bankruptcy laws, and providing for punishments for counterfeiting U.S. 
currency.   Even punishing piracy and raising armies substantially affect interstate commerce, 
argued Thomas, and yet each of these powers are specifically authorized to Congress.  
Justice Stevens answered both the majority and the originalist position as well in his dissent.  
“Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain commerce.  Their 
possession is the consequence, either directly or indirectly, of commercial activity . . . . Whether 
or not the national interest in eliminating [the firearm] market would have justified federal 
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legislation in 1789, it surely does today.”129  Justice Souter’s dissent also evaluated prior history 
when he likened the Court’s opinion to a return to a previous doctrine when the Court was at 
odds with both New Deal legislation and the popular will.  He feared that the distinction the 
majority made between what is patently commercial and what is not was a very similar test to the 
pre-1937 test that analyzed direct and indirect affects, and that test was discarded in NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.  Souter suggested, “Thus, it seems fair to ask whether the step 
taken by the Court today does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisdiction from 
which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago.” 
However, Justice Breyer submitted the most extensive dissent, including an appendix 
exceeding 150 scholarly articles and reports.  Discounting the originalist viewpoint of original 
understanding, Breyer began his dissent, “In my view, the statute falls well within the scope of 
the commerce power as this Court has understood that power over the last half century.”130  
Breyer applied three basic principles to reach his conclusion.  First, he argued, terms like 
“direct,” “indirect,” and “substantial,” have no precision, and the test for constitutional authority 
should be whether an activity’s effects on commerce are “significant.”  Second, to determine if 
an activity is likely to have significant effects on interstate commerce, the activities of an 
individual must be considered in light of the cumulative effects of all similar instances of the 
activity; thus, if students around the nation bring guns to schools, the effects on interstate 
commerce could become significant.  Third, Congress should be given broad leeway in 
determining the commercial nexus of its laws.  Congress is far better equipped than the Court to 
determine the relationship between a law and commerce because it has the resources to conduct 
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empirical studies to create findings on the activities under review.  Understanding that the Fifth 
Circuit and the majority on the Supreme Court overturned the law because Congress had 
presented no findings, Breyer endeavored to present his own evidence that guns in schools have 
a significant effect on interstate commerce.  Breyer’s dissent includes a litany of studies that 
indicated that, among other things, businesses tend to avoid localities with poor quality, violent 
schools; that, for Americans to be competitive in the worldwide economy, they must have sound 
educations.131 Breyer further commented, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, that the Court 
had upheld previous laws with less impact on interstate commerce than school violence.  Laws 
against local loan sharking, racial discrimination, and growing wheat for purely personal use all 
have, arguably, lesser effects on interstate commerce than does education, and yet those laws 
were upheld.132  Additionally, Breyer admonished the majority for including only purely 
commercial activities in its definition of activities that affect commerce quoting from Wickard, 
that though Filburn’s wheat wasn’t commerce, it could be regulated so long as “it exerts a 
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.”133  Finally, Breyer warned that the majority 
judgment would result in legal uncertainty since it seemed that the Court’s view of Congress’ 
commerce authority had been well-settled with over 100 sections of the United States Code, 
including at least 25 sections of criminal statutes, all justified by the use of the words “affecting 
commerce.” 
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The emotion-fraught political impact of United States v. Lopez was immediate.  Senator Kohl 
took the Senate floor to lambast the ruling, “If today’s decision is broadly interpreted, the 
reasoning of the majority could have far-reaching consequences that may undermine a variety of 
crucial federal laws; the Drug-Free School Zones Act, on which the Gun-Free School Zones law 
was based, the ban on cop-killer bullets, our federal wetlands laws; and many of our civil rights 
statutes.”134  However, no one was sure quite how to interpret the verdict.  Did it signal the 
Court’s return to a pre-1937 jurisprudence or was it simply an anomaly?  Had the Court only 
established the outer reaches of the regulatory state or was it signaling a rollback of federal 
authority?135  Perhaps the ruling was a message to Congress that federal judges were 
overburdened with seeing defendants who should be prosecuted in state courts.136  Many agreed 
that the effects of the ruling would be negligible in a practical sense.  “More than 40 states have 
similar legislation on the books.  The others should quickly follow suit,” stated a Washington 
Post editorial.137  Still, the impact of the ruling on other laws and the direction the Court was 
taking was yet to be determined. 
President Clinton made his views known in his April 29th weekly radio address.  As a backer 
of the Brady Act and the Assault Weapons Ban, he declared, “We all know guns simply don’t 
belong in school.”  He went on to say that he had asked his Attorney General, Janet Reno, to 
produce for him “what action I can take to keep guns away from schools.  I want the action to be 
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constitutional, but I am determined to keep guns away from schools.”138   Indeed, the previous 
year, in response to the Fifth Circuit Court’s decision, Clinton had proposed the “Gun-Free 
Schools Act” to require local school boards to adopt policies forcing schools to expel for one 
year any student who brought a firearm to school.  Any school that did not comply with the act 
would be ineligible for federal funding.139  Clinton countered conservative arguments about local 
control of schools by citing a Center for Disease Control and Prevention Youth Risk Behavior 
Surveillance Survey that indicated widespread violence in schools as well as an increase in 
students carrying weapons or being the victims of weapons on school property.  His 
administration also used the example of the San Diego school system, which had implemented a 
one-year expulsion for school gun possession.  In the 1992-93 school year there were 355 
assaults with weapons; after the gun ban took effect in 1993-94, there were only 230.  
President Clinton stated that the problem of school violence was a “national crisis” 
requiring “a national effort to fight it.”140  On May 10, 1995, the president made clear that he was 
prepared to begin the legislative battle to resurrect the overturned law.  In a message to Congress 
proposing a further amendment to the GFSZA he wrote, “[This] legislative proposal would 
amend the Gun-Free School Zones Act by adding the requirement that the government prove that 
the firearm has ‘moved in or the possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate or foreign 
commerce.’”141  Within two weeks, Senator Kohl had a new bill prepared for Senate approval; 
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Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) cosponsored the bill, thus making it a bipartisan effort.  In 
September the modified bill was rolled into HR 3756, an unrelated Omnibus Appropriations bill 
for fiscal year 1997.142 
President Clinton and Congress, which the Republican Party controlled for the first time 
since fall 1954, pushed through an omnibus bill that revised the GFSZA in keeping with the 
preferences of at least the president. The revision of §922(q), approved on September 30, 1996, 
set out, verbatim, all the findings and declarations featured in the 1994 revision purporting to 
show a nexus between possessing a gun in a school zone and interstate commerce, again, with an 
emphasis on the interstate movement or “in commerce” rationale.143 Equally important, the 
revision included a redefinition of the offense in keeping with the 1994 congressional findings 
and the arguments made by the government in Lopez: 
It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in 
or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.144  
 
If the reports of the federal circuit courts can be any guide, enforcement of the revised 
GFSZA appears to have, largely, given federal authorities an enhanced means to arrest and 
prosecute urban criminals involved in drug trafficking, other criminal enterprises, or violent 
crimes of any kind if committed near a school. The statute effectively established across each 
urban grid a relatively even constellation of enforcement radii, each over a third of a mile wide, 
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in which to ensnare offenders usually unaware that they were in a federally-created gun-free 
school zone and who did not intend to target public schools or their occupants. For example, in 
the 2007 First Circuit Court of Appeals decision reviewing a conviction under the GFSZA 
United States v Nieves-Castaño, a federal district court found Belen Nieves-Castaño guilty of 
keeping a firearm in a public housing project apartment, which happened to be situated within a 
2,000-foot school zone radii.145 Opponents of the GFSZA appear to have been far more 
concerned with staving off federal encroachments on state and local lawmaking prerogatives and 
Second Amendment rights than with undercutting the authority of federal officials to prosecute 
urban criminals. The GFSZA made an exception for persons licensed by a state to carry a 
firearm. But those who did so in “open carry” states could inadvertently cross into a gun-free 
zone while, simply, driving along major thoroughfares near a school and then face 
prosecution.146 Perennial Libertarian Party candidate for president and United States 
Representative of Texas Ron Paul introduced bills in May 2007, June 2009, and July 2011 to 
repeal the GFSZA. But such initiatives invariably died in committee.147  
In the two decades following the 1996 revision of § 922(q), lower federal courts, at least, 
seemed satisfied with the Gun-Free School Zones Act. After Lopez and to the publication of this 
study, two federal circuit courts of appeal decisions upheld convictions under revised § 922(q) of 
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the Gun Free School Zones Act and, in doing so, addressed challenges to the constitutionality of 
the provision under the Commerce Clause. In one of these two cases, United States v. Danks, the 
United States Supreme Court declined to review the decision of the Eighth Circuit, while the 
appellant in the other decision, United States v. Dorsey, rendered in the Ninth Circuit, did not 
seek review in the Supreme Court.148 Four other circuit court decisions upheld convictions under 
the GFSZA in the period 1996-2017 but did not deal with GFSZA Commerce Clause issues.149 
Three other circuit court decisions overturned convictions under the act in the period but also did 
not deal with such issues.150 
One might surmise, at first blush, that the refusal of the United States Supreme Court to 
review the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal in United States v. Danks (2000) 
signaled an acknowledgment by the Court that its Commerce Clause holdings in Lopez were a 
lost cause. In fact, the Eighth Circuit Court followed these holdings, presenting the Supreme 
Court no compelling reason to review the decision. In United States v. Danks, defendant Jordan 
Danks of Minot, North Dakota, was charged with shooting a car parked within 1,000 feet of a 
school in April 1998. He argued that amended § 922(q) was still unconstitutional because “the 
mere insertion of a ‘commerce nexus’ does not cure the original Act’s defect.” Danks’ challenge 
failed in the North Dakota District Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. With a per 
                                                 
148 United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1091 (2000); 
United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (2005, 9th Cir.).  
149 United States v. Weekes (Third Circuit 2007), No. 06-2082, decided May 23, 2007; United 
States v. Benally (Tenth Circuit 2007), No. 06-2277, decided May 24, 2007; United States v. 
Cruz-Rodriguez, 541 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. P.R., 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1017; United States v. 
Nieves-Castaño, 480 F.3d 597 (1st Circuit 2007). 
150 United States v. Tait, 202 F. 3d 1320 (11th Circuit 2000); United States v. Haywood (Third 
Circuit 2002), No. 01-4086, decided: April 8, 2004; United States v. Guzman-Montanez (First 
Circuit 2014), No. 13–107, decided: June 13, 2014. 
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curium opinion, judges of the Eighth Circuit Theodore McMillan and Richard S. Arnold, both 
Carter appointees, and David R. Hansen, a George H.W. Bush appointee, upheld the conviction 
of Danks under revised § 922(q). The circuit court noted that the Supreme Court in Lopez had 
struck down the 1990 provision because it lacked a “jurisdictional element” that would ensure, 
“through case-by-case inquiry,” that the firearm possession under review had a “requisite nexus 
with interstate commerce.”151 But the circuit court hastened to point out that the subsequent 1996 
revision of the provision had provided exactly what the Supreme Court had required.152 In 
making the requisite case-by-case inquiry and declaring that § 922(q) was “a constitutional 
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power,” the circuit court was careful to find that the 
district court had determined that “the firearm had moved in interstate commerce.”153 
Consequently, the circuit court did not hold that a federal criminal statute based on commerce 
power reached possession of a gun in school zone because such possession had affected or 
substantially affected interstate commerce.  
  In United States v. Dorsey (2005), Nikos Delano Dorsey of Anchorage, Alaska, was 
convicted of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in 
relation to a drug trafficking offense, and possession of a firearm in a school zone on September 
3, 2003. Before Dorsey pleaded guilty, the district court had rejected his motion to dismiss the 
charge under 922(q) of the GFSZA because the statute exceeded the scope of Commerce Clause 
power. Deciding the case on appeal in the Ninth Circuit was judge William C. Canby, Jr., a 
Carter appointee, and judges Richard C. Tallman and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, both Clinton 
                                                 
151 Lopez, 561-562, the Court discussing and quoting from United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 
336 (1971) at 347. 
152 Danks, 1037, quoting Lopez at 514 U.S. 561. 
153 Ibid. 
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appointees. In response to the §922(q) challenge, the circuit court pointed to that part of the 
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez that had relied on the 1971 decision of the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Bass; that decision had reviewed the controversial federal offense of 
gun possession by a convicted felon, set out in the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act and, therein, declared to be based on commerce power. Indeed, the chief justice had drawn 
on the basic Commerce Clause rationale in Bass to conclude in Lopez that, with the inclusion of 
a “jurisdictional element” in §922(q), a court might uphold the provision or not for the purposes 
of conviction or acquittal – but would be required to make a case-by-case inquiry as to whether, 
in the case at bar, there was a nexus between gun possession in a school zone and interstate 
commerce.154 The Ninth Circuit readily acknowledged that Congress had revised §922(q) in 
keeping with the holdings of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez – and seemed to accept, at least 
provisionally, the requirements set out in Bass. But the circuit court upheld §922(q) and affirmed 
the conviction of Dorsey without making an inquiry to determine if the district court had 
established a nexus between his gun possession in a school zone and interstate commerce. In 
justification of this omission, the Ninth Circuit relied on the 1977 decision of the Supreme Court 
Scarborough v. United States, which held that, in a prosecution for possession of a gun by a 
felon, under the same statute at issue in Bass, “the required nexus could be proven by 
demonstrating that the firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce. . . [and] the nexus 
did not need to be contemporaneous with the offense.”155   
                                                 
154 § 1202(a)(1), Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197, 
enacted June 19, 1968; United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (2005, 9th Cir.), Part III, 
Paragraph 3, quoting from United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) and United States v. 
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971). 
155 Dorsey, Part III, Paragraph 3, discussing and quoting from United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 
349-50 and Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575-77 (1977). 
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Because the Supreme Court had no opportunity to review Dorsey (2005), which 
misconstrued Lopez, the latter Supreme Court decision remained the paramount authority on the 
constitutionality of federal criminal statutes legislatively based on the Commerce Clause. The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that Scarborough had provided “clarification” for the Commerce Clause 
rationale set out in Bass. But it unaccountably read Scarborough as authority largely to dispense 
with the independent case-by-case inquiry mandated in Bass and Lopez – in lieu of what appears 
to have been an ad hoc de minimis presumption that all guns, at some point in time, had travelled 
in interstate commerce. The circuit court affirmed the conviction of Dorsey, who did not seek a 
writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. But, as in Danks, the Ninth Circuit in Dorsey did not 
decide that commerce power upheld §922(q) of the GFSZA because gun possession in a school 
zone affected or substantially affected interstate commerce.  
To some commentators, Lopez seemed to have little impact in the field of federal 
environmental law or on federal laws affecting endangered species grounded in commerce 
power. Olin Corporation, which operated numerous chemical manufacturing facilities, was 
prosecuted and found guilty under the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of disposing chemicals at its plant in McIntosh, 
Alabama, and required to clean up its property. The district court in Olin asked both parties to 
address the question of how Lopez applied to the case at hand. The district court subsequently 
determined that, with the passage of CERCLA, Congress was operating outside of its authority 
because the unregulated chemical dumping was strictly local activity. Eleventh Circuit Court 
Judges Robert Lanier Anderson, Phyllis A. Kravitch, and Albert John Henderson, all Carter 
appointees, however, reversed the decision of the district court and, in so doing, upheld 
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CERCLA against the Commerce Clause challenge made by Olin. 156 The appeals court 
concluded that Lopez had not changed the substantial effects test, and, thus, it ruled that the 
unregulated chemical storage at Olin’s McIntosh site substantially affected interstate commerce 
by providing an economic disadvantage to plant operators who obeyed the law and to 
surrounding landowners whose commercial endeavors could possibly be adversely affected by 
the hazardous chemical waste stored at the Olin plant.157   
The declaration of the Eleventh Circuit in Olin, that Lopez did not change the substantial 
effects test, while true on its face, appears to have been based on several questionable 
conclusions about the decision and prior ones made by the court. The circuit court in Olin read 
Lopez to say that the majority in that decision had ratified without much qualification the open-
ended declaration of plenary power under the commerce clause found in decisions such as Jones 
& Laughlin Steel and Wickard v. Filburn.158 Equally problematic, the Ninth Circuit in Olin 
concluded that a majority in Lopez had held the substantial effects test turned “not upon the 
qualities of the regulated activity, but rather the degree to which that activity affects interstate 
commerce.” The problem is that the majority in Lopez made no such holding. And the relevant 
discussion in Olin omitted entirely to address the critical passages in Lopez authored by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist clarifying the substantial effects test and limiting commerce power, under that 
rationale, to intrastate commerce or, at the most, intrastate economic activity, except if necessary 
to give effect to a comprehensive regulatory scheme.159 
                                                 
156 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) 
157 United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1506 (SD. Ala. 1996), revd 107 F.3d 1506 (11th 
Cir. 1997). 
158 Ibid., Part III, Paragraph 9; Lopez, 557, quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 128-129. 
159 Olin Corp, Part III, Paragraph 7.  
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Environmentalist Lydia B. Hoover, writing in 1997, was not convinced that the decision of 
the Eleventh Circuit in Olin had taken any meaningful steps toward undercutting the potential the 
holdings in Lopez had to overturn CERCLA. Hoover wrote as an advocate, arguing, instead, that 
the more restrictive Rehnquist Court understanding of the substantial effects doctrine continued 
to threaten the legislation – at least so far as Commerce Clause challenges might undercut federal 
authority under CERCLA to respond to the release of or threatened releases of hazardous 
substances potentially dangerous to public health or the environment and institute law suits to 
recover damages from violators. In her estimation, the broader substantial effects set out in Olin 
was much preferable to that established in Lopez. Local and state governments, in her view, were 
not sufficiently informed or prepared to deal with such problems on their own, and the Supreme 
Court needed to return to a broader view of interstate commerce to ensure the viability of the 
CERCLA and federal environmental protection.160   
Olin declined to appeal the 1997 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court in United States v. 
Olin Corp. But it seems worth pointing out that, had the Supreme Court reviewed that decision, 
it might well have come to the same result as did the Ninth Circuit – but by employing the 
substantial effects test, in fact, articulated in Lopez. First, adoption of CERCLA was based on 
extensive evidence compiled by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 
purporting to show “a nexus between all forms of improper waste disposal and interstate 
commerce.” According to the collected reports, these included “the growth of the chemical 
industry and the concomitant costs of handling its waste” and “agricultural losses from chemical 
                                                 
160 Lydia B. Hoover, “The Commerce Clause, Federalism and Environmentalism: At Odds After 
Olin?” William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol. 21, no. 3 (1997): 735-777. 
See the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act. Pub. L. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767, 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. I 1995); United States v. Olin Corp. 
107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). 
310 
 
contamination in six states at $283 million” and “commercial damages resulting from 
unregulated waste management . . . [and] “from accidents associated with purely intrastate, on-
site disposal activities, such as improper waste storage in tanks, lagoons and chemical plants.”161 
Given these findings, and that Congress formally acknowledged them, it seems unlikely that the 
Supreme Court might have found no “rational basis” for the remediation mandates of the 
CERCLA, even if the Court found some of the findings less than persuasive. As well, CERCLA 
established a comprehensive regulatory regime. And, under the Court’s prior holding in Perez, 
once Congress established “a class of activities” to be regulated under its commerce power, the 
Court had “no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”162 As well,  the 
unregulated storage of mercury- and chlorine-based commercial chemicals, as an integral, 
indispensable feature of production at Olin’s chemical plant at McIntosh, Alabama, certainly was 
“economic activity,” at least if one accepts standard definitions of the adjective “economic” – 
“relating to, or based on the production . . . of goods” or “having practical or industrial 
significance or uses” or “affecting material resources.”163  
The Lopez ruling created considerable disquiet among liberal members of the legal 
community who favored centralization of power and no little jubilation among conservative legal 
thinkers. Writing in 1995 about Lopez, Steven G. Calabresi maintained that “the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in United States v. Lopez marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival 
of the doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers.”164 The 
                                                 
161 United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, Part III (A) (12) (11th Cir. 1997). 
162 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
163 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed. (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 
Inc., 2001), 230, 365.  
164 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of 
United States v. Lopez,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 94, (1995), 752, proclaimed that  
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following year, Raoul Berger, concluded that Lopez afforded “an inducement to rethink the 
[Commerce] Clause, to abandon the conflicting efforts to ‘give’ it meaning, and to inquire rather 
into what the Framers meant by the words they employed.”165 The decision would, in the coming 
decade and a half, spawn numerous challenges to the Supreme Court’s newly defined boundary 
between state and federal power. But, in the view of some conservative jurists, at that point, 
Lopez had not inspired the constitutional counterrevolution for which they had hoped and which 
liberals had feared.  To some disappointed conservatives, Lopez now seemed to have made a 
very narrow ruling giving favor to states in the regulation of gun possession. In the view of 
Richard A. Epstein, writing in 2014, the holding of the Court in Lopez, unfortunately, had 
ratified the most expansive Commerce Clause interpretation to date – that set out in Wickard v. 
Filburn (1942). According to Epstein, the unexplained employment by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
of the Wickard “substantial effects” test in Lopez provided no guidance for future application of 
the rule.166 
Much of the public reaction to Lopez has omitted to identify or discuss with sufficient 
precision or appreciation the doctrinal breakthrough worked by the majority in Lopez. As 
discussed, there is ample reason to discount the various global assertions made by individual 
Supreme Court judges and commentators dating back to 1937 that the substantial effects 
rationale could extended commerce power to any kind of intrastate activity, “whatever its 
nature.” David Klein and Neal Devins remind us that “[t]he distinction between holding and 
dictum reflects fundamental norms of American law.” In support of this well-known proposition, 
they allude to a seminal assertion made by Karl Llewellyn: A “court can decide nothing but the 
                                                 
165 Berger, “Judicial Manipulation,” 696. 
166 Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution, 184. 
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legal dispute before it. . . . Everything, but everything, said in an opinion is to be read and 
understood only in relation to the actual case before the court.”167 This proposition, in theory, at 
least, is central to the tradition of judicial minimalism declared by the United States Supreme 
Court.168 Holdings are to be obeyed, dicta have no binding judicial power. According to Klein 
and Devins, the practice of treating dictum as holding, however, has played a substantial role in 
the making of “sudden and sweeping changes in doctrine.”169 No better case in point can be 
found than the 1942 declaration of Justice Robert H. Jackson in Wickard v. Filburn: “[E]ven if 
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, 
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce.”170 In Wickard, the Court invoked Darby Lumber and Wrightwood Dairy to 
declare, once again, the broad, “plenary power” of the Commerce Clause.171 Yet Wickard 
interpreted only a section of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The growing of wheat for 
home consumption under the act was, indisputably, economic in nature.172 But to declare that all 
                                                 
167 David Klein & Neal Devins, “Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus practice in Lower Court 
Decision Making.” William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 54, no. 6 (2013): 2021-2053; Karl 
Llewellyn, Michael Ansaldi, trans., The Case Law System in America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago press, 1989), 14. 
168 Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Neal Devins, “The Democracy-Forcing 
Constitution,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 97, no. 6 (1999): 1971-1993; Christopher J. Peters, 
“Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 6 (October 
2000): 1454-1537.  
169 Klein and Devins, “Dicta, Schmicta,” 2026.  
170 Emphasis added, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 125.  
171 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 118, 124. 
172 As discussed in chapter one, “economic” is defined as “of, relating to, or based on the 
production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.” The economic activities of 
production and consumption do not involve buying and selling, that is, commerce. Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed. (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2001), 
230, 365. 
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intrastate activity was within the reach of the commerce power was certainly not necessary for 
the decision. The sweeping substantial effects doctrine declared in Wickard was dictum insofar 
as it laid claim to intrastate non-economic activity having nothing to do with enforcement of the 
act in question.  
Yet, before the decision in Lopez, the Supreme Court and myriad lower federal courts 
had, off and on for half a century, invoked the seemingly open-ended power of Congress under 
the substantial effects test, first set out in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, as a bona fide foundation 
for an ever-expanding, virtual federal police power.173 The decision of the Rehnquist Court in 
Lopez identified and rectified this error. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s three-part substantial effects 
test entailed an emphatic clarification of extant Commerce Clause doctrine – one that he made 
without purporting to or, in fact, needing to overturn any important precedents. Rehnquist and 
the majority held that, in the case of congressional legislation not part of a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme, commerce power could reach intrastate activity only if it was commercial 
activity or, at a minimum, economic activity. In this case, non-commercial activity and non-
economic activity were out of bounds. Commerce power could reach intrastate non-economic 
activity to prevent such from undercutting a comprehensive interstate regulatory regime. But it 
was to be decided by the federal courts whether the statutory means chosen to regulate the 
subject intrastate non-economic activity were necessary to attain the purpose of that scheme. 
Quite similarly, under the substantial effects test, the commerce power might reach intrastate 
                                                 
173 For example, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); and Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal 
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). Coenen concludes that the “affecting interstate commerce” 
rationale articulated initially in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp “had a long reach – so long, in fact, 
that the court would find no law beyond its grasp for the next half century.” Dan T. Coenen, 
Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (New York: Foundation Press, 2004), 87.  
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non-economic activity to uphold a criminal statute – but, again, only if, on a case-by-case basis, a 
federal court found that activity to be penalized, in fact, had a nexus with interstate commerce.174 
The finding of the Supreme Court in Lopez that it had never, under its substantial effects 
rationale, upheld a Commerce Clause-based piece of legislation that reached non-economic 
intrastate activity suggested powerfully that, in future, there would be few instances in which the 
Court would, in fact, uphold such measures. 
Disputes over the balance of power between state governments and the federal 
government were central to culture wars conflict that emerged after 1963. The decision in Lopez 
re-animated a longstanding tradition of judicial minimalism protective of state sovereignty. In 
doing so, the decision effectively articulated discernible limits to an expanding commerce power 
– which helped to supercharge partisan culture war struggles for at least a decade. In the year 
following Lopez, the Supreme Court would again decide the purview of commerce power—this 
time in favor of the Eleventh Amendment. 
 
                                                 
174 Adler also concludes that, in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison (2000) the 
Court recognized that the authority of Congress to regulate intrastate activity that undercut a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme was part and parcel of the substantial effects doctrine. 
Jonathan H. Adler, “The Conflict of Visions in NFIB v. Sebelius,” Drake Law Review, Vol. 62 
937-980, 954 (2014). 
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Chapter Five 
Indian Casinos and 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996) 
 
In the year following Lopez, another Supreme Court decision was decided that would 
again raise eyebrows and stimulate concerns or hopes that the Court was seeking to reign in the 
federal Commerce Clause-based expansion of the federal government. This time, in Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court struck down the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) based upon Congress’ “Indian Commerce Clause” power.1  The Act held that states must 
enter into good-faith negotiations with Native American tribes who sought to open gaming 
casinos.  Florida, led by its Democratic Governor Lawton Chiles, refused to enter into such 
negotiations with the Seminole tribe, arguing that to be forced to do so was a violation of 
Florida’s state sovereignty.  The Supreme Court of the United States, in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida (1996), would eventually agree, ruling that Congress’ Article I power “to regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes” did not grant it the right to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity from private lawsuits in contravention of the Eleventh Amendment. Equally important, 
the decision overturned a 1989 ruling of the Court dealing with the contentious Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act to re-establish the principle that 
Congress could not, under its authority “To regulate Commerce . . . among the States,” similarly 
                                                 
1 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Public Law 100-497, 25 U.S.C. Sec 2710 et sec.; 
U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3.  “The Congress shall have Power To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 
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abrogate their sovereign immunity.2  Five of the nine justices in Seminole Tribe of Florida, at 
least, seemed to be reconfirming the sovereign authority of the states in the face of increasingly 
extensive employments by Congress of its commerce power.3  Thus, Seminole Tribe v. Florida 
constituted a major victory of the Rehnquist Court in advancing “New Federalism” principles 
that involved some of the most contentious issues comprising the culture wars of the 1990s – the 
rising casino gambling industry, federal government environmental protection regulations, and 
the balance of power between the state governments and the federal government. Of considerable 
importance, Seminole Tribe v. Florida undergirded earlier decisions declaring that the states 
were not to be “commandeered” by the federal government or otherwise transformed into mere 
administrative appendages of it. 
 
It seems rather clear that Congress and the Supreme Court have interpreted the Indian 
Commerce Clause far beyond its original meaning and that the IGRA was indeed an 
unconstitutional use of Congress commerce power.  The IGRA was a regulation of internal 
activities on Native American reservations.  The Commerce Clause, in its original meaning, does 
not provide Congress with the power to legislate over the internal affairs of a tribe.  The original 
meaning of the Commerce Clause would only allow Congress to pass laws regulating, limiting, 
or taking down barriers to trade with the Indian tribes.  Congress’ power over the Native 
American tribes and all their affairs is not plenary.  While it is true that Congress has acquired 
the power to govern the affairs of some tribes, that power was not derived from the Indian 
Commerce Clause; instead, it was the result of the treaties that the federal government concluded 
                                                 
2 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  
3 Jonathan D. Varat, William Cohen, Vikram D. Amar, Constitutional Law, 13th ed., (New York: 
Foundation Press, 2009), 278. 
317 
 
with the tribes.  Through treaties, the federal government could negotiate a variety of actions 
including changing tribal boundaries, negotiating land deals, or allowing the federal government 
to meddle in the internal affairs of the tribe.  But, since Congress outlawed making treaties with 
Indian tribes in 1871, and since most of the laws regarding the internal affairs of the tribes since 
that time have been based on the Indian Commerce Clause, it is reasonable to infer that many of 
the laws affecting the internal affairs of Native American tribes today have no true constitutional 
backing.4    
Writing in 1996, Herbert Hovenkamp argues that the term “commerce” encompassed far 
more than mere trade to the Founders, but instead included such activities as manufacturing and 
agriculture. 5  Why else, he argues, would the Constitution’s framers frequently speak of “trade 
and commerce” if the two words meant the same thing?6 With this broad view of the  Commerce 
Clause, it is no surprise that Hovenkamp takes the position that Congress’ commerce power is 
plenary, and in regards to Indian tribes, Congress may use its power “to apply its own law to 
Indian lands and preempt all state law.”7 In the Seminole Tribe case, any sharing of power 
between the federal government and the states was pure charity on the part of the federal 
                                                 
4 25 U.S. Code § 71 “No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United 
States may contract by treaty…”  More will be discussed on this topic later in the narrative. 
5 Herbert Hovenkamp, “Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court’s 
‘Lopez’ and ‘Seminole Tribe’ Decisions,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 96, no. 8 (Dec. 1996): 
2213-2248.  
6 Ibid., 2230.  However, Alexander Hamilton’s words in Federalist No. 17 would seem to 
contradict Hovenkamp’s view.  Hamilton wrote, “The administration of private justice between 
the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture [emphasis added] and of other 
concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by 
local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.” 
7 Hovenkamp, “Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism,” 2237. 
318 
 
government since the Constitution grants all power to deal with Native American tribes to 
Congress under Hovenkamp’s view of the meaning of the Clause.  
Also in search of the Commerce Claus’ original meaning, but more focused on the Indian 
Commerce Clause particularly, was Robert G. Natelson.8  Like Barnett, Natelson sought to 
determine if the Clause should be viewed narrowly or more broadly based upon the Founders’ 
use of the words.  He found that in his search through tens of thousands of eighteenth-century 
documents, phrases such as “commerce with the Indians” and “commerce with the Indian tribes” 
showed “almost invariably” that the expression meant merely “trade with the Indians” and 
nothing more.9  Natelson takes exception to the idea that the Indian Commerce Clause somehow 
grants the federal government police powers or the power to manage all Native American affairs.  
Indeed, he shows that such language was considered but removed from the Clause during the 
constitutional convention.  Founding era document searches of the term “regulation” of Indian 
commerce or trade was “generally understood to refer to legal structures by which lawmakers 
governed the conduct of the merchants engaged in the Native American trade, the nature of the 
goods they sold, the prices charged, and similar matters.”10  When the founders wished to 
describe interactions with the tribes more generally, they typically used the term “affairs,” and 
thus was the Department of Indian Affairs named.11  Therefore, powers not exclusive to trade are 
                                                 
8 Robert G. Natelson, “The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause,” Denver 
University Law Review, Vol. 85 (2007): 215.  Sources included the Thomson Gale data base 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online and the Readex database Early American Imprints, Series 
I: Evans, 1639-1800.  See also Robert G. Natelson and David Kopel, “Commerce in the 
Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 109 (2010): 55. 
9 Natelson, “The Original Understanding,” 214-215. 
10 Ibid., 216. 
11 Ibid., 217. 
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reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.12  Natelson argued that the federal 
government did indeed make extensive laws from the founding and through the nineteenth 
century that went beyond mere trade with Native American tribes, but that those laws were 
fashioned in support of treaties in which the tribes agreed to the terms.  Certainly, Article IV of 
the Constitution grants significant power to Congress over Indians living in a federal territory or 
on federal land within state boundaries; but is a reservation federal land or Native American 
land?  The idea of tribal sovereignty would suggest that reservations are Indian land.  Without 
treaties and with the power under Article IV limited, it seems reasonable that Congress’ authority 
under the Constitution is confined to regulating trade and not the internal affairs of the tribe.13 
Taking an alternative view to the originalists is Timothy Joseph Preso.14 Preso makes the 
point that one of the main motivations for moving from the Articles of Confederation to the 
Constitution was to clarify the dizzying inconsistencies of the thirteen states all dealing with the 
Native American tribes independently.  In his view, “[t]he Indian Commerce Clause committed 
power over relations between Indians and non-Indians exclusively to the federal government.”  
He shows how Article 9 of the Articles of Confederation could have provided the central 
government great powers over Indian affairs but that its power was stymied by the phrase within 
the Article that read, “. . .provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be 
not infringed or violated.”15 He argues that the Constitution removes that modifier and thus, 
                                                 
12 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
13 Natelson, “The Original Understanding,” 265-266. 
14 Timothy Joseph Preso, “A Return to Uncertainty in Indian Affairs: The Framers, the Supreme 
Court, and the Indian Commerce Clause,” American Indian Law Review, Vol. 19, no. 2 (1994): 
444-454. 
15 Articles of Confederation, Article 9, Section 4. 
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Congress’ power over the affairs of Native Americans is exclusive and far-reaching.  His case 
about exclusivity is certainly compelling; however, from an originalist standpoint, Preso’s 
argument is weakened by failing to differentiate the word commerce from the word affairs.  In a 
post-1937 view of the Commerce Clause, one might conclude that the word “commerce” denoted 
all affairs.  In the Founders day it appears evident that it would not.  Still, Preso offers a great 
deal of historical insight into the evolution of the Indian Commerce Clause from the Articles of 
Confederation. 
Another view comes from Mark Savage, who wrote a decade before Bartlett and Natelson. 
Savage provides an answer to the question of whether tribal lands fall under federal or tribal 
sovereignty.16 In his view, tribes are sovereign over their lands based upon how the Founders 
treated the issue.  He argues that beginning in the mid-nineteenth century the original 
understanding of the Constitution began to be ignored regarding the affairs with Native 
Americans.  However, at the time of the founding the new government of the United States had a 
very limited ability to usurp land from the Indian tribes without great cost.  War with the tribes 
could be expensive in resources and in human lives.  Much better for both the states and the new 
federal government, Savage explains, to either make treaties or purchase lands from the tribes to 
acquire their property by peaceful means.  He has good evidence to back up his claim.  The 
Northwest Ordinance, for example, states “The utmost good faith shall always be observed 
towards the Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their 
consent . . . .”17  Another example: Secretary of War Henry Knox stated his natural law view in 
1789, “The Indians being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil.  It cannot be taken 
                                                 
16 Mark Savage, “Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding,” 16 
American Indian Law Review (1991): 74. 
17 Ibid., 103. 
321 
 
from them unless by their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a just war.  To 
dispossess them on any other principal, would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of 
nature, and of that distributive justice which is the glory of a nation.”18  By this logic, even 
federal lands that encompass Native American lands remain the domain of the tribes.  If Savage 
is right, then whatever land continues to be held by Indian tribes must surely fall under their 
sovereignty and Commerce Clause-based laws which dictate Native American internal affairs 
must be unsupportable. 
Nathan Speed adds credence to Savage’s argument by illustrating that in the early days of the 
republic, when Congress wished to “regulate matters beyond trade and exchange, the Indian 
Commerce Clause was not asserted as a constitutional justification for doing so.” 19  He argues 
that no law to regulate the internal affairs of Native Americans living in tribal lands was ever 
introduced in Congress until 1834, and the one introduced failed to pass because the majority in 
Congress perceived it to be unconstitutional.20  Further, the first law that did assert direct 
governing power over the tribes, the Major Crimes Act of 1885, was upheld in United States v. 
Kagama, but not because of the Indian Commerce Clause. 21  Although the federal government 
lawyers argued that the Indian Commerce Clause was sufficient, a unanimous Court expressly 
rejected that argument and instead supported the law by asserting an extra-constitutional “ward” 
theory that claimed the United States had a duty to protect those who were dependent upon the 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 105 n. 178 
19 Nathan Speed, “Examining the Commerce Clause Through the Lens of the Indian Commerce 
Clause,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 87, (2007): 470. 
20 Ibid., 476-478, The Western Territory Bill of 1834. 
21 Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, Sec. 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885), allowed federal prosecution of 
Indians accused of committing certain major crimes on or off tribal lands.  United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
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government for food and political rights and thus it could legislate over internal affairs.  Once the 
ward theory became a precedent, Speed argues, the Court could then give Congress unlimited 
powers to regulate the internal affairs of the tribes. 
The evolution and interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause and how it has been used to 
control tribal activity has been contentious and evolving from colonial times to the present.  How 
did it get that way?  A review of what prompted the inclusion of the clause into the Constitution 
is in order before delving into how it has been interpreted since.    
During colonial times, individual colonies dealt with Native Americans on a local level with 
the power of the Crown behind them.  As the colonists moved westward and colonial populations 
grew, interactions with the tribes, whether peaceful or in war, was a primary concern, especially 
to those on the leading edge of westward settlement.  We’ll begin this study in 1754, as the 
French and British vied over lands west of the colonies and good colonial relations with the 
tribes was critical to maintaining the peace and balancing colonial power.  In that year, the Six 
Nations of the Iroquois threatened to sever relations with the colony of New York because of 
non-Indian encroachment on Native American lands as well as inconsistent policies towards 
them from the various colonies.  With such a crisis on the horizon, Benjamin Franklin and other 
colonial representatives from seven colonies met in Albany, New York to ameliorate the 
deteriorating relations with the Iroquois.  So important was creating a unified policy towards the 
tribes that the representatives went on to consider unifying the colonies on other issues as well 
and created a plan of colonial union.  Among other things, the proponents of the resulting 
“Albany Plan” hoped to be able to present consistent commercial and political policies toward 
the Native Americans by giving the power to create such policies solely to the proposed 
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President General and Grand Council.22  The Albany Plan failed initially due to the reluctance of 
colonial legislatures to give up their prerogatives and finally because the king completely 
ignored it.23 
Following the French and Indian War, the Crown attempted to establish more uniformity as 
well.24  King George III pronounced the Proclamation of 1763 and thus established a formal 
boundary between colonial and Native American lands.  The following year, the British Board of 
Trade attempted to take over regulation of commercial and Indian affairs from the colonies “so 
as to sett [sic] aside all local interfering of particular Provinces, which has been one great cause 
of the distracted state of Indian affairs in general.”25  That plan was never adopted as the colonies 
and their mother country grew further apart in the period before the Revolution. 
Beginning in the summer of 1775 and throughout the Revolutionary War, the Continental 
Congress attempted to secure and maintain good relations with the tribes to keep them from 
joining the British.  John Dickenson, in the second draft of the Articles of Confederation, 
proposed that one of the powers of the United States would be “Regulating the Trade and 
managing all Affairs with the Indians.”26 This power was not something that the newly 
independent states were ready to give up.  Thomas Jefferson’s thoughts on the matter are 
illustrative.  Regarding state sovereignty, he suggested in July 1776 that Congress only control 
Native American land sales outside of state boundaries, pointing out that Indians living within 
                                                 
22 Preso, “A Return to Uncertainty,” 445. 
23 Ibid., 446. 
24 1756-1763 
25 Preso, “A Return to Uncertainty,” 446. 
26 Ibid., 447.  It should be noticed that “trade” and “affairs” have been used as separate actions, 
conforming to Natelson’s similar findings regarding “commerce” and “affairs.” 
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state boundaries were already “subject to [state] laws in some degree.”27 After two years of 
wrangling over the precise language, when the Articles of Confederation that were adopted on 
November 15, 1777, Article IX read as follows:  
 
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and 
exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs 
with the Indians not members of any of the states; provided that the legislative 
right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated.28 
 
This clearly was not the plenary power that some, like Benjamin Franklin, had hoped for.  
When it is considered that “members” of states in contemporary terms referred to those involved 
in the body-politic or who paid taxes, it becomes evident that according to the Articles, Congress 
would handle all of the affairs of those Native Americans outside of state borders and those 
Indians who lived under tribal law rather than as state citizens and who didn’t pay taxes to the 
state.29  However, the final portion of the clause that defended the rights of the states to legislate 
within their borders was a problem; it caused confusion and allowed states to carry on much as 
they had before.  Congress would be authorized to negotiate with tribes within state lines, but 
would be required to coordinate with state officials to stay in compliance with the Articles.30 
Thus, for those wanting to standardize Native American policy and other affairs, a more 
powerful successor to the Articles was needed. 
When the Constitution was being drafted in Philadelphia in the long summer of 1787, 
Federalists such as James Madison came prepared to readdress the issue of Indian affairs.  
                                                 
27 Natelson, “The Original Understanding,” 228. 
28 Articles of Confederation, Article 9, Section 4. 
29 Natelson, “The Original Understanding,” 229. 
30 Ibid., 230. 
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Madison proposed a congressional power on August 18 “[t]o regulate affairs with the Indians as 
well within as without the limits of the U. States.”31  Four days later, the Committee on Detail 
responded with a version similar to that in the Articles of Confederation, reading, “to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with Indians, within the limits 
of any state, not subject to the laws thereof.”32 Madison and his supporters must have hoped to 
avoid another Article IX experience, but no record exists on further discussions of the subject.  
Although the Committee somewhat limited Madison’s ideal of allowing the federal government 
authority over Indian affairs to having authority only over commerce, they must have achieved 
some success in their wrangling because by September 4, the clause was finalized with the now 
familiar phrase, “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian tribes,” without the statement affirming the power of the states.33 
So, what power over Indian affairs did the new Constitution give the federal government and 
what was retained by the states?  In selling the Constitution to “we the people” in Federalist No. 
42, Madison wrote, “commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two 
limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and 
contradictory.”34 It appeared that the Constitution provided the federal government with unified 
power over commerce with Native American tribes, just as it did regarding commerce with other 
countries.  However, by limiting the Clause to the word “commerce” and not broadening it to 
include the word “affairs” it likewise appears that the Founders allowed states to maintain, under 
the Tenth Amendment, their police powers over persons within their boundaries.  Of course, on 
                                                 
31 Preso, “A Return to Uncertainty,” 453. 
32 Mark Savage, “Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding,” 16 
American Indian Law Review (1991): 74. 
33 Ibid., 75.; U.S Const., Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.  
34 Preso, “A Return to Uncertainty,” 453-454. 
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federal property or in a federal territory, the federal government had sovereignty under the 
Property Clause of the Constitution.35 However, as we have seen with Nathan Speed’s argument 
above, one was not to assume that tribal lands within the boundaries of federal territory were 
under federal control until the tribe who had rights to the land had ceded it to the federal 
government through treaty or just war. 
What about the power to make treaties with Native Americans?  Article II provides the 
power to negotiate treaties to the President under the Treaty Clause. 36  And Just as the 
Constitution provided the President power to negotiate treaties with other nations, that clause 
also provided the power to the President to make treaties with the Indian tribes. The treaty power 
allowed the new government and the tribes to make agreements that could be far more 
encompassing than just commercial activity.  However, for a treaty to be enacted, it had to be 
agreed to by two-thirds of the members of the Senate.  Senatorial concurrence was included in 
the Constitution to provide the states protection against federal overreach since at the time 
Senators were chosen by state legislators rather than through the popular vote as they are now.37  
Finally, the Indian Commerce Clause, Treaty Clause, and Property Clause only applied to the 
tribes, not individual Native Americans, implying that those who were not members of tribes 
were subject to state laws just as non-Indians.38 
                                                 
35 U.S Const., Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 the Property Clause. See David E. Wilkins and K. 
Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground, American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law, 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 5, 9. 99. 
36 U.S Const., Article II, Section 2, Cl 2, i.e. the Treaty Clause. 
37 See U.S. Const., Article I, Section 3, and Amendment XVII. 
38 Natelson, “The Original Understanding,” 243-244. 
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Arguably, the first law based upon the Indian Commerce Clause was the Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Act of 1790.39 That law included three sections that pertained to the regulation of 
trade, a fourth section that implemented the existing treaties, and a fifth that provided a criminal 
provision that made crimes by United States citizens against Native Americans in Indian country 
a federal criminal offense.40  The constitutional basis of the legislation is important because if it 
is based upon the Indian Commerce Clause, the implication is that the commerce power is 
plenary and encompasses all Indian affairs. Otherwise, one can assume a more limited view of 
the commerce power prevailed.  Even with the commerce-related name, the act appears to have 
been based upon the President and Congress’ treaty power when one reviews how the legislation 
came about.  In 1789, President Washington and his Secretary of War, Henry Knox, grew 
dissatisfied with American citizens not complying with existing treaties and hoped to have 
Congress draft enforcement legislation to support the agreements they had made.41 Washington 
visited Congress on August 22 and 24, 1789 to impress upon the Senate the importance of 
upholding the Hopewell Treaty to maintain positive relations with the Cherokees, Chickasaws, 
and Choctaws.42 The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act which passed the following summer 
appears to be a direct result of Washington and Knox’s desire to maintain the treaties that they 
had been parties to and not merely trade laws based upon Congress’ commerce power.  Several 
                                                 
39 1 Stat. 137, for text see http://tm112.community.uaf.edu/files/2010/08/Non-Intercourse-
Act.pdf (accessed November 22, 2014).  
40 Natelson, “The Original Understanding,” 255. 
41 The Treaty of Hopewell in which Congress defined Cherokee lands and the Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix with the Six Nations in New York, both passed during the Confederation era.  See 
Preso, “A Return to Uncertainty,” 450. 
42 Natelson, “The Original Understanding,” 254-255. 
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renditions of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act were made in two-year intervals after 1790 
until the law became permanent in 1802.43   
Relations between southerners and the Cherokees continued to be a point of contention 
between the federal government and the state governments involved.  In 1828, chafing at the 
federally defined borders of the Cherokee tribe, the State of Georgia passed legislation that in 
effect obliterated the Cherokee tribal government, extended Georgia’s hegemony over tribal 
lands, and distributed Native American lands to several county governments for disposal.44  In 
response, Cherokee leader John Ross attempted to garner support in Congress for it to do 
something about the situation.  His action bypassed the traditional executive branch-Indian tribal 
communication chain since he knew he’d have little success with the newly elected president, 
Andrew Jackson.  However, Ross made little headway in Congress since few representatives or 
senators wanted to be seen giving up their own states’ powers to deal with the Indians as Georgia 
was doing.   Eventually Ross succeeded in bringing his case to the Supreme Court.  In the case 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831),45 Chief Justice Marshall was perplexed as to how to go 
forward with the case.  Although in his ruling he seemed apologetic to all Native Americans for 
how they had been treated by Europeans, he could not find specifically in the Constitution where 
the Court was given authority to adjudicate cases between the tribes and the United States.  
Hearing a case between a foreign nation and the United States was addressed in Article III; the 
question that had to be decided before hearing the case was whether a Native American tribe 
constituted a foreign state.  Reasoning that the tribes were not wholly independent, Marshall 
                                                 
43 Nathan Speed, “Examining the Commerce Clause Through the Lens of the Indian Commerce 
Clause,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 87, (2007): 467. 
44 Preso, “A Return to Uncertainty,” 455. 
45 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
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ruled that they might more properly be called “domestic dependent nations” who had no legal 
standing in federal court as would maligned foreign states and their citizens would.46  Of interest 
to us is that Marshall noted that if there were any constitutional insight into the founders’ view of 
the tribes as being foreign states, the Commerce Clause made a distinct differentiation between 
the two.   
 
In this clause they are as clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to 
themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several states composing the 
union. They are designated by a distinct appellation; and as this appellation can 
be applied to neither of the others, neither can the appellation distinguishing 
either of the others be in fair construction applied to them.47  
 
Be that as it may, within a year, Marshall was to pen another ruling regarding the Cherokees 
in Worcester v. Georgia (1832).48  In that case, Samuel Worcester, a missionary who stood 
against Georgia’s Indian removal efforts, ignored a Georgia law requiring him to get a state 
license to reside in that state’s Indian country.  This time, Marshall ruled that while dependent 
upon the United States, an Indian nation was as a separate political entity and could not be bound 
by the laws of the state within which its territories lay. 
For the next half century, the United States government dealt with the Native American 
Tribes as nations, as had the European powers had previously.  The U.S. engaged in treaties 
guaranteeing Native American sovereignty within Indian territories, but all the while those 
treaties often cost the tribes portions of their lands.  In 1830, the United States government 
passed the Indian Removal Act.  That act resulted in the “Trail of Tears” begun by the Choctaws 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 17. 
47 Ibid., 18. 
48 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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in 1831 and concluded by the Cherokees in 1838 as tribes gave up their lands in the American 
southeast for their (temporary) freedom and sovereignty to live as they wished west of the 
Mississippi in what would later become Oklahoma.   
However, after the War Between the States, as the Indian Wars in the west subsided and as 
the last territories became states, the idea of thinking of Native Americans as dependent nations 
began to fade.  Instead, states longed to control all the territory within their borders and make 
relations with the tribes less complicated.  Settlers wished to settle on Native American lands and 
wanted them opened for settlement.  Additionally, since only the Senate had the power of advice 
and consent for treaties and many House members wanted a role in formulating Indian policy, 
Congress produced the Indians Appropriations Act of 1871.49  This seminal act made it illegal 
for the federal government to deal with Native Americans as tribes or nations and instead 
authorized the government to deal with Indians only as individuals.  There would no longer be 
treaties or contracts made between the United States and Indian nations.  As section 71 of the Act 
stated: 
No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with 
whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty 
lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 
3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.50 
                                                 
49G. William Rice, “25 U.S.C. Sec. 71: The End of Indian Sovereignty or a Self-Limitation of 
Contractual Ability?” American Indian Law Review, Vol. 5 (1977): 239. Also, in Antoine v. 
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202 (1975) Justice Brennan explained, “The Act of 1871 resulted 
from the opposition of the House of Representatives to its practical exclusion from any policy 
role in Indian affairs.  For nearly a century the Executive Branch made treaty arrangements with 
the Indians “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Although the House 
appropriated money to carry out these treaties, it had no voice in the development of substantive 
Indian policy reflected in them.” See also, U.S. Code Title 25: Indian Tribes, 16 Stat. 544, 566 
50 Ibid., Sec. 71. 
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Of course Congress maintained its power to make laws within United States territories and 
the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871 supported Congress’ drafting of statutes to control Native 
Americans who lived on reservations.51   Without treaties as the primary means of dealing with 
Native Americans, relations henceforth would be undergirded by statutes and the only power that 
Congress had in that regard was through the Indian Commerce Clause, even though that clause 
only described commerce with tribes, not individual Native Americans.  Also of note, the Clause 
gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with the tribes, not to regulate the commerce of 
the Indian tribes.  The way the Clause is written defines only an ability to regulate external 
commerce, not the internal affairs of a tribe.52  
Not long after changing the fundamental means by which the United States dealt with Native 
American tribes, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act of 1885.  That act allowed United States 
prosecution of Indians who were accused of committing crimes against other Natives in Indian 
Territory.53  The law was clearly an abrogation of tribal sovereignty, but Congress justified the 
law by positing that tribes were not capable of dealing with such serious issues of law and order.  
The landmark case that confirmed the constitutionality of the law was United States v. Kagama 
in 1885.54  As mentioned above, the unanimous decision to uphold the law was not based upon 
the Indian Commerce Clause; the justices expressly rejected that argument as follows: 
                                                 
51 U.S. Const. Article 4, Sec. 3, Clause 2; Donald Fixico, “Federal and State Policies and 
American Indians,” pp. 379-396, in A Companion to American Indian History, ed. Philip J. 
Deloria & Neal Salisbury (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2004), 383.  
52 Savage, “Native Americans,” 116. 
53 The crimes included murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to commit murder, arson, 
burglary, and larceny. Wilkins and Lomawaima, Uneven Ground, 108-109. 
54 United States v. Kagama, 118 U. 375 (1886); Savage, “Native Americans,” 116, n.32; Wilkins 
and Lomawaima, Uneven Ground, 108. 
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The mention of Indians in the constitution which has received most attention is 
that found in the clause which gives Congress “power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” 
This clause is relied on in the argument in the present case, the proposition being 
that the statute under consideration is a regulation of commerce with the Indian 
tribes. But we think it would be a very strained construction of this clause that 
a system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations, 
which left out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws justly enacted under 
that provision, and established punishments for the common law crimes of 
murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny, and the like, without any 
reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized by the grant 
of power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.55 
Instead of a ruling based upon the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court opted to justify the 
law by asserting that since the tribes’ sovereignty and political rights rested solely upon the 
benevolence of Congress, then Congress must therefore have plenary authority to legislate in 
whatever affairs it wished.  The Court reasoned as follows:   
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities 
dependent on the United States -- dependent largely for their daily food; 
dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and 
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of 
the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their 
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the 
federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, 
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been 
recognized by the executive, and by Congress, and by this Court, whenever the 
question has arisen.56 
 
With this precedent set, it became possible to legislate over the internal affairs of the tribes in a 
plenary manner.   
                                                 
55 118 U.S. 378-379. 
56 Ibid., 383-384. 
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Indeed, if treaties were no longer to be made with the tribes, and Congress’ power over the 
tribes was plenary, it would follow that treaties with the tribes might no longer be followed if 
Congress legislated thusly.  In 1903 the Court ruled in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock that Congress 
could do just that.57  Lone Wolf was a Kiowa chief who was a leader on the Kiowa, Comanche, 
and Apache reservation in Texas and Oklahoma.  Congress legislated to alter the lands of the 
reservation substantially but did so without getting three fourths of the adult males of the tribal 
population to agree to the reduction, as the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 required them to do. 
Citing the Kagama decision, Justice Edward White opined that:  
. . . . as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot 
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this 
legislation. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as 
implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be sought by 
an appeal to that body for redress, and not to the courts.58    
 
In other words, because the actions of Congress in the matter were constitutional, the only 
recourse to the tribes was through Congress.  There is no reference to the Indian Commerce 
Clause in the case; instead, the ward theory prevailed.   
Along with eliminating treaty obligations, the primary goal of the federal government in the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was Native American assimilation, with the 
aim of having Native peoples adopt the western model of property ownership—that is, individual 
ownership rather than tribal ownership.  The Dawes Act of 1887 was designed to eliminate the 
reservation system by dividing reservation land among the members of the respective tribes. 
Each head of a household would receive 80 acres of land and single males would be allotted 40 
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acres.59  Any land left over within the reservation, “surplus land,” would be sold to the federal 
government which could then sell the land to whoever wanted to purchase it, typically white 
settlers, railroad companies, or corporations.  Federally purchased surplus land could also be 
used for military bases and eventually national parks, forests, etc.60 
In 1924, Congress continued the process of Native American assimilation by passing the 
Indian Citizenship Act.61  In the wake of World War I, during which a significant number of 
Native Americans fought gallantly for the United States in Europe, many in Congress believed 
that all tribal members who had not already attained citizenship through other means should be 
granted that status through legislation.  The results of the Act were mixed.  Indians who attained 
U.S. citizenship and hoped to be involved in the political process were sometimes stymied by 
state laws that prevented them from voting.  Other tribal members had legitimate concerns that 
by assuming U.S. citizenship, they would be giving up what tribal sovereignty they retained 
since they would now be answerable to state and federal laws instead of tribal laws.    
If the Indian Citizenship Act occasioned mixed results, the out consequences of the Dawes 
Act were clearer; it was not generally good for the tribes or individual Native Americans.  The 
parcel of land allotted to a head of a household might be economically viable for the first 
generation, but for descendants it was wholly insufficient as family members could not divide 
the land but only hold a share in it.  Those shares got progressively smaller with each generation.  
                                                 
59 Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 (a.k.a. General Allotment Act), Pub. L. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388, 
approved February 8, 1887; Fixico, “Federal and State Policies,” 384. In 1891, the law was 
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2, 1924; Fixico, “Federal and State Policies,” 385. 
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Many tribal members never became successful farmers or ranchers, but by taking allotments they 
gave up the subsidies provided by the federal government to those living on reservations.  
Additionally, the allotments led to reservations becoming checkerboards of Native American and 
non-Indian held land thus making it difficult for tribes to use the land communally.  Because of 
the Dawes Act, Native Americans gave up nearly two thirds of their lands—roughly 86 million 
acres. 62  The process also caused a loss of sovereignty as some reservations ceased to exist and 
tribal members had to assume the responsibilities of landowners in U.S. society.63 
By 1934, there was a decided backlash against the idea of assimilation.  In that year, Franklin 
Roosevelt led the Congress to pass the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), known as the 
“Wheeler-Howard Act” as well.64  In the spirit of the era the act was also nicknamed the “Indian 
New Deal.”  The IRA was an attempt to reverse the assimilation goals of the Dawes Act and 
allow tribes once again to govern themselves – to ameliorate the effects of the Great Depression 
and improve the situation of Native Americans generally.  The act ended the allotment of tribal 
land and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to accept additional tribal lands into U.S. trust 
and to establish new reservations on those lands.  It also encouraged tribes to adopt Bureau of 
Indian Affairs-created constitutions to promote self-government.  In addition, the act set up 
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business charters to encourage economic progress.  The act also gave Native Americans a hiring 
preference with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).65  
However, the IRA never achieved its goal of bringing the tribes up to standard of living equal 
to the white population and during World War II and in the early Cold War years the IRA came 
under a great deal of scrutiny.  Indeed, the U.S. Senate spent fifteen years investigating Native 
American living conditions which resulted in its 1943 report, Survey of Conditions of the Indians 
of the United States.66 That report was highly critical of the IRA itself as well as the BIA’s 
administration of it.  The House began its own investigation in 1944 and by 1947 representatives 
held hearings on bills to “emancipate” Native Americans from BIA control.67  In 1953, Congress 
passed a resolution stating its official policy.  Known as HCR 108, the resolution was not 
binding but only states the policy that Congress would follow as it attempted to revise the 
relationship between the federal government and Natives not fully assimilated into American 
society.  Additionally, the resolution was only technically valid during the Eighty-third Congress 
(1953-55); however, it has never been replaced or “repealed,” although activists and interested 
groups have attempted to sway Congress to do so.68  
The long-term policy objective of HCR 108 was to “terminate” the federal government’s 
trusteeship responsibilities with the tribes and integrate Native Americans into the U.S. 
population as fully responsible tax-paying citizens.  The early 1950s saw the BIA encourage and 
                                                 
65 UAF Interior Aleutians Campus, “Indian Reorganization Act (1934).” 
https://tm112.community.uaf.edu/unit-2/indian-reorganization-act-1934/ (accessed July 23, 
2015); McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 121-124. 
66 Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R. Biggs, “The Evolution of the Termination Policy,” American 
Indian Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1977): 145. 
67 Ibid., 146. 
68 Ibid., 151. 
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assist tribal members to leave their reservations to take up residence in cities where they might 
find employment.    Additionally, Congress passed individual acts to terminate the federal 
relationship with specific tribes.  From 1955 to 1970, 109 tribes’ relationships to the federal 
government were terminated.  Roughly three percent of all federally recognized Native 
Americans were involved, as were about 3.2% of Indian held lands.69  Each tribe’s land was sold 
and the proceeds given to the tribes to distribute among its members.  Tribe members then 
became subject to state and county laws, taxes, and courts.  Federal health, education, and 
welfare assistance that was available exclusively to Native Americans became unavailable and 
individual Indians were only allowed into the same programs available to non-Indian U.S. 
citizens.  For those affected by termination legislation, their identities as tribe members tended to 
become essentially non-existent as their interests became more tied to non-Indian institutions. 
The Seminole Tribe of Florida avoided such a fate, although it was threatened with 
termination by the federal government and the action was supported by the State of Florida.  
Instead, in 1957 the tribe established a constitution and two-tiered formal government composed 
of a Tribal Council and a Board of Directors.  Additionally, it established the Seminole Tribe of 
Florida, Inc. to oversee the tribe’s business aspects.70   
However, even though the Seminole Tribe avoided termination of its relationship to the 
federal government, it, along with many other tribes in the U.S., had its federal relationship 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 Seminole Tribe of Florida official website, “Brief Summary of Seminole History.” 
http://www.semtribe.com/History/BriefSummary.aspx (accessed Aug 1, 2015); Katherine 
Ellinghuas, Blood Will Tell: Native Americans and Assimilation Policy (Lincoln: University of 
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changed significantly when Congress passed Public Law 83-280 in 1953.71 Known more 
commonly as “PL 280,” the legislation transferred criminal jurisdiction over the tribes from 
federal to state authority.  Initially, the law applied only to tribes in six states, but the law had a 
clause allowing other states to join in with the consent of the state’s citizens.  In 1962 Florida 
opted for PL 280 jurisdiction and hence held it in 1996 during the case at hand.72  
During the tumultuous years of the 1960s and continuing into the 1970s, the Civil Rights 
movement came to affect Native Americans as well. As historian of American Indian law Todd 
A. Morman puts it, “[t]he 1960s saw the rise of Red Power and Indian militancy. . . .”73 
Conditions on reservations had been poor historically. Mismanagement by the BIA was often to 
blame but tribal governments also came under Congress’ scrutiny.  Under tribal governments, 
traditional laws and justice took precedence over the Bill of Rights.  Indeed, in Talton v. Mayes, 
decided in 1896, the Supreme Court ruled that the protections afforded U.S. citizens from the 
federal government by the Fifth Amendment did not apply to Indians who remained on 
reservations.74 But the 1965 the Voting Rights Act put an end to divergent state laws regarding 
                                                 
71 The official title of Public Law 280 was “An act to confer jurisdiction on the States of 
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, with respect to criminal offenses and 
civil causes of action committed or arising on Indian reservations within such States, and for 
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72 Carole Goldberg, Duane Champagne, and Heather Valdez Singleton, “Final Report Law 
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the right of Natives to vote. Under its terms, Native suffrage was, as a matter of federal law, to 
be universal and unimpaired.75   In 1968, responding to concerted Native American protests and 
demands organized around the American Indian Movement, Congress passed the Indian Civil 
Rights Act. Included in that act was a stipulation that any further expansion of PL 280 
jurisdiction would require the consent of the states and of tribes within the states that would be 
affected.76 By 2007, there had been at least seventy-four cases brought by or on behalf of Native 
Americans under that Voting Rights Act or the Fourteenth or Fifteenth amendments. Most of 
these actions were litigated in states that included large reservations or Indian populations, such 
as Arizona, Oklahoma, and New Mexico.77 
   President Richard M. Nixon abandoned the termination policy, setting the stage for what 
some scholars have characterized as a new era of Indian sovereignty or at least relations of the 
tribes with the state governments and the federal government that were more reciprocal. The 
basic thrust of this change was the decision of the federal government to cede an increasing 
number of governmental functions to the tribes. The policy gained official standing in 1975, 
during the administration of President Gerald R. Ford, with the passage of the Indian Self-
                                                 
75 Daniel McCool, Susan M. Olson, and Jennifer L. Robinson, Native Vote: American Indians, 
the Voting Rights Act, and the Right to Vote (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 22. 
76 Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 337, 25 U.S.C. ch. 15, §§1301-
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Determination and Education Assistance Act.78  In 1978, Congress and President Jimmy Carter 
passed the Indian Child Welfare Act and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the latter 
of which provided for consultation with tribal leaders when federal action might adversely affect 
Native American sacred sites.79 
In the landmark decision Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida (1974), 
the Supreme Court broke new ground by holding that, under extant statutes, federal courts were 
authorized to try land claims asserted by Native Americans based on aboriginal title and treaties 
with the federal government and agreements with others.80 At this point, regardless of original 
understandings of the Constitution, most jurists accepted that Congress had “plenary” authority 
over the tribes, which could be derived from the Commerce Clause; the Treaty Clause (Article II, 
Section 2, Clause 2); the Property Clause (Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2); and, otherwise, the 
nature of the sovereign power of the federal government in relation to the Indian tribes. Even so, 
after 1974, numerous Native American tribes, including the Seminoles of Florida, assertively and 
successfully litigated contentious tribal claims to land and associated water rights against private 
title holders, state governments, their political subdivisions, and the federal government. Many of 
these lawsuits also sought to identify the extent to which the tribes were entitled to use their 
lands and associated resources under treaties and state and federal law. This litigation insurgency 
                                                 
78 Fixico, “Federal and State Policies,” 389. See Jack D. Forbes, Native Americans and Nixon: 
Presidential Politics and Minority Self-Determination, 1969-1972 (Los Angeles: American 
Indian Studies Center, UCLA, 1981); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
of 1975, Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203, approved January 4, 1975.  
79 The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95–608, 92 Stat. 3069, enacted November 
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80 Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Act of June 25, 
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led to major land settlements with Congress in the period 1978-2006 that resolved conflicting 
claims and clarified the property rights of the tribes, usually to their benefit.81  
The limits of PL 280 were tested in 1976 in Bryan v. Itasca County. Itasca County, 
Minnesota attempted to levy property taxes on any Native American who lived in a mobile home 
on a reservation within the county.  However, the Court ruled that PL 280 was not so expansive 
as to allow states and local government entities the power to tax Indians or regulate Native 
American activities on reservations but only granted states the power to try criminal cases and 
decide civil disputes that included reservation Indians.  The case is noteworthy because it 
resulted in a test that distinguished criminal legislation that penalized certain activities from civil 
statutes that regulated certain activity [hereafter “criminal/prohibitory versus civil/regulatory 
test”] to determine PL 280 applicability directly related to Native American gaming operations.82   
 
In some ways, the resolve of Congress to employ the Indian Commerce Clause to 
promote a new world of gambling enterprise via the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) seems incongruous with its strenuous exertions of commerce power to regulate, 
suppress, and criminalize gambling enterprises from 1949 through 1994. Ten years before 
                                                 
81 Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (New York: W. W. 
Norton. 2005), 241-270; Imre Sutton, ed., Irredeemable America: The Indians’ Estate and Land 
Claims (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985); Harry A. Kersey, Jr., “The 
Florida Seminole Land Claims Case, 1950-1990,” Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 72, no. 1 
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President John Kennedy signed into law three statutes in 1961 targeting interstate wagering by 
wire, transportation of gambling paraphernalia, and gambling enterprise, Congress and President 
Dwight Eisenhower had passed a measure that criminalized the interstate transportation of 
gambling devices, commonly known as the Johnson Act.83 A section of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, commonly known as the Illegal Gambling Business Act of 1970, took aim 
at syndicated gambling, including illegal casino-like enterprises, which the act declared to be a 
prime source of funds for organized crime.84 The Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations 
Act of 1970 defined as “racketeering activity” any “act or threat involving. . . gambling.”85 Eight 
years later, President Jimmy Carter and Congress combined to pass the Interstate Horseracing 
Act, which set up stiff penalties for off-track wagering by wire, telephone, or other electronic 
means.86 Adopted in 1986, during the administration of President Ronald Reagan, the Money 
Laundering Control Act zeroed in on interstate monetary transactions involving funds obtained 
from “specified unlawful activity,” especially “racketeering activity” such as illegal gambling 
enterprises.87 President George H. W. Bush signed into law the Professional and Amateur Sports 
                                                 
83 Transportation of Gambling Devices Act, Pub. L. 906, 64 Stat. 1134, approved January 2, 
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Protection Act of 1992, which made it unlawful for a “government entity” to set up a “wagering 
scheme” based on professional or amateur athletic games.88  
The presidency of Bill Clinton saw several bills passed to regulate various forms of 
gambling enterprise implicating interstate commerce. Consider the Interstate Wagering 
Amendment of 1994. This measure revised the 1961 ban on the transportation of wagering 
paraphernalia to prohibit lottery ticket messenger services that transported state lottery tickets 
from an issuing state into another state, at least in the absence of a compact between the two 
states. Congress based the act squarely on its commerce power to protect state lottery revenues, 
control interstate gambling, and, preserve state sovereignty.89 The Gambling Ship Act of 1994 
revised a 1949 statute that had prohibited any “gambling ship,” defined as a vessel used 
primarily for the operation of one or more gambling establishments other than ships that cruised 
for a minimum of twenty-four hours and provided meals and lodgings for passengers; the 1994 
revision altered the definition of a “gambling ship” to exclude vessels offering onboard gambling 
that cruised beyond the territorial waters of the United States during a “covered voyage.”90 
During the presidency of George W. Bush, Congress trained its sights on internet 
gambling. By 2006, numerous federal courts had ruled that, under the Constitution and Dormant 
Commerce clause, states were not to be permitted to regulate online services and commerce, at 
least commercial websites for adults. The courts rather consistently held that online services 
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constituted interstate commerce, which, Congress insisted, required a unified, comprehensive 
scheme of regulation.91 The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, which was included 
in the SAFE Port Act of 2006, prohibited “gambling businesses” from accepting payments 
related to the participation of another person in a wager involving the use of the Internet that was 
illegal under federal or state law.92  
 
Some Native American tribes began to dabble in commercial gaming in the 1970s.  Although 
a variety of games were offered, bingo was the primary activity.  Tribes in Florida and California 
operated such enterprises but without following existing state laws or obtaining state gaming 
licenses.  In both states, authorities attempted to enforce their state laws, and, in response, the 
tribes sued in federal court to obtain injunctions against further “harassment.”  Two cases 
resulted: Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth in Florida in 1981 and Barona Group of the Capitan 
Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy in California in 1982.93  In both cases, the appellate 
court judges ruled in favor of the tribes.  At the time, the State of Florida allowed pari-mutuel 
gambling in the form of horseracing and jai alai.  Likewise, the State of California allowed pari-
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mutuel betting and licensed betting at card parlors.  Neither state outlawed gambling entirely, 
they only regulated it.  The two appellate courts therefore reasoned that the tribes’ use of gaming 
to raise income was not criminal or prohibited activity that the states could prosecute under PL 
280.  Likewise, the activity could not be regulated by the state based on the Bryan v. Itasca 
County ruling.  The implication was that the tribes were free to operate gaming operations under 
their own rules.  Although both Florida and California tried to appeal their cases to the Supreme 
Court, the Court refused to hear their arguments.  Because of the two cases, Native American 
gaming began to grow substantially. 
Also contributing to the growth of Indian gambling operations in the 1980s were the efforts 
by President Reagan to reduce the size of the federal government.  Native American tribes had 
received significant amounts of federal funds through the BIA, the Indian Health Service, and 
other federal programs in the past.  As these funds were reduced, the tribes turned to gambling to 
become more self-sufficient.  As one writer noted, “As the implications of the two Federal court 
decisions percolated through Indian country, gaming seemed like an ideal source of revenue and 
there was a mini-explosion of tribal high stakes bingo and pull-tab operations.”94  In 1984, John 
Fritz, the Deputy Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior, reported 
to a House committee that about 80 tribes were conducting or would soon be conducting bingo 
activities on their reservations.  Of those, twenty to twenty-five were considered “high stakes” 
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gaming with unlimited jackpots.  Those high stakes operations could allow a tribe monthly gross 
revenue of $100,000 to $1 million.95 
The expansion did not come without a cost however.  Non-Indian backlash to unregulated 
Native American gambling operations was significant.  State and local authorities, non-Indian 
casino and other gaming operators, and those simply opposed to gambling all stepped up to decry 
the new Native American industry.  To them, the vacuum in legal authority needed to be 
remedied as quickly as possible.    
In response, Native American advocates anticipated that it would not be long before some 
members of Congress would move to fill the vacuum with legislation that would be unfriendly to 
Indian gaming.   Their response was a pre-emptive bill that would allow reservation gaming to 
continue as it had previously.  Therefore, the bill would include language that would give federal 
regulatory pre-emption to any potential laws that the individual states might adopt that would be 
restrictive on Native American gaming.  In addition, the bill’s authors were also concerned that 
non-Indian firms that the tribes had contracted with to oversee tribal gaming enterprises were 
bilking the tribes of much of their profits.  The writers wanted their bill to remedy that situation.  
To sell the bill to members of Congress opposed to Native American gaming, its authors gave 
the bill a hard-nosed sounding short title – the “Indian Gambling Control Act.”  Congressman 
Morris K. “Mo” Udall (D-AZ), Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, introduced the draft as H.R. 4566 on November 18, 1983.96  
                                                 
95 U.S. Congress, Hearing before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on H.R. 
4566, June 19, 1984, 62 in Ducheneaux, “Indian Gaming,” 10. 
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347 
 
Udall’s bill never made it out of his committee during the Ninety-eighth Congress.  Hearings 
were held on the bill to determine who would be the regulatory authority.  The Justice 
Department didn’t want the responsibility since Justice was not a regulatory agency.  The 
Department of the Interior didn’t want it either, fearing that it didn’t have the resources to do the 
job.  Additionally, in the 1980s, that agency was working to reduce its historic paternalistic role 
and allow for greater tribal independence and self-determination.  Finally, tribal opinion was 
against the bill since it appeared to the tribes that the legislation infringed upon their 
sovereignty.97    
Meanwhile, the growth of Native American gaming continued.  By 1985, the BIA was 
reporting the number of gaming enterprises at 108.  While gaming on reservations continued to 
grow, non-Indian cities and towns in need of revenue came up with an innovative idea.  Seeing 
the success of Native American gaming, local governments offered to donate land to the Federal 
government to be held in trust for a tribe.  In turn, the tribe would build a casino on their newly 
acquired land to benefit themselves and provide jobs and an economic stimulus to the local 
community.  However, this practice, along with the continued growth of Indian gaming on 
existing tribal lands, resulted in a more organized backlash against it for the same reasons as 
mentioned earlier.98   
With the increased attention given to Native American gaming, debates in the Ninety-ninth 
Congress over the issue grew more contentious.  Udall again presented his bill (this time called 
H.R. 1920) to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.  However, other bills related to 
Indian gaming were presented to Congress as well.  S. 902, introduced by Senator DeConcini (D-
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AZ), was similar to H.R. 4566; but it also proposed regional gaming commissions as part of the 
legislation; because of his legislation, eventually a single commission would be established by 
the final Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).99   
H.R. 2404 was introduced by Representative Norman Shumway (R-CA).  His bill was the 
most state-friendly of the bills in the House.  It prohibited gambling activities on reservations 
unless they conformed to state law.  However, this bill was soon rejected since the majority in 
Congress wanted the regulation to be a federal affair.100 
S. 2557 was the Reagan administration’s contribution to the issue.  In this version, the federal 
government would regulate bingo and traditional Native American gambling games but “hard 
core” gambling, such as that involving poker, black jack, and slot machines would be prohibited.  
This bill was soon rejected as well for being too restrictive and not allowing the tribes to 
maximize their profits.101    
H.R. 3130 was introduced by Congressman Douglas Bereuter (R-NE).  His bill addressed the 
practice of municipalities giving lands to the tribes for gaming purposes.  This concept had 
support and eventually made its way into the final version of the IGRA.  Recalling that the tribes 
had rejected the original, simpler, Indian Gambling Regulatory Act a year earlier, it’s interesting 
to consider that they might have avoided this prohibition along with a good number of additional 
stipulations.102  In a sense, they lost their own bet when gambling on the actions of Congress. 
Throughout the Ninety-ninth Congress the bill was debated and amended.  Gaming activities 
were defined as falling into three classes.  Class I gaming came to be defined as “social games 
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solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Native American gaming engaged in by 
individuals as a part of tribal ceremonies or celebrations or in relation to them.103   Class II 
games included bingo, card games, pull tabs, lotto, instant bingo, etc.  Games in this class did not 
include blackjack, slot machines, or electronic facsimiles of card games.  Class III games were 
defined as those not defined in the other classes and thus they included casino gambling.104  
As the Ninety-ninth Congress continued the legislative process towards finding compromises 
to pass the IGRA, a looming Supreme Court case tilted the debate; that case was California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians decided on February 25, 1987.105 In the case, the Cabazon 
Band as well as the Morongo Band of Mission Indians operated high stakes bingo, poker and 
other card games on their reservations near Palm Springs in Riverside County, California.  The 
State of California sought to shut down the operations arguing that such activities violated state 
regulations.  Riverside County also wanted to shut down the card games because they violated 
county ordinances and it wanted to be able to regulate the bingo games.   
In response, the Mission Indian bands argued that since California’s gaming laws were only 
regulatory and did not outright prohibit gambling, then under the criminal/prohibitory versus 
civil/regulatory test established in Bryan v. Itasca County, the state and county had no power to 
interfere with the tribes’ gaming operations.106  The Court agreed.  In a 6-3 opinion, the justices 
ruled as the tribes had argued, concluding, “State regulation would impermissibly infringe on 
tribal government, and this conclusion applies equally to the county's attempted regulation of the 
Cabazon card club.”107 
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Because of this decision, the legislative process in the IGRA came to a standstill.   Anti-
Indian gaming advocates now wanted a law that provided more state and federal control.  Native 
Americans became convinced that any legislation would be a setback for them and became 
somewhat divided between those who participated in Class I and II gaming and those who had 
the more hard-core Class III gaming establishments.  Pro-Native American legislators believed 
that legislation allowing for minimal oversight would protect Indian sovereignty in the long run 
and thwart the efforts of organized crime to infiltrate Indian gaming endeavors.  Formal 
committee meetings nearly ceased as the sides dug into their positions.  However, informal 
negotiations on the legislation continued over the next year and a half in the One-hundredth 
Congress and, in the end, the sides hammered out provisions that passed a voice vote in the 
Senate and 323 “ayes” and eighty-four “noes” in the House.108 
What Congress came up with was signed into law by President Reagan on October 17, 1988.  
The IGRA created a National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) that would provide oversight 
to certain gaming activities and aimed to ensure that Native American gaming remained free of 
the influence of organized crime.  It allowed for the regulation of Class I gaming to be done 
completely by the relevant tribes.  It allowed for the oversight of Class II gaming by the NIGC; 
the tribes were to remain primarily responsible for staying within the bounds of certain minimum 
standards.  Finally, regulation of Class III gaming would be done through the terms to be 
negotiated by the tribes and their respective states through a Tribal-State Compact.109 
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The Tribal-State Compact is what would eventually be tested in the Supreme Court.  The 
authors of the IGRA assumed that states hostile to Indian class III gaming would drag their feet 
in negotiating with tribes that wanted to operate such establishments.  As a result, a clause was 
inserted that allowed tribes to sue the reluctant states if those states failed to enter good-faith 
negotiations within 180 days after the tribe had presented an application to the state for such 
negotiations.110  In addition, the law also allowed the tribes to sue state officials who might 
obstruct negotiations from advancing.  At the time, Congress must have felt confident that these 
parts of the legislation were supported by the Indian Commerce Clause and the 1908 decision of 
the United States Supreme Court, Ex parte Young. In that case, the state of Minnesota had 
enacted a statute placing limits on railroad freight rates. The Northern Pacific Railroad filed suit 
in federal district court, invoking “substantive due process” to claim the statute violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, also, the Dormant Commerce Clause. They 
also sought an injunction against Edward T. Young, the attorney general of Minnesota, to 
prevent him from enforcing the law. Notwithstanding the argument by the state that Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity barred such an action, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the suit was, in fact, permissible because it sought to redeem protections set out in Section 
One of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five of which explicitly authorized the federal 
government to enforce.111 
The Seminole Tribe v. Florida case began to simmer in the news in late June of 1991 shortly 
after the tribe had applied for the state’s permission to allow gambling under the IGRA.  Florida 
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was historically one of the reluctant states that refused to allow the tribes within its borders to 
operate casino type gambling.   Indeed, Floridians had voted several times to disallow casinos or 
other gaming operations run by any entity.  However, the state did allow gambling in some 
forms.  It ran its own lottery.  Private entities ran horse and dog race operations.  Also, in 
existence at the time was a “penny-ante” law that decriminalized gambling for small stakes; 
however, such gambling was limited to poker.  Bingo games, typically run by charitable 
organizations, were also allowed.  Although charity events such as “Las Vegas nights” were also 
known to be held in the state, such events were, in fact, illegal since they involved blackjack and 
other casino games, which the state did not allow.  Complicating matters was the fact that Florida 
also outlawed slot machines, but the IGRA specifically allowed for electronic games that 
mimicked high-stakes bingo, a game commonly allowed on Native American lands.  Clearly 
some definitions of what constituted an electronic game would have to be worked out and the 
Seminoles hoped that requirements of the IGRA would help them fulfill their wishes.112 
In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe filed suit in federal court claiming that Florida 
Governor Lawton Chiles (D) and Attorney General Bob Butterworth (D) had failed to begin 
good faith negotiations with the tribe, after it had so requested, as required by the IGRA.  In 
early 1991, the tribe had contacted the governor and attorney general requesting permission to 
offer poker, video, electronic and computer-aided games and similar games, but the governor 
                                                 
112 John D. McKinnon and Marlene Sokol, “Seminoles Seek Casino Gambling,” St. Petersburg 
Times, June 28, 1991, Tampa Bay and State, 1B.  Florida legalized horse racing in 1931 to bring 
in revenue during the Depression.  In 1986, a ballot measure passed to allow a state lottery for 
public schools.  That ballot measure also defeated a constitutional amendment to allow casinos.  
In 1990, the Florida legislature passed a law allowing “inter-track wagering via television 
hookups at the state’s track and jai-alai frontons.” John D. McKinnon, “Legislature Seems Ready 
to Take a Chance,” St. Petersburg Times, November 12, 1991, Tampa Bay and State, 1B.    
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rejected all the proposals except poker.  In June, the tribe expanded their request to include 
casino gambling but in August learned that the state would fight each any form of gambling not 
previously allowed by state law.113   
Meanwhile, the tribe continued its operations in its bingo halls.  While Florida law limited 
bingo jackpots to $250, tribal bingo operations had no such limits.  As a result, Florida 
reservation bingo games with jackpots up $16,000, $20,000, and even $85,500 were reported on 
October 1992.  Likewise, reservation video gaming grew stronger as well with one establishment 
operating about 200 machines offering such games as bingo and lotto in a video format.  The big 
difference was that those games allowed for an unprecedented speed of gambling.  Although the 
bets were low (typically $2) they could be made in five second intervals, resulting in gambling 
that more resembled traditional slot machine games than the bingo and lottery games they were 
supposed to replicate.114  
On June 18, 1992, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida Judge Stanley 
Marcus issued his ruling in favor of the Seminole Tribe. 115  During the trial, Ft. Lauderdale 
attorney Bruce S. Rogow represented the Seminoles and argued that the state had failed to enter 
good-faith negotiations with the tribe after being requested to do so.  Florida Assistant Attorney 
General Jonathan A. Glogau countered that Congress had no power to enforce the “good faith” 
requirement of the compact process because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits such action.  
The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution reads as follows: 
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The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.116 
 
In his ruling, Judge Marcus first set out a synopsis of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  In 
1890, he emphasized, the Supreme Court had ruled in Hans v. Louisiana that, not only could a 
state not be sued by a citizen of another state, but citizens could not sue their own states in 
federal court.117  The Supreme Court’s reasoning was that the initial ratifying states would never 
have given up such sovereignty to join the union.  On the other hand, said Judge Marcus, the 
sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment was not absolute and the Supreme 
Court had ruled in several instances that the Amendment could be abrogated. Again, in 1908, the 
Supreme Court had ruled in Ex parte Young that an individual may obtain a federal injunction 
against a state officer to prevent the him from acting in ways that contravened the Fourteenth 
Amendment.118 Judge Marcus also pointed to the 1964 decision of the Supreme Court in Parden 
v. Terminal Railway of Alabama, in which the Supreme Court had ruled that a state could waive 
its immunity and consent to be sued in federal court.119  
Far more important for the case at hand, Judge Marcus relied on the 1989 Supreme Court 
decision Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company (1989) 120 In that decision, the Supreme Court had 
                                                 
116 U.S. Const., Amend. 11. 
117 134 U.S. 1. 
118 209 U.S. 123.  In this decision, the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause were ruled to be violated by a Minnesota state law that severely limited what 
railroads could charge within the state, so much so that it inhibited interstate commerce.    
119 The Court had found only one such occurrence.  In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama, 
377 U.S. 184 (1964), the State of Alabama wished to run its state-run railroad in competition 
with commercial railroads on an interstate basis.   The Eleventh Amendment would have 
protected Alabama unfairly in such a case according to the Court. 
120 491 U.S. 1. 
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declared that Congress possessed the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when it 
legislated under the auspices of the Interstate Commerce Clause.  The reasoning was that 
Congress would clearly need a means to enforce Commerce Clause-based laws and each state 
would have had to understand that fact when they voted to ratify the Constitution. In other 
words, the states would have had to understand that they would be ceding certain powers to the 
federal government when they agreed to join the Union, and assenting to the federal commerce 
power was one of those powers given up.121 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989) had undoubtedly constituted a grievous setback 
for the New Federalism being advanced by the conservative justices of the Rehnquist Court. In 
this 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court had held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) authorized Congress, under its commerce power, to 
allow companies required to pay for hazardous waste site cleanups to sue states for their role in 
creating such environmental hazards – notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity protections. From about 1900 to 1950, the predecessor of Union Gas Company had 
operated a coal gasification plant near Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, along Brodhead Creek. A 
waste byproduct was coal tar, which the company stored underground. After the plant was 
dismantled, the state of Pennsylvania reworked areas along Broadhead Creek to improve flood 
control. In 1980, after having obtained easements from Union Gas, state workers accidentally 
struck a large deposit of coal tar while excavating the creek, and the hazardous material seeped 
into it. The EPA declared the project the first emergency Superfund site. The State of 
Pennsylvania and EPA operatives cleaned up the area at a cost of $720,000, and the federal 
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government sued Union Gas under CERCLA for reimbursement. Union Gas, in turn, sued the 
state of Pennsylvania in federal district court for its contribution to the spilled hazardous material 
under a provision of CERCLA allowing such suits to be brought against states, whether they 
consented or not. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the action.122  
But five members of the Supreme Court saw the matter differently. With a plurality 
opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, and with Justice Byron White concurring, the 
Court remanded the case for reconsideration in view of amendments to CERCLA made by the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) that clearly allowed liability 
suits against the states in federal court. The bare holding was that Congress could abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the states from lawsuits to effectuate its commerce 
power on behalf of CERCLA. Invoking the 1934 decision of the Supreme Court Monaco v. 
Mississippi, Justice Brennan emphasized that “We have recognized that the States enjoy no 
immunity where there has been “a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention” – 
quoting Federalist No. 81, by Alexander Hamilton: 
Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same time as it 
confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus conferred would be 
incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to the 
extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also 
relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this 
authority, to render them liable. The States held liable under such a congressional 
enactment are thus not “unconsenting”; they gave their consent all at once, in ratifying 
the Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, rather than on a case-by-case basis.123 
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357 
 
In the face of considerable public support of federal action to improve environmental 
protection, and amid growing controversy over Superfund projects, Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Sandra Day O’Connor registered strong dissents, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Anthony Kennedy joined. According to Justice O’Connor, “a faithful interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment embodies a concept of state sovereignty which limits the power of 
Congress to abrogate States' immunity when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”124 
Federal District Court Judge Marcus, in Seminole Tribe of Florida relied entirely on the 
rationale set out by Justice Brennan in Union Gas:    
Given Congress’ plenary authority over Indian relations, explicitly noted in the 
text of the Constitution at Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 3, and the uniquely federal issues 
raised when such authority is exercised, considered in conjunction with the 
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 
. . . we conclude that Congress, when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce 
Clause, has the power to abrogate the States’ immunity.125 
 
Judge Marcus’ ruling was a blow to Governor Chiles, but Florida quickly made a petition to 
the Eleventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta and continued to resist in negotiations with 
the Seminoles.  However, even if the governor had no interest in negotiating with the tribe, the 
Seminoles continued to make offers.  In early 1993 the tribe offered to pay the state of Florida 
$100 million a year to allow it to operate casinos in Tampa, Hollywood, and Brighton.  In a 
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sense, the governor was being offered a gamble himself since federal law prevents states from 
collecting taxes on Native American gaming.  If Florida lost its appeal, gaming would be 
allowed and the state would receive nothing in return.  However, Governor Chiles was adamant 
in his opposition to Indian gaming, and in fact he was against all gambling, including the state’s 
lottery.  His communications director stated the governor’s views thus: “From a broad policy 
(standpoint) we think that government has an obligation to lead by action.  If individuals want to 
gamble that’s up to an individual, but in terms of a government endorsing certain areas and 
expanding the arena the governor’s always been on record against that.”126  
Governor Chiles’ gamble and stand on principles paid off.  On January 18, 1994, the 
Eleventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Judge Marcus’ decision, although the three-
judge panel also ruled that the tribes could turn to the Secretary of the Interior for redress 
according to the IGRA.  The panel was composed of Chief Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat, Circuit 
Judge Susan H. Black, and Senior Circuit Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.  The Chief Judge was first 
appointed by President Nixon the federal bench in 1970 and was later promoted to a circuit court 
position by President Ford.  Tjoflat knew and was admired by Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
who respected the judge’s work.127  Judge Black was first appointed to federal district court by 
President Carter in 1979 and President H.W. Bush appointed her to the Eleventh Circuit in 
1992.128  Judge Johnson had achieved considerable fame during the Civil Rights Era while he 
was the district court judge for the Middle District of Alabama from 1955 to 1979.  He was the 
federal judge responsible for ruling to desegregate busses, parks, and restaurants in the 
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Montgomery area during the 1950s and 60s.  His opinions earned him death threats and a cross 
burned on his front lawn as a result.129  First appointed by President Eisenhower, he was elevated 
to the Fifth Circuit in 1979 by President Carter and then to the Eleventh Circuit in 1991 by 
President H.W. Bush where he assumed senior status.130   
Similarly to Judge Marcus, the appeals judges determined that the critical precedent upon 
which to decide the case was Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company.  However, the appeals court 
determined that Union Gas was inapplicable to the case at hand.  The panel differentiated the 
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause.  While questioning the authority 
of the Union Gas ruling because of the plurality of the judgment, the Tjoflat-authored judgment 
stated, “we refuse to disregard Union Gas merely on these bases.” Instead, they found that the 
case simply didn’t apply to the present case since the present case involved the Indian Commerce 
Clause.  The judges reasoned that the Indian Commerce Clause was added to the Constitution for 
a very different reason than the Interstate Commerce Clause, one clause being to allow Congress 
to legislate in the field of Native American affairs and one to smooth the way for commerce 
between states.  Thus, the panel concluded, “the Union Gas holding does not control our 
disposition of this case.”131  It was now the Seminoles turn to appeal. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments on October 11, 1995.132  
Representing the State of Florida was its Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan A. Glogau, aided 
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by Florida’s Attorney General, Robert A. Butterworth.  This was both attorneys’ first 
appearances in the Supreme Court. Bruce S. Rogow represented the Seminole Tribe.  Rogow 
was a prominent Fort Lauderdale attorney who had been before the Court eight times 
previously.133  Representing the United States was Solicitor General Drew S. Days, III, who also 
urged a reversal of the judgment.  Days had argued before the Court nineteen times previously 
and had represented the government in United States v. Lopez.134  The case had gathered strong 
constituencies on both sides with five other tribes and the National Indian Gaming Association 
filing amici curiae briefs urging reversal and thirty state attorneys general filing such briefs 
urging affirmance.135 Court watchers, having recently seen the surprising judgment in Lopez 
were watching this case closely as well.136 
During oral arguments, the questions of the justices centered largely on one aspect of the 
case. They wondered why the Seminoles wanted to force the state to negotiate an agreement 
when the IGRA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to allow gaming licensing on 
reservations when all prescribed avenues or tribal-state negotiations had been exhausted.  
Likewise, they wondered why a state would not engage in negotiations knowing that, at some 
point, they would lose bargaining power when the issue went to the Secretary of the Interior.  
None of the three attorneys arguing the case seemed to have wanted to let time take its course but 
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were, instead, bent upon winning in court.137 The justices offered no hints as to how they were 
going to rule on the decision and the waiting game for the ruling began. Their decision was 
published nearly six months later, on March 27, 1996.   
With Chief Justice William Rehnquist authoring the majority opinion, joined by justices 
Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court 
readily acknowledged that it had found authority for Congress to abrogate the sovereign 
immunity of the states in the Fourteenth Amendment. In this connection, the Court pointed first 
to its 1976 decision Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. In that case, employees of the State of Connecticut had 
brought a class action against the state, arguing that its statutory retirement plan discriminated 
against them because of their sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A federal district 
court, among other things, had denied an award to the petitioners of retroactive retirement 
benefits as compensation for their losses and to cover an attorney’s fee. The district court based 
this ruling on the proposition that both awards would constitute a recovery of money damages 
from the treasury of the state, which, it insisted, the Eleventh Amendment precluded. According 
to the Supreme Court in Bitzer, however, the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a backpay award 
because the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty upon which it was 
grounded were limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which granted Congress authority to enforce “by appropriate legislation” its substantive 
provisions. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist in Seminole Tribe of Florida, “[w]e held that 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the 
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Eleventh Amendment and therefore that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to 
abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment.”138  
But the Court in Seminole Tribe also determined that the doctrine of Ex parte Young did 
not permit suits against a state’s governor for prospective injunctive relief to enforce the 
negotiation requirements of the IGRA.139 Again, that controversial decision had held that a 
lawsuit seeking an injunction against a state official did not violate the sovereign immunity of 
the state, because the state official was not acting on behalf of the state when he sought to 
enforce an unconstitutional law. In Seminole Tribe, the Court recognized that the principle set 
out in Ex parte Young had sometimes upheld federal jurisdiction in a suit brought by a private 
party against a state official. But, according to the Court, “[t]he situation presented here. . . is 
sufficiently different from that giving rise to the traditional Ex parte Young action so as to 
preclude the availability of that doctrine.” Of critical important, the IGRA provided a “carefully 
crafted and intricate remedial scheme.”  The IGRA already had a remedy in place for a state 
unwilling to negotiate.  The law demanded that, if a state was non-compliant for 180 days, a 
court would provide sixty more days to reach an agreement.  After sixty days, the two parties 
were to provide their plans to a mediator who would then conclude a settlement.  Finally, if the 
state failed to agree to the mediated plan, then the case would be referred to the secretary of the 
Department of the Interior, who would then prescribe regulations governing Class III gaming on 
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tribal lands.  The Court reasoned that a state’s liability under Ex parte Young would be 
considerably greater than that proposed by the IGRA scheme, and the Court had no interest in 
rewriting the scheme; that would be the job of Congress.  Therefore, Ex parte Young did not 
apply to this case.140      
  The Court also declared that its decision in Union Gas did not authorize Congress, under 
the Indian Commerce Clause, to permit private parties to sue the states under the IGRA and, 
thereby, abrogate their sovereign immunity. Chief Justice Rehnquist directly addressed the 
holding articulated by Justice Brennan in Union Gas that the states, when the they ratified the 
Constitution, had agreed to surrender certain powers under the Commerce Clause. According to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, “We agree with petitioner that the plurality opinion in Union 
Gas allows no principled distinction in favor of the States to be drawn between the Indian 
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause.” But, to the extent that Union Gas 
purported to authorize abrogation of state sovereign immunity under either component of the 
Commerce Clause, the decision was unacceptable and wrongly decided. In the words of the chief 
justice, “Union Gas should be reconsidered and [is] overruled.”141 And, in this regard, he was 
rather emphatic: 
It was well established in 1989 when Union Gas was decided that the Eleventh 
Amendment stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limited 
the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III. The text of the Amendment itself is clear 
enough on this point . . . . And our decisions since Hans had been equally clear that the 
Eleventh Amendment reflects “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that] 
limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III.”142 
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The four justices in the minority took a dim view of the majority ruling.  Two dissents were 
written, one by Justice Stevens (who wrote a concurring opinion in Union Gas) and the other by 
Justice Souter. The opinion of Justice Stevens ran twenty-four pages and was peppered with 
terms such as “curious,” “shocking,” and “misguided.”143  The thrust of his contention was that 
the idea of state sovereign immunity is “ancient” and “cannot justify the majority’s expansion of 
it.”144  He wrote: “For this Court to conclude that timeworn shibboleths iterated and reiterated by 
judges should take precedence over the deliberations of the Congress of the United States is 
simply irresponsible.”145 In Justice Steven’s view, the states were clearly subordinate to the 
federal government and only Congress could decide in which cases the Eleventh Amendment 
applied.  
Justice Souter’s eighty-five-page dissent ran nearly three times the length of the Court’s 
opinion and was joined by justices Ginsburg and Breyer.  Souter argued that the authors of the 
Eleventh Amendment had no desire to stifle all suits against states; all they intended was to 
ensure that states that had borrowed money from citizens of other states to finance the 
Revolutionary War were not sued by their creditors in federal court. The Eleventh Amendment, 
insisted Justice Souter, was never intended to bar cases arising under federal law or the 
Constitution.146  Further, the idea of sovereign immunity was a remnant of the English common 
law that held little weight with the men who wrote the Constitution; indeed, the question would 
have to be asked, what exactly was the common law?  Souter recalled James Madison’s 
observation: “The common law was not the same in any two of the colonies.”147  In addition, 
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Souter argued that the ruling in Hans was suspect and that the Hans Court also misread the 
Eleventh Amendment because it had misconstrued the significance of the common law.148  
 Seminole Tribe of Florida constituted a “twofer” from the perspective of the Supreme 
Court justices interested in advancing an understanding of the Commerce Clause that comported 
with the New Federalism. Notwithstanding the outrage registered by the two dissenting opinions, 
the majority in Seminole Tribe of Florida held unmistakably that the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibited Congress from making the State of Florida, or any other state, capable of being sued 
in federal court for non-compliance with the tribal demands authorized by the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act.  The “narrow exception” to this sovereign immunity, which empowered 
Congress to pass legislation to uphold the protections set out in Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, was inapplicable because the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provided a 
satisfactory remedial scheme. This holding could only have further dismayed the dissenters if the 
opinion of the majority, in this regard, had stated plainly that the remedial scheme provided by 
the IGRA, ultimately, permitted a state to ignore altogether the request made to it by an Indian 
nation to form a tribal-state compact for the purposes of establishing a casino on tribal land.149 
And it was, quite likely, gratifying to at least a few of the more conservative judges on the Court 
that Seminole Tribe of Florida also overturned Union Gas – and, thereby, entirely neutralized the 
erstwhile capacity of the CERCLA to produce lawsuits in federal courts against the states for 
environmental damages wrought by corporate industry. Union Gas had been a clear aberration to 
the majority in Seminole Tribe.  It had not been a strong decision, as discussed, being based on a 
majority of five constituted by four justices joined in a plurality opinion and a concurring justice. 
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Additionally, the holdings in Union Gas had been blurred by partial concurrences and dissents 
that muddled exactly what the Court agreed upon. Fragmented as the 1989 decision was, it had 
greatly expanded the power of the federal judiciary to hear suits against the states beyond those 
authorized to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Union Gas, moreover, had created confusion 
in the lower courts as these tribunals weighed the decision’s viability and waited for it to be 
overruled.150  
Earnest A. Young emphasizes that the decision of the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe 
of Florida quickly created an opportunity for the Court to further advance its New Federalism 
sovereign immunity doctrines. Because the decision reaffirmed its holding in Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, that is, that the Congress was authorized to establish remedial law suits against the states 
to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, claimants energetically 
began to bring such actions under legislative revisions made by Congress, under this rationale, to 
several extant programs and regulatory regimes. The Rehnquist Court rather rapidly overturned 
virtually all these initiatives, including decisions relating to revised provisions of the Patent Act 
of 1790, the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1967, as well as 
to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Title 1).151   
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Young argues that the Rehnquist Court handed down its New Federalism sovereign 
immunity decisions, beginning with Seminole Tribe, because there had been no New Deal 
innovations to impede this assertive line of constitutional federalism. There was no Wickard or 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. permanently weakening state sovereign immunity. This 
circumstance, he suggests, “allowed the Court to do something nice for constitutional federalism 
without overruling important precedents or directly challenging the national regulatory state.”152 
Young suggests further, with some circumspection, that the states’ rights enhancing line of 
sovereign immunity decisions “reflects a somewhat odd mix of principle and pragmatism. It was 
principled in the sense that the impetus came from a desire to vindicate a neglected aspect of 
constitutionalism, not so much from a desire to achieve particular policy results.”153  
On the other hand, one might well view Seminole Tribe of Florida and the New 
Federalism sovereign immunity decisions it produced as emblematic of the determination of the 
Rehnquist Court to resist efforts by the Congress to undercut further state sovereignty with a 
divergent employment of commerce power. Beginning with Seminole Tribe, every New 
Federalism sovereign immunity decision through 2002 dealt with federal regulatory schemes 
based initially on the commerce power set out in Article I, Section 8. The reactive series of 
                                                 
Hour Come Round at Last? State Sovereign Immunity and the Great Debt Crisis of the Early 
Twenty-first Century,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol, 35 (2012): 593-622, 608.  
152 Marking the end of the surge was, according to Young, a 2003 decision, while a 2006 
decision seemed to confirm it. Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 
(2003) upheld the immunity-abrogating provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993. 
Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6, approved February 5, 1993. Central Virginia Community College v. 
Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) held that the Article I Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution 
abrogated state sovereignty, which made this decision the only one in the history of the Supreme 
Court to allow Congress to authorize individuals to sue state governments.  
Young, “Its Hour Come Round,” 608-609, 612. 
153 Ibid., 613-614.  
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decisions, thus, refused to allow Congress to inaugurate private law suits against state 
governments under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendments by revising regulatory schemes and 
programs originally based on commerce power.154  
Seminole Tribe and its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity progeny stood as a 
reaffirmation of the federalism principle that the state governments were not to be 
“commandeered.” Seminole Tribe effectively held that Congress could not employ private law 
suits to compel states to enter tribal-state compacts against the wishes of a state’s electorate and 
leadership, while, with its reversal of Union Gas, quite similarly insulated state governments 
from the remedial strictures of CERCLA. The two most contentious sovereign immunity rulings 
resulting from Seminole Tribe made it clear that Congress could not authorize private lawsuits to 
dictate the internal operations of a state. Private lawsuits authorized by federal statute for 
compensatory damages and backpay probably did not have the potential to adversely affect state 
treasuries to any large degree. But such actions not only encroached on Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity – in the case of suits based on the revised Age Discrimination Act and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act – they compelled state governments to adhere to employee wage 
                                                 
154 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank (1999): 
Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, approved April 10, 1790; Patent and Plant Variety Protection 
Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-560, approved October 28, 1992. College 
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (1999): Lanham 
Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427; Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 
1992, 106 Stat. 3567, approved October 27, 1992. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000): Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, 
approved December 15, 1967; Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 95-151, 88 
Stat. 74, approved April 8, 1974; Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 978, 
Pub. L. 101-433, approved October 16, 1990. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett (2001): Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 
approved July 26, 1990. 
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and hour, hiring, and promotion policies imposed unilaterally by Congress. As discussed in 
chapter three, this kind of encroachment had raised the hackles of conservatives jealous of state 
sovereignty, especially those with seats on the United States Supreme Court.155 
As in Lopez, the decision in Seminole Tribe implicated some of the most contentious 
issues fueling the culture wars of the 1990s – including the rising casino gambling industry, 
federal government environmental protection regulations, and the balance of power between the 
state governments and the federal government. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996), five of the 
nine justices of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the sovereign authority of the states in the face of 
increasingly extensive employments by Congress of its powers under Article I, Section 8. 
Dealing with that part of the Commerce Clause known as the “Indian Commerce Clause” and the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, the decision marked a major advance for the “New 
Federalism.”  
Seminole Tribe of Florida constituted a twin victory from the perspective of the Supreme 
Court justices interested in advancing Commerce Clause New Federalism. The decision made it 
clear that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited Congress from making the State of Florida, or any 
other state, susceptible of being sued by a private party in federal court for non-compliance with 
the tribal demands authorized by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. In coming to this result, the 
Court also reversed a decision it rendered in 1969 to hold that commerce power did not authorize 
Congress to allow companies required to pay for hazardous waste site cleanups under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to sue 
                                                 
155 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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states for their role in creating such environmental hazards. Once again, Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity protections forbade this. 
Seminole Tribe of Florida and the New Federalism sovereign immunity decisions it 
produced were also emblematic of the determination of the Rehnquist Court to resist efforts by 
the Congress to undercut further state sovereignty with a divergent employment of commerce 
power and to “commandeer” the states. While Seminole Tribe effectively held that Congress had 
no authority to authorize private law suits to compel states to enter tribal-state compacts, the 
decision also insulated state governments from the remedial strictures that Congress had set out 
in CERCLA. Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity decisions resulting from Seminole Tribe 
that dealt with private lawsuits under the Age Discrimination Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, moreover, effectively declared that Congress had no authority to establish 
private causes of action against state governments to coerce them into following Commerce-
Clause-based employee wage and hour, hiring, and promotion policies imposed unilaterally by 
Congress.  
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Chapter Six 
Violence against Women and 
United States v. Morrison (2000) 
 
Congress and President Bill Clinton approved the Violence against Women Act (VAWA) on 
September 13, 1994, establishing the new federal offense of gender-motivated violence. On May 
15, 2000, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of United States v. Morrison that § 13981 of the 
VAWA was unconstitutional.1  The Court concluded that Congress had no constitutional 
authority to enact that part of the statute providing victims of gender-motivated violence a civil 
remedy against their attackers. This remedial provision could not be sustained by either the 
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.2  The events that precipitated the case began 
nearly six years earlier on a college campus in Virginia.   
On the night of September 21, 1994, and the following morning, two men raped student 
Christy Brzonkala in her dormitory at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Brzonkala, a freshman, had 
been a high school athlete and was attending Virginia Tech in hopes of pursuing a sports-related 
career.3  Antonio Morrison and James Crawford were both new students at Virginia Tech as well 
                                                 
1 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 42 U.S.C. Sect. 13981. 
2 U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, “Congress shall have the Power To . . . regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes.”   
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, Sec. 1., “. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
3 Brooke A. Masters, “‘No Winners’ in Rape Lawsuit; Two Students Forever Changed by Case 
That Went to Supreme Court,” The Washington Post, May 20, 2000, B01. 
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and were also members of its highly-touted football team.  The effects on Brzonkala were 
immediate and dramatic.  She sought mental assistance, stopped attending classes, and 
eventually withdrew from school.  In early 1995, Brzonkala had charges brought against her 
alleged attackers, but a Virginia grand jury refused to indict the men.  She then brought suit in 
federal district court under § 13981 of the federal Violence against Women Act [VAWA 
hereafter].  That District Court of Western Virginia, based on the precedent set by the Lopez 
decision, concluded that the Act was unconstitutional.  The three-judge panel of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling by a 2-1 split decision; a review by 
the full Court of Appeals then vacated the panel’s decision.  The Supreme Court upheld the 
lower court’s decision and added more fuel to speculation about the Court’s new outlook on 
Commerce Clause-based legislation.   It was clear that the Court was no longer going to accept 
carte blanche any new statutes based on tenuous ties to commerce as it had for the past sixty 
years. 
The Lopez decision had shocked Court followers and officials nationwide because it was the 
first Commerce Clause-based statute overturned in sixty years. The Supreme Court was, in 
United States v. Morrison, again adjudicating in an area of federal authority in which it had never 
ruled before, making the case one of first impression. While culture wars conflict produced the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, divergent understandings of its social, political, and 
constitutional import shaped popular understandings of Christy Brzonkala’s lawsuit and the 
ruling in Morrison. Activists working to improve women’s rights would generally discount the 
decision for its seeming insensitivity to the pain and struggles of battered women. But, as in 
Lopez, the Supreme Court in Morrison also faced a question of monumental importance: Would 
Congress be permitted to rely on the Commerce Clause to wield an unlimited federal police 
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power? The clarified substantial effects test set out in Lopez would, amid much partisan tumult, 
provide the answer. 
 
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 was the federal government’s first attempt to deal 
specifically and directly with the crimes of gender-based rape, domestic violence, and other 
forms of violence against women, other than statutes that had made assault and violence crimes 
on federal property. The VAWA, moreover, constituted Title IV of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.4 More important, the VAWA was the result of several 
decades of feminist activism.5  The modern history of the VAWA may be thought of as having 
begun with second-wave feminism, which was popularly associated with the Women’s 
Liberation Movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s.6   
Second-wave feminism extended the efforts of the women’s rights movement beyond 
suffrage and marital property rights to deal with inequities related to gender prescriptions 
concerning female sexuality, reproductive rights, family relations, and employment and related 
legal inequalities embedded in the law. Among other achievements, feminists of this cohort 
focused their efforts on raising public awareness about domestic violence, including marital rape. 
Part and parcel of this campaign was the organized effort to establish rape crisis assistance and 
                                                 
4 Sections 40001-40703, Title IV. Violence Against Women, Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-1955, approved September 13, 
1994. 
5 Sally F. Goldfarb, “The Supreme Court, The Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and 
Abuse of Federalism,” Fordham Law Review, Vol. 71, no. 1 (2002): 64. 
6 Carol Giardina marks the beginning of the Women’s Liberation Movement in the United States 
with the arrival there of Simone de Beauvoir’s Le Deuxième Sexe (1949), or The Second Sex, in 
1953. Giardina, Freedom for Women: Forging the Women’s Liberation Movement, 1953-1970 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010), 15-33. 
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shelters for battered women, and reform the law of divorce and child custody to make them more 
equitable for women. Among other things, the activists of this cohort scored signal victories with 
significant alterations to federal law, including the extension of affirmative action rights to 
women in 1967, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade (1973), the 
passage of the Title IX Education Amendments, and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.7 
As indicated, one of the prime campaigns of second-wave feminism in the United States was 
dedicated to what contemporaries denominated the “anti-rape movement” or “rape prevention 
movement.”  Spurred by turn-of-the-decade F.B.I. statistics that showed an annual occurrence of 
19.4 rapes per 100,000 people in New York, 35.3 in Columbus, Ohio, 43.2 in Kansas City, and 
51.8 in Los Angeles, many women’s rights activists made rape the focus of their activities.8  The 
long-term goals of the movement were to reduce the incidence of sexual violence and lessen the 
impacts of such violence on victims.  To reach these goals, the movement’s activists sought to 
achieve many sub-objectives.  They hoped to raise awareness about the incidence of rape and 
sexual assault and change the traditional attitudes about rape.  Rape had historically been 
assumed to be the result of unbridled sexual desire, but feminists hoped to make the point that it 
was instead an act of domination.  Activists also argued that rape victims had often been too 
                                                 
7 Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, approved June 23, 
1972: No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); The Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 93-495, title V, § 503, 88 Stat. 1521, approved October 28, 
1978; The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, approved 
October 31, 1978, amended Title VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964 to “prohibit sex 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.” Stephanie Gilmore, ed., Feminist Coalitions: 
Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2008).  
8 Angela Taylor, “The Rape Victim: Is the Also the Unintended Victim of the Law?” The New 
York Times, June 15, 1971, 52L. 
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ashamed or afraid to speak out; anti-rape advocates hoped to enable women to feel less 
threatened to come forward with accusations.  By raising awareness, the movement then hoped 
to be able to revise the sexual violence statutes in existence at the time to allow for more fruitful 
prosecutions and to aid the victims of sexual assault as well.9  
The movement to stop sexual violence against women began as activists developed 
communications networks to organize for other issues in the late 1960s.  By the early 1970s, 
anti-rape activists were conducting conferences and workshops to raise consciousness including 
“speak-outs” in which rape victims presented public testimony on their experiences.10  In July 
1972, the Rape Crisis Center in Washington D. C. established the first rape crisis hotline to 
provide emergency assistance and support for victims.  A year later, the City of New York, in 
cooperation with private efforts, established a similar operation.11  By 1977, the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) was operating approximately two hundred rape task forces 
around the country, including a national task force.12   
As the rape prevention movement grew in numbers and support, its activists tried, with 
various degrees of success, to modify state statutes to make rape and sexual assault prosecutions 
more successful.  They helped in crafting “rape shield laws” that prevented defense attorneys 
from revealing or inquiring about a victim’s past sexual conduct.  By 1974, ten states had passed 
such laws in varying forms, while a dozen other states considered them.13  While some women’s 
                                                 
9 Vicki McNickle Rose, “Rape as a Social Problem: A Byproduct of the Feminist Movement,” 
Social Problems, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Oct. 1977): 75. 
10 Ibid., 75-76. 
11 New York Times, August 9, 1973, p. 25, col. 2. 
12 Rose, “Rape,” 76. 
13 Linda Wolfe, “New Rape Laws Ending the Anti-Victim Bias,” The New York Times, Dec. 1, 
1974, 10E. 
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rights activists claimed victory with the passage of the new laws, other activist lawyers voiced 
concerns that forbidding cross-examination was a slippery slope in the field of civil rights since 
the practice could threaten a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.14  
Nonetheless, by 1984, forty states had enacted rape shield laws.15   
Another change in law that women’s rights activists tried to influence was the requirement 
for corroboration of identity of the assailant and proof of rape.16  Advocates seeking to stop 
sexual violence against women argued that while other crimes, such as robbery, assault, or fraud, 
required only the victim’s word to make a viable case, rape was different.  In contrast with other 
crimes, rape required corroborating evidence to substantiate the identity of the accused, evidence 
of force and lack of consent, and proof of penetration.  Such evidence could include a witness, a 
torn dress, bruises, and other physical proof, but such proof was often lacking since many 
victims waited days or even weeks to report the crimes.  Advocates for women’s rights were 
passionate in their cause but they were opposed by many who favored the stringent requirement.  
Their opposition included lawyers, psychiatrists, and others, who believed that, to protect those 
wrongly accused, the standard of proof had to be higher in rape and sexual assault cases.  They 
pointed out that the motives for claiming rape were many, including an excuse for an unwanted 
pregnancy, feeling guilt afterwards about having had sex, unrequited love, or injured pride as the 
result of a breakup.  Eve Preminger, the President of the Correctional Association of New York 
                                                 
14 Jerrold K Footlick, Lucy Howard, Diane Camper, Elaine Sciolino, and Sunde Smith, “Rape 
Alert,” Newsweek, November 19, 1975, 70; U.S. Const. Amend. VI, “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him . 
. . .” 
15 Colman McCarthy, “Shield Laws on Trial,” The Washington Post, March 11, 1984, K3.  See 
also, for example, Linda Wolfe, “New Rape Laws Ending Anti-Victim Bias,” The New York 
Times, Dec. 1, 1974, 10E. 
16 “Learning the Law from Women’s View,” The New York Times, October 28, 1971, 34L. 
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stated her concern, “By coming out in favor of stricter prosecution, it’s as if the women’s 
movement has stopped believing in the basic principles of our entire legal system—that it’s 
better to let some guilty people go free than to send one innocent person to jail.”17  Women’s 
rights activists countered, and the argument was used later to support § 13981 of the VAWA, 
that the higher standard of proof was a denial to women of equal protection under the law as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.18  The idea was that just as that amendment had been 
used to combat prejudicial treatment against African Americans, the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be used to support legislation that aimed to give equality to the sexes in rape and sexual 
assault cases.  Because of their activism, many states relented in relaxing the burden of proof.  In 
1974, New York eliminated the need for corroboration, while other states followed suit in later 
years.19  In April 1975, Michigan passed what many feminists considered the model “criminal 
sexual conduct” code.  The Michigan statute dropped the requirement for corroborative evidence 
and modified the penalties for rape as well, providing several sentencing options.  Because rape 
is such a serious charge, penalties for it were often so severe that juries were less prone to 
convict knowing that they could be possibly sentencing an innocent man to life in prison or even 
giving him a death sentence.20  In addition, the Michigan statute included a rape shield aspect 
                                                 
17 Linda Wolfe, “New Rape Laws Ending the Anti-Victim Bias,” The New York Times, 
December 1, 1974, 10E 
18 Lesley Oelsner, “‘Because Ladies Lie,’” The New York Times, May 14, 1972, E5. 
19 David A. Andelman, “New Law on Rape Signed by Wilson,” The New York Times, Feb. 20, 
1974, 34L 
20 “In 22 states a convicted rapist can get up to life in prison. . . . In Mississippi, rape is 
punishable by death.” Timothy Harper, “Enormous Change in U.S. Rape Laws,” The Associated 
Press, April 28, 1984. 
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that prevented defense teams from cross-examining rape victims about their past sexual 
experiences.21   
Activists also worked to redefine the legal view of rape from a violent expression of sex into 
an act of violence and dominance.22  Feminist and journalist Susan Brownmiller led the 
movement on this front with her 1975 work, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape.  
Likening rapists to “shock troops” who inadvertently, but effectively, put the fear of men into 
women for the benefit of other men, Brownmiller argued that throughout history, rape was used 
as a form of domination.23 At the same time, other advocates for women’s rights argued that to 
reduce sexual violence in the future, the roles of men and women must change through mass 
education.  Florence Rush, a New York feminist, presaging arguments that continue to exist, 
stated to a conference of thirty activists, “We must educate even very young children, and stop 
raising little boys to be aggressive and assertive and little girls to be passive.”24 
With their success at the state level in improving sexual violence laws, the year 1975 also 
saw feminist leaders pressing for the allotment of federal funds to women’s groups to allow them 
to organize local rape crisis centers.   Proponents of such funding believed that local police 
departments were not equipped for the challenge of comforting rape victims and gathering 
information from them in a way that did not make the victim feel as though she was not trusted.25  
                                                 
21 Wolfe, “New Rape Laws.” 
22 Timothy Harper, “Enormous Change in U.S. Rape Laws,” The Associated Press, April 28, 
1984.   
23 Jerrold K. Footlick, “A Feminist’s View,” Newsweek, November 10, 1975, 72; see also Susan 
Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1975).  Brownmiller argues that men have used rape since time immemorial to show dominance 
over women, including the women of a defeated population after war. 
24 “Feminists Ask Role in Establishment of Rape Crisis Unit,” The New York Times, August 24, 
1975, 38L. 
25 Ibid. 
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A Newsweek article that year, which focused on the growing national problem, quoted a 
Northern Virginia police academy official as saying, “Policemen are problem-oriented so they 
respond to the problem, not the victim.”  However, in the same article, the magazine also 
reported that nearly every major city had a special sexual-offense unit.  The state of 
Massachusetts mandated such units for every community, and the police academy of northern 
Virginia was teaching all officers who might encounter sexual assault victims to treat them with 
decency and respect.26   Although the states made great strides in protecting and caring for their 
citizens, Congress became convinced to get involved as well, and in July it created a National 
Center for the Prevention and Control of Rape.  With a planned budge of $10 million, the 
center’s role was to disseminate information nationally about the causes and prevention of rape 
and to study further rape law reform.27  During the late 1970s, however, states tightened their 
budgets in response to the nation’s poor financial condition.  As they did so, roughly a quarter of 
the 600 rape crisis centers nationwide were forced to shut down.  Women’s rights activists again 
turned to the federal government for help and in 1981 finally got the support they had lobbied for 
when Congress authorized block grants to states to support the centers.28  Massachusetts for 
example, received $75,000 in 1983 to support rape counseling in 12 centers.29 
The drive to prevent sexual assault on women also focused on family violence issues.  
Referring to an English common law heritage that relegated women to be treated as the property 
                                                 
26 Jerrold K Footlick, Lucy Howard, Diane Camper, Elaine Sciolino, and Sunde Smith, “Rape 
Alert,” Newsweek, November 19, 1975, 70. 
27 “For Victims of Rape: Many New Types of Help,” U.S. News and World Report, December 8, 
1975, 44. 
28 Stuart Taylor, Jr., “Rape Crisis Centers Reduced,” The New York Times, 4B. 
29 Mary Wessling, “State Launches Campaign Against Rape,” The Associated Press, May 16, 
1983. 
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of the male head of household, the crime of rape was not seen as offensive because of its effects 
on the female victim but was instead seen an infringement on the property rights of one man by 
another.  Through this prism, a head of a household was responsible for the actions of all the 
members of his household and he thus had the right to treat those members as his property and 
discipline them as he wished.  Thus, state officials typically did not concern themselves with 
wife beating and child abuse if what they understood to be “public order” was maintained.   
However, these ideas changed over time and especially with the advent of the women’s 
movement as women strove for greater independence and equality.    
In this connection, idiosyncratic second-wave feminist, lawyer, and political scientist 
Catharine A. MacKinnon controversially articulated a thoroughgoing feminist critique of law 
that frustrated and perplexed many conservative and liberal activists interested in improving the 
legal rights of women. From about 1983 through 1989, she publicized widely her view of law as 
an organic part of a socially male state, which had arisen over thousands of years from customs 
and practices fashioned by men and entirely consistent with male dominance. While taking Marx 
to task for presupposing that women’s responsibility for child rearing was a “natural” gender, or 
sex, role – MacKinnon, it seems, employed several Marxian theories to elaborate how bourgeois 
“knowledge” normalized sex inequality. Consequently, contemporary society had little capacity 
to recognize the existing patriarchal hierarchies embedded in the foundations of the law. Men’s 
thoroughgoing domination of women, socially and economically, and through the employment 
of violence, was grounded in everyday life long before modern political thinkers began to 
conceptualize understandings of social compact, state-building, the rule of law, and equality.30  
                                                 
30 Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence,” Signs, Vol. 8, no. 4 (Summer, 1983): 635-658. 
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MacKinnon’s project was to reveal the deep gender bias permeating extant law and its 
implications for violence by men against women. With this perspective, she boldly recast legal 
debate on a whole host of issues connected to sex-based discrimination, sexual abuse, 
prostitution, pornography, sexual harassment, rape, and other forms of violence western society 
and states had long authorized men to inflict on women to whom they laid claim. Most pertinent 
to this discussion was MacKinnon’s distinctive argument that rape was, fundamentally, an 
expression of inequality between women and men. Her linkages between the male state and rape 
were, to say the least, provocative: 
The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest 
of men as a gender, through its legitimizing norms, relation to society, and substantive 
policies. It achieves this through embodying and ensuring male control over women’s 
sexuality at every level, occasionally cushioning, qualifying, or de jure prohibiting its 
excesses when necessary to its normalization. Substantively, the way the male point of 
view frames an experience is the way it is framed by state policy. To the extent 
possession is the point of sex, rape is sex with a woman who is not yours, unless the act is 
so as to make her yours.  
 
MacKinnon, it seems, was not entirely hopeful that even the most liberal lawmakers and 
jurists in the United States, or elsewhere, might quickly take meaningful steps to ameliorate the 
grim impact of the male state on women. According to MacKinnon, “As male is the implicit 
reference for human, maleness will be the measure of equality in sex discrimination law.”31 By 
the late 1980s, as will be discussed hereafter, the extraordinarily iconoclastic views of activists 
such as Catharine MacKinnon had contributed to a reaction within the ranks of feminism – 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 644. Fred R. Shapiro provides substantial evidence tending to show that MacKinnon’s 
1983 journal article had an inordinate impact, at least for a time, on legal academics. Shapiro, 
“The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 71 (1996): 
751. See also Catharine MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard, 1989), 161. 
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centered on debates over the meanings and boundaries of acceptable female sexuality, including 
opposing views over pornography, prostitution, and lesbian relationships.32 
 Amid a seething debated within feminism over the proper goals of women’s rights 
advocacy, the 1980s saw new national leadership beset with the challenge of further dismantling 
the male state and shifting to a more conservative line of policymaking. Having responsibility for 
the welfare of their citizens since the founding, States had typically taken the lead on family 
violence issues, as they had in matters of rape and sexual abuse; however, in Ronald Reagan’s 
1984 State of the Union Address, as a “rededication to values” he promised, “This year we will 
intensify our drive against these and other horrible crimes like sexual abuse and family 
violence.”33  Although the National Coalition against Domestic Violence criticized him for 
reducing federal funding for domestic violence programs, he committed the federal government 
to family violence prevention and support in two ways.34  First, U.S. Attorney General William 
French Smith established the Department of Justice’s Task Force on Family Violence.  The task 
force was responsible for creating reports on the frequency and impact of family violence in 
America and to provide recommendations to local law enforcement.  Upon announcing the task 
force’s first report, French stated, “This is essentially a state and local matter.  Nevertheless, as in 
other areas, the federal government is ideally suited to provide leadership and to provide 
                                                 
32 Jane F. Gerhard, Desiring Revolution: Second-Wave Feminism and the Rewriting of American 
Sexual thought, 1920 to 1982 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Lisa Hunter 
Duggan and Nan D. Hunter, Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture (New York: 
Routledge, 1995); Dorchen Leidholdt and Janice G. Raymond, eds., The Sexual Liberals and the 
Attack on Feminism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1990). 
33 Ronald Wilson Reagan, “State of the Union Address (January 25, 1984),” The Miller Center, 
University of Virginia. http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/5457 (accessed February 
5, 2012). 
34 Joan Mower, “Washington Dateline,” The Associated Press, March 1, 1985. 
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education and training.”  The report recommended that the justice system treat people charged 
with family crimes just as if there was no relationship between the alleged attacker and the 
victim.  The report also suggested that, “Whenever possible, prosecutors should not require 
family violence victims to testify at the preliminary hearing,” instead allowing hearsay evidence 
to suffice, and for cases in which a child was the victim, the child’s trial testimony could be 
presented via videotape so the child would not have to confront the defendant in the courtroom.  
In addition, prosecutors were advised, “The victim should not be required to sign a formal 
complaint against the abuser before the prosecutor files charges, unless mandated by state law.”35  
Seemingly contradicting these suggested deviations from typical prosecutions, Detroit Police 
Chief William Hart, the task force chairman, noted in presenting the report, “The legal response 
to family violence must be guided by the nature of the abusive act, not the relationship between 
victim and abuser.”36  The second federal jump into the family violence realm in 1984 occurred 
when Congress passed the Family Violence Prevention Services Act.  Passed as Title III of the 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the Act authorized money for funding domestic 
violence shelter care facilities, police training related to domestic violence and elder abuse, and 
setting up an information clearing house.37  The funding equaled $11 million in fiscal year 1985, 
and $26 million for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 and was reported by the American Bar 
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Association Journal to have been the result of a six-year lobbying campaign by women’s and 
children’s advocates.38 
The Department of Justice was not the only federal agency to join in the fight against sexual 
assault and rape.  In 1985, President Reagan’s Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, assembled a 
task force of his own comprised of 175 health professionals from around the country.  Koop 
stated in a Senate subcommittee on health meeting that, “The traditional response by Americans 
has been to strengthen the forces of law and order, enlarge our prison capacity and reform our 
laws concerning the punishment of perpetrators of these kinds of crimes.”  He argued instead that 
that health professionals step away from their detached, professional manners and get more 
involved in discovering if abuse was occurring when patients came in for treatment.  He 
suggested that health professionals had a role to play in reporting abuse when they suspected it as 
part of the national fight against domestic violence.39  
As the funding for federal women’s projects began to be allocated, groups outside of the 
women’s liberation movement, who took a more conservative view of how to respond to sexual 
violence, requested funds for their projects as well and controversy ensued.  In 1985, the Justice 
Department provided a grant to the National Coalition against Domestic Violence, a women’s 
rights advocacy group.  Seeing those funds as counterproductive to preventing domestic violence 
and only encouraging a feminist anti-male agenda, Phyllis Schlafly, an ardent foe of the Equal 
Rights Amendment and leader of the conservative group, The Eagle Forum, encouraged a group 
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closely aligned with hers to apply for a similar grant for their organization, The Task Force on 
Families in Crisis.  The Washington Post reported that Schlafly said that while there is a place 
for women’s shelters, she also stated, “The feminist ideology is that all men would be wife-
beaters if they got the chance.  We do not accept that ideology.  Surely the whole answer cannot 
be to punish the woman by taking her out of her own home.”40  Instead of creating more shelters, 
the task force leaders applied for a grant of $622,905 to educate mainstream America about 
family violence to enlist civic and religious groups to help in prevention of spousal and child 
abuse.41  Liberal groups were outraged at the idea.  People for the American Way called the 
award “a scandalous abuse of public funds” and the group’s president, Anthony T. Podesta, 
wrote a letter to Congress decrying the grant as “a vehicle for the Eagle Forum to garner federal 
support to advance its controversial views.”42  In April 1986, having made the point that they 
could garner taxpayer funds, the task force withdrew its application.  Tottie Ellis, leader of the 
task force explained, “The only reason we made the application in the first place was because we 
believe the government has an obligation to balance the tremendous amounts of government 
money already given to feminist groups who pursue their own agenda at taxpayers’ expense.”43  
Undeterred by the withdrawn application, Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) charged that the grant 
might have been illegal since the funds were supposed to be used exclusively for shelters and not 
education.  Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), Chair of the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
believed that Congress should start an investigation immediately, but because the application had 
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been withdrawn and no money went to the task force, the issue lost its punch as other issues 
gained in importance.44   
Champions of women’s rights next turned their attention to rape and sexual assault on 
college campuses.  An increasing number of rapes on campuses were reported throughout the 
early 1980s.  While it was unclear whether the increase was due to more reporting of the crime 
or more frequent occurrences, rape became college officials’ primary security concern.  For 
example, the New York Times reported that the Rape Treatment Center at the Santa Monica 
Hospital Medical Center saw a “dramatic increase” in the number of women reporting assaults 
on campus; the facility saw sixty-five more rape victims in 1987 than in 1986. The medical 
center was so concerned about the rise that it prepared a booklet entitled “Sexual Assault on 
Campus: What Colleges Can Do,” which it distributed to 3,200 college presidents and campus 
newspapers.  Also of concern to rape prevention activists was that incidents of what came to be 
known as “date rape” or “acquaintance rape,” i.e. instances in which the victims knew their 
attackers, were possibly more frequent than sexual violence committed by strangers.  Campus 
women’s rights advocacy groups, like Stanford’s Rape Education Project and the Center for the 
Study of Campus Violence at Towson State University in Towson, Maryland, distributed 
pamphlets to students to raise student awareness about campus sexual violence.45 
Women’s rights activists began to press colleges to develop new policies condemning sexual 
violence against women, developing educational programs on rape, and instituting procedures to 
modify living arrangements if a victim and the accused lived in the same dormitory.  The New 
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York Times reported that during the fall semester of 1988 students staged protests around the 
country in which they demanded stricter policies on sexual violence targeting women.  UCLA 
responded with new lighting systems, additional security guards, escort services, rape awareness 
sessions, and the distribution of 5,000 whistles.  Brown University saw a three-hundred-student 
protest and a candlelight vigil afterward organized by the school’s Women’s Political Coalition.  
Five hundred students held a similar protest at the University of Illinois.46 Clearly, advocates for 
women’s rights had succeeded in making students across the nation aware of the problem. 
As women’s-rights advocates pressed colleges to develop new rape prevention policies, a 
debate raged about the statistics on sexual assault on women, employed to support the cause, as 
well as a debate about the definition of the term “rape.”  The New York Times detailed an FBI 
report that incidents of rape rose across the nation thirty-five percent from 1978 to 1987.  These 
numbers were somewhat nebulous, however, as some experts suspected only half of rapes were 
reported while others suggested that it was more likely that only one in ten rapes was reported.  
Figures about the proportion of rapes committed by strangers and acquaintances varied as well.  
A Justice department study found that forty-five percent of rape victims reported their assailants 
as being “non-strangers” while a study done in Massachusetts found that number to be seventy-
two percent.  St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital in Manhattan estimated eighty to ninety percent of 
its patients who had been raped knew their attackers.  Perhaps some of the discrepancy can be 
attributed to what exactly constitutes a rape.  The definition of rape in the 1960s was generally 
defined as a brutal, forced, sexual act; however, by 1989, what constituted this crime was less 
constrained and included any form of non-consensual sex whether force was used or not.  
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University of New Mexico sociologist Gary D. LaFree perhaps said it best when he said rape 
was defined first by the victim but ultimately “rape is whatever a jury says it is.”47  
Amidst this controversy arose one of the most horrific and hence sensational events that 
affected the campaign to stop sexual violence against women, the case of the “Central Park 
Jogger.”  On April 19, 1989, Trisha Meili, a slightly built, twenty-eight-year-old, white, 
investment banker, was brutally beaten and raped in Central Park while jogging at night.  She 
was left for dead and found four hours later bound and gagged, laying in a puddle, comatose, and 
suffering from hypothermia and two skull fractures.48  On that same night, a group of over thirty 
black and Hispanic boys from Harlem, aged thirteen to fifteen, went on what came to be called a 
“wilding” in which they robbed a man, threw rocks at a taxicab, and assaulted a male jogger and 
two bicyclists.  Nine of the boys were arrested and five later charged with the rape.  Stories 
began to emerge from the interrogations of the boys that only heightened the tensions 
surrounding the case.  Fifteen-year-old Yusef Salaam was said to have confessed, “It was 
something to do. It was fun.”49  Detectives referred to the accused as being “smug” about their 
actions.  Although all five confessed to the crime before trial, they all recanted their admissions, 
saying that the police had coerced them.  However, the five boys were convicted a year and half 
later and were given sentences of five to thirteen years.  Locally, the trials of the boys helped 
make law-and-order candidate Rudy Giuliani attractive to voters in his New York mayoral 
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election.50  Nationally, the case was closely watched and caused concern over rising violent 
crime.51 
One of the issues that arose during the Central Park Jogger episode was whether the name of 
a sexual assault victim should be released to the public.  Unlike other crime victims, those who 
were raped commonly faced stigma and suspicion.  Major news outlets did not release Trisha 
Meili’s name during the trial; instead she was referred to as the “Central Park Jogger.”  However, 
in February 1990, The Des Moines Register published a five-part story about the experience of 
Nancy Ziegenmeyer, a rape victim, written by the paper’s editor, Geneva Overholser.  
Overholser had previously editorialized that by withholding the names of sexual assault victims, 
including those who are brutally raped, the press compounded the stigma surrounding the 
victims.  She wrote, “As long as rape is deemed unspeakable—and is therefore not fully and 
honestly spoken of—the public outrage will be muted as well.”52  Ziegenmeyer’s graphic and 
heart-wrenching story made national news and became a thing of controversy.  Many Register 
readers were moved to write letters to the paper’s editor about the story.  James E. Smith, of 
Sioux Center seemed to represent a consensus view. “The disgusting and degrading details of 
Nancy Ziegenmeyer’s rape have no place in a family newspaper the caliber of The Register. . . . 
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Unfortunately, we have to face such violent crimes at a very personal level before we are aroused 
to action and commitment.”53   
The Register’s story certainly started a national dialog about the issue of naming victims.  
Journalists who advocated naming names argued that many other people have their names 
released into the news media with no choice in the matter.  Additionally, naming names adds 
credibility to a news report.  Those working to improve women’s rights argued that the stigma of 
rape was sustained by treating the offense as different from other crimes.  Susan Brownmiller 
was reported to have said, “By not printing a name, you’re just perpetuating the myth that rape is 
the worst possible thing that can happen to a woman.”54  Another viewpoint was made by 
Attorney Carey Haughwout, who argued that identifying the victim provides the public a face 
with which to place its sympathy, which could be advantageous to obtaining a conviction.  She 
pointed out how in a recent case of an alleged “date rape” by Sen. Edward Kennedy’s (D-MA) 
nephew, William Kennedy Smith, Smith had the public relations advantage provided by daily 
illustrations of Smith and his family’s pains and stresses.  “These pictures brought Will to us, 
helped us know him and judge him.  On the other side, we had an alleged victim; no name, no 
face.  I believe this contributed to the public’s attitude that supported Mr. Smith and applauded 
the jury’s verdict”55 
While the debate continued about the naming of rape victims, the issue Haughwout 
mentioned, date rape, provided yet another controversy presaging the VAWA.  “Judging by the 
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news and entertainment media, the problems of date rape and acquaintance rape have reached 
crisis proportions in recent years,” wrote Reason magazine’s Stephanie Gutmann in July 1990.56  
Throughout the late 1980s many college campuses reported large increases in rape and sexual 
assault, mostly involving friends or acquaintances.  One of the more notable reports, by 
University of Arizona professor Mary Koss, concluded that among 3,187 women surveyed at 
thirty-two college campuses, 27.5 percent had been victims of rape or attempted rape; most of 
them by acquaintances.57  The St. Petersburg Times reported a study suggesting that fifty-seven 
percent of all sexual assaults were committed by aggressors known by the victims.58  The 
University of Illinois sexual assault task force mailed surveys to 1,460 women on the campus of 
25,950 undergraduate students; 537 women responded and of them 16.4 percent reported 
“criminal sexual assault,” defined as “intercourse with a clearly expressed lack of consent;” 
furthermore, in sixty percent of the cases the attackers were fraternity members.59   
However, reports of rape to campus and city police in college towns did not reflect those 
numbers.  “Few of the incidents were reported to police,” stated an article detailing the Illinois 
study.  On Missouri campuses, the story was similar; in the first four months of 1989, only one 
date rape was reported to the Washington University campus police and only one rape was 
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reported in the city of Columbia, Missouri, home of the University of Missouri.60  Likewise, at 
the University of California, Irvine, only one rape was reported and Columbia University’s 
security department saw no rapes reported in the five years prior to 1989.61  Meanwhile, FBI data 
showed that while reported cases of rape rose from thirty-five per 100,000 women in 1970 to 
seventy in 1980, between 1980 and 1988, reported cases of rape remained nearly constant at 
seventy per 100,000 women.   
Additionally, the National Crime Survey of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), which 
included an estimate of unreported cases, indicated a decline from 150 to 113 per 100,000 
women between 1980 and 1987.62  While the numbers are certainly horrific, they fail to correlate 
with the higher numbers reported by campuses.  Two things were likely causing the seeming 
discrepancy.  First, women were reporting their cases to campus rape crisis centers rather than to 
the more formal security and police forces.  “Date rapes normally are not reported to the police,” 
said Columbia, Missouri’s deputy chief of police in a 1989 interview.63  The reason for the lack 
of reporting, some crisis counselors reasoned, was that victims of date rape were usually 
embarrassed by the incidents since alcohol was often involved and the women involved often 
blamed themselves.64  A second reason that women reported on surveys that they had been 
victims of date rape but hadn’t reported the incidents to police was that they didn’t know the 
definition of the term “date rape” and hence didn’t realize that they had been involved in such an 
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incident.  For instance, in a work by Clark University professor Christina Hoff Sommers, in 
which Sommers analyzes the 1988 Mary Koss’ report, she states, ‘‘only 27 percent’ of the 
women [Koss] counted as having been raped labeled themselves as rape victims.  Of the 
remainder, 49 percent said it was ‘miscommunication,’ 14 percent said it was a ‘crime but not 
rape,’ and 11 percent said they ‘don’t feel victimized.”65  Indeed, students were unaware of their 
victimization because the term “date rape” wasn’t defined in a standard way among rape 
counselors.  Dr. Andrea Parrot, a psychiatry professor at Cornell University defined date rape as 
“Any sexual intercourse without mutual desire,” she went on, “[a]nyone who is psychologically 
or physically pressured into sexual contact is as much a victim of rape as the person who is 
attacked on the streets.”66  The Swarthmore College’s Acquaintance Rape Prevention Workshop 
defined the term more broadly, stating, “Acquaintance rape . . . spans a spectrum of incidents and 
behaviors ranging from crimes legally defined as rape to verbal harassment and inappropriate 
innuendo.”67  Such definitions, and the implications thereof, became items of intense debate for 
at least the next decade.   
Outspoken feminists, such as UCLA law professor Susan Estrich, argued that women should 
be “empower[ed] in potential consensual situations with the weapon of a rape charge.”  Others, 
seeing young women who were confused by the dilemmas presented by their morals in the wake 
of the sexual revolution, were concerned that those women saw the new definition of date rape as 
a sort of escape from responsibility for their actions.  “If they say ‘date raped,’ they don’t have to 
think about their own behavior; they don’t have to think about their feelings.  There’s no 
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complicity, there’s no responsibility, and that’s the nonfeminist piece of it as far as I am 
concerned,” said Catherine Nye of the University of Chicago’s counseling service.68  UC- 
Berkeley social welfare professor Neil Gilbert likened the broad definitions of rape to a feminist 
social reprogramming of society.  He wrote, “The feminine prescription redefines conventional 
morality so as to give women complete control of physical intimacy between the sexes.   
Advances by males, in almost any form, that do not receive clear and explicit consent are 
deemed coercive or assaultive.”69  Clearly there was a great deal of debate over what constituted 
rape, but just as clearly, the topic had great potential politically at the national level.  
The heated debate over the law of rape and legitimate female sexual intimacy reflected the 
emergence of what many activists and scholars have identified as “third wave feminism.” 
Gaining a public profile in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this new phase of activism entailed 
several diverse lines of feminist endeavor, arising, in part, as a reaction to the perceived failures 
of second wave feminism. The new framework certainly involved a broadening of feminist 
thought and action to include women of diverse racial, ethnic, religious, and class backgrounds, 
as well as lesbian and other kinds of female sexuality.70 But the movement also challenged 
second-wave feminist thought that had attempted, with special zeal, to de-legitimize prostitution 
and pornography. While second-wave feminists strictly identified these practices with male 
domination and violence against women, third-wave feminists understood them, at least in some 
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cases, as modes of female empowerment. Quite similarly, third-wave feminists rejected entirely 
second-wave theories that cast women persistently as victims of male domination and, thus, 
bereft of the autonomy and power to shape their own gender identities. Wendy Brown articulated 
a potent third-wave view that called on the liberal state, ultimately, to live up to its promises for 
female freedom and equality – but criticized feminist efforts to outlaw pornography and 
misogynist hate speech because such initiatives cast women as victims in need of government 
protection.71 Former legal aid attorney Wendy Kaminer, who had opposed efforts to censor 
pornography in the 1970s on both feminist and First Amendment grounds, published A Fearful 
Freedom: Women's Flight from Equality (1990). This influential book explored the conflict 
between “protectionist feminism” and a more individualized field of feminist thought and 
activity open to women who assertively took control of their own lives and destinies – a 
feminism that would be, in the view of its proponents, truly empowering and egalitarian.72 
In this turbulent ideological context, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) introduced the first 
version of the Violence Against Women bill, along with three cosponsors, in the Senate on June 
19, 1990.73  He co-wrote the bill with staffer and future University of Wisconsin law professor 
Victoria F. Nourse.74  Titled S. 2754, a companion bill, H.R. 5468 was introduced in the House 
of Representatives by Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA) on August 3, 1990.75  The Senate 
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Judiciary Committee held thee hearings on the bill, addressing gender issues in rape cases, 
campus sexual assaults, and crimes of domestic violence.76  Mary Koss was a witness in the 
second hearing, providing the findings from her 1988 report.  The report produced by the 
committee stated that “[m]ore college women will be raped this school year than will be struck 
by any other major crime,” and that 125,000 women could expect to be raped in 1990, or any 
school year.77   “These numbers show that rape has reached epidemic proportions in our 
country…American women are in greater peril now from attack than they have ever been in the 
history of our nation,” the Washington Post reported Senator Biden as saying upon release of the 
first report.78  The Senator’s bill would have doubled the federal penalties for rape committed on 
federal property, authorized $300 million in federal block grants to local law enforcement to 
fight sexual assault, and redefined rape as a “hate crime,” thus allowing victims to sue their 
attackers.79   While Biden presented a passionate case for his bill, it failed to make it to a floor 
vote in 1990.  Regarding the bill, “I remained a lonely voice in the Senate,” Biden lamented in 
his biography.80    
He reintroduced the bill, joined by twenty-five co-sponsors on January 14, 1991 as S. 15 and 
on March 20, Representative Boxer (D-CA) again introduced a companion bill, H.R. 1502, along 
with twenty-two co-sponsors in the House.81  The Judiciary Committee held one hearing on the 
bill, on April 9, 1991.  The hearing focused on the civil rights remedy for gender-motivated 
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crime.  Professor Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago School of Law and Professor Burt 
Neuborne of the New York University School of Law agreed that Congress held the 
constitutional power to enact such a provision.82  The second attempt to pass the bill showed that 
it had at least some support by the states.  The Illinois attorney general publicly supported the bill 
while the Iowa attorney general pleaded, “Please make stopping violence against women a very 
high federal priority, just as it has become an urgent project in Iowa and other states.”83   
Meanwhile, another precursor to the Bryzonkala case was emerging as an issue of societal 
discussion.  A May 1991 edition of Mademoiselle written by Jill Neimark included an article on 
Athletes and Rape illustrating an alarming link between the two.84  Neimark reported that 
athletes on group sports teams and fraternities could become prone to committing gang rape, 
“From June 1989 to June 1990, at least 15 alleged gang rapes involving about 50 athletes were 
reported.”  She postulated that athletes on teams become extremely bonded over years of playing 
together and gang rapes are yet another manifestation of such bonding.  They also become quite 
confident that they are desired by women and assume that their sexual advances will be accepted, 
regardless of whether a woman verbally consents.  Neimark also concluded that the men 
categorized women into sexual classes such as “nice-girl girlfriend” and “party girl rape victim.”  
Generally speaking, “party girls” were categorized as such if they wore lots of makeup, wore 
tight clothes, were buxom, or had had sex with one of the group before.85  USA Today reported a 
similar link between athletes and the crime of rape in August, providing a litany of examples in 
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which groups of three to five teammates participated in their crimes.  The report also suggested 
that in most cases the participants failed to recognize that they had done anything wrong due to a 
sense of entitlement and that fear of losing respect within their group was more of motivator than 
fear of prosecution.86 
As Senator Biden’s bill gained momentum in the Senate, and was approved by the Judiciary 
Committee in July, it met another roadblock, this time from Chief Justice Rehnquist.  Rehnquist 
wrote in his 1991 year-end report on the federal judiciary that the federal court system was 
nearing the point of becoming overburdened.  He recommended that crimes such as domestic 
violence and firearms murders were best handled at the state and local levels.  He warned that 
justice could suffer if the federal system became overburdened with cases without national 
import.  He spoke specifically against what would become § 13981 of the VAWA, saying that its 
definition of a new crime “is so open-ended, and the new private rights of action so sweeping, 
that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations 
disputes.”87  The Senator wrote later that he certainly didn’t appreciate the Chief Justice 
“sticking his nose in congressional business.”88  With the unwanted input of Justice Rehnquist, 
Senator Biden’s second attempt at passing the VAWA would fail, as had the first. 
Biden suffered another major defeat during 1991 when Clarence Thomas was confirmed onto 
the Supreme Court.  President George H. W. Bush nominated Thomas to replace the retiring 
Thurgood Marshall on July 1, 1991.  Biden’s Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings the 
following October.  Although the hearings were contentious, they became much more so when a 
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leaked FBI investigation was revealed concerning allegations of Thomas’ sexual harassment of 
one of his aides, University of Oklahoma law professor Anita Hill.  Hill was called before the 
committee on Oct 11 and her testimony included accusations that Thomas had offered 
unsolicited comments to her about, among other things, pornographic movies and his own sexual 
prowess.  Thomas denied all these allegations.  Two other women made similar accusations but 
did not wish to address the committee.  Several other women provided their support for Thomas, 
suggesting that Hill was not telling the truth.  Thomas denied all the charges as well and took the 
offensive in his defense, stating to the committee: “This is not an opportunity to talk about 
difficult matters privately or in a closed environment. This is a circus. It's a national disgrace. 
And from my standpoint, as a black American, it is a high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in 
any way deign to think for themselves, to do for themselves, to have different ideas, and it is a 
message that unless you kowtow to an old order, this is what will happen to you. You will be 
lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a committee of the U.S. Senate rather than hung from a 
tree.”89  Thomas’ nomination was moved to the Senate as a whole, but the judiciary committee 
was unable to agree on whether to recommend him or not. The Senate, on October 15, 1991, 
confirmed Thomas by a vote of 52-48.  The vote was one of the closest in history but was not 
split down by party lines. 
Thomas’ confirmation to the Supreme Court was still on voters’ minds during the election of 
1992.  Although Thomas was confirmed to the Supreme Court, his confirmation had effects on 
the composition in the Senate.  Many women’s rights activists decried the fact that there were no 
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women on the Senate Judiciary Committee during Thomas’ hearings.  State Senator Patty 
Murray (D-WA) claimed that she decided to run for the U.S. Senate because of her frustrations 
over the hearings.  San Francisco mayor Diane Feinstein (D-CA) won a race to complete an 
unfinished Senate term in California while Representative Barbara Boxer won the other Senate 
seat.  Additionally, Carol Moseley Braun (D-IL) won her election to become the first female 
African American Senator.  Because of their victories, 1992 became known by the news media 
as “The Year of The Woman” as the Senate added four new female senators to the two who 
already held Senate seats.90  Two of the women, Diane Feinstein and Carol Moseley-Braun, 
accepted Senator Biden’s invitations to join the Judiciary Committee.91 
With the election of Bill Clinton to the presidency in November 1992, the addition of the 
four women, as well as the support of Senator Orin Hatch (R-UT) in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Biden believed the time was right with the new Congress to reintroduce the 
VAWA.92  On January 21, 1993, the first day of the legislative session of the 103rd Congress, he 
and, now Senator, Boxer introduced S. 11, and the bill amassed sixty-seven co-sponsors.93  In the 
House, Representative Pat Schroeder (D-CO), along with Representatives Louise Slaughter (D-
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NY), Charles Schumer (D-NY), and Constance Morella (R-MD) introduced the companion 
house version, H.R. 1133, on February 24, eventually gathering 225 cosponsors.94  In selling his 
bill, Senator Biden pointed out that violence against women was a federal issue because it 
addressed issues of civil rights as guaranteed by the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.   
Our criminal laws must be judged by their effectiveness in responding to the 
injustices done to victims of violence.  This is the covenant of equal protection 
guaranteed by our Constitution—that our criminal justice system shall not 
make distinctions in practice that cannot be sustained in law. . . . Long ago, we 
recognized that an individual who is attacked because of his race is deprived 
of his right to be free and equal we should guarantee the same protection for 
victims who are attacked because of their gender.  Whether the violence is 
motivated by racial bias or ethnic bias or gender bias, the law’s protection 
should be the same.95 
 
  Senator Biden’s views on the right not to be sexually assaulted or raped as a fundamental 
human right reflected a growing international view about the rights of women as well.  As news 
emerged from Bosnia during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia during 1992 and 1993, it 
became evident that thousands of Bosnian women suffered systematic rapes as part of the 
Serbian war effort.  Media outlets such as the St. Louis Post-Dispatch urged the U. N. 
Conference on human rights to encompass women’s rights and pledge to guarantee those 
rights.96 
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The two versions of the VAWA were debated throughout 1993 and 1994.  Committee 
hearings from earlier versions of the bill included discussions about the legislation’s 
constitutionality.  Before the Lopez decision in 1995, it was assumed that bills based on the 
Commerce Clause would stand judicial scrutiny if challenged.  University of Chicago Law 
School Professor, Cass Sunstein, testified in 1991, “the constitutional objections to the bill are 
quite weak.”97  Written testimony from Sunstein and Professor Burt Neuborne, of New York 
University School of Law, explained that, “under that Clause, Congress has ‘exceptionally 
broad’ power to regulate any activity exerting a ‘substantial economic effect’ on interstate 
commerce.”98  Sunstein went on the explain that “Congress might reasonably find that sex-
related violence affects interstate commerce not simply by deterring women from engaging in 
certain interstate commercial activities, but also by producing large losses in interstate 
productivity after the violent acts have occurred.”99   
If the Commerce Clause support for the bill was believed to be substantial, the equal rights 
portion supported by the Fourteenth Amendment was more problematic. The text of Section 1 
states “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” The language clearly applies only to actions perpetrated by the states; 
however, the bill’s crafters reasoned that the bill created a substantive “right to be free from 
gender-based violence” that could provide a plaintiff a remedy at the federal level.100    
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The Senate and House versions of the bill were similar when they were introduced, but were 
modified over time.  The Senate version was a compromise between the Biden bill and a similar 
anti-assault bill, S. 6, produced by Senator Hatch.  The compromise included the civil rights 
remedy, known as Title III of the legislation, and could claim bipartisan support as the Biden-
Hatch crime bill exited the judiciary committee for review by the entire Senate.  In the House, 
Representatives compromised as well but removed the civil rights remedy to make the bill less 
controversial, thus giving it near unanimous support.  On November 1, 1993, Senator Biden 
introduced S. 1607, which was an omnibus crime bill.  On November 4, 1993 the VAWA was 
incorporated into the larger bill and on November 19, 1993 the Senate passed the bill.101  On 
November 20, 1993, the House passed its bill as well by a vote of 421-0, but without the civil 
rights provision.102  The Senate rejected this bill and it sat idle for five months.  Eventually, the 
Senate amended the House bill by striking all its text and replacing it with the language from the 
Senate bill.  Over the spring and summer of 1994, the House and Senate held conferences over 
the bill, finally reaching a compromise in late August.  The House committee members agreed to 
keep the civil rights provision in the legislation while the members of the Senate agreed to 
remove the “litter” from the bill by removing the judiciary committee’s findings, which had been 
included in the text of the bill, and placing them instead into the legislative history.  On August 
21, 1994 the House passed the revised bill with a vote of 235-195.  On August 25, 1994, the 
Senate voted on the bill and it passed 61-38.  President Clinton signed the bill into law on 
September 13, 1994.  “Let us roll up our sleeves to roll back this awful tide of violence and 
reduce crime in this country . . . . We have the tools now.  Let us get about the business of using 
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them,”103 the President said as he signed the bill.  The VAWA was designated Title IV of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.104  
The civil rights remedies for the criminal offense of gender-motivated violence were set out 
in § 13981 of Title 42 of the United States Code.105 But it should be noted that the Violence 
Against Women Act otherwise included a wide array of progressive initiatives. These ranged 
from the enhancement of sentences for those convicted of a violent crime involving a woman 
victim when such convicts had previously been found guilty of such an offense; grants to state 
and local law enforcement agencies to reduce crimes involving violence against women; funding 
to improve security for women in public transportation; new evidentiary rules to be employed at 
trial when female victims of violent crime were called to testify; funding and programs to 
provide assistance to victims of sexual assault and domestic violence; counseling services for 
preventing family violence; guidelines for protecting the confidentiality of abused women and 
children; data collection and research on violence against women and children; and funding to 
promote cooperative efforts between law enforcement officials, prosecutors, local communities, 
and victim advocacy groups to investigate and prosecute incidents of domestic violence and 
child abuse, provide treatment and counseling to the victims of such crimes, and develop 
education and prevention strategies to deter them.106 
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Drafters of § 13981 of the VAWA, as indicated, had been highly aware of the necessity of 
providing defensible foundations for the measure in the realm of public opinion and the 
Constitution. The section first declared that its purpose was to “to protect the civil rights of 
victims of gender motivated violence by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for 
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.” Part and parcel of establishing the new 
criminal offense providing the basis for that cause of action was a declaration that “All persons 
within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by 
gender.” Alluding to an extant section of the United States Code, one subsection defined a 
“crime of violence” to mean “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person or property of another.” Another subsection defined a “crime of violence motivated 
by gender” as “a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and 
due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.” The key provision of § 13981 
maintained that “[a] person. . . who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus 
deprives another of the right declared . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the 
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such 
other relief as a court may deem appropriate.” The civil remedy was good, furthermore, 
regardless of whether the perpetrator had been criminally charged, prosecuted or convicted of 
any violent act constituting a felony under federal law. Equally prominent was a discreet 
declaration of the constitutional authority for § 13981:    
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this subtitle under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the 
Constitution, it is the purpose of this subtitle to protect the civil rights of victims of 
gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting 
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interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of 
crimes of violence motivated by gender.107 
 
The language of § 13981 seemed to open the door wide for law suits that had little or 
nothing to do with sexual assault or rape of women by men. While much of the debate over 
passage of the VAWA had concentrated on the national problem of sexual assault and rape of 
women, the new criminal offense, in fact, proscribed any gender-motivated “crime of violence,” 
regardless of the gender of the perpetrator or victim. Again, under the definition of the offense 
set out in § 13981, any person, adult or minor, male or female, could successfully sue another for 
the use of violence against her or him or the threatened use of violence – if the violence or threat 
of violence was made “on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the 
victim’s gender.” The chances of success for plaintiffs in the sole cause of action authorized by § 
13981 were optimized. As in all civil cases, determinations of guilt in actions brought under the 
provision would necessarily be based on a preponderance of the evidence, rather than, as in a 
criminal prosecution, a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  And, yet, § 13981 closed 
with language demonstrating, it seems, the solicitude of the Senate for the actual intended 
beneficiaries of the act – female rape victims: “It is the sense of the Senate that news media, law 
enforcement officers, and other persons should exercise restraint and respect a rape victim’s 
privacy by not disclosing the victim's identity to the general public or facilitating such disclosure 
without the consent of the victim.”108  
A week after the VAWA was passed, on September 21, 1994, a female college student at 
Virginia Polytechnic University was alleged to have been raped repeatedly by two of her 
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classmates when she visited them late one night in their dormitory room.109  Christy Brzonkala 
had entered Virginia Tech that fall and was a prospect for the women’s softball team.110  Antonio 
J. Morrison, also a freshman, was a highly recruited, 222-pound reserve linebacker for the 
Virginia Tech Hokies football team.111  Prior to college, he was a Group AAA All-state 
quarterback and defensive back as well as a standout basketball player at Indian River High 
School in Chesapeake, Virginia.112  James Crawford was a freshman member of the football 
team as well and was Morrison’s roommate.   Brzonkala alleged that Morrison held her down 
and raped her, Crawford then did so, and, afterward, Morrison raped her a second time.  She also 
claimed that Morrison verbally abused her, saying, “You better not have any . . . diseases.”113  
Additionally, Brzonkala claimed that she told Morrison “no” twice during the incident.  While 
Morrison admitted that he had intercourse with Brzonkala, he claimed the sex was consensual; 
however, Crawford denied having any sexual contact with Brzonkala that night.114   
Brzonkala did not report the incident for four months, she said, because she was 
embarrassed, afraid, and ashamed.  In January 1995, she told a friend about the alleged attack; in 
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March she received counseling at Virginia Tech’s Women’s Center.115 Brzonkala left Tech that 
spring to live with her parents and did not return to Virginia Tech in fall 1995 because she did 
not want to risk seeing the two men again on campus.  She said she did not file criminal charges 
because there was no physical evidence to support her accusation and she did not want to face 
her attackers.  She did, however, file charges through the University Judicial System and on May 
3, 1995 Morrison was suspended for two semesters by a university disciplinary panel that found 
him guilty of “sexual misconduct.”  However, the charges against Crawford were dismissed due 
to a lack of sufficient findings of guilt.  Morrison appealed the university disciplinary panel’s 
ruling, claiming that the suspension violated his due process rights and that “the sanction was 
unduly harsh and arbitrary.”116 Morrison hired a lawyer, David Paxton of Roanoke, who 
discovered that the university’s sexual misconduct policy had not been published in the school’s 
student handbook at the time of the alleged incident.  As a result, Morrison was given a second 
hearing, and charged with “sexual assault,” a more serious charge that was included in the 
student handbook current in September 1994.  Both Morrison and Brzonkala had legal 
representation at the second hearing and the panel ruled on July 21, 1995, that it was “unable to 
come to a conclusion of sexual assault;” instead, it determined that “Morrison’s actions 
represented only abusive conduct, because of language used toward Brzonkala,” reported the 
Roanoke Times.117  His sentence remained the same, suspension for the next two semesters.  On 
August 21, 1995, after a review of the case by Virginia Tech Provost Peggy Meszaros, 
Morrison’s punishment was reduced to probation and a one-hour counseling session.  The 
provost, “the first woman to hold the job at the once all-male military college,” had determined 
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that the suspension was “excessive when compared with other cases” of abusive conduct.118  
Although the case to this point had been held in secret, as was usual for the university’s 
disciplinary panel proceedings, Brzonkala decided to break her pledge of confidentiality because 
Virginia Tech refused her demand for it to pay for her to attend another university.  The Virginia 
Post reported her frustration, “I feel kind of helpless, except for going public…The worst part is, 
I can’t go to college where I choose.  He was found guilty and he’s going to college on a 
scholarship.”119  
On December 27, 1995, Brzonkala filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia in Roanoke seeking $8.3 million in damages against Virginia Tech, Morrison, and 
Crawford.  Tech’s football team had recently been awarded $8.3 million for accepting an 
invitation to play in the New Year’s Eve Sugar Bowl game against Texas (which Tech would 
win, 28-10).120  Although other women had filed criminal charges based on the federal statute, 
Brzonkala would be the first to file a civil action under § 13981 of the VAWA.121  Brzonkala’s 
attorney saw the case as a test for the civil rights remedy section included in the VAWA that had 
been passed fifteen months before.122 The United States intervened shortly thereafter to defend 
the constitutionality of § 13981123 
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Brzonkala began her action with a single attorney, but as the case achieved notoriety, other 
attorneys joined it. Brzonkala’s first attorney, Eileen Wagner, was a Richmond higher education 
law specialist.  Wagner had a strong history of defending students and professors against college 
administrations.  She sued The College of William and Mary and Virginia Commonwealth 
University on behalf of women students who said they were sexually harassed by their 
professors.  She also filed a friend of the court brief in 1993 arguing that the Virginia Military 
Institute should either accept women or become a private institution.  Claiming that she was a 
victim of sexual assault herself, she believed that the only way that victims of alleged harassment 
or assault could get a fair hearing in the male-dominated court system was by presenting their 
cases in the court of public opinion.124 By March 1996, Julie Goldscheid of the National 
Organization of Women Legal Defense Fund had joined Eileen Wagner on Brzonkala’s legal 
team.125  Brzonkala increased her lawsuit to $10 million and added All-American defensive end 
Cornell Brown to the suit because, according to Brzonkala, he watched the assault and failed to 
intervene.126  Virginia Tech was part of the lawsuit as well because Brzonkala charged that the 
school “sexually discriminated against her by giving favorable treatment to Morrison in 
university judicial proceedings because he was a valuable member of the football team.”127   
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Meanwhile, Michael Rosman of the Center for Individual Rights joined Morrison’s attorney 
David Paxton in Morrison’s defense.   The Center for Individual Rights had taken on high-profile 
college cases in the past as well.  They were successful in a fight against the University of 
Virginia where a student argued that the School had to fund his Christian magazine the same as it 
did other campus activities.  It also achieved a victory in court against the University of Texas 
affirmative action policy on behalf of white applicants.128  Rosman and Paxton made clear that 
they would defend their client by showing that the VAWA was itself an unconstitutional use of 
congressional power.129   
As the civil lawsuit proceeded, the state of Virginia conducted an inquiry into criminal 
aspects of the case as well; however, the state police investigated the case for two months but 
were unable to reach a conclusion about Morrison and Crawford’s guilt or innocence.  On April 
10, 1996, a grand jury in Montgomery County, Virginia found that there was insufficient 
evidence to indict either of the men, thus closing the criminal aspect of the case.130  On April 
27th, however, Brzonkala achieved some level of success as the Justice Department filed court 
documents in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia to defend the 
constitutionality of the law.  Their efforts were thwarted somewhat on May 7, when U.S. District 
Court Chief Judge Jackson Kiser dismissed Virginia Tech from the lawsuit, ruling that Brzonkala 
had not shown that the school’s actions were based on sexual discrimination.  The Virginian-
Pilot quoted from Kiser’s ruling, “In the final analysis, Brzonkala has alleged a flawed judiciary 
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proceeding, the outcome of which disappointed her, but she has failed to allege facts that would 
support the necessary gender bias to state a claim.”131  Chief Judge Kiser determined that 
Virginia Tech’s preferential treatment of the football players was not based upon Brzonkala’s 
sex, but upon the player’s status as athletes.  The following month, Brzonkala’s attorney, Eileen 
Wagner, filed a motion to dismiss Cornell Brown from the lawsuit after a witness made it clear 
that Brown could not have been present during the alleged attack.132  On June 10th, Kiser heard 
the case between the two remaining defendants and Brzonkala.   
While Chief Judge Kiser considered the arguments of both sides, the VAWA was undergoing 
scrutiny in a separate federal distinct court as well.  Judge Janet Bond Atherton, in New Haven, 
Connecticut, presented a verdict on June 19th upholding the statute in a case where a wife was 
suing her husband for repeatedly threatening to kill her, beating her, throwing objects at her, and 
forcing her, as the New York Times reported, “to be a ‘slave’ and perform all manual labor.”133  
The judge ruled that the four-year legislative history of the law showed that Congress was within 
its authority to create the VAWA.  She wrote, “A rational basis exists for concluding that gender-
based violence is a national problem with substantial impact on interstate commerce.”134  She 
further stated that because existing state and federal laws were inadequate to protect against 
gender-motivated violence, then it was appropriate for Congress to legislate in the area.135  
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Although the outcome of the case was encouraging for Brzonkala, she and her lawyers opted to 
file backup civil cases against Virginia Tech and Morrison, Crawford, and Brown in state court.  
The Roanoke Times reported, “Wagner said she has no plans at this point to serve notice on the 
defendants, which formally notifies them that they are being sued and requires them to respond.  
But the state suits can be served if the pending federal suit is dismissed.”136 
Wagner’s backup plan was prudent; on July 26, 1996, Chief Judge Kiser ruled counter to his 
northern counterpart and dismissed the suit against Morrison and Crawford after determining that 
the VAWA was not sustainable under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.137  
In his forty-one-page ruling Kiser ruled that gender-based violence against women was beyond 
the commerce power of Congress and that, because the Fourteenth Amendment concerned only 
state action, not the individual acts of private persons, the law was not sustainable under that 
amendment. As far as the Commerce Clause issue was concerned, the district court duly recited 
the clarified substantial relations test set out in Lopez. Similarly to the Gun Free School Zones 
Act, wrote Chief Judge Kiser, § 13981 of the VAWA sought to suppress “intrastate activity 
which is not commercial or even economic in nature.” § 13981 was, furthermore, part of a 
criminal statute, but the text of the measure did not include a jurisdictional element explicitly 
tying gender-based violence to interstate commerce under an “in commerce or affecting 
commerce” rationale.138 “Without a doubt violence against women is a pervasive and 
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troublesome aspect of American life which needs thoughtful attention.  But Congress is not 
invested with the authority to cure all the ills of mankind,” the judge wrote.139 
As was the case after the Lopez judgment, Congress was less than enthusiastic about Chief 
Judge Kiser’s ruling.  “This [judge] is the same guy who ruled [Virginia Military Institute] could 
keep women out,” Senator Biden said, referring to the 1991 trial in which Kiser ruled in favor of 
VMI’s all male admission policy.140  Senator Hatch stated that while he was not a great 
proponent of the civil rights provision of the statute, he believed that is was constitutional and 
would like to “keep it alive.”141  Eileen Wagner was trying to keep the statute alive as well.  On 
September 12, 1996, she filed an appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond.142  
Within a week, the Justice Department also appealed the ruling.143  
While Morrison’s litigation difficulties made his future unclear, his fortunes in college 
athletics seemed to vacillate.  On the football field he was doing quite well.  As a sophomore he 
played several games and he started six games as a linebacker in his junior year.  However, he 
continued to have run-ins with the police that kept him off the field.  In April 1995, he was 
convicted of reckless driving and the following December he was charged with public 
intoxication, petty larceny, and destruction of property after a disturbance at a local bar.  Because 
of the bar incident, he was removed from the roster for Virginia Tech’s appearance at the Sugar 
Bowl.   Later, in relation to the December incident, he was found guilty on a fake driver’s license 
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charge, but the other charges were dismissed once he paid court costs.  During his junior year, he 
was sidelined for five games because of injuries and because of a suspension for an undisclosed 
disciplinary problem.  Following his junior year season, Virginia Tech’s coach, Frank Beamer, 
decided to drop Morrison from the football team.  In a statement released to the press on March 
24, 1997, Beamer wrote, “This decision was made after a meeting between Tony and me.  The 
meeting was private and personal and I will have no further comment on it, or the decision which 
has been made.  All of us connected with Virginia Tech football wish Tony Morrison well in his 
future endeavors.”144  Morrison had no comments about the decision.  When asked about it, he 
responded, “I don’t want to comment on anything.  Whenever I do say something, you only put 
in the article what you want anyway.”145  Morrison’s high school coach, Bob Parker, did add 
some insight saying, “From everything I kept hearing, the coaches were behind him, the student 
body wasn’t.”146  Indeed, the Virginia Tech coaching staff searched for colleges where Morrison 
could finish his senior year, believing that the Virginia Tech campus atmosphere was too volatile 
for him.  “They thought highly of him, and thought he deserved a second chance,” said Hampton 
University coach Joe Taylor.  Morrison joined Hampton University, an NCAA Division I-AA 
school, near his hometown of Chesapeake, Virginia, in fall 1997.   
At the end of the fall football season in 1997, Morrison had a lawsuit served that he had filed 
in Richmond Circuit Court in November 1996.  He was suing Virginia Tech’s Collegiate Times 
newspaper seeking $10.3 million in damages for articles and opinion pieces that the paper began 
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publishing in fall 1995.  Morrison claimed the paper, and its then-editor, Terry Paladino, carried 
out a “vendetta” against him and “recklessly published details about his confidential campus 
judicial hearings and portrayed him as guilty of criminal assault.”147 Although the lawsuit caused 
a stir, Morrison would eventually abandon the suit in May 1998, as the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered Brzonkala’s case against him.148 
On June 4, 1997, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Brzonkala v. Morrison.  The 
Fourth Circuit panel that heard the case was composed of three federal judges; Diana Gribbon 
Motz, Kenneth Keller (K.K.) Hall, and Michael Luttig.  Judge Motz came to the Fourth Circuit 
as a nominee of Bill Clinton in 1994 having achieved notoriety as Assistant State Attorney 
General in Maryland for her role in recovering thousands of dollars in bribes received by Spiro 
Agnew when he was the Governor of the state.149 Judge Hall was a World War II veteran of the 
Navy and former mayor of Madison, West Virginia.  Although he was a Democrat, Richard 
Nixon appointed him to be a U.S. district judge in 1971 and Gerald Ford nominated him for the 
Fourth Circuit in 1976.  He had ruled on several controversial cases including one in which he 
overturned long-standing West Virginia abortion statutes and another in 1976 in which he 
granted injunctions against a wildcat coal strike.150  The third judge, J. Micheal Luttig, had a 
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rather close association with the Supreme Court as he had served in the Office of the 
Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice from 1976 to 1978, as a law clerk for then D. C. 
court of appeals judge Antonin Scalia in 1982 and 1983, and clerked for Chief Justice Warren 
Burger from 1983 to 1984.  In various capacities as special assistant to the White House Counsel, 
assistant attorney general of the United States and counselor to the attorney general at the 
Department of Justice, Luttig helped prepare future justices Sandra Day O’Connor, David 
Souter, and Clarence Thomas for their Senate confirmation hearings.  George H. W. Bush 
appointed Luttig to the Fourth Circuit in 1991.151 
On December 23, 1997, the three-judge panel issued its decision that § 13981 of the VAWA 
authorizing the civil remedy was a constitutional use of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause.  In a 2-1 majority opinion written by Judge Motz and affirmed by Judge Hall, 
the court stated, “After four years of hearings and consideration of voluminous testimonial, 
statistical, and documentary evidence, Congress made an unequivocal and persuasive finding 
that violence against women substantially affects interstate commerce.”152  The majority ruled 
that in order to satisfy the substantial effects test, the court only needed to see that a rational 
basis existed for Congress’ actions in order for the statute to be deemed constitutional.  In Motz’s 
view, Congress’ findings satisfied the economic link that was missing in Lopez.153   
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Judge Luttig, in his dissent, blasted the majority for its lack of deference to the Supreme 
Court’s new view of the Commerce Clause as illustrated in Lopez and its clarification of the 
substantial effects test – which demonstrated that the rulings of the Supreme Court going back to 
the New Deal had held that the commerce power could only reach intrastate activity that was 
commercial or, at least, economic activity. Intrastate non-economic activity was beyond the 
bounds of the commerce power, even if such non-economic activity did, in fact, have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Luttig argued that the majority was proceeding as if 
the decision in Lopez had never occurred. “Indeed, as the majority tacitly acknowledges, with 
understandable reluctance, it views Lopez, the most significant Commerce Clause decision in 
more than half a century, as an aberration, a case limited in its reach to section 922(q), of Title 
18, of the United States Code” [the Gun-free Schools Zone Act].154  Luttig hoped that the full 
Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court would reverse the majority’s opinion, as he saw “the 
Commerce Clause challenge to the instant statute pristinely present[ing] the Court with the 
logical next case in its considered revisitation of the Commerce Clause.”  Indeed, Luttig’s hopes 
came to fruition as the full Fourth Circuit eventually reviewed the case on March 3, 1998 at the 
request of the Virginia Attorney General’s office.155   
On March 5, 1999, a 7-4 majority of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
ruled that § 13981 of the VAWA “simply cannot be reconciled with the principles of limited 
federal government upon which this nation is founded.”156  Writing the majority opinion was 
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Judge J. Michael Luttig, joined by Chief Judge Harvey Wilkinson and judges Hiram E. Widener, 
William Wilkes, Paul V. Niemeyer, Clyde H. Hamilton, and Karen J. Williams. That the position 
of the majority was grounded in a determination to redeem state sovereignty from unwarranted 
federal encroachments was quite evident in the opening lines of the opinion: 
We the People, distrustful of power, and believing that government limited and dispersed 
protects freedom best, provided that our federal government would be one of enumerated 
powers, and that all power unenumerated would be reserved to the several States and to 
ourselves. Thus, though the authority conferred upon the federal government be broad, it 
is an authority constrained by no less a power than that of the People themselves.  
 
The majority amplified its point with a quote from the opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall in 
Marbury v. Madison: “[T]hat these limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is 
written.”  According to the Court “[t]hese simple truths of power bestowed and power withheld 
under the Constitution have never been more relevant than in this day, when accretion, if not 
actual accession, of power to the federal government seems not only unavoidable, but even 
expedient.157 
 Once again, Judge Luttig belabored the fact that, under Lopez, the clarified substantial 
effects rationale could only extend commerce power to intrastate activity that was commercial 
activity, or, at a minimum, economic activity – and that gender-motivated violence was, 
therefore, outside the scope of the commerce power. As in his December 1997 dissent, he 
pointed out that, in Lopez, the Supreme Court “emphasized that, any dictum in its previous cases 
notwithstanding . . . it had never extended the substantial affects test to uphold the regulation of a 
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noneconomic activity.”158 Obviously somewhat exasperated that appellants and the dissenting 
judges were either unable or unwilling to consider the prime holding in Lopez, Judge Luttig 
reiterated that “[t]he [Lopez] Court repeatedly pointed to a distinction between the regulation of, 
on the one hand, those activities that are commercial or economic in nature—or arise out of or 
are connected with a commercial transaction—and, on the other hand, those activities that are 
not.”159 As far as the VAWA was concerned, Judge Luttig was unequivocal, if not blunt:  
Appellants do not contend that section 13981 regulates economic activity. Nor could 
they. The statute does not regulate the manufacture, transport, or sale of goods, the 
provision of services, or any other sort of commercial transaction. Rather, it regulates 
violent crime motivated by gender animus. Not only is such conduct clearly not 
commercial, it is not even economic in any meaningful sense.160 
 
 
Having also determined that § 13981, as a criminal statute, contained no jurisdictional element 
tying the measure to interstate commerce, the Court declared that “the Congress having exceeded 
its constitutional authority . . . the district court dismissing plaintiff-appellant Brzonkala’s claims 
. . . . is affirmed.”161 
The majority opinion closed with language no less solemn than its opening. Judge Luttig 
observed that, given the serious purpose of the Violence Against Women Act and the highly-
provocative label, or title, appended to it, judges no less than politicians could only be tempted to 
affirm § 13981, simply, to right a crying injustice or avoid the appearance of not having 
sympathy for its victims. But his larger point was that the current political environment had 
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placed intense partisan pressures on both lawmakers and judges to do so by abandoning the 
Constitution and the rule of law: 
We live in a time when the lines between law and politics have been purposefully blurred 
to serve the ends of the latter. And, when we, as courts, have not participated in this most 
perniciously Machiavellian of enterprises ourselves, we have acquiesced in it by others, 
allowing opinions of law to be dismissed as but pronouncements of personal agreement 
or disagreement. The judicial decision making contemplated by the Constitution, 
however, unlike at least the politics of the moment, emphatically is not a function of 
labels . . . . And if it ever becomes such, we will have ceased to be a society of law, and 
all the codification of freedom in the world will be to little avail.162  
 
The ruling, thus, went against Christy Brzonkala in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic 
Inst. & State University – and against the government in the case with which it was joined, 
United States v. Morrison.163 Attorney Julie Goldscheid of the National Organization of Women 
Legal Defense and Education Fund and other lawyers, on behalf of Brzonkala, as well as 
Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman and other attorneys for the Clinton administration 
immediately petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.  Six months after the Fourth 
circuit issued its ruling, on September 28, 1999, the Court issued its writ. The case had made its 
way to the Supreme Court.164 
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The oral argument in the Supreme Court took place on January 11, 2000.  Julie Goldscheid 
argued first to sustain the law.  Her first argument was that after four-years of legislative fact-
finding, Congress concluded that “gender-based violence and the fear of that discriminatory 
violence deters women’s travel interstate, restricts women’s choice of jobs and ability to perform 
those jobs, reduces national productivity, and increases medical and other costs.”165  Justice 
Scalia immediately interrupted her argument by asking whether all the cases that Congress used 
in its findings were based solely on instances in which the aggressor was acting purely upon his 
animus towards women generally, or did the findings include all cases of violence against 
women?  Goldscheid conceded that such a differentiation was not made but that clearly within 
the findings some instances were discriminatory.  Based upon the Commerce Clause justification 
of § 13981 of the VAWA and Goldscheid’s assertion that sexual violence substantially affects 
commerce, Justice Scalia then wondered, if the Court found § 13981 of the VAWA 
constitutional, what would prevent Congress from enacting a federal murder law or a federal 
robbery law?  Goldscheid countered that it has historically been a federal responsibility to 
address concerns of discrimination, thus Congress was justified in creating the statute in 
question.  Justice Ginsburg then posited that were that the case, cases of marital distribution, 
where courts often favored men over women, could also become a federal concern.  Following 
Julie Goldscheid, Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman then responded that Congress had not made 
findings about such matters but it had made findings about violence against women, thus making 
the statute sustainable. The Court members then pressed Waxman on why, based upon purely 
Commerce Clause grounds, could the federal government not enact a federal murder statute, 
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considering the economic impact of murder on the country’s economy.  Although Waxman tried 
to offer a theory that the civil provisions set out § 13981 of the VAWA set the law apart from a 
localized violent crime as another avenue for victims to use against their aggressors, the 
members of the Court seemed unconvinced. Waxman argued that Congress made the criminal 
portion of § 13981 of the VAWA wholly separate from the civil portion; crimes had to occur 
across state lines to fall under the act, while discrimination touched upon the protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Chief Justice was skeptical that it would be more beneficial for a 
plaintiff to sue in federal court if the jurors, with the same prejudices, were drawn from the same 
pool of potential jurors as were drawn by the states.  At best, Waxman could offer the federal 
remedy as an “alternative forum”166 for a victim to turn to.  As Waxman concluded his 
arguments, several of the justices seemed to have remained convinced that, if the VAWA civil 
remedy were upheld, there would be nothing to prevent Congress from passing a similarly 
grounded murder statute, a crime traditionally and historically under the authority of the States.   
Michael E. Rosman then presented his arguments; first, that “this Court has not yet held that 
Congress can regulate any violent crime non-economic in scope and without any jurisdictional 
element tying it to interstate commerce in the specific instance,” and second, that “[w]ith respect 
to section five [of the Fourteenth Amendment], this Court has not yet held that Congress can 
remedy violations of the Section 1 prohibition against State denials of equal protection by 
regulating purely private behavior that could not possibly violate Section 1.”167  Regarding the 
Commerce Clause justification of the statute, the main point of contention was between Rosman 
and Justice Stevens, who wanted to know from Rosman whether the congressional findings were 
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trustworthy or even relevant to the case.  Rosman argued that the findings were too broad and not 
limited to just gender-based and animus-motivated conduct, but included simply gender-based 
conduct as well, thus inflating the economic impact on the economy.  Additionally, argued 
Rosman, the Lopez ruling set a precedent that non-economic activity would no longer fall under 
Congressional commerce power.  Justice Souter appeared unconvinced considering Congress 
had found a $3 billion effect on the economy during its legislative history.  Indeed, when pressed 
by Justice Souter about the constitutionality of a national law against growing marijuana for 
personal use, Rosman argued that such a statute could be differentiated from the one sustained in 
Wickard v. Filburn because marijuana is not a legally tradable product.  In a preview of the 
ruling in Gonzales v. Raich, Justice Stevens offered his agreement with Rosman on the point. 
Rosman was also asked about his argument against sustaining the Violence Against Women 
Act under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Kennedy asked Rosman to imagine a scenario in 
which it is found that if black people are assaulted within the states, prosecutors did not treat the 
crime with the same seriousness as they did in cases in which white people were assaulted.  
“Could Congress pass a two part statute, severable: one, making it a federal crime to assault a 
black person on . . . on account of his race; two, giving a civil remedy to a black person who was 
assaulted so that the black person could sue the white person . . . [u]nder its Fourteenth 
Amendment powers[?]168  Rosman argued that such a law would be unconstitutional because 
“the text of the statute says that Congress will enforce the prohibitions . . . I don’t believe that [a 
Federal remedy] would be enforcement litigation because it would be doing . . . legislation . . . . 
it would be doing nothing to the States to get them to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.  
It would be as if Congress decided that instead of having schools in the south [sic] to segregate in 
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the 1950’s, they would offer separate federal schools.  That would not be enforcement 
legislation.”  Rosman had the last word in the oral argument.169 
Court watchers got busy during the interval between oral argument and the 
announcement by the Supreme Court of its determination. University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law professor and recognized expert in administrative law and federal regulation Peter M. Shane 
weighed in on the decision of the Fourth Circuit in late April 2000. In the opening lines of an 
article he published in the Villanova Law Review, Shane highlighted the concurrence in 
Brzonkala authored by Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Harvie Wilkinson. Shane quoted 
language from the concurrence to show that, while the chief judge had joined Judge Luttig in the 
majority opinion, he had also made it clear that the ruling of the Fourth Circuit, and its 
dependence on Lopez, marked “[t]his century’s third and final era of judicial activism . . . an 
interest in reviving the structural guarantees of dual sovereignty. . . states as entities having 
residual sovereign rights.” According to Shane, the decision of the Fourth Circuit marked 
nothing less than an ill-conceived, rogue judicial movement intended to undermine the beneficial 
regulatory authority of Congress.170 And while Chief Judge Wilkinson had allowed that 
conservative judicial activism might be constructive, Shane hastened to set the record straight:  
Chief Judge Wilkinson is unjustified. . . in his optimism for the current conservative 
project of devising new doctrinal tools for cutting back Congress’ commercial regulatory 
powers in order to protect the states’ sovereign rights. These doctrinal tools, I believe, are 
overwhelmingly likely to prove unworkable . . . . And, because they are likely to be 
employed by judges less willing than Chief Judge Wilkinson to acknowledge their 
activist role forthrightly, these doctrinal maneuvers will often be dressed up in 
discussions of history or precedent that will be wrongheaded and misleading.171  
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In mid-February 2000, former legal aid worker, ACLU lawyer, and third-wave feminist 
Wendy Kaminer conveyed her views on the pending case in an editorial she published in The 
American Prospect. Feminists, she emphasized, had long considered rape to be a hate crime and 
a “particularly vicious form of bigotry” and a tool of “social control.” Kaminer acknowledged 
that there was widespread feminist support for the VAWA. She dismissed out of hand 
conservative attacks that had associated the legislation with misguided and over-zealous 
“victimism.” Much was at stake in the upcoming decision of the Supreme Court, she insisted. 
Certainly, the Court would be called on to uphold, or not, a new civil right for the benefit of 
women threatened with or injured by gender-motivated violence. On the other hand, she 
declared, “this is not simply a case about civil rights. It is a case about federal power, which can 
be used to extend or restrict the rights of individual citizens.” On balance, she surmised, a 
commerce clause power turned into a judicially-enshrined, federal authority to make law on all 
subjects might not be so good for women or anyone else. In her view, the decision involved 
nothing less than a test of the limits of congressional police power:  
If Congress can regulate handgun possession under the Commerce Clause because of its 
potential, indirect impact on the economy, then what can’t Congress regulate? Does this 
seem like legalese? Try the common sense test: When you think of a rape in a college 
dormitory, do you think about interstate commerce? . . . . Sexual violence does have a 
general connection to the economy. It affects women’s employment decisions, spending 
habits, and mobility as well as the nation’s health care expenses, as supporters of VAWA 
assert. But virtually all crimes and most conduct, within and outside the home, can be 
said to have economic impact. So what? Do you want Congress to enjoy unrestricted 
regulatory power over you?172 
 
                                                 
172 Wendy Kaminer, “Sexual Congress,” The American Prospect, February 14, 2000. 
427 
 
The Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Morrison on May 15, 2000. The 
case was decided by a 5-4 majority with the opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist; Justice 
Thomas again filed a concurring opinion while Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion shared 
by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion that 
was joined by Justice Stevens in whole and in part by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.   
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his opinion by emphasizing that “[e]ven under our 
modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory authority is not 
without effective bounds.173 Unlimited commerce power, he said, would spell the end of the 
federal constitutional order. And to make the point, he invoked none other than the seminal New 
Deal decision both liberal and conservative jurists understood well to mark the beginning of the 
“modern” era to which he referred: 
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the interstate commerce 
power “must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be 
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to 
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.”174 
 
Reciting the “three broad categories of activity” identified in Lopez that Congress was 
authorized to make law under the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that 
petitioners all agreed that the “substantial effects test” was to be the framework of assessment for 
the case at hand.175 He noted that the Court had upheld a “wide variety” of congressional 
enactments under this rationale. Quoting from Lopez, however, he reiterated that “Where 
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity 
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will be sustained.”176 And he took exception to the effort of the petitioners, as well as Justice 
David Souter in his dissent, “to downplay the role that the economic nature of the regulated 
activity plays in our Commerce Clause analysis.” Even in Wickard, which was “perhaps the most 
far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,” the activity 
involved had been “economic activity.”177 Chief Justice Rehnquist could not have been more 
deliberate and unequivocal: 
Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where we 
have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s 
substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of 
economic endeavor.178 
 
 
Similarly to the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez, said Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the difficulty with the civil cause of action set out in § 13981 derived from the novel 
criminal offense on which it was based. As a criminal statute, § 13981 of the VAWA included 
“no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.” Nothing in the statute, in other words, 
explicitly described the relationship of the offense of gender-motivated violence with interstate 
commerce. With this omission, Congress had “elected to cast § 13981’s remedy over a wider, 
and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime.”179 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
quoting from Lopez, “‘simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.’ Rather ‘whether 
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particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional 
power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and 
can be settled finally only by this Court.’” Equally important, if not more so, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted that Congress’s findings were substantially weakened because they relied so 
heavily on an unworkable method – that is, by reasoning that gender-motivated violence deterred 
interstate travel and employment in interstate business, which diminished national productivity; 
increased medical costs; and reduced the supply of and the demand for interstate products.180 As 
in Lopez, such an argument would allow Congress  to “use the Commerce Clause to completely 
obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority.” The ill 
consequences of accepting such a rationale were all too obvious: 
If accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as 
the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, 
production, transit, or consumption. Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender motivated 
violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence since gender-
motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic 
impacts than the larger class of which it is a part . . . . Petitioners’ reasoning, moreover, 
will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be 
applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since 
the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is 
undoubtedly significant.181  
Before closing this segment of his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist took the opportunity 
to emphasize, once again, that the prime difficulty with § 13981 of the VAWA was that the 
activity to be penalized, that is gender-motivated violence, was not economic activity for the 
purposes of Commerce Clause adjudication under the substantial effects test:  
                                                 
180 Ibid., 615, referencing H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385. 
181 Ibid., 615-616. 
430 
 
With these principles underlying our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as reference points, 
the proper resolution of the present cases is clear. Gender-motivated crimes of violence 
are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. While we need not adopt a 
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to 
decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce 
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.182 
 
To discount the arguments made by petitioners and the government based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied upon the precedents set in United States v. Harris 
and the Civil Rights Cases, both settled in 1883.183 In both cases, the Court determined that the 
authority provided by Congress by § 5 of  Fourteenth Amendment could only be employed to 
make enactments that restrained the action of state officials – not regulate or impose sanctions 
upon private individuals; thus, the civil remedy provided victims of gender-motivated violence 
by § 13981 of the VAWA was outside of Congress’ remedial power under § 5. The chief justice 
pointed out that the principles for assessing congressional legislation under that section were 
well settled. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment stated that Congress may “‘enforce’ by 
‘appropriate legislation’ the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of 
‘life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’ nor deny any person ‘equal protection of 
the laws.’”184 Alluding to the ordeal suffered by Christy Brzonkala, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
declared that, “If the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide 
her a remedy for the conduct of respondent Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy 
must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States.”185  
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Justice Thomas joined the Rehnquist opinion in full, but added his own thoughts. As he had 
done in the Lopez ruling, he posited once again that the “substantial effects” test was inconsistent 
with the original understanding of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause.  Instead, he 
urged the Court to take up a standard more reflective of an originalist view. “By continuing to 
apply this rootless and malleable standard, however circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the 
Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.” In 
the view of Justice Thomas, the holdings of the Court in Lopez and Morrison, clarifying the 
reach of the commerce power under the substantial effects test to economic activity was not 
enough: 
Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard 
more consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress 
appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.186 
 
In response to the opinion of the chief justice, Justice Souter provided a dissent joined by 
justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Souter opted not to address the holding of the Court that 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided no basis for § 13981 of the VAWA, declaring that 
the Commerce Clause alone sustained the provision.  He opened his dissent with a reminder that 
Congress had a much larger capacity for gathering evidence and taking testimony than the Court; 
thus, the Court’s duty was to review the congressional assessment, “not for soundness but simply 
for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in fact.”187 He went on to 
enumerate, according to congressional research, several of the most significant impacts on the 
national economy attributable to domestic violence and rape.  Those figures included an 
aggregate cost annually of $3 billion in 1990 and a considerably less exact figure of $5 to $10 
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billion in 1993.188  Justice Souter sought to counter the majority’s argument that “the listing in 
the Constitution of some powers implies the exclusion of others unmentioned,” such as states’ 
traditional police powers. Instead, he maintained that, given that Congress was provided the 
power to regulate commerce and that federal authority was supreme, “it follows only that 
Congress may claim no authority under that section to address any subject that does not affect 
commerce.”189 He went on to argue, however, that, under the holdings of the Court in Wickard 
and Darby, the substantial effects test placed no categorical limits on the power of Congress, 
which should be allowed to respond to the urgent national problem posed by gender-based 
violence against women.  
In the view of Justice Souter, the Framers believed that politics would determine the balance 
of power between the states and the federal government since the several states would be 
represented in Congress by sending Senators to represent their interests. Passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, allowing for the popular election of U.S. Senators, certainly tipped the 
balance away from the states. But, he suggested somewhat facetiously, this change did not 
require the Supreme Court to overturn congressional enactments made by Congress based on the 
Commerce Clause: “The Seventeenth Amendment may indeed have lessened the enthusiasm of 
the Senate to represent the States as discrete sovereignties, but the Amendment did not convert 
the judiciary into an alternate shield against the commerce power.”190 Convincing Justice Souter 
that § 13981 of the VAWA should stand was the preponderance of political will in favor of the 
measure, the fact that thirty-six states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had filed amicus 
briefs in support of it, and that a majority of the Supreme Court had yet to overturn any major 
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Commerce Clause precedent since 1937. In his view, the clarified, or revamped, substantial 
effects test articulated in Lopez and Morrison constituted a wrong-headed attempt to institute 
judicially new lines of demarcation between federal and state power – an approach that would 
prove unworkable and short-lived.191 
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Souter on every point made by the latter but added his own 
views.  According to him, “Congress, not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for 
striking the appropriate state/federal balance.” Justice Breyer, however, seems to have had more 
faith than Justice Souter that congressional members would, under the Commerce Clause 
doctrines articulated by the majority, continue to represent state and local concerns, noting that 
“the bulk of American law is still state law, and overwhelmingly so.”192 As well, it was apparent 
to Justice Breyer that, in the case at hand, states had been properly represented through their 
attorneys general and that, consequently, federalism was working.  He, too, declined to take a 
position on arguments made that § 13981 of the VAWA was sustainable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. But he noted that, even if the statute did not operate to impose restraints on state 
officials for failure to provide women equal protection under their criminal laws, the VAWA 
may lead state actors to improve their own remedial systems, primarily through example.”193 
The majority’s ruling was not a complete surprise to Christy Brzonkala. The Roanoke Times 
reported that she and her attorney, Eileen Wagner, had expected to lose the case since the oral 
arguments the previous January.  Brzonkala had received $75,000 for an out-of-court settlement 
with Virginia Tech earlier in the year over the school’s handling of her allegations. After 
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withdrawing from Virginia Tech following her freshman year, she transferred to George Mason 
University, which was near her home, but didn’t enjoy school, struggled with substance abuse, 
and eventually withdrew from the university.  By the time the Supreme Court decided her case, 
she had found work as a waitress and assistant manager in a live music blues bar in downtown 
Washington, D.C. She had no plans to press the case against Morrison or Crawford further in 
state court. However, even though she had lost in the Supreme Court, she planned to continue 
fighting for women’s rights by joining her lawyer “in lobbying Congress for more effective 
legislation to combat gender-based violence.”194  
Antonio Morrison had spent only one semester at Hampton University and returned to 
Virginia Tech to finish a degree in human nutrition, foods, and exercise.  His dreams of 
becoming a professional football player had long since been dashed, and he had come to believe 
his degree was of little value as he looked unsuccessfully for work as an athletic trainer.  In the 
wake of the decision, Morrison’s lawyer stated, “How’s he going to get hired by a college once 
people realize he’s the guy all the stuff has been written about?  His good name has been 
completely trashed.”195   
The Washington Post didn’t take long to begin publishing pieces highly critical of the 
decision in Morrison. The day after it was rendered, an anonymous editorial in the paper 
discussed how the majority opinion had recognized that the Violence Against Women Act was 
aimed at a “terrible problem” – but that state courts, not federal ones, were the proper venues for 
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dealing with it. According to the editorial, “[t]he case was about the balance of congressional and 
state power under the Constitution.”196 On May 19, 2000, quite similarly, correspondent Brooke 
Masters, who covered the criminal justice beat for the newspaper, concluded that the decision in 
Morrison had turned on considerations of federalism “not sexual politics.”197 But, in a longer 
essay appearing two days later, Peter M. Shane thoroughly condemned the decision. He 
emphasized that the attorneys general from thirty-six states had declared that § 13981 of the 
VAWA was “a particularly appropriate remedy for the harm caused by gender-motivated 
violence.” According to Shane, “[t]heir collective judgment exposes one of the more bizarre 
aspects of the Supreme Court’s recent activism on behalf of state sovereignty: From the states’ 
point of view, this campaign is often pointless and sometimes counterproductive.” Shane 
discounted entirely conservative argumentation emphasizing that, with passage of the VAWA 
civil remedy, Congress had overstepped its authority, concluding that “[t]he Constitution gives 
each branch of government a variety of exclusive and far-ranging powers that are plainly 
susceptible to abuse.” But, in his view, “[i]t’s the Supreme Court, not Congress, that has gone 
too far. If Congress needs to be curbed, that is a job better left to voters. As for the states, they’re 
doing just fine without the court’s help.”198 
Within a week of the decision in Morrison, advocates for women’s rights responded to it 
publicly. Some resorted to protests, including one quickly held at Georgia Tech and a more 
carefully organized event in Washington D.C.199 New York Times Supreme Court correspondent 
and Pulitzer Prize winner Linda Greenhouse observed that the decision in Morrison represented 
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“a convergence between the court’s focus on a Congress of limited powers and its newly found 
solicitude for state sovereignty . . . .” She emphasized that the ruling had suddenly brought to 
prominence a major judicial upheaval heretofore largely unnoticed: 
Beginning with the Lopez decision, which invalidated a law few people had ever heard 
of, most of the court’s federalism rulings have involved obscure statutes or obscure 
constitutional provisions like the 10th and 11th Amendments. As a result, a constitutional 
development of potentially enormous significance has been unfolding -- albeit in plain 
sight -- largely outside the realm of public discussion. 
 
In her estimation, it seemed likely that Americans would now awaken to the New Federalism 
orientation of the Supreme Court. “Not too many years ago,” she said, it would hardly have 
seemed likely that questions about federalism might dominate a Supreme Court confirmation 
hearing. Now that prospect seems likely when the next vacancy occurs.”200 Kathy Rodgers, one 
of Christy Brzonzkala’s attorneys from the National Organization of Women Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, expressed deep concern that the outcome of the case would have a “chilling 
effect” on Congress’ motivation to legislate for the improvement of women’s rights.201 
In an article appearing in the November 2000 edition of the Harvard Law Review, 
Catharine MacKinnon denounced Morrison for its “implicitly patriarchal” rationale. In her 
estimation, the decision was proof positive that the federal judiciary deemed “male issues” more 
important than domestic violence against women. She allowed that Morrison represented “a 
high-water mark of this Court’s specific notion of federalism.” But the inherent bias of the male 
state was all too obvious in the ruling:  
Morrison can be seen to employ ostensibly gender-neutral tools to achieve a substantive 
victory for the socially unequal institution of male dominance. Read substantively, 
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Morrison is not an abstract application of neutral institutional priorities but a concrete 
refusal to allow Congress to redress violence against women – a problem of substantive 
sex inequality that the Court declined to see as one of economic salience or national 
dimension.  
 
While emphasizing that the Court had revived against women the same states’ rights doctrine 
that had been employed to justify slavery and uphold Jim Crow, she completely denied the 
contention that state courts were fit to handle the problem of gender-motivated violence: 
“Morrison leaves women who are denied the effective equal protection of state criminal laws 
against battering and rape without adequate legal recourse.”202 As she would argue in her 2005 
book Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws, MacKinnon insisted that the prime factor at work in  
Morrison was not federalism, as the justices claimed, but the maintenance of male power.203 
In the next decade or so, periodic congressional reauthorization of the VAWA, sans § 
13981, remained a contentious proposition. A letter authored by Director of the ACLU Caroline 
Fredrickson encouraged the Senate Judiciary Committee to reauthorize the VAWA shortly 
before it was set to expire under its sunset clause on September 30, 2005. According to 
Frederickson,  
VAWA is one of the most effective pieces of legislation enacted to end domestic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking. It has dramatically improved the 
law enforcement response to violence against women and has provided critical services 
necessary to support women and children in their struggle to overcome abusive situations 
. . . . VAWA 2005 is a landmark piece of legislation that makes great inroads toward 
ending violence against women. We strongly urge you to support the Violence Against 
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Women Act of 2005. The lives of battered women and children depend on your support 
of this important legislation.204 
President George W. Bush and the Republican-controlled Congress renewed the VAWA in 
January 2006. But after it lapsed again in 2011, conservative activists went public with their 
opposition. Senior fellow at Concerned Women for America Janice Shaw Course, for example, 
characterized the VAWA as a “boondoggle” that generated an unfair stereotype of men as 
inherently violent and one of women as victims.205 At about the same time, Phyllis Schlafly, 
outspoken opponent of the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s and founder of Eagle Forum, 
similarly derided the VAWA as a mechanism for filling “feminist coffers” and a regime that 
undercut marriages and fomented undue hatred of men.206 
Culture wars political mobilization against gender-based violence produced the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994, while the highly-publicized action brought under the VAWA by 
Christy Brzonkala against Antonio Morrison and James Crawford fanned the flames of 
controversy over the statute in the ensuing six-year period. From the perspective of those who 
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strongly supported the civil remedy set out in § 13981 of the VAWA, federalization of judicial 
authority over domestic violence properly marked gender-based violence against women as a 
serious national problem. Such violence was, indeed, a widespread source of misery and a crying 
injustice that congressional leaders amply verified. On the other hand, the empathy, compassion, 
and moral certitude that spurred strong support of the VAWA civil remedy predisposed many 
such well-intended partisans to discount or ignore altogether the larger implications for limited 
government, federalism, and personal liberty of a judicially-authorized Commerce Clause-based 
police power that would know no bounds. The urgent felt need among activists for a fast and 
powerful solution to gender-based violence, essentially, drove such considerations beyond the 
constitutional horizon and out of view. The ruling of the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Morrison constituted a great setback for those who had expended much time and effort to supply 
federal courts with the remedial tools activists deemed necessary to suppress gender-based 
violence against women. Vigorous feminist critiques utterly condemned the decision in Morrison 
for being, simply, emblematic of a federal judiciary little concerned with improving women’s 
rights and insensitive to the plight of women targeted by gender-motivated violence.  
As had been the case in Lopez, the Supreme Court in Morrison was called upon to decide 
a question of great moment, indeed, one that went beyond solving the national problem of 
gender-motivated violence: Would the Court allow Congress to rely on the Commerce Clause to 
establish an unlimited federal police power. In Morrison, the Court upheld and reiterated the 
substantial effects rationale clarified in Lopez – but, this time, in a controversy that drew 
widespread public attention to this holding and its New Federalism foundations. The Court 
declared once again that none of its decisions had ever extended commerce power, under the 
substantial effects test, to non-economic intrastate activity.  Even when a given non-economic 
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intrastate activity, aggregated with all other instances of it, had a substantial impact on interstate 
commerce, such activity was beyond the commerce power. Congress could regulate intrastate 
activities that were commercial or, in and of themselves “economic in nature” – but not non-
economic intrastate activity, such as gender-motivated violence or gun possession in a school 
zone or myriad other non-economic intrastate activities exclusively within the purview of state 
civil and criminal law. Last, Morrison reaffirmed that part of the clarified substantial effects test 
set out in Lopez holding that, for the commerce power to justify a criminal statute, it was 
required to include a jurisdictional element tying the offense to interstate commerce under an “in 
commerce or affecting commerce” rationale, which would permit a court to make the required 
case-by-case determination if the offense at issue, indeed, fell within the commerce power.  
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Chapter Seven 
Medical Marijuana and  
Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 
 
If originalist court watchers had begun to see a paradigm shift in Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence in Lopez and Morrison, their hopeful expectations were confounded by the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich.1  Six of the nine justices decided that a 
California statute allowing the use, or consumption, of marijuana for medicinal purposes was 
unsustainable under the Commerce Clause-based federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).2 The 
case arose in August 2002 after a three-hour standoff between county officials and Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents. The DEA agents finally prevailed and destroyed the six 
marijuana plants owned by Diane Monson of Oroville, California. Monson used cannabis to treat 
the pain she suffered from a car accident. Seeking to confirm her right to use marijuana for 
medical purposes with a court order, Monson was joined by Angel Raich of Oakland. Raich used 
homegrown marijuana supplied to her by others to treat her many ailments, including cancer, 
because she was allergic to synthetic medications. Monson and Raich, joined by Raich’s 
suppliers, sued in federal district court for an injunction, arguing that the CSA, as applied to 
those using a locally produced product for state-sanctioned medicinal purposes, was a violation 
of the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, as well as the common law doctrine of medical necessity. The plaintiffs were 
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unsuccessful at the district court level; they found a favorable ruling in the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals but then ultimately lost their case in the Supreme Court. At the time of the ruling, eight 
states, in addition to California, had statutes allowing the medical consumption of cannabis, 
whether by smoking the leaves of the plant, inhaling vapors derived from its oil, or by ingesting 
it, which indicated rather clearly that the electorate of California was not unique in its desire to 
legalize and regulate the drug for specific uses in ways that conflicted with federal law.3  
As indicated, the case that raised the question of medical marijuana to the level of 
constitutional controversy engaged directly the strictures of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. 
That federal statute was the product of incremental changes in American law, dating from the 
nineteenth century, that permitted an absolute prohibition of beverage alcohol, a process that 
reconfigured constitutional understanding to facilitate the absolute proscription of other mind-
altering intoxicants. Novel federal government tax policies that effectively suppressed cannabis, 
as well, constituted signal precursors of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act – the first federal 
anti-illicit drug measure to be based on the Commerce Clause. The CSA marijuana ban, 
however, also resulted from a growing public concern after 1900 with a narcotic associated 
originally with African-American jazz musicians, the criminal underworld, and an insurgency of 
Mexican immigrants whose “locoweed” seemed to portend “reefer madness” among the youth of 
the nation. Setting the stage for the challenge to the CSA ban on cannabis that was at the center 
of Gonzales v. Raich were the counterculture insurgency of the 1960s, turbulent culture wars 
contention over the problem of rising drug abuse and addiction, and a campaign by marijuana 
advocates to legalize cannabis and free medical marijuana from federal and state controls, the 
latter of which produced the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996. While the decision of 
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the Supreme Court in Raich v. Gonzales upheld the CSA in its entirety, the decision met with the 
disapproval of conservatives who had anticipated that New Federalism principles would prevail 
to rein in further the commerce power – even as it produced partisan reactions across the political 
spectrum. But the prime holdings in Gonzales v. Raich, nonetheless, followed other key 
Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions – all of which held the line against the further 
expansion of commerce power that had begun during the New Deal-era – and fixed in place the 
Commerce Clause holdings set out in Lopez. 
Criminal penalties for the mere possession and private consumption of beverage alcohol 
would seem to be inconsistent with the natural law outlook of the Founders. But in the nineteenth 
century, with the rise of the temperance movement, a series of state and federal court decisions 
eroded long established assumptions about property rights.4 The process began with the License 
Cases of 1847, in which Chief Justice Roger B. Taney stated that there was nothing in the United 
States Constitution that could prevent a state from attempting to promote the safety of its citizens 
by regulating or prohibiting the production or trafficking of alcoholic beverages within its 
borders.5 Several state courts then followed Taney’s lead and took the view that as long as a 
state’s legislature had determined alcoholic beverages had an adverse effect on its citizens’ 
public health, safety, or morals, and there was no specific state constitutional restriction, then 
societal self-protection would eclipse private property rights.6 Not all courts accepted this 
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argument of course. Notable decisions in New York (Wynehamer v. People) and Indiana (Beebe 
v. State and Herman v. State) undergirded the right to possess beverage alcohol by invoking the 
natural rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence -- and enshrined as a substantive 
right under the due process guarantees set out in the constitutions of the two states, rulings that 
courts continued to rely upon through the nineteenth century.7 But eventually, the public safety 
argument prevailed. At the federal level, nineteen years after ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in the case of Mugler v. Kansas, the United States Supreme Court specified that the 
manufacturer or seller of intoxicating liquors had no recourse under either the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause that would protect him from state police power. A 
state, if its legislature so chose, could forbid manufacture even for personal use.8 
While federal courts had never questioned the sovereign authority of the states to regulate 
their purely internal manufacturing and trade, prohibiting the mere possession of private property 
in the form of beverage alcohol was more problematic for federal courts. Tavern and public 
house licensing, as well as the regulation of wholesale and retail liquor sales, were well 
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established in the Anglo-American legal tradition. But a total ban on the simple possession of 
beverage alcohol was another matter entirely.9 It was not until the case of Crane v. Campbell in 
1917 that the United States Supreme Court decided that a state (Idaho in this case) could outlaw 
the mere possession of alcohol.10 With Justice James Clark McReynolds writing for the majority, 
the Court reasoned that, if states had the power to prohibit the sale and manufacture of alcohol, 
then they also had the power to “adopt such measures as are reasonably appropriate to or needful 
to render exercise of that power effective.”11 Justice McReynolds went on to state that, “the right 
to hold intoxicating liquors for personal use is not one of those fundamental privileges of a 
citizen of the United States which no State may abridge.”12 So much for “the pursuit of 
happiness.” At any rate, it came as no surprise that, in the 1922 decision Corneli v. Moore, the 
Court also upheld a provision in the federal Volstead Act that outlawed the possession of 
intoxicating liquor.13 The legal rationales and precedents established in Crane and Corneli could 
now be applied to narcotics and cannabis possession at the national level. 
Although temperance advocates focused on alcohol during the years prior to the Civil War, 
thereafter, drug addiction became a significant concern to elected officials. The war spawned an 
army of addicts; physicians freely prescribed opium and morphine in hospitals, and many 
wounded veterans became habitual users. Also, many non-prescription patent medicines of the 
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period contained doses of addictive agents, such as cocaine and opium, as well as alcohol. But 
consumers, without knowing the contents or dosages, commonly became inadvertently addicted 
to these medications. Both practices resulted in addiction, not a consequence of pleasure-seeking 
but, instead, unintentionally.  
While accidental addiction was a problem in the eastern states, society typically treated it 
sympathetically, and addicts could receive medical treatment for their misfortune. In contrast, 
some of the first anti-narcotics laws to treat “pleasure addiction” originated in western states that 
had relatively large numbers of persons originally from east Asia, a prime source of opium. In 
the 1800s, narcotics were typically classified as “poison” and, hence fell, under state poison 
control statutes. Statutes in western states were enacted primarily to prevent the spread of opium 
smoking.  Specially targeted were Chinese immigrants, commonly derided with the epithet 
“heathen Chinee,” as evidenced by the 1886 Oregon federal district court decision Ex parte Yun 
Jon.14 Nine years prior to that case, Nevada had become the first state to enact an anti-narcotics 
statute, prohibiting the retail sale of opiates for nonmedical purposes. Between 1877 and 1911, 
eighteen states passed statutes making opium dens illegal or prohibiting opium smoking 
entirely.15 
The first federal statute to address problems arising from narcotic drugs came near the turn of 
the twentieth century, an act that dealt with the problem of inadvertent addiction resulting from 
the use of patent medicines. Based on the Commerce Clause, the Pure Food and Drug Act of 
1906 required that products containing certain habit-forming drugs that were to be shipped in 
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interstate commerce, including marijuana, but also including cocaine, heroin, and morphine, be 
properly labeled with their contents and prescribed dosages.16 By requiring producers to list the 
ingredients of their products for consumers to review, the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 
largely accomplished its goal of protecting the public from accidental addiction; however, it also 
nearly eliminated the patent medicine industry in the process. In addition to the impact of the 
new statute on accidental addiction, corporate laboratories developed new non-addictive 
painkillers and anesthetics that made post-operative addiction to such medications less likely.17   
The Pure Food and Drug Act ushered in a new role for the federal government in the 
trafficking and distribution of illicit drugs. Prior to 1906, states occupied the primary role in drug 
control and regulation. But, as state statutes regulating opium use in the West became more 
common, and as the United States became more influential in world affairs, public health experts 
and reformers demanded that the federal government legislate in the area as well. In 1909, 
Congress passed the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, which barred the importation of opium 
suited for smoking.18 Congress passed the act primarily at the behest of the State Department and 
President Theodore Roosevelt, with the intention of bringing the United States in line with other 
nations that were working to limit the smoking or ingestion of opium or intravenous injection of 
its derivatives. Congress also intended the act to improve relations with China. The act 
comported with the effort of that nation to reduce its exportation of the drug and limit the opium 
                                                 
16 Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, Sec. 902(a), 52 Stat. 1059; 
Rayburn D. Tousley, “The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,” Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Jan. 1941): 259-269, 259. 
17 Bonnie and Whitebread, “Forbidden Fruit,” 985.   
18 21 U.S.C. §§ 176-185 (1909) (repealed 1970). 
448 
 
trade in the Pacific colonies acquired by the United States during and after the Spanish American 
War.19    
As the crusade against drugs and alcohol gathered strength in the United States amid the 
initial wave of “progressive” activism, anti-narcotics reformers again called on the federal 
government to act. Touting dire warnings about “‘Chinamen’ seducing white women with 
drugs,” such advocates argued that it was the duty of the white race to save the supposedly-
inferior races from the evils of narcotics.20 Such talk, undergirded by progressive understandings 
of Social Darwinism, made the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, signed into law by President 
Woodrow Wilson, especially palatable to southerners. Residents and politicians from the 
southern states were, amid the tightening of Jim Crow, most reluctant to brook federal 
encroachments upon the sovereign powers of the states.21 Besides the racist impulses and racial 
sensationalism that promoted the act, Congress also framed it as a revenue measure to ease 
concerns about its constitutionality. The statute imposed a tax on, and required registration of, 
people who imported, produced, dealt in, sold, or issued opium, cocaine or their derivatives. A 
special Bureau of Internal Revenue form had to be used to transfer legally the items of concern 
from one person to another; this documentation would allow revenue agents to track sales 
through tax records. Only those persons, typically physicians and pharmacologists, registered 
with the federal government could obtain the forms. 
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 The effect of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act was immediate. Physicians quickly learned that 
supplying addicts of any type with maintenance doses to sustain their habits was illegal under the 
tax act. While the Harrison statute was firmly based on the power of Congress to tax, its 
regulatory aspects brought about constitutional challenges. On March 13, 1919, the United States 
Supreme Court narrowly sustained the act by a five-to-four decision in United States v. Doremus, 
followed on the same day, and with the same five-to-four margin, by United States v Webb, 
which also sustained the statute.22  Physician Charles T. Doremus paid the taxes required to 
acquire heroin; however, he then sold the product to sustain the heroin habit of one of his 
patients without completing the revenue form as required by the statute. He argued that Congress 
was using its taxing authority to invade the police power of the state of Texas. The Supreme 
Court rejected Doremus’s defense. With Justice William R. Day writing for the majority, the 
Court held that “[t]he act may not be declared unconstitutional because its effect may be to 
accomplish another purpose as well as the raising of revenue. If the legislation is within the 
taxing authority of Congress –  that is sufficient to sustain it.”23    
The Harrison Act lumped both inadvertent and pleasure-seeking addicts into a category of 
individuals whom society harshly judged, even as those beset by addiction turned to underground 
economies to obtain their “fixes.” The black market, in response to the new demand, grew 
significantly as prices rose. For instance, after March 1, 1915, when the Harrison Act went into 
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effect, the street price of heroin rose from $6.15 per ounce to about $100 per ounce.24 Those 
addicted to heroin commonly turned to desperate means to obtain funds for the drug, while all 
illicit narcotic use and commerce came to be associated with lawlessness and immorality. In turn, 
public authorities increasingly considered such unfortunates, in each case, to be a “social 
menace.”25 
In August 1917, Congress began considering the passage of a resolution for what would 
become the Eighteenth Amendment. If ratified, the amendment would prohibit the “manufacture, 
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the 
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for 
beverage purposes.”26 The proposed amendment, which was ratified in January 1919, said 
nothing about mere possession of liquor. In October of the same year, Congress overrode the 
veto of President Wilson to pass the National Prohibition Act, commonly known as the Volstead 
Act, which largely implemented the amendment.27  
The felt need by federal authorities to suppress the use of marijuana as a mood- and 
perception-altering agent arose only slowly after 1900, along with the entry of marijuana 
consumption into American culture. While accounts vary, the earliest recorded uses of the plant 
in the United States, at least as a psychotropic substance, date from the first decade of the 
twentieth century. New Orleans musicians, such as Louis Armstrong, opted for pot over alcohol 
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because the former provided them stamina for all-night jam sessions. In the view of many of 
these artists, the smoking of marijuana helped them to render more imaginative and unique 
sounds. Indeed, observers commonly concluded that jazz and swing music derived primarily 
from this practice.28 By the 1920s, black musicians also made cannabis available to their 
listeners, even as the weed became known in larger cities by a steadily widening array of rubrics, 
ranging from “Rose Maria” to “grifa.” Authorities, who invariably identified as “white,” 
increasingly associated the use of marijuana with supposedly inferior persons of color, especially 
those who frequented jazz bars and bordellos in the port cities – and with urban underworld 
criminality.29  
By the mid-1930s, government officials and a large segment of the American public had 
come to associate smoking marijuana with “wild” music, incomprehensible behavior, and with 
the two races deemed by whites to be at the bottom of America’s racial and social hierarchy. The 
1910 Revolution in Mexico sent waves of peasant immigrants into the United States Southwest. 
These refugees brought with them their traditional custom of smoking marijuana, a practice they 
did not always separate from the arduous work routines they pursued as itinerant laborers.30 
More troubling, by the early 1930s, were rumors that circulated among police officers in Texas 
that Mexican immigrants were distributing the diabolical weed to American school children. 31 
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According to Isaac Campos, however, Mexican officials and prominent leaders were no less 
suspicious of marijuana use and trafficking than their counterparts in the United States. In fact, 
the Mexican government banned cannabis in 1920, and much of the rhetoric warning of “reefer 
madness” originated with the Mexican leadership. The 1936 Louis J. Gasnier film of the same 
name struck terror in the hearts of law-abiding Americans concerned about the vulnerability of 
their children to the “Mexican menace.” But the movie advanced a dire morality tale originating 
from the same country supposed to have launched the dreaded “locoweed” into the United 
States.32 In any case, New Orleans banned marijuana in 1923, the state of Louisiana did so in 
1927, and many states took this step in the coming decades.33 
 It was in this context that the United States government established an enforcement 
apparatus to give effect to its entanglement in the policing of narcotics and beverage alcohol. 
Since the Harrison Act was a federal taxation statute, it assigned enforcement to the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue – later the Internal Revenue Service, situated within the Department of the 
Treasury. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service Daniel C. Roper established a 
Narcotics Division within the IRS, made part of the Prohibition Unit in 1920 after the passage of 
the Volstead Act.  In 1927, the Prohibition Unit outgrew the IRS and became an independent 
bureau, which included the Narcotics Division. In 1930, the Narcotics Division became an 
independent agency –  the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN).   
The new FBN was led by Harry Jacob Anslinger, a Pennsylvania-born expert in the 
investigation and policing of international drug trafficking. At the time of his appointment, he 
                                                 
32 Isaac Campos, Home Grown: Marijuana and the Origins of Mexico's War on Drugs (The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2012), Ch. 8; Johnson, “Workers’ Weed,” 320-341; Lee, 
Smoke Signals, 38-42. 
33 Larry Sloman, Reefer Madness: A History of Marijuana (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 
1998), chs. 1-3.  
453 
 
was the Assistant Commissioner of Prohibition and, thereafter, worked hard to justify and 
expand his new organization by educating the public about the dangers of illegal drug use, which 
sometimes amounted to sensational propaganda. All the while, he took an aggressive stance 
against narcotics trafficking with little toleration of, much less sympathy for, those addicted to 
such drugs.34 Anslinger made a significant impact on developing drug legislation.  According to 
Ralph Susman, Associate Director of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, 
“[Anslinger’s] bureaucratic achievements and his capacity to influence and lead docile and 
uninformed congressional committees for the many years of his tenure is probably unmatched in 
the history of the nation.”35 
For the first four years of the FBN’s existence, its focus was on opium and other narcotics.  
The bureau perceived marijuana use, whether by smoking or other modes of consumption, to be 
a problem among Mexican-Americans, but the bureau took the position that state government 
agencies were competent to control the relatively limited involvement of that population with the 
plant.36 In 1930, sixteen states had placed restrictions on marijuana, but the statutes were 
generally a low priority for law enforcement, and penalties were not generally harsh.37 However, 
in the mid-1930s, cannabis suddenly became an item of high interest to the bureau. The New 
York Times reported on the enforcement activities of Anslinger in December 1934, noting that 
the commissioner was “investigating the use by school children in Cleveland and other areas of 
marijuana, a mild narcotic reported to change the qualities of valor and courage to fear and 
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insanity.”38 Scholars disagree whether the FBN or western state governments were the primary 
impetus for a federal response to the perceived threat posed by cannabis. But it does seem 
apparent that, at the least, the FBN began a campaign to educate citizens nationwide about the 
disastrous individual and social destruction wrought by the smoking or other ingestion of 
cannabis.39 Popular journals and newspapers cast marijuana smokers as violent criminals who 
were also habitual users of heroin, cocaine, and other addictive substances.40 Noting “increasing 
abuse” of the drug, the bureau pleaded with state officials to increase their efforts against the 
spread of marijuana intoxication in the form of standardized state legislation through the 
National Conference on Uniform State Laws.41 By May 1937, FBN agents were meeting with 
civic groups involved in the education of youth to encourage “[r]elentless warfare on marijuana.” 
Former assessor to the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee Elizabeth Wright, now 
special representative of the FBN to the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, called the 
drug “the latest narcotic menace to youth” and “the most pernicious of drugs.”42 Whether the 
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FBN campaign was actually the motivator, by the end of 1937 all states had passed statutes 
prohibiting the smoking or other consumption of cannabis.43   
In 1937 Congress began to focus on the supposed growing threat to the public posed by 
marijuana use and trafficking. As discussed in preceding chapters, before 1937 the United States 
Supreme Court had not given the Commerce Clause the expansive interpretation that it was to 
receive in decisions such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, Wickard v. Filburn, and United 
States v. Darby. The policing of marijuana remained within the traditional general police powers 
of the states. A January 1937 New York Times article reported, “The Federal bureau has admitted 
that its hands are tied by the fact that the marijuana weed is indigenous to so many states that its 
distribution is an intrastate problem.”44 However, just as the 1914 Harrison Act used the taxing 
power of Congress to limit the use and distribution of narcotics,  with tax collection processes 
and related forms, the federal government would eventually employ a similar method to address 
the perceived problem of marijuana use. 
If scholars differ on the extent to which the Federal Bureau of Narcotics influenced the 
decision of Congress to establish the federal Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, it seems almost certain 
that FBN Commissioner Harry Anslinger provided a strong voice to promote passage of the act 
during congressional hearings, which ran from April 27th to May 4, 1937.45 One might weigh 
carefully the probative value of the evidence Anslinger offered during hearings to support the 
conclusion that there was a national cannabis disaster in the making -- newspaper opinion pieces 
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authored by FBN employees.46 With a perceived national crisis at hand, that Congress would 
pass the new tax statute was a forgone conclusion. The only medical doctor who appeared during 
hearings was William C. Woodard, who represented the American Medical Association as both a 
physician and a lawyer. He argued that cannabis had not been studied enough for experts to be 
able to conclude whether cannabis had any salutary medicinal applications, and he urged some 
lessening of the restrictions on marijuana set out in the bill. Representative John Dingell, Sr. (D-
MI), however, dismissed Dr. Woodard curtly after he had presented his testimony and 
conclusions: “You are not cooperative in this. If you want to advise us on legislation you ought 
to come here with some constructive proposals rather than criticisms, rather than trying to throw 
obstacles in the way of something that the Federal Government is trying to do.”47  The bill 
passed easily through the Senate and became law shortly afterward on October 1, 1937. 
The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 was very similar to the Harrison Act. It required a 
registration of, and an occupational tax on, any person who sold marijuana.48 It also placed a tax 
on all transfers of marijuana, which were to be verified with forms similar to those that the 
Harrison Act required. Possession without the required documentation was presumptive evidence 
of guilt.49 The act was challenged in 1950 in United States v. Sanchez with the argument that the 
measure constituted an attempt by Congress to regulate trade beyond its authority.50 Overturning 
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the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the United 
States Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]t is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to 
be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed.”51   
A year after Sanchez unsuccessfully challenged the Marijuana Tax Act, Congress passed the 
Boggs Act of 1951 to stiffen penalties for drug users and dealers.52 The years from 1947 to 1951 
saw a rise in narcotics abuse and addiction, or at least this was the conclusion of authorities, most 
alarmingly among people under the age of twenty-one. Amid rising fears of international 
communism and radical subversion within, the New York Times reported in July 1951 that 
“Commissioner Anslinger and his staff of 180 agents have been waging an admittedly losing 
battle with the drug traffic, particularly among juvenile offenders, for the last couple of years.”53   
Representative Thomas Hale Boggs, Sr. (D-LA), stated during congressional debates on the bill 
that there was a seventy-seven percent increase in arrests for narcotics violations between 1948 
and 1950.54 In addition, the conclusion that narcotics trafficking and use were on the rise also 
affected committee and house debates over the bill. During the House floor debate, Boggs 
emphasized what he believed to be the critical dynamics of youth addiction:  
Our younger people usually start on the road which leads to drug addiction by smoking 
marijuana. They then graduate into narcotic drugs – cocaine, morphine, and heroin. When 
these younger persons become addicted to the drugs, heroin, for example, which costs 
from $8 to $15 per day, they very often must embark on careers of crime . . . and 
prostitution . . . to buy the supply which they need.55   
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Opposition to the bill was not substantial; it passed easily through Congress, and President Harry 
Truman signed it into law in early November 1951.   
Two features of the Boggs Act marked the measure as a stern response to a perceived 
narcotics threat of significant proportions. First, it increased penalties for existing statutes.  
Second, it made uniform and mandatory the penalties for marijuana or narcotic use, thereby 
placing the smoking or other consumption of marijuana on par with the use of opium and heroin. 
A first-time offender for marijuana possession could now expect a minimum sentence of from 
two to five years with a fine of up to $2,000.56 
Five years later the lawmaking process was repeated with the Narcotic Control Act of 1956.57  
The new statute increased the already harsh mandatory penalties of the Boggs Act, especially for 
those convicted of “peddling,” and prohibited any possibility of parole except for first time 
offenders in the possession category.58 Minimum sentences now ranged from two years for first 
time offenders and fines of up to $20,000.59   
While the 1950s saw increased official concern about marijuana use, the 1960s saw a 
substantial, albeit complicated, retreat from its censure. The counterculture of the 1960s rejected 
middle-class norms that had held sway in the Cold-War dominated 1950s. Along with 
denouncing Jim Crow in the South and, after 1967, the increasingly bloody war in Vietnam, 
American youth eschewed materialism, corporate capitalism, technocratic society, traditional 
authority, and repressive sexual norms. Counterculture warriors embraced civil rights for racial 
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minorities, communitarian experimentation, free speech, and commitments to world peace, along 
with psychedelic rock music, “pop-art” and new understandings of spirituality. Within the 
movement, intertwining currents drove activism in favor of improving women’s rights and 
feminism, environmentalism, and a holistic understanding of the relations of human beings with 
Mother Earth.60 A virtual revolution in thinking among the mostly white middle-class champions 
of a new and better age readily indulged their appetites for experimentation with mind-altering 
substances, especially marijuana – which became an emblem of this youthful cultural 
insurgency.61 According to Martin A. Lee, the smoking and other consumption of cannabis in the 
1960s emerged as a defining force in a culture war that would persist into the twenty-first 
century.62 
Marijuana consumption, as indicated, increased most rapidly among white youth and young 
adults. As a result, the extremely harsh sentences, formerly imposed usually on members of 
racial and ethnic minorities and low-income users, came to be applied to this far more populous 
and politically well-connected segment of society. The response was a reevaluation of marijuana 
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as a dangerous drug and the addition of addiction treatment as an appropriate governmental 
response, rather than merely tougher prison sentences. Both the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations commissioned studies that concluded marijuana was not the “stepping stone” to 
more dangerous illicit drugs, as experts had previously declared, and that use of cannabis was not 
likely to induce violence.63 Additionally, as recreational consumption of marijuana increased, 
anecdotal evidence regarding its medicinal possibilities began to surface.64   
In February 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson merged the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC). The FBN had been under the auspices of the 
Treasury Department, while the BDAC was located within the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. The new agency, which officially went into operation in early April 1968, was 
designated the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). Its home would be within the 
Department of Justice, the primary law enforcement agency of the federal government.65 This 
reorganization reflected President Johnson’s concerns about the widespread use of illegal drugs 
among youth and young adults associated with the counterculture.66 But the creation of the 
BNDD also constituted, in part, a response to growing unease among many Americans about the 
increasingly violent direction of the Civil Rights Movement, which had produced dozens of 
major race riots in American cities from 1964 through the summer of 1967.67 Such concerns 
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intensified after the assassinations of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968, and 
of Democrat party presidential candidate New York Senator Robert F. Kennedy on June 6, 1968, 
after which President Johnson and Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act on June 19, 1968.68   
 Having run in fall 1968 on a “law and order” platform, newly-elected President Richard 
M. Nixon was well-positioned to engage the growing national problem of drug abuse. The 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations had viewed adverse socioeconomic and cultural 
circumstances as the prime explanations of rising urban crime rates. But Nixon openly 
condemned civil unrest and disrespect for the law, which he combined with promises to get 
tough on law breakers.69 He also attributed much of the “moral looseness” and lawlessness he 
associated with the “youth revolt,” or counterculture, to the use of illicit drugs.70  
Shortly after Nixon took office, Harvard psychology professor and writer Timothy Leary also 
helped establish the conditions for a revamping of the federal illicit drug regime. The Harrison 
Act had used cumbersome tax and registration forms to monitor and dissuade illicit drug use, and 
it had been the model for the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937. That statute imposed an occupational 
tax upon all those who dealt in cannabis, required such individuals to register with the IRS, and 
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imposed a “transfer tax” on all transfer of marijuana, which had to be documented with the 
completion of a form. On May 19, 1969, however, the United States Supreme Court declared 
portions of the Marijuana Tax Act unconstitutional in Leary v. United States. Timothy Leary was 
then widely known for his controversial, if not infamous, explorations of the therapeutic 
potential of psychedelic drugs, especially lysergic acid diethylamide, or LSD. Leary argued, after 
his arrest on charges of possessing marijuana in violation of the Marijuana Tax Act, that, to 
comply with the act, he would, in effect, be admitting to the federal government his possession 
of a substance for which he could be criminally prosecuted in state courts. According to the 
Supreme Court, with Justice John Marshall Harlan writing for the majority, the order form and 
transfer tax provisions of the Marijuana Tax Act violated Leary’s privilege against self-
incrimination “as they force the defendant either to violate their requirements or to classify 
himself as a person inherently suspect of criminal activities.” 71  
From the beginning of his presidency, Richard Nixon had wanted to streamline the various 
anti-illegal drug statutes that the federal government had enacted over the previous decades. The 
judicial victory of Timothy Leary at least served as the occasion for Congress to repeal both the 
Marijuana Tax Act and the Harrison Act and revamp and repackage such strictures within a 
comprehensive scheme to regulate both legal and illicit drugs. So, two years after President 
Johnson had reorganized the drug control bureaucracy with the creation of the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, President Nixon and a Democratic party controlled Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.72 Within this statute 
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was Title II, the Controlled Substance Act (CSA), which would figure importantly in the legal 
challenge to the CSA brought by Angel Raich and Diane Monson in October 2002. 
The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 constituted a major departure from earlier drug 
statutes in that Congress based the measure on its power to regulate interstate commerce rather 
than on its power to tax. The act constituted one of the most extensive deployments of commerce 
power on behalf of conservative demands that fueled the gathering culture wars. The opening 
section of the CSA, § 801, included an explicit finding and declaration by Congress that the 
comprehensive regulation of drug manufacture, possession, distribution, and use was within its 
Article I commerce power:  
 
The Congress makes the following findings and declarations: 
 
(1) Many of the drugs included within this title have a useful and legitimate 
medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare 
of the American people. 
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and 
improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental  
effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.  
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through 
interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an 
integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local 
distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect 
upon interstate commerce because— 
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in 
interstate commerce, 
(B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been 
transported in interstate commerce immediately before their 
distribution, and 
(C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate 
commerce immediately prior to such possession. 
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to 
swelling the interstate traffic in such substances. 
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be 
differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed 
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interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between 
controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled 
substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. 
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled 
substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of 
such traffic.73 
 
The Controlled Substances Act provided federal law enforcement with license to police in 
areas historically reserved to the states – and with the aim of shutting down all possibility of 
illegal drug possession, distribution, and use. In doing so, the CSA categorized drugs into five 
categories or “schedules.” Schedule I drugs were said to have no medicinal purposes, pose a high 
probability of abuse, and have no approved safety standard for use. In other words, they had no 
redeeming value, and the public interest required that they be eradicated. Such drugs included 
heroin, LSD, marijuana, and many others. The other schedules included drugs that Congress 
determined to have medicinal value; the act placed various controls upon their production and 
distribution, depending upon their potential for abuse. The CSA also stipulated that changes to 
the schedules could be made by Congress or by the Food and Drug Administration, in 
coordination with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.74  
With a powerful new statutory apparatus in place, President Nixon sought to suppress 
energetically the widespread illicit distribution and use of narcotics, including marijuana, by 
declaring, on July 17, 1971, a “war on drugs,” which, in his estimation, had “assumed the 
dimensions of a national emergency.” Every administration thereafter employed this rubric as a 
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rallying cry and a policy position through the presidency of George W. Bush.75 In 1973, 
President Nixon combined the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs with elements of the 
Customs Agency Service of the Bureau of Customs to form the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA). The mission of the DEA was to carry out, with exclusive authority, 
enforcement of federal drug statutes.76 Indeed, it would be DEA agents who would override the 
opposition of the Butte County, California, Sheriff’s Office to arrest Angel Reich and Diane 
Monson nineteen years later.   
The Drug Enforcement Administration and its predecessors had some notable successes in 
the war against drugs in the 1970s. The heroin epidemic of the late 1960s and early 1970s passed 
its peak, arguably, because of successful DEA efforts outside of the United States. A significant 
victory occurred in Turkey, which banned opium within its borders in response to DEA 
initiatives. Additionally, the breaking of the “French connection” stymied a major heroin 
smuggling route. In North America, the Mexican government began a program of spraying 
opium fields, which further limited supply.77 
Federal government interest in the drug war waned in the 1970s, a decade that saw United 
States troops returning home in the wake of the war in Viet Nam, a stagnant economy, soaring 
gasoline prices, and rising tensions in the Middle East.  Neither President Gerald Ford nor 
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President Jimmy Carter mirrored Nixon’s interest in putting the suppression of illicit drugs at the 
top of their agendas. Carter even somewhat endorsed the removal of criminal penalties for the 
possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal consumption.  In a message to Congress 
on August 2, 1977, he said, “Penalties against possession of a drug should not be more damaging 
to an individual than the use of the drug itself.”78  However, Congress refrained from acting on 
this sentiment. 
The relative disinterest of the federal government in stemming drug abuse in the 1970s 
complemented rather well the emergence of a full-fledged drug culture in the United States. To 
conservatives, this transformation perpetuated one of the most troubling aspects of the 1960s 
counterculture. While its reform idealism rapidly dissipated, illicit drug use and addiction among 
teen agers and young adults climbed steadily. American youth experimented increasingly with 
more dangerous drugs, including cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, barbiturates, and 
methaqualone. A growing number of young adults combined the use of hallucinogens, especially 
LSD, with an array of new spiritual movements, although the federal government moved against 
the manufacture and sale of LSD in the mid-1970s. By the end of that decade, nonetheless, film 
and other media had begun to advance an alluring cocaine culture in the larger cities. And 
through the 1970s, a voluminous supply of marijuana from Mexico provided what many deemed 
to be the “recreational” drug of choice. Mexican government crack-downs on this industry, 
however, spurred new efforts by Americans to cultivate cannabis in the United States, even as 
American pot users persisted in laying claims to the harmlessness, consciousness raising, and 
even health benefits of marijuana consumption. 
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Part and parcel of the 1970s drug culture was its commercialization and related efforts to 
legalize cannabis. Countercultural entrepreneurs, now with an eye toward turning profits, opened 
“head shops” that offered for sale paraphernalia for enhancing acid trips or for smoking 
marijuana. Owners of such emporiums touted their wares as emblems of an alternative lifestyle 
and, at the same time, a symbolically-rich material culture with which they and their customers 
could identify. According to Joshua Clark Davis, drug culture entrepreneurs fostered the idea 
that their businesses helped customers expand their minds and improve society – the first order 
of business for which, however, was the legalization of pot. Head shop owners typically involved 
themselves in changing state statutes that persisted in making the possession and consumption of 
marijuana criminal offenses. By the end of the 1970s, such operators numbered in the tens of 
thousands, had organized into trade groups, and regularly convened to coordinate lobbying 
campaigns to legalize cannabis. And, by that time, they had succeeded in about a dozen states.79 
By 1978, the casual smoking of marijuana had entered the public mind as a growing threat to 
high school-aged children. In that year, nearly one in nine high school seniors reported having 
used the drug daily in the previous month.80 By the end of the 1970s, parents’ groups and 
lawmakers had begun to advance a national campaign against “commercialized drug culture.”81  
Once in office, President Ronald Reagan reignited the war on drugs, primarily taking aim at the 
increasing use of cocaine, but also urging law enforcement to crack down on marijuana 
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consumption and trafficking. In October 1982, the president announced the creation of the 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, a program to be coordinated by federal 
prosecutors. To demonstrate the seriousness of the problem to be addressed and the depth of his 
resolve, President Reagan placed Vice President George H. W. Bush in charge of a south Florida 
task force to stem the rapidly rising influx of cocaine and marijuana through one of the main 
smuggling points of entry into the United States.82  
The mid-1980s also saw the emergence of a new and threatening form of cocaine that soon 
caught the attention of federal authorities. “Crack” cocaine, which made its appearance in 1985, 
was a purified form of the drug that allowed users to smoke, or “free-base” the substance, rather 
than inhale the simpler powdered form.83 A vial of crack could be purchased in New York City 
for $10 to $20 and the substance proved to be extremely addictive. The New York Times reported 
that treatment centers were seeing “addicts arrive who had been using cocaine not for years but 
for months or weeks.”84 The new crack addicts, authorities averred, commonly had a direct 
relationship to rising crime. In the first six months of 1986, areas in which crack use was 
common saw a dramatic leap in murders, robberies, and other violent crimes. All leading New 
York newspapers followed the trends, and on May 18, 1986, the Times, The Daily News, and 
Newsday all published prominent articles alerting their readers to the crack threat. By September 
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of that year both NBC news and CBS news telecast special reports about the new dangers posed 
by crack cocaine.85 
Adding to the growing public alarm that stemmed from the highly visible new threats posed 
by the more powerful and addictive cocaine derivative were the deaths in a two-week period of 
June 1986 of two prominent professional athletes, both a consequence of cocaine overdoses. Len 
Bias was a first round draft pick from the University of Maryland who played for the Boston 
Celtics. Don Rogers was the 1984 defensive Player of the Year for the Cleveland Browns. 
Clearly, reasoned thoughtful observers, if the lives of preeminent professional athletes could be 
ruined and lost to cocaine addiction, something had to be done. Additionally, 1986 was a 
congressional election year, and the time was ripe to make political hay of the tragedies. Boston 
Celtic fans, incensed at the tragic death of Len Bias, inspired House Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” 
O’Neill, Jr. (D-MA) to situate a “tough on drugs” policy at the center of the Democratic 
platform. He adopted this tactic to keep the House from going to the Republicans.86 
On July 23, 1986, Speaker O’Neill assembled eleven House committee chairmen to develop 
a bipartisan response to the growing illegal drug problem. By September, the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986 was ready for a floor vote.87 There was little debate over the language of the statute; 
the primary motivation was to have something passed by November. Representative Claude 
Pepper (D-FL) captured the sentiment of the moment when he quipped, “Right now, you could 
put an amendment through to hang, draw, and quarter. That’s what happens when you get on an 
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emotional issue like this.”88 The legislation sailed through Congress – few wanted to face voters 
with a “NO” vote on such a bill. In the House, the vote was 392-16 and, in the Senate, it was 97-
2. President Reagan signed the bill into law on October 27, 1986, just in time to let the 
incumbent candidates of both political parties crow about their tough stances on illicit drug 
trafficking and use before the November election.89 The act stiffened mandatory sentencing for 
drug possession, including possession of marijuana. It focused roughly two thirds of funding on 
interdiction and sentencing; the final third provided for prevention and rehabilitation efforts. 
Mandatory sentencing had been removed from federal statutes in 1970 after careful 
consideration. But, with the new “tough on drugs” outlook stirred by the times, it was again 
added to the federal code.90  
Although President Reagan spoke of reducing the size and scope of the federal government, 
in the realm of illicit drug control the president oversaw federal expenditures increase from $1.5 
billion in 1981 to $6.6 billion in 1989.91 First Lady Nancy Reagan encouraged voluntary action 
with her “Just Say No” campaign. But when President Reagan attempted on one occasion to 
reduce funding for law enforcement efforts to suppress illegal drug use, members of both parties 
roundly criticized him. Representative Charles B. Rangel, a Democrat from Manhattan, 
complained, “Congress envisioned this program to grow, not to be cut.” Another New York 
Democratic Representative, James H. Scheuer of Queens, noted some irony stating, “All of us 
are appalled that the President and the Administration are telling us to tell Americans to say no to 
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drugs, when they’re also telling us that they’re saying no to drug funding.” Cogent observers, 
however, took it for granted that policing illicit drug would continue to be an important federal 
government commitment 92  
Congress attempted to repeat the drama of creating a popular anti-illegal drug statute before 
elections two years later. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 established the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Its director was supposed to hold a cabinet-level position and 
oversee and coordinate the actions of more than thirty federal agencies involved in the war on 
drugs. Known as President George H.W. Bush’s “drug czar,” the position was first filled by 
William J. Bennett, who had previously served as Secretary of Education under President 
Reagan. Although Bush opted not to add another member to his cabinet, Bennett took full 
advantage of his “bully pulpit” to attack those in favor of general or medical legalization of 
marijuana.93  Indeed, the act reauthorizing the position in 1998 included language that 
specifically ordered the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to,    
ensure that no Federal funds appropriated to the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
shall be expended for any study or contract relating to the legalization (for a medical use 
or any other use) of a substance listed in schedule I . . . and take such actions as necessary 
to oppose any attempt to legalize the use of a substance . . . listed in schedule I . . .  [that] 
has not been approved for use for medical purposes by the Food and Drug 
Administration.94 
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While the Reagan and Bush administrations saw an increase in federal funding to suppress 
illegal drugs and enlarged the federal counter-narcotics bureaucracy, the Clinton administration 
appeared, simply, to maintain the status quo. African Americans became increasingly over-
represented as the targets of drug interdiction efforts, even as the federal budget remained 
roughly the same, and the ratio of money spent for enforcement and rehabilitation remained 
nearly constant. Courts continued to use sentencing guidelines established in 1986. Over time, 
the effects of long-term mandatory sentences began to show on prison population statistics. 
Between 1992 and 2000, the number of federal prisoners who had been convicted of drug 
offenses nearly doubled, climbing from 35,398 to 63,898.95 The rate of arrest and prosecution for 
the possession or distribution of illegal drugs in the 1990s, however, grew substantially higher 
for African Americans than for persons who identified as “white.” Consequently, the “war on 
drugs” steadily took on racial overtones and, because of this, highly politicized meanings.96  
While drug culture entrepreneurs lobbied successfully for the legalization of marijuana in 
some states, federal authorities haltingly took steps that controversially raised the possibility that 
cannabis might have bona fide medical uses. In November 1976, United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia Judge James A. Washington dropped charges against glaucoma-sufferer 
Robert C. Randall, who had been charged under the District of Columbia criminal code with 
possession of marijuana. The court did so by recognizing his novel defense – one that was based 
on the common law doctrine of medical necessity. In 1978, Randall successfully sued various 
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agencies of the federal government, including the Food and Drug Administration, to obtain 
lawful access to cannabis for medical purposes, an initiative that spurred the federal government 
to launch its very limited and experimental Compassionate Investigational New Drug program. 
The state of New Mexico, in 1978, passed the first legislation recognizing the medical value of 
marijuana as an analgesic for chronic pain and other ailments. Given the growing trepidation of 
parent groups and law enforcement authorities across the United States over the rapidly-growing 
incidence of recreational marijuana use among teen-agers and young adults, and the increasing 
consumption of cocaine and other dangerous controlled substances, this development was 
politically charged almost from the beginning: Due sympathy for those afflicted with chronic 
pain, including the terminally ill, collided head-on with intense parental fears. By the mid-1990s, 
marijuana advocates further augmented their message by emphasizing the racial injustice 
stemming from illegal drug interdiction efforts that, per capita, increasingly impacted African 
Americans.97   
It was about this time that states began to reassert their power to regulate drug use. In 1996, 
the voters of California passed Proposition 215, which allowed for the medicinal consumption of 
marijuana under the supervision of a physician.98  The proposition process was begun by San 
Francisco resident Dennis Peron, whose gay partner had used marijuana to relieve AIDS-related 
suffering. Peron had been a strong advocate of legalized medicinal marijuana use since his 
service in Viet Nam. He opened his San Francisco Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op with the intention of 
distributing marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. He succeeded in operating his 
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business under the auspices of a 1991 city resolution allowing for the consumption of medical 
marijuana, a measure that he had helped to pass. Although the local community and law 
enforcement officials permitted his activities, Republican Governor Pete Wilson vetoed medical 
marijuana bills passed by the California legislature.99 Peron and his supporters concluded that, 
perhaps, the people of California could pass a medical legalization statute through the 
proposition process. Backed by a $350,000 donation from Hungarian-American financier George 
Soros, along with pledges from other wealthy supporters, Peron amassed the required 400,000 
signatures to get his proposition on the ballot for November 5, 1996.100  With this success, he 
came under the scrutiny of California Attorney General Dan Lungren, a Republican, who 
arrested Peron and shut down his business on October 12, 1996, less than a month before the 
election date. Nevertheless, Proposition 215, entitled the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, passed 
with a majority of nearly fifty-six percent.101 
At about the same time, in Arizona, sixty-five percent of voters approved a similar ballot 
initiative, Proposition 200, which specifically addressed the Controlled Substances Act by stating 
its purpose: “To permit physicians to prescribe Schedule 1 controlled substances such as 
marijuana to treat disease or to relieve the pain and suffering of seriously and terminally ill 
patients.”102 Over the next few years other states would follow California and Arizona. The states 
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of Oregon and Washington passed medical marijuana legislation in 1998. Alaska and Maine did 
so in 1999, followed by Colorado in 2000.103 Also, in 2000, Hawaii enacted a medical marijuana 
statute through its legislature rather than by ballot initiative.104  
The case of Gonzales v. Raich came about during the presidency of George W. Bush. It is 
somewhat ironic that candidate Bush included in his campaign platform the position that 
individual states should choose whether to ban the use of medical marijuana.105 Whether his 
administration would have been more accommodating than his predecessors towards state 
legalization of medical marijuana we will never know. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, spurred President Bush to take a wide array of national actions to support the War on 
Terror, some of which seemed to violate individual liberties set out in the Constitution, such as 
the initiatives to ramp up the war on illegal drugs. With all the new state legislation that directly 
contradicted the restrictions set out in the CSA, it was only a matter of time before litigants 
challenged the CSA in the federal courts.  
The first challenge resulted from enforcement of California’s Compassionate Use Act of 
1996. In 1998 the United States filed suit against the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative to 
stop the organization from manufacturing and distributing marijuana to qualified patients – since 
the CSA, under long-established Commerce Clause judicial precedents, preempted the California 
statute.  The district court granted an injunction, but Oakland Cannabis Buyers simply ignored 
and violated it. When notified that the cooperative was in contempt, its managers argued that 
they were continuing their activities out of a medical necessity for the well-being of their patients 
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since no other medication offered the therapeutic benefits of marijuana. In response, U.S. 
marshals seized the cooperative’s premises. On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers agreed to cease distribution and manufacture, both to comply with the injunction and 
regain possession of their facilities. But the cooperative moved to have the injunction modified, 
reiterating their medical necessity justification. The appeals court agreed and remanded the case 
to the district court to incorporate a medical necessity defense in which marijuana could be 
prescribed if the patient had “no reasonable legal alternative to cannabis” and legal alternatives 
were ineffective or caused intolerable side effects.106 However, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on May 14, 2001. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence 
Thomas concluded that Congress had already contemplated medical necessity when it placed 
marijuana in the Schedule I category of drugs. By its nature, the decision of Congress reflected 
“a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception (aside from 
government-approved research).”107 Thus, the Court rejected the medical exception argument for 
manufacture and distribution by a vote of 8-0. Thomas also noted that “the Cooperative asserts, 
that shorn of a medical necessity defense, the statute exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause 
powers, violates the substantive due process rights of patients, and offends the fundamental 
liberties of the people under the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.”  However, because the 
Court of Appeals did not address these constitutional claims, Thomas concluded that the 
Supreme Court would decline to do so as well.108   
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative did not appear to have much of an effect, at least in the western states. In Alaska, 
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Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, and Oregon, the state-level legalization of 
marijuana use continued. In California, medical marijuana licenses continued to be issued to 
patients with the recommendation of a physician. In Maine, state prosecutors avoided getting 
involved in enforcing the federal statute, although the state legislature did drop a statute designed 
to supply medical marijuana to those who needed it.  United States Attorney General John 
Ashcroft did not provide guidance to federal prosecutors on how to approach such violations of 
federal law. It was as though the Court had ruled for Oakland Cannabis Buyers.109    
Federal prosecutorial inaction would abate after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The War 
on Terror required that federal authorities scrutinize every illicit activity possibility related to 
international Islamic terrorism. On August 15, 2002, deputies from the Butte County Sheriff’s 
Department and DEA agents appeared at the home of Diane Monson of Oroville, California. The 
officers, to some extent, were responding to what was reported as a “crackdown on medical 
marijuana” inspired in part by the new anti-terrorism stance of the federal government. President 
Bush had stated that the illegal drug trade helped finance terrorists.110   
Diane Monson, the suspect, was a forty-five-year-old office manager and bookkeeper who 
had suffered from severe chronic back pain and spasms for the previous three years. She 
described the pain as so severe that the only way to relieve it, even partially, was to lie down, 
thus making it impossible for her to work effectively. Although she had tried other medications, 
including muscle relaxers and anti-inflammatories, those types of drugs kept her groggy and 
unable to perform her work duties.  She had even tried more addictive drugs such as Vicodin and 
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Vioxx, but she found these medications were ineffective in relieving her pain and, in addition, 
made her quite nauseated.111    
In 1999, Monson first tried marijuana to relieve her back spasms. The plant proved effective; 
she stated that her spasms were reduced by seventy-five percent. Even when they did occur, she 
reported, the marijuana relaxed her and did not make her drowsy, thus allowing her to work 
without pain. Her physicians recommended that she use a vaporizer to ingest the cannabis.  In 
addition, she took the drug sublingually in a spray form. She reported no side effects from the 
marijuana use.112 
Monson reported that the deputies accepted that her cultivation of six marijuana plants for 
medicinal consumption was under the supervision of a physician and legal under California state 
law.  However, the DEA agents argued that the plants must be destroyed to enforce the federal 
Controlled Substances Act. A three-hour discussion ensued. This complicated conversation 
involved local district attorney Mike Ramsey in support of Monson and U.S. Attorney for the 
Eastern District of California John K. Vincent, who backed the DEA agents. Ultimately, the 
agents prevailed and cut down the plants.113 
The experience of Angel Raich was somewhat different because she personally did not 
experience a raid on her premises by DEA agents. In 2002, Raich was under treatment for an 
extensive variety of medical conditions, which included scoliosis, spinal injuries, muscle spasms, 
chronic headaches, an inoperable brain tumor, a uterine fibroid tumor, fibromyalgia, and 
posttraumatic stress disorder resulting from childhood sexual abuse. She stated that the 
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prescription drugs she used for all these injuries, ailments, and impairments were either 
ineffective or resulted in nausea or allergic reactions, or some combination thereof.114 
Raich also stated that, before she became a medical cannabis patient, she opposed the 
recreational consumption of marijuana; however, on the recommendation of her physician, she 
tried cannabis in 1997. She found that various strains of the plant gave her positive results. 
According to Raich, “[o]ne strain of medical cannabis helps my chronic pain, one helps my 
seizures, one helps me eat and hold onto my weight, and another may [sic] helps control my 
nausea.”115 Raich obtained her medicinal cannabis through the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative beginning in 1998. Indeed, she had not been involved with the cooperative for long 
before she became enmeshed in the case described previously, United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative. She was one of fourteen “medical necessity” patients at the 
center of the controversy. 
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, Angel Raich 
had to find other means for obtaining her marijuana. She described the pitfalls of buying in the 
black market. In that ever-shifting and unpredictable network of exchange, she had no control 
over the strain of cannabis she could obtain or the quality and potency of the plant she purchased.  
She noted, “Black market marijuana is not medical grade cannabis. One really does not know 
what is in that marijuana. It may contain mold, fungus, pesticides, other drugs, rat droppings, or 
god [sic] knows what. One does not know how it was grown or processed. It is just not safe.”116 
She tried growing the plant but was unsuccessful. Eventually, she found two “caregivers” who 
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grew cannabis and provided her with it free of charge – that is, there were no commercial 
transactions involved. The two caregivers would be part of the future suit as well under the 
pseudonyms “John Doe Number One” and “John Doe Number Two,” and Raich made the point 
that the growing operations of both suppliers were situated within the state of California.117 
Because of their treatment by the DEA, Raich, Monson, and the two Does sued the United 
States for declaratory and injunctive relief on October 9, 2002, in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs wanted to be protected from the federal 
government arresting or prosecuting them, seizing their medical cannabis, causing forfeiture of 
their property, or seeking civil or administrative actions against them for possessing medical 
marijuana, or for obtaining or growing marijuana for personal medical use, or, in the case of the 
Does, for growing medical marijuana to be provided to Raich. The plaintiffs, thus, petitioned the 
court to declare that the CSA was unconstitutional to the extent that it prevented the plaintiffs 
from obtaining, possessing, or growing marijuana for medicinal purposes.118 
Attorneys Randy E. Barnett, Robert A. Raich, and David M. Michael argued the case for the 
plaintiffs. Barnett, a law professor at the Georgetown Law Center and a senior fellow at the 
libertarian Cato Institute, commanded expert knowledge about the Commerce Clause and its 
original and historical meanings.119 The second attorney, Robert Raich, was Angel’s husband at 
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the time, and he specialized in the law of medical cannabis as well as business and political law.  
Indeed, the couple had met when he was helping with the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative case, when she was a member of the cooperative.120 Both Barnett and Raich had 
previously taken part in the Oakland Cannabis Buyers Cooperative case.121 Finally, David M. 
Michael was a San Francisco attorney whose specialties were marijuana law and general 
criminal defense.122   
The plaintiffs introduced their argument by emphasizing that the federal government was 
unconstitutionally seizing private property through harassment, administrative action, and 
paramilitary raids. They based these claims on the Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the 
Ninth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the doctrine of 
“medical necessity.”123 Counsel for plaintiffs maintained that no authority was more central to 
the sovereignty of the states than their police powers, which include the responsibility to provide 
for the health and safety of citizens. Raich’s legal team argued that that Congress had no 
authority under the Constitution to undercut such sovereign rights and duties. “State 
governments have authority to enact measures reasonably necessary to protect public health.  
Congress cannot exercise its power over interstate commerce to interfere with a State’s police 
power by prohibiting wholly intrastate conduct that the State mandates in the interest of health 
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and safety.”124 Referring to Madison’s Federalist, No. 42, the plaintiffs argued that the 
preservation of state authority over its internal affairs was essential to the maintenance of the 
federal system of dual government. The Controlled Substances Act was unconstitutional insofar 
as federal authorities had used it, and might use it in the future, to prosecute Raich, Monson, and 
the John Does for, simply, taking advantage of state law authorizing their consumption of a 
medicinal substance wholly outside the scope of interstate commerce. Referring to the Ninth 
Amendment, which reads, “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,” the plaintiffs argued, “[t]he rights 
to bodily integrity, to ameliorate pain, and to prolong life are closely related. They are distinct 
rights or specific aspects of the famous trinity of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” in the 
Declaration of Independence.”125 Therefore, the pursuit of life allowed patients to consult with 
and act on the treatment recommendations of their physicians. 
Countering the arguments of the plaintiffs were attorneys Robert McCallum, Jr., Kevin Ryan, 
Arthur Goldberg, and Mark T. Quinlivan. McCallum held the B.A. from Yale and was a graduate 
of its law school and a Rhodes Scholar. As of October 2002, he was the assistant attorney 
general for the Civil Division of the Department of Justice. McCallum was a 1968 classmate of 
George W. Bush at Yale and the two were fellow members of the secretive Skull and Bones 
Society. A rising star in the United States government who had defended the Bush administration 
on many fronts, McCallum would later become the third-ranking official at the Department of 
Justice and afterwards the U.S. Ambassador to Australia.126  Kevin Ryan was also a Bush 
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appointee, having recently become a U.S. Attorney only two months prior to the plaintiffs’ filing 
of their complaint.127 Goldberg worked for McCallum in the Justice Department Civil Division. 
U.S. Attorney Mark T. Quinlivan came to the case with a record of success in the medical 
marijuana arena, having been the lead attorney for the government in Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s 
Cooperative.128 This high-powered team suggests that the government took the case very 
seriously.  
The government maintained that the arguments plaintiffs raised had no merit. According to 
its response, “[g]overning Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority forecloses each of the 
plaintiffs’ contentions.”129 Counsel for Justice Department cited United States v. Bramble, a 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision holding that the CSA’s prohibition on the distribution, 
manufacture, or possession of marijuana and other controlled substances “is constitutional under 
the Commerce Clause.”130 The government referenced over a dozen cases in which the Ninth 
Circuit, as well as all the other federal circuit courts, had ruled on the question and had 
differentiated challenges to the CSA from those aimed at the statutes at issue in Lopez and 
Morrison; the Supreme Court, after all, had found that neither the Gun Free School Zones Act 
nor the Violence Against Women Act targeted activity that was intrastate commercial or 
economic activity, whereas the CSA certainly did. The government attorneys invoked a Tenth 
                                                 
127 Bob Egelko, “Report: U.S. Attorney Ryan’s Firing Justified,” SFGate, September 30, 2008. 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Report-U-S-attorney-Ryan-s-firing-justified-3192327.php 
(accessed March 12, 2012). 
128 Associated Press, “High Court’s Ruling Having Little Effect,” Lubbock Avalanche Journal, 
June 14, 2001. 
129 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, C 02-4872 MMJ, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. 
http://www.robertraich.com/docs/DistCourtNorthDist/DefendantsOpp.pdf (accessed March 14, 
2014). 
130 103 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Circuit, 1996). 
484 
 
Circuit ruling from 2001, which held “[w]e think any party would be hard-pressed to prove that 
trafficking in controlled substances is not an economic activity and not an issue of national 
concern.”131 
It then followed, counsel for the government argued, that, if the Controlled Substances Act 
was, indeed, a constitutional assertion of the commerce power, the Tenth Amendment challenge 
plaintiffs put forth could only fail. In New York v. United States, the government pointed out, the 
Supreme Court had ruled, “if a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth 
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the states.”132   
Finally, the government lawyers addressed the medical necessity argument. They maintained 
that the Ninth Circuit, in Carnohan v. United States, had previously found there was no 
fundamental right to receive medical treatments not shown to be effective. In that decision, the 
court ruled that the use of laetrile, unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, could not 
be used as an alternative cancer treatment even with the claim of medical necessity. According to 
the Ninth Circuit, referring to the mandates of the California Health and Safety Code, 
“[c]onstitutional rights of privacy and personal liberty do not give individuals the right to obtain 
laetrile free of the lawful exercise of the government police power.”133 Additionally, emphasized 
counsel for the government, the Supreme Court had found in Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative that “there is no medical necessity exception to the prohibitions at issue [in the 
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CSA], even when the patient is “seriously ill” and lacks alternative avenues for relief.”134 It thus 
appeared that the government had strong precedents on its side. 
Deciding the case was District Court Judge Martin J. Jenkins. A moderate Democrat, Jenkins 
had previously served as a prosecutor for Alameda County and Department of Justice trial 
attorney, specializing in racial violence and police misconduct cases.  Republican Governor 
George Deukmejian appointed him to the Oakland Municipal Court in 1989, and fellow 
Republican Governor Pete Wilson elevated Jenkins to the Alameda Superior Court in 1992. 
Jenkins went on to become the presiding judge of the Juvenile Division in 1995; after his 
appointment to the federal bench by President Bill Clinton, he had served as a judge for the 
Northern District of California since November 1997.135    
Judge Jenkins agreed with the government’s arguments, while ruling that the precedents 
relied on by plaintiffs would not likely support their challenge to the CSA. Consequently, he 
denied the preliminary injunction. Relying on well-established precedents, Jenkins declared that, 
for a preliminary injunction to issue, a three-point test must be met, showing “(1) a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the balance of irreparable harm favors the case; and 
(3) that the public interest favors granting the injunction.” Alternatively, plaintiffs were required 
to show that a decreasing probability of success combined with a sufficiently increasing severity 
of irreparable harm could tip the balance in favor of an injunction.136 Jenkins noted that he was 
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unable to disregard the relevant Ninth Circuit decisions without an intervening Supreme Court 
ruling; the precedents in these decisions were “closely on point.”137   
Each of the arguments advanced by the Justice Department attorneys was accepted in its 
entirety by the judge. Congress had gathered evidence and made findings during its deliberations 
over the Controlled Substances Act, which were declared in the initial section of the CSA, that 
marijuana production and consumption had a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 
According to Judge Jenkins, these findings were not the result of the type of “attenuated 
analysis” found problematic in Morrison.138 Enforcement of the CSA against the plaintiffs would 
not contravene the Tenth Amendment; only when the federal government attempted to compel 
states to act was the Tenth Amendment violated. Since the federal government was not 
attempting to force California authorities to enforce the CSA, Tenth Amendment rights remained 
unviolated.139 The Ninth Amendment was not at issue either. Since Congress had found that 
marijuana had no medicinal value, it followed that denying it to Raich or Monson would not, at 
least in a strict legal sense, be denying them treatment. “[A]s the Supreme Court was not in a 
position to overturn the legislative determination that placed marijuana in Schedule I, and thus, 
made it unavailable for prescription to seriously ill people, much less so is this Court.”140 Thus, 
the plaintiffs were left to appeal their case to the next higher federal court.  
Undeterred by their failure in the district court, Raich, Monson, and the Does filed a timely 
notice of appeal on March 12, 2003, to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case was then 
argued on October 7th and decided on December 16th. Robert Raich and Randy Barnett again 
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argued for the plaintiffs, while Mark T. Quinlivan represented the U.S. government. Raich and 
Barnett were backed with amicus support from Alameda and Butte counties as well as the City of 
Oakland and the State of California. The California Medical Association, the California Nurses 
Association, and the Marijuana Policy Project provided support as well.141 The Justice 
Department, evidently more confident at the appellate level, did not apply the same resources to 
the case as it had previously. 
Deciding the appeal in the circuit court was a three-judge panel, including Judges Richard A. 
Paez, Harry Pregerson, and C. Arlen Beam, rather than the full Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.142 After reviewing the arguments presented in the district court, two of the circuit court 
judges came to a different conclusion from that reached by Judge Jenkins. Judges Paez and 
Pregerson agreed with Raich, Monson, and the other appellants that the Controlled Substances 
Act, as applied to them, was an unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause, while Judge Beam 
dissented and agreed with the district court ruling. Judge Pregerson, appointed to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, wrote its opinion, which accepted 
at least some of appellants’ constitutional arguments:  
We find that the appellants have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on their 
claims that, as applied to them, the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause authority. We decline to reach the appellants’ other arguments, which 
are based on the principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment, the 
appellants’ alleged fundamental rights under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments, and the 
doctrine of medical necessity.143 
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How did the circuit court three-judge panel find for the appellants when faced with the same 
precedents considered by the district court? The panel reasoned that, although it had, indeed, 
ruled upon the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act in the past, this case was 
different. Prior decisions had enforced the CSA against drug trafficking. “The appellants’ 
conduct,” they explained, “constitutes a separate and distinct class of activities: the 
noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as 
recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to valid California state law.”144 The panel 
invoked one of its own decisions, United States v. McCoy, in which defendant Rhonda McCoy 
had been charged for violations of federal child pornography statutes. A trial court acquitted her 
because the criminal activity for which she was indicted, possessing a photograph of herself and 
her ten-year-old daughter while unclothed in the privacy of their own residence, was within a 
separate and distinct class of activity than that targeted by the statute.145 McCoy had no intention 
of entering the photograph into interstate or foreign commerce; it was intended for her family’s 
own private use.   
The three-judge panel also evaluated the case in terms of key Commerce Clause holdings set 
out in Lopez, and reiterated in Morrison, regarding regulation of intrastate economic activity and 
criminal statutes. The judges formulated these holdings as a four-factor test: “(1) whether the 
statute regulates commerce or any sort of economic enterprise; (2) whether the statute contains 
any ‘express jurisdictional element that might limit its reach to a discrete set’ of cases; (3) 
whether the statute or its legislative history contains ‘express congressional findings’ regarding 
the effects of the regulated activity upon interstate commerce; and (4) whether the link between 
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the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is ‘attenuated’” – referring 
here, it seems, to the “costs of crime” and “national productivity” arguments thoroughly 
discounted in Lopez.146 
The circuit court panel concluded that, “as applied to the limited class of activities presented 
by this case,” the first Lopez-Morrison factor did not weigh in favor of the constitutionality of 
the CSA. Without systematically distinguishing cultivation from consumption or possession, the 
circuit court concluded that “[t]he cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal 
purposes and not for exchange or distribution is not properly characterized as commercial or 
economic activity.” In contrast to the growing of corn for home consumption under review in 
Wickard v. Filburn, there was no commercial character whatsoever in the gifting of marijuana by 
the Does to Raich. By difficult-to-ascertain reasoning, the circuit court distinguished also the 
growing of corn for home consumption and the fact that Monson grew her marijuana plants 
purely for her own use, not as part of a commercial crop.147    
According to the circuit court panel in its discussion of the second Lopez-Morrison factor 
and, thus, dealing with the CSA as a criminal statute, the act contained no express jurisdictional 
element that might limit its reach to a discrete set of cases that substantially affected interstate 
commerce. The act was, consequently, without the bounds of commerce power and 
unconstitutional as applied to the intrastate activities of the appellants. As shown above, 
however, the opening section of the CSA, that is, § 801, clearly announced the finding and 
declaration of Congress that “a major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows 
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through interstate and foreign commerce” and that “[i]ncidents of the traffic which are not an 
integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and 
possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce . . . . ” It 
appears that the three-judge panel, simply, ignored this part of the CSA and considered only the 
text of that section of the act setting out the drugs to be included in Schedule I and those sections 
that defined offenses and penalties.148  
The assessment by the circuit court panel of the CSA under the third Lopez-Morrison 
factor also militated against upholding the act under the commerce clause for the purposes of 
enforcement against the appellants. Now, while taking cognizance of the expressed 
congressional finding and declaration set out in § 801 of the CSA, the judges found the statute 
lacking. Although Congress had gathered evidence and determined that “control of the intrastate 
incidents in the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the 
interstate incidents of such traffic,” the judges concluded that Congress had not gathered 
evidence regarding the class of activities in question in the case at hand – meaning the 
possession, use, or cultivation of medical marijuana. To undergird this determination, the court 
emphasized a key holding in Lopez, set out verbatim in Morrison: 
“[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the 
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation . . . . Rather, whether particular 
operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power 
of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and 
can be settled finally only by this Court.”149  
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Notwithstanding that the circuit court panel held possessing, cultivating or using medical 
marijuana not to be economic or commercial activity, it assessed the constitutionality of the CSA 
as applied to the appellants under the fourth factor it drew from Lopez and Morrison. According 
to the judges, the activity under consideration was too attenuated, even in the aggregate, to 
substantially effect interstate commerce. Considering the intended use of the marijuana in this 
case, the judges ruled that the crop was non-fungible and had no likelihood of ever entering a 
market. As well, the amount of cannabis that either Raich or Monson might buy, were they to do 
so only to meet their medical needs, would be so limited as to have virtually no effect upon the 
street price of the substance. Considering all four Lopez-Morrison factors, the circuit court three-
judge panel declared that the “CSA, as applied to the appellants, is likely unconstitutional.”150    
Judge C. Arlen Beam dissented in Raich v. Ashcroft, arguing that there was no significant 
difference between the facts and statute law giving rise to the decision in Wickard and the 
present case. “Except for why the marijuana at issue in this case is consumed, i.e., for the 
medicinal rather than nutritional purposes, plaintiffs’ conduct is entirely indistinguishable from 
that of Mr. Filburn’s.”151 Further, the attenuation argument posed by the majority was addressed 
and dispensed with in Wickard. Just as Filburn would have to purchase wheat in the market, and 
thereby help sustain high wheat prices, so would the plaintiffs have to purchase marijuana “or 
possibly, a (federally) legally prescribed and dispensed drug such as Marinol – both of which are 
articles of interstate commerce.”152 Judge Beam added, “I don’t believe that the commodity 
involved in Wickard was composed of any parts that had ever moved in interstate commerce. Yet 
the grain was still deemed by the Supreme Court to be the proper subject of congressional 
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regulation through the commerce power.”153 It seems clear that Judge Beam saw this case as one 
that should have been easily decided in keeping with the 1942 precedent. And it seemed just as 
obvious to many observers that the Justice Department would not allow the three-judge panel of 
the Ninth Circuit Court ruling to stand without another fight.                  
The issue of medical marijuana went beyond the borders of California, and the appeal by the 
Department of Justice drew widespread attention. Nine states, including California and several 
others in the West, had passed statutes easing or eliminating penalties for medical use of 
marijuana. In February, the appeal by the Justice Department to the full Ninth Circuit was 
refused. The Ninth Circuit Court stood by the ruling of its three-judge panel.154  In response, the 
government applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on April 28, 2004, and the 
Court agreed to a late November hearing. Newspapers around the country heralded the upcoming 
event. Jurists, partisans, marijuana activists, and many ordinary citizens were eager to see if the 
New Federalism advocated by the Court’s most conservative justices would hold in the face of 
something as controversial as the use of medical marijuana, which more than a few Americans 
viewed as a clever ruse to open the door to legalized recreational cannabis.155 The case also 
brought together some unlikely alliances. Authorities in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, 
typically states dominated by social conservatives, filed amicus briefs supporting the marijuana 
users with the aim of underscoring states’ rights.  Likewise, liberal groups, such as the 
Community Rights Council, an environmentalist organization, joined hands with the Justice 
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Department to ensure that federal statutes upon which their various causes depended would 
remain secure. 
Oral arguments in what would be styled Gonzales v. Raich were presented before a crowded 
United States Supreme Court on November 29, 2004. Representing the government was Acting 
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement. He had a long record of presenting cases under Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and, so, was no stranger to appearing before the Supreme Court.156 
Representing Raich and her co-respondents was Randy Barnett, making his first appearance 
before the Court. Presiding over the Court was the eighty-five-year-old Associate Justice John 
Paul Stevens, in lieu of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who had been under treatment for 
thyroid cancer since mid-October and continued to work from home; Justice Stevens announced 
that Rehnquist would participate in the case by reading the briefs and the argument transcripts.157     
The arguments that Acting Solicitor General Clement put forth were based primarily on 
Wickard v. Filburn. He argued that, whether or not any commodity was being bought or sold, 
“the whole point of the Wickard case was to extend rationales that applied previously to 
commerce to activity that the Court described as economic but not commercial.”158 It was clear, 
he reasoned, that if medicinal consumers of marijuana grew their own product, they would not 
have to buy cannabis in the black market, which included the interstate market. And prices in 
those markets would, consequently, decrease, if only infinitesimally, thus creating an economic 
impact, and a negative one at that, considering federal law enforcement efforts to enforce the 
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CSA. Further, he argued, neither the State of California nor the federal government could 
differentiate recreational marijuana from medical marijuana. According to Clement, such 
inability to differentiate would “frustrate Congress’ goal in promoting health,” although he did 
not address here the fact that the promotion of health was traditionally a responsibility assumed 
by the states.159 Clement also argued that medical marijuana was something of an oxymoron 
since Congress and the Food and Drug Administration had determined that marijuana had no 
medicinal value, at least in its unprocessed form. Pointing out that there were over 400 different 
chemical components in crude marijuana, Clement argued that Marinol, an oral medication 
derived from the beneficial components of marijuana and available as a Schedule III drug, was a 
better alternative than smoking the plant in its unrefined form, even if ingesting Marinol took 
longer than smoking cannabis to bring the therapeutic compounds in cannabis into the 
bloodstream. Clement seemed to find a reasonably receptive audience among the justices, 
needing only to parry rather mild questioning. Only Justice Sandra Day O’Connor pressed 
Clement. She asked him to explain how this case differed from those presented in Lopez and 
Morrison. Justice O’Connor differentiated the present case from Wickard by noting that part of 
farmer Filburn’s corn crop was intended to enter the marketplace, while, in this case, the product 
was intended for personal consumption only. Clement countered by stating that, “I think it might 
be a bit optimistic to think that none of the marijuana that’s produced consistent with California 
law would be diverted into the national market for marijuana . . . . I don’t think that there’s any 
reason to assume that California is going to have some sort of almost unnatural ability to keep 
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one part of a fungible national drug market separate.”160 Having defended the position of the 
government, Clement, yielded the floor to Barnett. 
Randy Barnett, on behalf of the respondents, endeavored to make two main points. First, “the 
class of activities involved in this case are non-economic and wholly intrastate” and second, “the 
federal prohibition of this class of activities . . . is not an essential part of a larger regulatory 
scheme that would be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” Perhaps seeking to 
appeal most to the five justices who had constituted the majorities in Lopez and Morrison, 
Barnett also warned that, “If you accept the government’s contrary contentions on either of these 
two points, Ashcroft v. Raich will replace Wickard v. Filburn as the most far-reaching example 
of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.”161  
But Barnett faced some trenchant questioning. In response to his opening, justices David 
Souter and Stephen Breyer peppered him with queries about how to differentiate a valuable street 
drug like marijuana from that grown for personal medicinal use. Likewise, Justice Antonin 
Scalia was critical of Barnett’s attempt to carve out a narrow category of cannabis users to be 
exempt from the constraints of the Controlled Substances Act. “What basis is there to draw it 
that narrowly? I mean, I guess if we . . . we could say people whose last name begins with a Z. 
You know, that would narrow the category too.” Referencing the Court’s key 1942 precedent, 
Justice Scalia observed that medical marijuana grown for personal use “sounds like Wickard to 
me . . . . always used to laugh at Wickard, but that’s . . . that what Wickard said.”162  
To cast the intrastate activities of his clients outside the scope of the substantial effects test 
articulated in Lopez, Barnett continued to argue that his clients were not engaged in economic 
                                                 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
496 
 
activity and that their activity was different from the economic activity of drug traffickers. It 
should be observed here that drug trafficking for profit was, under standard definitions, at least, 
economic activity and commerce, while cultivating or consuming marijuana were economic 
activities but not commerce – and merely possessing marijuana was neither economic activity 
nor commerce. But Barnett tried to make his case by eliding some of these distinctions, which, 
because of the judicial precedents in play, took on critical legal importance. For example, he 
asked the Court to consider the difference between marital sex, a non-economic activity, and 
prostitution, an economic activity.  Omitting to point out the additional commercial nature of the 
latter activity, Barnett declared, “We could be talking about virtually the same act.”163 
Unconvinced, Justice Breyer moved on to suggest that, perhaps, rather than attempting to find 
the Controlled Substances Act unconstitutional, Barnett and his clients might wish to pursue 
action with the FDA to have medical marijuana taken off Schedule I or perhaps sue them if they 
refused for “an abuse of discretion.” Breyer added, “And while the FDA can make mistakes, I 
guess medicine by regulation is better than medicine by referendum.”164 
In the aftermath of oral arguments, it seemed apparent to knowledgeable jurists and policy 
experts that the Supreme Court would not declare the Controlled Substances Act unconstitutional 
as applied to medical marijuana cultivators and consumers because the Wickard precedent was 
too foundational for myriad federal regulations and the legalization of medical marijuana too 
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controversial. The headlines were indicative: “States’ Rights Defense Falters in Medical 
Marijuana Case”; “High Court Not Receptive to Marijuana Case -- Medical Use Seen as Subject 
to Regulations”; and “Court Skeptical on Medical Marijuana – Five Justices Seemed Disinclined 
to Rule for Patients suing to Prevent Federal Confiscation of their Drugs.”165 In February 2005, 
President George W. Bush appointed his former white house counsel Alberto R. Gonzales 
United States Attorney General, who aggressively set about prosecuting the war on terror – 
while, in lieu of John Ashcroft, also becoming a party to the litigation involving Raich and 
Monson. These two women, in the meantime, continued medical marijuana therapy undeterred 
by the likely negative ruling to come. 
Justice John Paul Stevens announced the decision of the Court in Gonzales v. Raich on June 
6, 2005.  He made it clear with his oral presentation that the case had been “extremely 
troublesome” for the justices because “respondents have made such a strong showing that they 
will suffer irreparable harm if denied the use of marijuana to treat their serious medical illness.” 
But be that as it may, he conveyed without equivocation that the federal government would 
continue to regulate and police marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance:  
[T]he question before us is not whether marijuana does in fact have valid therapeutic 
purposes, nor whether it is a good policy for the Federal Government to enforce the 
Controlled Substance Act in these circumstances. Rather, the only question before us is 
whether Congress has the power to prohibit respondents’ activities. . . . Our case law 
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firmly establishes that Congress has the power to regulate purely local activities when 
necessary to implement a comprehensive national regulatory program.166 
 
As indicated, the majority came to its decision by relying on the substantial effects and 
ancillary comprehensive regulatory scheme rationales set out in Lopez and reiterated in 
Morrison. According to Justice Stevens, “Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to 
regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”167 Justice Stevens relied heavily upon Wickard v. 
Filburn, concluding that “[t]he similarities between this case and Wickard are striking.”168 First, 
he stressed that, as in Wickard, Congress had a rational basis for including the cultivation, 
possession, and use of marijuana for medical purposes in the larger regulatory scheme set out by 
the Controlled Substances Act – and that, similarly to the situation in Wickard, “leaving home-
consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market 
conditions.”169 More important, and in keeping with his oral presentation, Justice Stevens 
concluded that the regulation of the purely intrastate cultivation, use, and possession of 
marijuana, even if only for personal medicinal purposes, was essential for the attainment of the 
ends declared for the Controlled Substances Act:  
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are 
quintessentially economic . . . . We have no difficulty concluding that Congress acted 
rationally in determining that none of the characteristics making up the purported class, 
whether viewed individually or in the aggregate, compelled an exemption from the CSA; 
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rather, the subdivided class of activities defined by the Court of Appeals was an essential 
part of the larger regulatory scheme.170  
 
With substantially less authority, it seems, Justice Stevens invoked Perez v. United States (1971) 
and Maryland v. Wirtz (1968) to declare that when a federal court determined that Congress had 
a rational basis to establish a comprehensive scheme regulating a broad class of economic or 
commercial activities, it was powerless to excise any sub-class of intrastate activities from this 
larger class.171  
Justice Scalia, in his words, offered a “more nuanced” opinion to agree with the decision 
of the majority. He, too, took the view that the case at hand bore no resemblance to Lopez or 
Morrison, since neither of them dealt with a comprehensive regulatory scheme such as the 
Controlled Substances Act. He also agreed with the holding of the majority that the CSA may be 
validly applied to the intrastate “cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana for 
personal medicinal use” – and that such regulation was essential to the operation of the 
comprehensive regulatory scheme. His principle beef was with the way the majority seemed to 
suggest, in imperative terms, that the Commerce Power alone authorized Congress, for the 
purposes of upholding the scheme, to regulate these intrastate activities with the substantial 
effects rationale. Scalia emphasized that the power of Congress to regulate intrastate activities 
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that were “not themselves part of interstate commerce” derived from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause set out in Article I, Section 8. While the power provided thereby to make comprehensive 
regulation effective “commonly overlaps with the authority to regulate economic activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce . . . the two are distinct.” Included within the reach of the 
ancillary authority provided by the Necessary and Proper Clause, at its outer limits, were non-
economic and non-commercial intrastate activities that did not affect interstate commerce. And 
Justice Scalia hastened to point out that the Court had articulated the parameters of this rule in 
Lopez:  
As we implicitly acknowledged in Lopez . . . Congress’s authority to enact laws 
necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws 
directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Though the conduct in Lopez was not economic, the Court nevertheless recognized that it 
could be regulated as ‘an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.’ This statement referred to those cases permitting the regulation of intrastate 
activities “which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted 
power.”172  
Justice Scalia does not appear to have taken too seriously the declaration made by Justice 
Stevens that federal courts were powerless to excise a sub-class of activities from a larger class 
of activities comprehensively regulated by Congress under its commerce power. His discussion 
of the relevant seminal New Deal-era decisions, including Wrightwood Dairy and Darby, 
indicated that the federal courts were fully authorized, if not duty bound, to exclude from a valid 
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comprehensive regulatory scheme a marginal sub-class of intrastate activities not “necessary” or 
“essential” or “appropriate” for giving effect to the larger scheme. Neither the Commerce Clause 
nor that provision in tandem with the Necessary and Proper Clause could support such a use of 
the commerce power, and, the Court, not Congress, had been the final arbiter of constitutional 
questions since Marbury v. Madison.173  
As well, Justice Scalia maintained, Lopez and Morrison had “rejected the argument that 
Congress may regulate noneconomic activity based solely on the effect that it may have on 
interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences.” To permit the commerce power to 
reach noneconomic intrastate activity with such an attenuated nexus with interstate commerce 
would “obliterate what is national and what is local.”174 While conceding that the power of 
Congress to reach intrastate activity with the substantial effects rationale was broad, “it does not 
permit the Court to ‘pile inference upon inference’ . . .  to establish that noneconomic activity has 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”175   
Justice O’Connor based her dissenting opinion on federalism principles and a strenuous 
objection to the majority’s position on the scope of commerce power under its substantial effects 
rationale. First, she condemned the decision of the Court for helping to undercut “[o]ne of 
federalism’s chief virtues,” that is, the capacity of the states, under their “core police powers,” to 
serve, in a changing world, as laboratories for experimenting with new laws and institutions to 
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“protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”176 To bolster this point, Justice 
O’Connor quoted from James Madison’s Federalist, No. 45: “The powers reserved to the several 
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, 
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the 
State.”177 Next, O’Connor decried the majority’s definition of “economic activity” that the 
commerce power might reach under its substantial effects test:  
The Court’s definition of economic activity is breathtaking. It defines as economic any 
activity involving the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities 
. . . . [The] Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory 
reach.178 
 
In this connection, Justice O’Connor appears to have been persuaded by the arguments made by 
counsel for respondents Randy Barnett that almost all activities have commercial and non-
commercial versions. “Most commercial goods or services have some sort of privately 
producible analogue. Home care substitutes for daycare. Charades games substitute for movie 
tickets.  Backyard or windowsill gardening substitutes for going to the supermarket.” In 
O’Connor’s view, if the Court wished to proceed along its current path, then virtually all forms 
of human activity would have the potential to be legally considered economic activity.179  
If the dissenting opinion of Justice O’Connor relied less on Court precedents than the ruling 
of the majority, the dissent penned by Justice Thomas was even less so constrained.  He quoted 
from works by the Founders, especially James Madison and Alexander Hamilton to remind his 
colleagues of the original purpose of the Commerce Clause as well as its definition at the time 
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the states ratified the Constitution. “In the early days of the Republic, it would have been 
unthinkable that Congress could prohibit the local cultivation, possession, and consumption of 
marijuana.”180 And yet, Thomas lamented, Congress now regulates activities that are wholly 
intrastate in nature, including the use of products that do not even move in commerce. “If 
Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtually anything – 
and the Federal Government is no longer one of limited and enumerated powers.”181 He noted 
that, unlike the Gun-Free School Zone Act and the Violence Against Women Act, the Controlled 
Substances Act cast so broad a net that, rather than simply regulate illegal drugs that crossed 
state lines for sale, it reached purely intrastate activity with no commercial nexus. With its 
passage of the CSA, “Congress has encroached on States’ traditional police powers to define the 
criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”182 Further, he 
complained, if California had established a regulatory scheme that set the conduct of the 
respondents apart from other marijuana producers and consumers with state-mandated medical 
identification cards, then why should the federal government not respect that? “We normally 
presume that States enforce their own laws,” he pointed out. 183 Additionally, he stressed, other 
high-risk drugs regulated by the Controlled Substances Act, such as morphine and 
amphetamines, were available by prescription. Why not marijuana? “No one argues that 
permitting use of these drugs under medical supervision has undermined the CSA’s 
restrictions.”184 
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Justice Thomas homed in on the “substantial effects” test used by the Court for Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence and, again, deplored how far some of the justices had drifted from the text 
of the Constitution. Calling the substantial effects test “rootless and malleable,” he complained 
that the Court no longer even bothered to ask whether a statute regulated outside the bounds of 
interstate commerce, which he understood to be the buying and selling of goods and services 
across state lines. Instead, the question, all too often, had become whether a statute properly 
extended to intrastate economic activities that substantially affected interstate commerce. 185 
Further, he bemoaned, similarly to Justice O’Connor, that the Court had defined “economic 
activity” in the broadest possible terms, that is, “the production, distribution, and consumption of 
commodities.”186 Frustrated with the abuse of the rubric and how it had come to be interpreted, 
he lashed out at his colleagues, stating, “If the majority is to be taken seriously, the Federal 
Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 
50 States.”187  
Last, Thomas rejected the majority declaration that, while the Controlled Substances Act was 
a reasonable assertion of commerce power to regulate comprehensively a class of activities, it 
was not judicially possible to excise from the CSA a sub-class of intrastate activities such as the 
personal cultivation, use, and possession of medical marijuana. Whether the excision of this sub-
class of activities would undercut the entire regulatory scheme of the statute, ultimately, 
remained a decision of the Court.  According to Justice Thomas, and echoing a similar complaint 
made by Justice O’Connor, “it is implausible that this Court could set aside entire portions of the 
United States Code as outside Congress’ power in Lopez and Morrison, but it cannot engage in 
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the more restrained practice of invalidating particular applications of the CSA that are beyond 
Congress’ power.”188 All the views of the stalwart conservative justice were undoubtedly music 
to the ears of constitutional conservatives. But they had not changed the outcome in Gonzales v. 
Raich.  
Although the impact of the decision in Gonzales v. Raich was a blow to the nine states whose 
medical marijuana statutes had been preempted, more important for many others was what the 
ruling meant for the future of federalism. The judgments of the four liberal justices were not 
especially surprising, nor were those of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O’Connor and 
Thomas. That Justice Kennedy joined with the four more liberal justices was not wholly 
unexpected. But that choice was certainly unwelcomed by originalists, who believed that, as one 
of the Court’s swing voters, his allegiance to New Federalism Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
was critical for its success. The big surprise to many was the decision of Justice Scalia to side 
with the majority, if only with his concurring opinion. Those hoping to limit further the size and 
scope of the federal government were deflated by Scalia’s apparent fickleness, which seemed to 
suggest that his social conservatism had trumped his originalist principles. Linda Greenhouse of 
The New York Times captured the conservative letdown in the immediate aftermath of the 
decision. In a piece she published in the paper on June 12, 2005, she reported that Roger Pilon of 
the libertarian Cato Institute had concluded that Justice Scalia was a “fair-weather federalist.” 
Michael S. Greve of the conservative American Enterprise Institute surmised that “[t]he 
federalism boomlet has fizzled . . . . [t]he court was never clear about what it wanted to 
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accomplish or how the revolution would play itself out when the first modest steps bumped up 
against entrenched political structures.”189  
According to Greenhouse, then Georgetown University Law Center Professor Mark Tushnet, 
a well-known proponent of critical legal studies and a confirmed left-of-center liberal, revealed 
that he believed the Court’s earlier decisions had “brought the justices to a threshold that was far 
away when Rehnquist joined the court . . . . [but] they have yet to decide whether to stay where 
they are, or continue on, or retreat.” Indicative of his liberal-left orientation, Tushnet referred to 
Gonzales v. Raich as an “easy case . . . at the heart of national regulatory authority” and 
cautioned that the ruling did not necessarily mean a retreat.190  
Certainly, the decision of the Supreme Court in a related Commerce Clause case ripe for 
review at about the same time it decided Gonzales v. Raich indicated that a majority of its 
justices might continue to affirm comprehensive regulatory schemes. In the same month as the 
Court issued its decision in Raich, it opted not to review the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal 
decision GDF Realty Investments v. Norton. That case involved a Commerce Clause challenge to 
the enforcement of provisions set out in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). GDF Realty applied 
for a permit to build on its 200-acre rural tract in Travis County, Texas, which featured a rocky 
topography with water percolating through limestone rock that created sinkholes and caves. The 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service denied the permit, basing its decision on a finding that some of 
the caves were populated by six endangered species of tiny arachnids and insects.191 By 
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declining to review the decision, the Supreme Court permitted the ruling of the Fifth Circuit 
Court in favor of the ESA to stand, with effects adverse to the economic interests of land owners 
in that part of the country and elsewhere. More than a few ordinary Texans considered the 
decision of the Court to be a fit measure of its willingness to allow Congress and administrative 
agencies to employ federal regulatory authority, in the name of the commerce power, to undercut 
further property rights, suppress productive employment of private resources, and jeopardize the 
fortunes of those who made a living with such enterprise.192  
    Richard A. Epstein concludes that Gonzales v. Raich reversed the “Lopez synthesis.” 
Notwithstanding that Monson and Raich had “structured their transactions so as to eliminate all 
possible interstate economic transactions,” the substantial effects aggregation rule set out in 
Wickard v. Filburn and the comprehensive regulatory scheme rationale articulated in Perez v. 
United States constituted a “one-two punch” sufficient to render the New Federalism Commerce 
Clause decisions defunct.193 Other knowledgeable commentators see Raich as a return to pre-
Lopez rational basis review of Commerce Clause cases, that is, a policy of deference by the 
Court to reasonable legislation passed by Congress under its commerce power to achieve a 
legitimate end, the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny. In this connection, Jonathan H. Adler 
and Mollie Lee maintain that Raich constituted a repudiation of or significant retreat from Lopez. 
Michael C. Blumm and George A. Kimbrell conclude that, under the circumstances, Lopez and 
                                                 
Kretschmarr Cave Mold Beetle, which are subterranean insects. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Circuit, 
2003). 
192 Through 2011, at least, the Court would turn down six applications for review challenging the 
Endangered Species Act. Greg Stohr, “Endangered Species Act Survives Challenge at U.S. High 
Court,” Bloomberg News, October 31, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-
31/endangered-species-act-survives-challenge-at-u-s-high-court.html (accessed March 27, 2014). 
193 Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited 
Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 184-185. 
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Morrison had been aberrations in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the Court rather than a 
substantial break from that which the Court had established with the New Deal.194   
But Lawrence B. Solum suggests there is an alternative way to interpret Gonzales v. 
Raich – one that situates the decision coherently within the Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause 
line of decisions and larger New Federalism jurisprudence. Jurists who fervently embraced 
originalist understandings undoubtedly were disappointed with Raich.195 But, given it was 
always “radically implausible” for the Rehnquist Court to issue rulings that would overturn a 
substantial amount of New Deal and Great Society legislation, its conservative majorities opted 
for a second-best alternative. And this was to “somehow accept the legal rules generated by the 
New Deal Settlement, as those rules currently exist” – but refrain from endorsing “a dynamic 
understanding of the content of the settlement.” In plain terms, the Rehnquist Court decisions 
construed New Deal Commerce Clause holdings strictly and avoided establishing precedents that 
further expanded commerce power at the expense of the states – but without overturning seminal 
New Deal decisions. According to Solum, New Federalism decisions can be summarized with a 
                                                 
194 Jonathan H. Adler, “Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose,” Lewis 
& Clark Law Review, Vol. 9 (2005): 751-778; Mollie Lee, “Environmental Economics: A 
Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 116 (2006): 456-
492, 468; Michael C. Blumm and George A. Kimbrell, “Gonzales v. Raich, the ‘Comprehensive 
Scheme’ Principle, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act,” Environmental 
Law Review, Vol. 35 (2005): 491-498, 497. But Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., concluded that it was not 
possible to discern whether the opinions rendered in Raich applied the new standards set out in 
Lopez and reiterated in Morrison. Pushaw, “The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause 
Counter- Revolution?” Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 9 (2005): 879-914, 884. 
195 Lawrence B. Solum, “How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt,” Washington 
University Law Review, Vol. 91 (2013): 1-58, 49-54, referencing, inter alia, Charles H. Clarke, 
“Supreme Court Assault on the Constitutional Settlement of the New Deal: Garcia and National 
League of Cities,” Northern Illinois University Law Review, Vol. 6 (1986): 39-79; Randy E. 
Barnett, “The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause,” University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol. 68 (2001): 101-147.  
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slogan he borrows from a piece authored by Randy Barnett reflecting on Rehnquist Court 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence: “this far, and no further.” Solum, thus, casts the New 
Federalism decisions, through Raich, as “The Frozen New Deal Settlement.”196 
The federal statute that gave rise to Gonzales v. Raich was the product of gradual changes in 
American law, dating to the nineteenth century, which permitted a total ban on beverage alcohol 
and, thereby, retooled constitutional understanding to permit the absolute proscription of other 
mind-altering intoxicants. Federal government experimentation with nominal tax policies that, in 
fact, regulated and suppressed cannabis also constituted an important precursor of the 1970 
Controlled Substances Act – which distinguished itself as the first anti-illicit drug measure to be 
based on the Commerce Clause. This comprehensive regulatory regime, however, also derived 
from growing public trepidation after 1900 with a narcotic associated originally with black jazz 
musicians, underground criminality, the rapid immigration of Mexican peasants whose 
customary use of marijuana seemed to portend “reefer madness,” and a threatening drug culture 
rooted in the 1960s counterculture insurgency that made cannabis a powerful emblem of culture 
wars conflict through the early twenty-first century. Political contention over the problem of 
increasing drug abuse and addiction, along with a concerted campaign by marijuana advocates to 
legalize cannabis and then free medical marijuana from federal and state controls, produced the 
California Compassionate Use Act of 1996 and, in turn, the challenge to the CSA ban on 
cannabis that became Gonzales v. Raich.  
                                                 
196 Solum, “How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt,” 50-54; Randy Barnett, 
“‘This Far and No Farther’: Baselines and the Individual Insurance Mandate, Volokh Conspiracy, 
January 22, 2012. http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/22/this-far-and-no-farther-baselines-and-the-
individual-insurance-mandate (accessed November 2, 2017). 
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The decision in Raich certainly did not meet the approval of conservatives who had hoped to 
see New Federalism principles, as in Lopez and Morrison, further circumscribe the commerce 
power. On the other hand, intense culture wars disputation seems to have distorted somewhat the 
expectations and perception of the decision for conservatives and liberals alike. After all, Raich 
affirmed the 1970 Controlled Substances Act, which had constituted an expansive deployment of 
commerce power in keeping with a cause that conservatives, at the opening of the culture wars, 
had held near and dear – the vigorous suppression of illegal drug trafficking and drug abuse. For 
thirty-five years, the CSA had categorically proscribed the possession, distribution, and use of 
cannabis. And yet the decision of the more liberal members of the Court in Raich not to 
recognize an exception to the proscription fueled the ire of conservative partisans. Even Justice 
Scalia could not escape their censure – an example of how culture wars imperatives could 
rearrange partisan priorities. Liberal jurists undoubtedly could chuckle at the way the liberal 
majority in Raich relied on New Federalism Commerce Clause jurisprudence to sustain the 
congressional deployment of commerce power fully to the new limits identified in Lopez – albeit 
with a result that flouted well-established liberal positions on drug policy, criminal law 
enforcement, and racial justice. But liberal partisans who demanded that federal authorities 
exclude medical marijuana from the CSA proscription, if only for humanitarian reasons, were no 
more satisfied with the decision in Raich than civil libertarians who, simply, preferred that 
recreational marijuana be made legal in all states and permitted by federal law.   
 Gonzales v. Raich, in fact, reiterated holdings set out in Lopez and reinforced by 
Morrison, making it clear, once again, that the Supreme Court intended to enforce the outer 
limits of the commerce power rather than, as before Lopez, allow the Commerce Clause to serve 
as an open-ended grant of general legislative authority. The decision in Gonzales v. Raich did not 
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contradict or undercut any of the major holdings in those two decisions. In fact, the majority in 
Raich affirmed the articulation of the substantial effects test set out in Lopez and reiterated in 
Morrison, holding again that commerce power alone could not extend so far as to reach intrastate 
non-economic activity, even if such activity substantially affected interstate commerce. As in 
Lopez and Morrison, the majority agreed that the Constitution permitted Congress to regulate 
intrastate non-economic and non-commercial activity – but only if such was essential to sustain 
the effectiveness of a comprehensive regulatory regime well-grounded in the commerce power. 
Raich did not draw into question holdings in Morrison declaring that Congress could not 
circumvent the limited grant of power set out in the Commerce Clause by issuing a legislative 
finding and declaration that demonstrated only an “attenuated” connection between a non-
economic or non-commercial intrastate activity and interstate commerce. The decision in Raich 
did not suggest that the Court would abandon its commitment to viewing with skepticism 
congressional regulatory measures that encroached upon the sovereign authority of the states. As 
discussed, for thirty-five years before the decision, Congress had readily exercised the power to 
regulate controlled substances. Upholding the CSA ban on medical marijuana, notwithstanding 
the strenuous complaints of justices O’Connor and Thomas, did not constitute any kind of new 
threat to well-established areas of state government authority. Notwithstanding the superheated 
partisan conflict over the legalization of medical marijuana, the decision in Gonzales v. Raich 
comported entirely with other seminal Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions. These 
decisions, including Raich, held the line against the further expansion of commerce power that 
had commenced during the New Deal – locking in place the articulation of New Federalism 
Commerce Clause doctrines set out by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez. 
  
512 
 
 
513 
 
 
Chapter Eight 
 
A Bridge Too Far: Obamacare, the Individual Mandate,  
and N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius (2012) 
 
No single piece of congressional legislation based on the Commerce Clause since the New 
Deal raised the hackles of conservative Americans more than the signature legislative 
accomplishment of President Barack H. Obama: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA). Passed in March 2010, by a margin of 60-39 in the Senate and 219-212 in the House, 
and without a single Republican vote in support of it, the Affordable Care Act was highly 
controversial because of its individual mandate, to be enforced with a civil penalty, requiring 
most Americans to carry some form of health insurance by 2014. To conservatives the ACA 
bastardized the Commerce Clause into something wholly unintended by the Founders – and in a 
way sure to devastate personal liberty. The ACA, after all, commanded commercial activity 
rather than simply regulating commerce that already existed. Now presided over by Chief Justice 
John Roberts, the Supreme Court responded to an avalanche of Commerce Clause-based 
challenges to the ACA – ultimately upholding the individual mandate with an unlikely resort to 
the power of Congress to tax, while refusing to accept that the commerce power could justify it.1 
The ACA and the fragmented decision of the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius both arose from 
and exacerbated the culture wars polarization that had been developing over the previous five 
decades. To liberal progressives, the ACA and the decision in Sebelius constituted a giant leap 
                                                 
1 Pub. L. 111-148 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
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forward in providing health care to millions who had been unable to afford it before, while 
further advancing the cause of economic equality for all. Notwithstanding that the Supreme 
Court had forestalled yet another attempt to expand radically the scope of commerce power  
 – some conservatives and libertarians were apoplectic because, in important respects, Sebelius 
extended federal power into the lives of ordinary Americans to an unprecedented degree.  
By the time Americans elected Barack Obama to the presidency in fall 2008, the adoption of 
a single-payer health care system had been a fundamental goal of the liberal-progressive wing of 
the Democrat Party for decades. The actions taken by President Bill Clinton and First Lady 
Hillary Rodham Clinton beginning in September 1993 to advance a health care overhaul, which 
included several steps toward nationalization of health care services, in fact, helps explain the 
strident objections to the Affordable Care Act in 2009 and 2010. The merits of “socialized 
medicine” are not the subject of enquiry here – only the extent to which culture wars contention 
over health care reform constituted the critical context driving the unusually rapid and 
controversial passage of the Affordable Health Care Act in 2010, the extraordinarily energetic 
response by conservatives to the initiative – and the response of one majority of justices in 
Sebelius that many conservatives might have appreciated more than they did. 
Early in his first term, President Obama called for Congress to pass legislation reforming 
health care in the United States with the aim of improving health insurance availability; in this 
way, he set about making good on a major campaign promise. His proposal was to spend 
$900 billion over ten years and include a government insurance plan, which he dubbed the 
“public option.” Government subsidized health insurance would compete with policies offered 
by private health insurance companies. According to the president, this competition would lower 
costs and improve the quality of health care services. Fundamental to his goal was to terminate 
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the longstanding practice by which health insurance providers refused to insure individuals with 
pre-existing medical problems. Critical for this project was to enlarge insurance pools across the 
country to increase insurance company revenues to cover the increased costs of health care 
services to be provided for such high-risk clients.  
In mid-June 2009, House Democrats presented a massive 1,017-page plan for remaking the 
health care system in the United States, indeed, one that was as voluminous and complex as that 
which the Clintons had advanced in 1993. On September 9, 2010, President Obama delivered a 
rousing speech to a joint session of Congress to announce the importance of the reform and his 
strenuous support for it. The ACA proved to be a highly controversial bill while debated in 
Congress. With a major national financial crisis having ensued in late 2007 and continuing in 
2009 and 2010, the number of Americans covered adequately by health insurance declined 
steadily in these years. From the perspective of conservatives and entitlement-conscious 
Republicans, the Democratic-controlled Congress seemed bent on passing a health care law, with 
its distinctive individual mandate, that seemed to threaten individual liberty and the established 
relationship between the United States government and its citizens. Undaunted, President Obama 
signed the bill into law on March 23, 2010, concluding an extraordinary legislative process that 
featured Democrat majorities in both houses of Congress asserting themselves audaciously in the 
face of strenuous Republic opposition. 
The Affordable Care Act was one of the most ambitious comprehensive regulatory schemes 
reliant on commerce power ever to be adopted. It effectively granted the federal government the 
authority to reconfigure major sectors of the national domestic economy, not only health care 
insurance, but also health care services, the federal-state program of Medicaid, and, to some 
extent, Medicare. Many ordinary Americans worried about the difficult-to-anticipate social and 
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economic consequences that might result from implementation of the ACA, with especially 
intense concerns focused on the possible disruption of patient-physician relations.2 
Intense disputes over the costs, practicality, mandates, and government subsidies imposed 
by the ACA obscured the ambitiousness and full extent of the scheme. Spread out over ten titles, 
were innovations dedicated to revamping the role of public health care programs; improving the 
quality and efficiency of health care services; preventing chronic disease, training and 
regimenting “the healthcare workforce,” providing transparency and program integrity for the 
keeping and institutional sharing of personal and aggregated health care information, and 
improving access to innovative medical therapies.3   
The individual mandate penalty set out in the Affordable Care Act applied variously, 
depending on the income of those required to obtain health insurance. The ACA exempted 
persons with an annual income below a specified level – in which case they would qualify for 
Medicaid subsidies to cover the costs. According to White House and Congressional Budget 
Office figures, the maximum share of income that enrollees would have to pay would vary 
depending on their incomes relative to the federal poverty level. Particularly, the ACA included 
the expansion of Medicaid eligibility for individuals earning annually up to 133% of the federal 
poverty level. Health and Human Services defined the poverty level in 2010 to be an annual 
income of $10,830 or less for an individual, increased by $3,740 for each household dependent. 
The ACA subsidized insurance premiums for individuals earning up to 400% of the federal 
poverty level.  
                                                 
2 Title I, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, approved 
March 23, 2010. 
3 Titles I-X, ibid. 
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As well, the ACA provided tax incentives for employers to provide health care benefits to 
their workers. Businesses that employed fifty or more full-time workers were to offer such 
employees prescribed health insurance coverage or face a penalty, known as the “employer 
mandate,” to take effect in 2015 or 2016, depending on the number of workers employed by a 
company. Companies with 100 or more full-time employees were to offer coverage to at least 
seventy percent of eligible workers in 2015, and that percentage would increase to ninety-five 
percent in 2016. Companies that employed from fifty to ninety-nine full-time workers were not 
required to comply until 2016.4  
As discussed, the ACA prohibited health insurance companies from denying coverage 
because of the pre-existing health condition of an applicant. The act established state government 
and federal government-operated insurance “exchanges” that would broker health insurance 
policies from government-approved health insurance companies. The ACA prohibited annual 
health insurance coverage maximum payments, or “caps,” and also provided financial incentives 
to private health care providers for health care research. 
According to the ACA, the costs of health insurance premiums would be offset by federal 
taxes, fees, and “cost saving measures.” These measures, which came mostly at the expense of 
certain categories of taxpayers, included new Medicare taxes for recipients deemed to be in high-
income brackets; new taxes on those who used indoor tanning services; and sizeable cuts to the 
existing Medicare Advantage program, which provided benefits for the elderly. As well, cost-
savings would accrue with the imposition of new fees on medical devices and pharmaceutical 
companies.5 The Congressional Budget Office buoyantly estimated in March 2010 that the 
                                                 
4 Sections 1511-1511, Part II, Title I, ibid. 
5 Title I, ibid. 
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overall effect of the ACA would be to reduce the federal deficit by $143 billion in the first 
decade of full-scale ACA operation. This appeared, by early 2016, to have been a somewhat 
inaccurate prediction. By March 2016, the CBO had revised its estimates: now, the program 
would cost the federal government $1.34 trillion over the ensuing decade, an increase of $136 
billion from the predictions made by the CBO in 2015. The CBO estimated that the ACA and its 
programs would cost a total of $110 billion for 2016 alone.6 
Set out among the many titles and subtitles were numerous progressive measures to 
improve social relations, albeit presented as also being beneficial to the improvement of health. 
For example, under the title “Creating Healthier Communities” was included a revision to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, which required all employers to provide “a reasonable break time for 
an employee to express breast milk for her nursing child” in “a place other than a bathroom,” 
indeed, an area that was to be “shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and 
the public, which may be used by an employee to express breast milk.” This section did, 
however, allow that a company employing less than fifty workers was “not to be subject to the 
requirements of this subsection, if such requirements would impose an undue hardship by 
causing the employer significant difficulty or expense when considered in relation to the size, 
financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s business.”7 
                                                 
6 Statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, “CBO’s Analysis 
of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010,” before the Subcommittee on 
Health Committee, Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of 
Representative, March 30, 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2011); Kerry 
Close, “Here’s How Many Billions Obamacare Will Cost in 2016,” Money, March 24, 2016. 
http://time.com/money/4271224/obamacare-cost-taxpayers-2016/ (accessed October 3, 2017). 
7 Section 4207, Subtitle C, Title IV, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119. 
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Certainly, the drafters of the Affordable Care Act relied primarily on the commerce 
power as a foundation for the comprehensive regulatory scheme and, particularly its individual 
mandate. Language in the opening title of the ACA declared that “Congress makes the following 
findings. . .  as a formal finding by Congress that . . . “[t]he individual responsibility requirement 
provided for in this section . . . is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects 
interstate commerce. . . .” The effects of the requirement on interstate commerce were set out at 
length, which included the finding that the requirement regulated activity that was commercial 
and economic in nature, that is, “economic and financial decisions about how and when health 
care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.” The requirement and other provisions 
of the ACA would add millions of new consumers to the health insurance market, thereby 
increasing the supply of, and demand for, such services; improve the financial security of 
families and reduce bankruptcies; and increase the size of insurance pools and reduce 
administrative costs. The lengthiest justification of the requirement explained the fundamental 
difficulty the ACA reorganization would have without the mandate: 
If there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance 
until they needed care. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse 
selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which 
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement is essential to creating effective 
health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are 
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.8  
 
While Congress relied almost exclusively on its commerce power to justify the ACA and 
the individual mandate penalty, other language in Section 1501, simply, described how the 
penalty for non-compliance was to be collected from the non-compliant individual – as a 
                                                 
8 (a)(2) (H), Subtitle F, Part I, Section 1501, ibid. 
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payment to be included with her or his annual income tax return. According to Section 1501, the 
penalty “was to be determined in an amount equal to one-twelfth of the determined amount due 
for premiums in any calendar year. “Any penalty imposed by this section with respect to any 
month shall be included with a taxpayer’s return . . .  for the taxable year which includes such 
month.”9 
After passage of the ACA in March 2010, it became clear to conservatives, libertarians, and 
others that they had little choice but to organize and become energetically involved in the 
political process. Such partisans perceived that the federal government, more than ever, was 
becoming too expansive, too expensive and, especially in the view of libertarians, too intrusive. 
One group of conservatives and libertarians organized as the Tea Party movement, which 
invoked Revolutionary Era rhetoric targeting tyrannical taxation, although liberal-left partisans 
satirized them as ignorant, half-crazed “tea baggers.” The November elections of that year, 
however, produced a landslide victory for Republican candidates at all levels of government. In 
the House of Representatives, sixty-three seats changed from Democrat to Republican. In the 
United States Senate, the Republican Party increased its number of seats by six, leaving 
Democrats in control with a slim 51-47 majority. The Republicans picked up 680 seats in state 
legislatures, giving the GOP control of both bodies in twenty-five states, while only sixteen 
remained in Democratic Party control. Governorships also changed hands; in the end, twenty-
nine of fifty governors were affiliated with the Republican Party.10    
                                                 
9 (a)(2) (A-H), Subtitle F, Part I, Section 1501, ibid. 
10 Chris Good, “In Redistricting Year, GOP Gains Edge,” The Atlantic, November 4, 2010. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/11/in-redistricting-year-gop-gains-a-big-
edge/66128/ (accessed March 17, 2016); Tim Store, “GOP Makes Historic State Legislature 
Gains in 2010,” Rasmussen Reports, December 10, 
2010http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/political_commentary/ 
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The fall 2010 national elections seemed to suggest that those who preferred more limited 
federal power might well become rapidly a pivotal force in American politics. However, 
conservatives and libertarians had to face the hard, cold truth – the fact that the Democrat party 
continued to control the Senate and neither that body nor President Barack Obama had any 
intention of acceding to the wishes of the Republican party-controlled House of Representatives. 
Understanding well that Democratic Party control of the federal government and a liberal-
leaning print and electronic media boded ill for reversing the ACA overreach, conservatives and 
libertarians turned to their state governments as the only authority powerful enough to act in their 
behalf. Several states adopted statutes to prevent their agencies from setting up ACA health care 
insurance “exchanges” in the aftermath of the ACA’s passage.11   
Across the United States, state governments and other interested parties soon challenged the 
Affordable Care Act on constitutional grounds in the federal courts.12 The ACA challenge that 
would eventually reach the United States Supreme Court originated in Florida.13 The state of 
Florida, along with the attorneys general or governors, or both, of twenty-six states, two 
individual plaintiffs, and the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), sued the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services in the northern district of Florida.  
Federal Judge Roger Vinson, appointed by President Reagan, faced two significant questions 
regarding the individual mandate and its civil penalty. First, did Congress have the power to 
                                                 
commentary_by_tim_storey/gop_makes_historic_state_legislative_gains_in_2010 (accessed 
March 17, 2016).    
11 Missouri Healthcare Freedom, Proposition C (August 2010).   
12 Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 2010 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); Thomas 
More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D.Mich.2010), Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D.Va.2010). 
13 Florida Ex. Rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 
(2011). 
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coerce Americans to purchase private health insurance? Second, if the individual mandate was 
unconstitutional, could the remainder of the Affordable Care Act survive separately? In his final 
analysis of these questions, Judge Vinson made it clear that he did not think it was within the 
realm of possibility that the Founders had understood the Commerce Clause to be sufficient 
authorization for Congress to coerce the individual to engage in commercial activity:   
It is difficult to imagine that a nation which began, at least in part, as the result of 
opposition to a British mandate giving the East India Company a monopoly and 
imposing a nominal tax on all tea sold in America would have set out to create a 
government with the power to force people to buy tea in the first place.14    
 
Judge Vinson concluded that only a Supreme Court ruling that would expand the scope of 
commerce power or a Constitutional amendment to that effect could justify the individual 
mandate.  Accord to him, “[b]ecause the individual mandate is unconstitutional and not 
severable, the entire Act must be declared void.”15 The Department of Health and Human 
Services immediately appealed the result to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta that reviewed the decision of the 
district court was composed of judges Joel Dubina, who had been appointed by President George 
H. W. Bush, and Frank Hull and Stanley Marcus, both of whom had been appointed by President 
Bill Clinton. Chief Judge Dubina and Associate Judge Hull wrote the majority opinion of the 
court, which, by a margin of 2-1, affirmed part of Judge Vinson’s ruling, while reversing another 
part.16 Dubina and Hull agreed that the individual mandate was unconstitutional. But they also 
took the view that the remainder of the ACA could stand. Such a result may have made sense; 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 1286. 
15 Ibid., 1306. 
16 State of Florida et al v. United States Department of Health and Human Services et al, 648 F. 
3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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there were hundreds of stand-alone provisions unrelated to the individual mandate. However, one 
of those provisions held that insurance companies must provide health care even to individuals 
with pre-existing conditions, and at an affordable price. Insurers had supported the ACA during 
its drafting; they had based this support on the assumption that premiums received from the 
larger pool of customers virtually guaranteed by the individual mandate would allow them to 
absorb the losses that providers were sure to incur by insuring all applicants regardless of their 
health condition and health care needs. The circuit court panel ruling, thus, caused a significant 
stir within the health insurance industry, as insurance company officers and stockholders 
pondered how they would survive if the opinion of the circuit court panel stood.17 Adding to the 
confusion was that the ruling of the Eleventh Circuit three-judge panel conflicted with that 
arrived at by the 2-1 June decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting in Cincinnati. 
The controversy was, thus, ripe to be heard by the Supreme Court. The legal challenge to the 
ACA in the Eleventh Circuit went forward as National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius.18   
NFIB v. Sebelius featured not only questions about the individual mandate and its 
severability from the law but also the Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA.  The plaintiffs 
argued that 1) the Commerce Clause did not empower Congress to compel individuals to buy 
health insurance; 2) the ACA requirement that the states expand Medicaid coverage or, 
                                                 
17 Brent Kendall, “Health Overhaul is Dealt Setback,” The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2013. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904006104576504383685080762 (accessed 
March 17, 2016). 
18 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), 183 L. Ed. 2d 
450, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
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otherwise, forfeit all existing Medicaid funding, was unconstitutionally coercive; and 3) the ACA 
requirement that employers with fifty or more employees purchase health insurance for their 
employees impermissibly infringed on the sovereign jurisdiction of the states. But, from the 
perspective of most Americans who were unsettled by the ACA, the prime objection was the 
individual mandate, which will be the focus here. 
The composition of the Supreme Court in June 2012 had changed significantly since it had 
rendered its 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Reich. Chief Justice Rehnquist had passed away in 
September 2005 shortly after that ruling. In his place sat Chief Justice John Roberts, whom 
President George W. Bush had appointed. President Bush had also appointed Justice Samuel 
Alito to replace the retired Justice O’Connor. President Obama had appointed Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, who replaced Justice Souter, who retired in 2009. He also appointed Justice Elena 
Kagan to replace Justice Stevens, who retired in 2010. The ideological balance of the Court, in 
the view of most experts, was not significantly changed from that which had prevailed on the 
Court at the end of the tenure of Chief Justice Rehnquist. There were, as of 2012, four generally 
conservative justices, four generally liberal justices, and Justice Kennedy, who maintained the 
unpredictable middle ground.  Based upon the various decisions of the circuit courts, how Justice 
Kennedy might vote on the challenges that had been raised to “Obamacare” was anyone’s 
guess.19  
On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to parts of three cross-
appeals from the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In December 2011, the Court 
                                                 
19 Massimo Calabresi, “Why Obamacare May Stand: Reading Justice Kennedy, the Supreme 
Court’s Swing Vote,” Time, March 30, 2012 at http://swampland.time.com/2012/03/30/why-
obamacare-may-stand-reading-justice-kennedy-the-supreme-courts-swing-vote/ (accessed March 
17, 2016). 
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announced that it would hear six hours of oral argumentation over a three-day period in late 
March 2012. To argue for the government was United States Solicitor General Donald B. 
Verrilli, appointed by President Obama in January 2011. Representing the Florida respondents 
was Paul D. Clement, who had taught briefly at the Georgetown University Law Center in 2008 
and shortly thereafter represented the National Rifle Association in the Supreme Court in 2010 
and, in 2011, the National Basketball Association players during labor negotiations during a 
2011 lockout. Michael A. Garvin, who represented the National Federation of Independent 
Business and other respondents, had argued before the Florida Supreme Court on behalf of 
George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election Florida recount controversy.  
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited ruling in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. With Chief Justice John Roberts authoring the 
majority opinion, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit in part and reversed it in part.  
Justice Anthony Kennedy, contrary to the expectations of some, did not cast the swing vote in 
the 5-4 ruling. Far more surprising to most was the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts. To the astonishment of jurists from all ideological points of view, Chief Justice Roberts 
held that the taxing power of Congress, not its commerce power, supported the controversial 
individual mandate. Joining the chief justice in this holding were justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.  
In a joint dissent, the more conservative justices, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and 
Samuel Alito, as well as Justice Kennedy, supported the conclusion of Chief Justice Roberts, set 
out in Part III-A of his opinion, that neither the Commerce Clause alone or in tandem with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause could support the individual mandate – but with notably different 
reasoning. Although the four dissenters did not formally join with the chief justice in this part of 
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his opinion, their support of its conclusion effectively constituted a joint concurrence. As well, 
Justice Thomas authored a separate opinion expressing his distinctive view on why the 
Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with the authority to institute the individual 
mandate.  
Also winning the support of a majority was the conclusion of Part IV of the chief 
justice’s opinion, which held unconstitutional the coercive features of the ACA Medicaid 
expansion, which authorized the government to withdraw all existing Medicaid funds from states 
that refused to adopt the expanded coverage provisions of the ACA. In this regard, the chief 
justice was joined by justices Breyer and Kagan, while the dissenting justices, Scalia, Thomas, 
Kennedy, and Alito, effectively concurred. Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion, dissenting 
in part and concurring in part, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and which justices Breyer and 
Kagan joined in four of five parts. Among other things, this opinion maintained that the 
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause did, in fact, in concert with the Commerce 
Clause support the individual mandate.20 
 The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, which sided in part with the more liberal justices 
and in part with the more conservative justices, opened with a notable paean to the principle that 
the Constitution, especially Article I, Section 8, had created a general government vested with 
only enumerated and limited powers. Language included in Part I of his opinion conveyed a 
                                                 
20 Strictly speaking, Chief Justice John Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and 
delivered the opinion of the Court in Parts I, II, and III–C of his opinion. In parts I, II, and III-C, 
the Chief Justice was joined by justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, 
and Elena Kagan. Effectively concurring with the chief justice in Part III-A of his opinion were 
the four joint dissenters, justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Samuel Alito. Part IV of the 
opinion authored by the chief justice was joined by justices Breyer and Kagan, while the four 
dissenting justices effectively concurred with it. National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), 183 L. Ed. 2d 450, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
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deep, abiding respect for conservative understandings of federalism, state sovereignty, and 
limited federal power:  
Today, the restrictions on government power foremost in many Americans’ minds are 
likely to be affirmative prohibitions, such as contained in the Bill of Rights. These 
affirmative prohibitions come into play, however, only where the Government possesses 
authority to act in the first place. If no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a 
certain law, that law may not be enacted, even if it would not violate any of the express 
prohibitions in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution . . . The Federal 
Government has expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, but it still must show 
that a constitutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions . . . Our respect for 
Congress’s policy judgments thus can never extend so far as to disavow restraints on 
federal power that the Constitution carefully constructed. . . And there can be no question 
that it is the responsibility of this Court to enforce the limits on federal power by striking 
down acts of Congress that transgress those limits.21  
 
The prefatory language also suggested that the Chief Justice, at least, preferred not to declare his 
view on whether the ACA was prudent or even sound policy. He emphasized that the Court was 
not in the business of making policy judgments, which were properly left to the people through 
their elected leaders.22 
Having paid his respects to the principles of judicial restraint that helped to define the 
proper role of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts duly recognized its established Commerce Clause 
rules of interpretation: “Our precedents can be read to mean that Congress may regulate ‘the 
channels of interstate commerce,’ ‘persons or things in interstate commerce,’ and ‘those 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.’”23 And, while acknowledging that the 
                                                 
21 NFIB v. Sebelius, Opinion of Justice Roberts, Part I, Slip Opinion, 3. 
22 Ibid. See Randy E. Barnett, “Who Won the Obamacare Case?” pp. 17-27 in Nathaniel Persily, 
ed., The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court's Decision and Its Implications (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
23 NFIB v. Sebelius, Opinion of Justice Roberts, Part III-A, referencing United States v. Morrison 
at 529 U.S. 609. 
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substantial effects rationale provided Congress a relatively broad power, Chief Justice Roberts 
declared that the individual mandate of the ACA could not, under its parameters, stand as a 
legitimate exercise of the commerce power. According him, “[t]he Constitution grants Congress 
the power to ‘regulate Commerce’ . . . The power to regulate commerce presupposes the 
existence of commercial activity to be regulated . . . As expansive as this Court’s cases 
construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they uniformly describe the power as 
reaching ‘activity.’”24 The Chief Justice belabored the point that the “[t]he individual mandate . . 
. does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active 
in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate 
commerce.” In the view of the chief justice, “[c]onstruing the Commerce Clause to regulate 
individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast 
domain to congressional authority. The Chief Justice was adamant:  
The Framers knew the difference between doing something and doing nothing. They 
gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. Ignoring that distinction 
would undermine the principle that the Federal Government is a government of limited 
and enumerated powers. The individual mandate thus cannot be sustained under 
Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce.”25   
 
Chief Justice Roberts appears to have readily gauged the sentiment of libertarians who bristled at 
the idea that government could command the individual to enter into a contract for health 
insurance. In the closing part of his opinion, he reiterated the objection: “The individual mandate 
cannot be upheld as an exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. That Clause 
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order individuals to engage in it.”26 
                                                 
24 NFIB v. Sebelius, Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, Part III-A, referencing United States v. 
Lopez at 514 U.S. 549. [Original emphasis] 
25 NFIB v. Sebelius, Opinion of Justice Roberts, Part III-A. 
26 NFIB v. Sebelius, Opinion of Justice Roberts, Part IV-B, Slip Opinion, 58. 
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In a separate part of his opinion, the Chief Justice addressed the argument of the 
government that Congress had the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose the 
individual mandate to give effect to the ACA, which was, if anything, a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme. The power to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution’ the powers enumerated in the Constitution . . . vests Congress with 
authority to enact provisions ‘incidental to the [enumerated] power, and conducive to its 
beneficial exercise . . .’”27 But the chief justice was not predisposed to allow the Congress to 
employ this ancillary authority. According to him, “Even if the individual mandate is ‘necessary’ 
to the Act’s insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a ‘proper’ means for 
making those reforms effective.” Even the Necessary and Proper Clause could not bring 
inactivity within the commerce power. Just as the individual mandate could not be sustained as a 
law regulating the substantial effects of the failure to purchase health insurance on interstate 
commerce, neither could it be upheld as a “necessary and proper” component of the ACA.28 
Chief Justice Roberts certainly expressed strong commitments to federalism principles and 
expressed what seems to have been a sincere commitment to the preservation of state sovereignty 
in the introduction of his opinion. His holding that struck down features of the Medicaid 
Expansion that sought to coerce states into participation with this program demonstrated rather 
plain this regard. But in Part III-A of his opinion, he seemed to articulate an understanding of the 
substantial effects test that drew on some of the most partisan language ever employed by its 
New Deal innovators. Most notably, Chief Justice Roberts quoted a well-worn snippet of obiter 
dictum from the 1937 majority of opinion of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes in NLRB v. 
                                                 
27 Ibid., referencing McCulloch v. Maryland,17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 418.  
28 NFIB v. Sebelius, Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, Part III-A.  
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Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp declaring that the plenary power of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause could reach all intrastate “activity.” This incantation, at least when not tied to the 
comprehensive regulatory scheme at issue in that decision, was certainly at odds with the 
holdings of the Court in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich declaring that, under the substantial effects 
rationale, the commerce power could reach, at its farthest extent, only intrastate economic 
activity. 
 Under the circumstances, it was remarkable that Chief Justice Roberts held that the 
individual mandate penalty could be upheld as a tax, and not as an exercise of the commerce 
power, in conjunction or not with the Necessary and Proper Clause. According to the chief 
justice, the individual mandate could constitutionally impose a monetary penalty on those who 
did not purchase insurance as required by the ACA. This penalty, which was to be submitted to 
the IRS could reasonably be “construed” as a tax. The penalty was not referred to as a tax in the 
statute, it was referred to as a “penalty” – a payment based upon a failure to comply with the 
ACA mandate. Yet the Chief Justice, joined by the four liberal justices on the Court, declared it a 
tax.29 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the federal government was well within its power to 
levy the exaction for the omission to purchase health insurance: 
[I]t is abundantly clear the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid 
taxation through inactivity. A capitation, after all, is a tax that everyone must pay simply 
for existing, and capitations are expressly contemplated by the Constitution. The Court 
today holds that our Constitution protects us from federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause so long as we abstain from the regulated activity. But from its creation, the 
Constitution has made no such promise with respect to taxes.30  
                                                 
29 Ibid., Part III-C. 
30 NFIB v. Sebelius, Opinion of Justice Roberts, Slip Opinion, 41. 
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The four most liberal justices, that is, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia 
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, agreed with the Chief Justice that the mandate penalty 
could be constitutionally levied as a tax. But they were not prepared to agree with him 
that the individual mandate could not also be upheld as an exercise of the commerce 
power. Justice Ginsburg argued that many citizens did not have health insurance but that 
would not prevent them from being active in the health care market:  
Everyone will, at some point, consume health-care products and services . . . 
Thus, if THE CHIEF JUSTICE is correct that an insurance purchase 
requirement can be applied only to those who “actively” consume health care, 
the minimum coverage provision fits the bill.31 
 
In the view of Justice Ginsberg, the Commerce Clause was a valid source of authority for the 
individual mandate since even “inactive” persons were actually “active” in the interstate health 
care market.   
A separate opinion regarding the constitutionality of the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause was set out in the joint dissent. But the dissenters did not formally join Part 
III-A, or any other part, of the chief justice’s opinion – a step that appeared to be somewhat 
inexplicable in the view of some analysts. In response to the opinion of the four more liberal 
justices that the commerce power was sufficient to sustain the individual mandate penalty, 
justices Anton Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, to say the least, 
registered their dissatisfaction. The joint dissenters were appalled that the reach of the commerce 
power under the substantial effects rationale, stretched beyond recognition as it had been since 
the New Deal, could now be stretched, even farther to include inactivity.  
                                                 
31 NFIB v. Sebelius, Opinion of Justice Ginsburg, Slip Opinion, 18. 
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The striking case of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which held that the 
economic activity of growing wheat, even for one’s own consumption, affected 
commerce sufficiently that it could be regulated, always has been regarded as the 
ne plus ultra of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  To go beyond that, 
and to say the failure to grow wheat (which is not an economic activity, or any 
activity at all) nonetheless affects commerce and therefore can be federally 
regulated, is to make mere breathing in and out the basis for federal prescription 
and to extend federal power to virtually all human activity.32 
 
Further, as to the decision of the majority to construe the ACA mandate penalty as a tax, the 
four dissenting justices were not persuaded. They argued that it simply was not possible for a 
civil penalty to double as a tax; referencing previous opinions, the dissenters maintained that “‘a 
tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty . . . is an 
exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.’”33 The dissent also pointed out 
that it was not within the power of the judicial branch to rewrite legislation – that was the job of 
Congress according to Article I.  That being the case, the decision of the majority to change the 
meaning of the statutory individual mandate penalty amounted to rewriting the ACA, an obvious 
violation of the Constitution, at least in the view of the joint dissenters. 
Justice Thomas was not ready to quit with his joint dissent and wrote his own brief but 
piercing individual dissent as well. Notwithstanding the extent to which the decisions in Lopez, 
Morrison, and Raich had significantly delimited the reach of commerce power under the 
substantial effects test, Justice Thomas remained an inveterate foe of the rule. He seized on the 
occasion to reiterate arguments against it set out in earlier opinions he had authored. In his 
words, “the very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent 
                                                 
32 Ibid., Joint Dissent, Slip Opinion, 2-3 (joint dissent of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito). 
33 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U. S. 213, 224 (1996) 
(quoting United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 572 (1931)) at Ibid., 18 
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with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce 
Clause cases.” And further, he added, “the Court’s continued use of that test ‘has encouraged the 
Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.’” In 
conclusion, Justice Thomas declared that “[t]he Government’s unprecedented claim in this suit 
that it may regulate not only economic activity but also inactivity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce is a case in point.” 34  
While President Obama and former House speaker Nancy Pelosi praised the outcome in 
Sebelius, conservatives and libertarians, as well as Republican congressional leaders, such as 
Speaker of the House John Boehner and Senate Minority leader Mitch McConnell, expressed 
deep-seated dismay – and vowed to repeal the Affordable Care Act. In the coming months and 
years, numerous jurists and public policy experts weighed in on the decision. Marcia Coyle, for 
example, concluded that Sebelius had unmasked the great ideological divides within the Court.35 
Jack M. Balkin, perhaps the most well-known champion of the “living Constitution” at the time 
the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Sebelius, insisted that the ruling had reaffirmed the 
nation’s social contract. In fact, he likened the decision to early New Deal decisions that had 
facilitated the expansion of the regulatory state.36 Legal ethicist J.B. Coleman, however, 
                                                 
34 NFIB v. Sebelius, Dissent of Justice Thomas, Slip Opinion, 1-2, Justice Thomas quoting from 
his concurrence in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
35 Marcia Coyle, The Roberts Court: The Struggle for the Constitution (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2013). See also Ronald K.L. Collins, “Foreword, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts 
Court, the First Amendment, and the New Absolutism.” Albany Law Review, Vol. 76, no. 1 
(2013): 409-66; Stephen E. Gottlieb, Unfit for Democracy: The Roberts Court and the 
Breakdown of American Politics (New York University Press, 2016).  
36 Nathaniel Persily, ed., The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court's Decision and Its 
Implications (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5.  
534 
 
surmised that the majority that upheld the individual mandate appeared to have placed 
commitments to society over individual liberty37  
One of the most notable consequences of NFIB v. Sebelius was the utter shock of many 
jurists, lawmakers, and politicians when concluding that the post-New Deal settlement, supposed 
to grant the federal government unlimited power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the 
economy and society of the United States, was not so unlimited and could still be challenged on 
constitutional grounds with viable arguments and Supreme Court precedents. Never had so many 
liberal observers seen so many “frivolous” and “off the wall” arguments taken so seriously. In 
the estimations of these observers, the Commerce Clause conclusions of Justice Roberts were, on 
numerous grounds, incorrect.38 
Conservative jurist and writer Richard A. Epstein, well-versed on Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, flogged the chief justice for that part of his opinion upholding the individual 
mandate penalty as a tax. In his words, this holding was “jurisprudential mishmash.” The chief 
justice had, clearly, “struggled” to recast the penalty as a tax. In his estimation, the federal 
                                                 
37 J. B. Coleman, “Autonomy and the Affordable Care Act Individual Mandate,” pp. 135-148 in 
Fritz Allhoff and Mark Hall, eds., The Affordable Care Act Decision: Philosophical and Legal 
Implications (Routledge, 2014; Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014). 
38 Marcus Schulzke and Amanda Cortney Carroll, “The Health of the Commerce Clause: The 
Sebelius Decision and the Future of Federal Power, pp. 272-282 in Fritz Allhoff and Mark Hall, 
eds., The Affordable Care Act Decision: Philosophical and Legal Implications (Routledge, 2014; 
Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014): Nathan Stout, “Activity, Inactivity, and Production: 
Roberts's Commerce Clause Argument,” ibid., pp. 117-130; Neil S. Siegel, “More Law Than 
Politics: The Chief, the “Mandate, and Statesmanship,” pp. 192-214 in Nathaniel Persily, ed., 
The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court's Decision and Its Implications (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 6, 192; Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz, Uncertain Justice: The 
Roberts Court and the Constitution (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2014), 52-87; 
Andrew Koppelman, “‘Necessary,’ ‘Proper,’ and Health Care Reform,” pp. 105-124, in 
Nathaniel Persily, ed., The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court's Decision and Its 
Implications (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6. 
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government had never levied a tax on the omission to engage in a transaction. One reason for 
this, he pointed out, is that “every person at any given time is not engaged in thousands of 
activities that could expose him to taxes from all sides.” Because the chief justice had insisted 
that Congress could not “regulate such inactivity under the Commerce Clause, it is ludicrous to 
conclude in the next breath that it can do an end run around that limitation by resorting to the 
taxing power.39 
The assessment of originalist Randy Barnett was no more encouraging. He emphasized 
that under the ACA, even after paying the penalty, one continued to violate the law if one did not 
purchase health insurance. The chief justice had, by declaring the individual mandate penalty a 
tax, essentially, rewritten the statute – a mistake that had rendered this jurisprudential 
incoherence. Now, the Court had, moreover, passed a law the political process could not have 
produced. Perhaps equally egregious, the chief justice and his four supporters had allowed that 
the Congress might impose a tax on inactivity.40  
While seeming to please no constituency entirely, the decision in NFIB v. Sebelius left 
the question of affordable health care a fit battle ground for continuing culture wars conflict. At 
least it should be observed that the decision in Sebelius quickly produced a surge of publications 
debating the merits of Sebelius and, particularly, the difficulties produced by its holding that 
Congress could not coerce a state government into participating in the Medicaid Expansion with 
                                                 
39 Richard A. Epstein, “A Most Improbable 1787 Constitution: A (Mostly) Originalist Critique of 
the Constitutionality of the ACA,” pp. 28-50, 39, in Nathaniel Persily, ed., The Health Care 
Case: The Supreme Court's Decision and Its Implications (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 5. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest 
for Limited Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 183-193. 
40 Randy E. Barnett, “Who Won the Obamacare Case?” pp. 17-27, 20-23, in Nathaniel Persily, 
ed., The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court's Decision and Its Implications (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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a threat to withdraw existing Medicaid funding if it chose not to do so. Steven Brill concluded 
that, in the aftermath of Sebelius, the Affordable Care Act was, simply, emblematic of a 
healthcare industry fraught with abuse, corruption, and incompetence.41 Writing in 2015, James 
S. House surmised that health care reforms such as the ACA could not resolve an ongoing crisis 
in a health care system that had already demonstrated its incapacity to provide adequate 
healthcare services in the wealthiest country in the world.42According to Daniel E. Dawes, 
Sebelius only highlighted that, in a “polarized political environment,” health care reform had 
been caught in the cross fire of partisan struggle.43  
 
The passage by Congress and President Barack Obama in March 2010 of the Patient Care 
and Affordable Care Act, similarly to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994, was the consequence of an unprecedented surge in culture wars 
political polarization. The ACA constituted an extraordinary congressional overreach – driven by 
                                                 
41 Steven Brill, America’s Bitter Pill: Money, Politics, Backroom Deals, and the Fight to Fix Our 
Broken Healthcare System (New York: Random House, 2015). 
42 James S. House, Beyond Obamacare: Life, Death, and Social Policy (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2015); See also  Daniel Béland, Philip Rocco, and Alex Waddan, Obamacare Wars: 
Federalism, State Politics, and the Affordable Care Act (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2015); Josh Blackman, Unraveled: Obamacare, Religious Liberty, and Executive Power (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Ezekial J. Emanual, Reinventing American Health 
Care: How the Affordable Care Act Will Improve our Terribly Complex, Blatantly Unjust, 
Outrageously Expensive, Grossly Inefficient, Error Prone System (New York: Public Affairs, 
2014); Grace-Marie Turner, Why ObamaCare is Wrong for America: How the New Health Care 
Law Drives Up Costs, Puts Government in Charge of Your Decisions, and Threatens Your 
Constitutional Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 2011); Stephen Davidson, A New Era in U.S. 
Health Care: Critical Next Steps Under the Affordable Care Act (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013). 
43 Daniel E. Dawes, 150 Years of ObamaCare (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2016).  
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well-intended progressive commitments to providing universal health care. The unprecedented 
tactics employed in Congress by the Democrat Party to pass the ACA strictly along party lines, 
however, were an integral feature of partisan conflict and related cultural polarization dating 
back decades.44 Conservatives and libertarians, far more than liberal-left supporters of the ACA, 
saw its Commerce Clause-based individual mandate as nothing less than an effort by Congress, 
in effect, to establish an unbounded authority for it to legislate on all subjects.   
That Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB v. Sebelius was joined by the four most liberal members 
of the Court to uphold the ACA individual mandate penalty under the taxing power of Congress 
constituted a notable departure from the originalist and textualist principles of interpretation that 
had commonly provided the foundations for the decisions of the Rehnquist Court – and from the 
commitments to judicial restraint among the conservatives of that Court. That a majority of the 
Court in Sebelius may have rendered this holding in deference to Congress, under the 
circumstances, only highlights the extent to which powerful partisan bitterness had come to 
figure prominently in both the processes of federal lawmaking and adjudication. More 
problematically, the virtual rewriting of the ACA mandate and penalty by the Chief Justice to 
cast the penalty as a tax also constituted a species of judicial activism that blatantly disregarded 
the principles of popular sovereignty enshrined in the Constitution, which most Americans, even 
in 2012, supposed to have made the will of the people, expressed through their representatives in 
Congress, the legitimate source of lawmaking authority. 
On the other hand, the holding of a different 5-4 majority, also led by Chief Justice Roberts, 
constituted a firm rejection of the unprecedented congressional overreach that fundamentally 
                                                 
44 H. R.3600, Health Security Act, 103rd Congress (1993-1994), introduced on November 20, 
1993 by Democrat Representative Rep. Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri. 
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distinguished the ACA – its reliance on the commerce power to support the individual mandate. 
Strongly indicating the persistence of Rehnquist Court New Federalism principles was that part 
of the opinion authored by the chief justice holding that the commerce power, under the Court’s 
substantial effects rationale, could not reach inactivity – even in tandem with the ancillary power 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Neither the substantial effects or comprehensive regulatory 
scheme rationales were sufficient to uphold the individual mandate penalty. Not so surprising 
was that Justice Anthony Kennedy, widely deemed to be the “swing vote,” supported these 
holdings by siding with the three more conservative justices in a joint dissent. The four dissenters 
did not formally join the Chief Justice in this part of his opinion. But they were certainly 
sufficiently in accord with him to constitute a bona fide holding.  
NFIB v. Sebelius, thus, held that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to 
command the individual to engage in commercial activity because such an omission in the 
aggregate might affect, in any relevant market, the future price of goods or services in that 
market – or because the individual might later become active in that market. The individual 
mandate of the Affordable Care Act, at least as presented by the Justice Department in Sebelius, 
presupposed, in a classic utilitarian way, that the provision would provide the most benefit for 
the most people. This aggregate utility rational, however, appears to have ignored long-
established Commerce Clause jurisprudence holding that statutes based on the commerce power 
could only regulate the actual activities of an individual – not what a person might do in the 
future. Indeed, the proposition that government could only bring its power to bear on the 
individual for her or his actions, rather than his or her probable future actions, was a fundamental 
proposition of due process dating back centuries in the Anglo-American constitutional tradition. 
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In several respects, Chief Justice Roberts exhibited an ambivalent stance toward the New 
Federalism principles established by the Rehnquist Court. In addition to holding that the 
Commerce Clause, along with the Necessary and Proper Clause, could not support the individual 
mandate, the Court held that the federal government could not coerce the state governments into 
accepting the ACA Medicaid expansion with the threat to deny existing Medicaid arrangements 
if they did not do so. In addition, the four joint dissenters in Sebelius refused to join that part of 
the opinion authored by the chief justice declaring that, under the Court’s substantial effects 
rationale, intrastate activity of any kind having a substantial effect on interstate commerce was 
within the commerce power of Congress. This wholly unsupported part of the opinion 
resurrected well-worn obiter dictum from the New Deal-era that declared an unbounded, plenary 
commerce power.  
Taken together, the three seminal Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions and Sebelius 
defined a coherent set of categorical limits to the range of commerce power under the Supreme 
Court’s substantial effects test. Under the substantial effects rationale articulated in Lopez and 
reaffirmed in Morrison and Raich, commerce power could, at its furthest extent, reach only 
intrastate economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. Chief Justice Roberts 
and the four joint dissenters in Sebelius effectively established a second outer limit to that power 
– inactivity. Intrastate non-economic activity and inactivity, consequently, remained beyond the 
scope of commerce power under its substantial effects rationale. Commerce power could reach 
intrastate activity of any kind only if necessary to give effect to a bona fide comprehensive 
regulatory scheme, while inactivity remained out of bounds even for that purpose.  
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Conclusions 
 
The changing scope, meanings, and significance of commerce power from 1964 through 
2012 were fundamentally enmeshed in the culture wars conflict that engulfed the United States 
in that period. At the same time, commerce power shaped and reflected highly contested 
processes of congressional legislation and Supreme Court adjudication, as well as the energetic 
engagements of increasingly polarized partisans determined to seize cultural and political 
supremacy from their opponents. Commerce Clause-based lawmaking and adjudication on the 
eve of the culture wars was, however, grounded in a complex development of commerce power 
that had commenced with the ratification of the United States Constitution. 
From ratification in 1789 through 1936, congressional legislation and Supreme Court 
interpretation produced a steady increase in commerce power to meet the needs of national 
expansion and development. Congress and the Supreme Court, over many decades, produced a 
legislative application and jurisprudence of commerce power that extended beyond the 
regulation of simple exchange – becoming, instead, a federal authority that encompassed the 
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and the flow of people and products in 
interstate commerce. By the late nineteenth century, commerce power most notably restrained 
monopoly corporate power and prohibited interstate trade in products deemed unhealthy, 
immoral, or unsafe. 
Commerce power took a quantum leap during the New Deal of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, which established a long-term trend toward centralization of law-making and judicial 
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power in the national government and a declining role for the states as primary centers of policy 
making. From 1933 to 1945, lawmakers, judges, and administrators emerged as a college-
educated elite caste of social engineers who believed that government had both a responsibility 
and a right to spur progress according to their own understandings of the concept. Legal 
liberalism brought the demise of the traditional liberal ideals of laissez-faire and individualism. 
Its proponents placed a premium on “social justice,” which included prominently the 
redistribution of income for the benefit of ordinary people.  
The idea of “liberalism” came to denote a level of concentrated government power and 
regimentation largely inconsistent with its eighteenth and early nineteenth century meanings and 
almost completely at odds with understandings of individual liberty that had once inspired 
Americans to fight for independence. President Roosevelt, the Democrat party-controlled 
Congress, and the redirected Supreme Court after 1936 succeeded in casting New Deal policy as 
a breakthrough for freedom. That they succeeded so well in this project suggests rather strongly 
the extent to which many Americans came to place a greater value on the economic security 
offered by New Deal programs than a personal autonomy all too frequently besieged by modern 
economic uncertainties.  
In response to the Great Depression, New Deal enactments and Supreme Court rulings turned 
the commerce power into a powerful tool for implementing a liberal-progressive vision of a fully 
integrated industrialized and urban nation. Decisions such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 
United States v. Darby, and Wickard v. Filburn laid the foundations for the radically-enhanced 
commerce power that would now prevail. Armed with decisions such as this, the federal courts 
refrained from imposing any meaningful restraints on Congress’s commerce power for the next 
half a century.   
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Fundamentally revising constitutional understanding of the Commerce Clause that had 
evolved for 150 years after the ratification of the Constitution was the New Deal Supreme Court 
“revolution of 1937.” From an Article I, Section 8 power demonstrably intended and understood 
at the time of ratification only to facilitate trade across state boundaries, the Court held that the 
commerce power was to extend, not only to the instrumentalities and channels of commerce and 
the flow of persons and goods within interstate commerce, but also to intrastate activities 
substantially affecting interstate commerce – and, with the aid of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, to regulate or suppress altogether intrastate activities that undercut a federal regulatory 
scheme.  
In a few short years, the Supreme Court established the power of Congress to bolster the 
status and rights of organized labor, regulate employer-employee relations, and control the 
production and prices of agricultural and manufactured products. As a result of the development 
of more extensive regulatory power was the creation by Congress of a vast bureaucracy of 
administrators, knowledgeable experts largely insulated from the judgments of democratic 
politics and, thus, electoral accountability, much like the federal judges who generally defended 
the new agencies against constitutional challenges.  
From 1946 through 1963, commerce power more than any other constitutional authority, 
spurred the emergence of a centralized regulatory state far more encompassing and complex than 
the federal apparatus that had existed before World War II.  Americans viewed the rise of federal 
agencies and comprehensive regulatory schemes, variously, as praiseworthy, necessary, or 
wrong-headed, depending on individual socioeconomic, cultural, and political affiliations. Novel 
interventions in the period 1946-1963 included new wage and hour regulations for non-unionized 
labor; antitrust measures aimed at corporate combinations; criminal statutes that targeted corrupt 
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labor unions and their subversion by international communism; and other kinds of organized 
crime increasingly connected with multistate gambling, drug trafficking, and racketeering. But 
entrepreneurs and the managers of corporate capital had pressing financial reasons to be 
discontented with a federal regulatory apparatus that steadily increased their costs of doing 
business and their income tax obligations. By 1963, new commerce power interventions on 
behalf of environmental protection and equal pay for women, in fact, foreshadowed a sea change 
in American society and culture. 
More than any other constitutional authority in the period 1964-1998, the commerce power 
served the purpose of rapidly reordering socioeconomic and political relations in the United 
States. Its deployment was central to intensifying political and cultural conflict. In the period 
1964-1998, Congress wielded its commerce authority as a virtual general police power, largely 
with the accommodation of the Supreme Court, to substantially remake the socioeconomic, 
cultural, and political fabric of the United States – by rearranging the relations of race, class, and 
sex; the relations between increasingly aggressive law enforcement personnel and newly-
invented classes of criminals; and the relations between human beings, a steadily growing array 
of protected flora and fauna, and natural resources, climate, and even the weather.  
Certain that theirs was the correct and most moral vision of America, partisan political 
operatives sought to realize their visions with the most effective tool available – central 
government power. Congressional legislation and Supreme Court rulings made many 
controversial issues national ones and the stakes at election times, consequently, became a 
“winner takes all” proposition.  With the capacity of central power to spur change clearly 
established, victory seemed imperative for partisan combatants. Because of the enormous 
implications of most policy questions central to culture wars conflict, the vitriol between 
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conservatives and liberals grew so intense as to produce the perception that very little common 
ground remained.   
Commencing with the instrumental use of Commerce Clause authority to ameliorate the 
racial injustice that African Americans had suffered for centuries, well-intended federal 
lawmakers resorted increasingly to this potent instrument of change. Supported vigorously by a 
predominantly liberal academy and mass print and electronic media – new congressional 
legislation and administrative agencies deployed Commerce Clause power to raise wages and 
limit the hours of workers, ensure equity in hiring and promotion for women and minority 
members with affirmative action directives, and end the sex- and gender-based harassment of 
women and members of the LGBT community in the work place. The rapid extension of federal 
authority on behalf of liberal conceptions of progress entailed the imposition of new regulatory 
regimes that took aim at environmental hazards and threats to endangered species. The 
increasing reliance on commerce power to limit the availability of post-viability abortion, arrest 
and prosecute “super predators,” restrain drug-cartel trafficking, and restrict gun ownership 
exponentially intensified partisan conflict. Many business owners and consumers, however, 
resented deeply the rising costs of regulation, while others simply wanted to be free of federal 
government regimentation they deemed both unnecessary and in violation of fundamental 
freedoms.  
As indicated, the period 1964-1998 saw the rapid proliferation of comprehensive regulatory 
schemes based on the commerce power. More explicitly than ever before, the Warren and Burger 
courts held that Congress could regulate or entirely suppress an intrastate activity if Congress 
had reasonably concluded that such regulation was necessary to uphold such a scheme. This was 
so even if an activity, taken in the aggregate, did not have a substantial effect on interstate 
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commerce. In the case of a comprehensive regulatory regime, Congress could employ the 
commerce power to regulate intrastate activities – and even ban intrastate activities if necessary 
to uphold such a regime. As well, Congress could pass criminal statutes based on commerce 
power if the language of such statutes contained a jurisdictional element identifying a nexus of 
the offense, in each case, to interstate commerce. Such a linkage permitted a federal court to 
decide, on a case-by-case basis, if the statute met Commerce Clause muster for the purposes of 
enforcement. 
Until Richard M. Nixon was elected president in fall 1968, the American public generally 
had accepted the steady expansion of federal power that had relied fundamentally on New Deal 
Supreme Court Commerce Clause doctrines. Together with commitments to securing “law and 
order” in the tumultuous late 1960s, Nixon sought to rein in federal authority by reinvigorating 
principles of state sovereignty. This was a political impulse that brought to life the New 
Federalism and, among conservative jurists, the constitutional theory of “originalism.” This 
theory was fully intended to counterbalance that of a “living Constitution,” which had emerged 
as a set of ideas to justify increasingly inventive interpretations of the constitution’s language 
and increasingly expansive interventions of federal power, including those grounded in the 
Commerce Clause. Just as it had taken presidents with liberal orientation decades to make 
appointments sufficiently numerous to generate New Deal and Great Society jurisprudence in the 
United States Supreme Court, it took over two decades for appointments to the Court to bring 
about a balance between progressives and conservatives. Remarkably, from 1968 until 1992, 
presidents affiliated with the Democrat party did not add a single member to the Court. The 
consequences of this development for Commerce Clause jurisprudence became apparent in the 
1990s. 
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The growing number of conservative justices appointed to the Supreme Court increasingly 
generated decisions that refrained from enlarging the scope of the substantial effects test and in 
other ways calibrated Commerce Clause-based measures to contain them within the limits of the 
New Federalism, which gathered something of a critical mass during the tenure of Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist. In this connection, the Rehnquist Court produced Commerce Clause 
decisions that assertively staked out the sovereign prerogative of the states to refuse to be 
“commandeered” into federal regulatory schemes. 
  Congress and the Supreme Court engaged one another to generate Commerce Clause-
based law that steadily re-arranged the balance of power between states and the federal 
government. Some of the more controversial measures regulated or criminally penalized 
activities that bore no clear relationship to interstate commerce and seemed to invade the 
customary and, indeed, constitutionally reserved criminal jurisdiction of the states. These 
developments spurred anxiety among many in what would one day be called “flyover country” 
that federal authority knew no bounds and that the capacity of state and local governments to 
manage their affairs in keeping with the preferences of their constituents was rapidly 
disappearing.  
The Rehnquist Court began to recalibrate substantially the Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
developed in the New Deal era with its 1995 decision United States v. Lopez. At the least, this 
decision demonstrated that Congress, with its passage of the Gun Free School Zones Act of 
1990, could not bring an activity always assumed to be entirely within the jurisdiction of local 
and statute authorities into federal criminal jurisdiction. The decision in Lopez, which overturned 
the GFSZA, surely disturbed some liberal members of the legal community who favored 
centralization of power and no little jubilation among conservative legal thinkers. More 
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important, the decision worked a major doctrinal breakthrough for the New Federalism. Before 
the decision in Lopez, the Supreme Court and numerous lower federal courts had, off and on for 
half a century, invoked the seemingly open-ended power of Congress under the substantial 
effects test, first set out in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, as a bona fide foundation for an ever-
expanding, virtual federal police power. The decision of the Rehnquist Court in Lopez identified 
and rectified this error.  
In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist clarified existing Commerce Clause doctrine without 
declaring to or, in fact, needing to overturn any important precedents. Rehnquist and the majority 
held that, under the substantial effects rationale, commerce power could reach intrastate activity 
only if it was commercial activity or, at a minimum, economic activity. In this case, non-
commercial activity and non-economic activity were out of bounds. As well, the Court allowed 
that Congress might rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to bring any intrastate activity 
within the commerce power, but only if necessary to uphold a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 
Last, the Court declared that it would uphold criminal statutes based on commerce power if the 
language of such statutes contained a jurisdictional element identifying a nexus of the offense to 
interstate commerce – but reserved to the federal courts the right to decide, on a case-by-case 
basis, if prosecuted activity was, in fact, within the commerce power. The finding of the 
Supreme Court in Lopez that it had never, under its substantial effects rationale, upheld a 
Commerce Clause-based piece of legislation that reached non-economic intrastate activity 
suggested powerfully that, in future, there would be few instances in which the Court would, in 
fact, uphold such measures. The decision in Lopez re-animated a longstanding tradition of 
judicial minimalism protective of state sovereignty. In doing so, the decision effectively 
articulated discernible limits to an expanding commerce power – which helped to supercharge 
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partisan culture war struggles for at least a decade. In the year following Lopez, the Supreme 
Court would again decide the purview of commerce power—this time in favor of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996), five of the nine justices of the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the sovereign authority of the states in the face of increasingly extensive 
employments by Congress of its powers under Article I, Section 8. Dealing with that part of the 
Commerce Clause known as the “Indian Commerce Clause” and the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act of 1988, the decision marked a major advance for the “New Federalism.” As in Lopez, the 
decision in Seminole Tribe involved some of the most contentious issues fueling the culture wars 
of the 1990s – including the rising casino gambling industry, federal government environmental 
protection regulations, and the balance of power between the state governments and the federal 
government.  
Seminole Tribe of Florida constituted a twin victory from the perspective of the Supreme 
Court justices interested in advancing Commerce Clause New Federalism. The decision made it 
clear that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited Congress from making the State of Florida, or any 
other state, susceptible of being sued by a private party in federal court for non-compliance with 
the tribal demands authorized by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. In coming to this result, the 
Court also reversed a decision it rendered in 1969 to hold that commerce power did not authorize 
Congress to allow companies required to pay for hazardous waste site cleanups under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to sue 
states for their role in creating such environmental hazards. Once again, Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity protections forbade this. 
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Seminole Tribe of Florida and the New Federalism sovereign immunity decisions it 
produced were also symbolic of the determination of the Rehnquist Court to resist efforts by the 
Congress to undercut further state sovereignty with an unrestrained employment of commerce 
power and to “commandeer” the states. While Seminole Tribe effectively held that Congress had 
no authority to authorize private law suits to compel states to enter tribal-state compacts, the 
decision also insulated state governments from the remedial strictures that Congress had set out 
in CERCLA. Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity decisions resulting from Seminole Tribe 
that dealt with private lawsuits under the Age Discrimination Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, moreover, effectively declared that Congress had no authority to establish 
private causes of action against state governments to coerce them into following Commerce-
Clause-based employee wage and hour, hiring, and promotion policies imposed unilaterally by 
Congress.  
Culture wars political mobilization against gender-based violence produced the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994, while the highly-publicized action brought under the VAWA by 
Christy Brzonkala against Antonio Morrison and James Crawford fanned the flames of 
controversy over the statute in the ensuing six-year period. From the perspective of those who 
strongly supported the civil remedy set out in § 13981 of the VAWA, federalization of judicial 
authority over domestic violence properly marked gender-based violence against women as a 
serious national problem. Such violence was, indeed, a widespread source of misery and a crying 
injustice that congressional leaders amply verified. However, the empathy, compassion, and 
moral certitude that spurred strong support of the VAWA civil remedy caused many such well-
intended partisans to discount or ignore altogether the larger implications for limited 
government, federalism, and personal liberty of a judicially-authorized Commerce Clause-based 
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police power that would know no bounds. The urgent felt need among activists for a fast and 
powerful solution to gender-based violence, essentially, drove such considerations beyond the 
constitutional horizon and out of view. The ruling of the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Morrison constituted a great setback for those who had expended much time and effort to supply 
federal courts with the remedial tools activists deemed necessary to suppress gender-based 
violence against women. Vigorous feminist critiques utterly condemned the decision in Morrison 
for being, simply, symbolic of a federal judiciary little concerned with improving women’s rights 
and insensitive to the plight of women targeted by gender-motivated violence.  
As had been the case in Lopez, the Supreme Court in Morrison was called upon to decide 
a question of great importance, indeed, one that went beyond solving the national problem of 
gender-motivated violence: Would the Court allow Congress to rely on the Commerce Clause to 
establish an unlimited federal police power. In Morrison, the Court upheld and reiterated the 
substantial effects rationale clarified in Lopez – but, this time, in a controversy that drew 
widespread public attention to this holding and its New Federalism foundations. The Court 
declared once again that none of its decisions had ever extended commerce power, under the 
substantial effects test, to non-economic intrastate activity.  Even when a given non-economic 
intrastate activity, aggregated with all other instances of it, had a substantial impact on interstate 
commerce, such activity was beyond the commerce power. Congress could regulate intrastate 
activities that were commercial or, in and of themselves “economic in nature” – but not non-
economic intrastate activity, such as gender-motivated violence or gun possession in a school 
zone or any number of other non-economic intrastate activities exclusively within the purview of 
state civil and criminal law. Lastly, Morrison reaffirmed that part of the clarified substantial 
effects test set out in Lopez holding that, for the commerce power to justify a criminal statute, it 
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was required to include a jurisdictional element tying the offense to interstate commerce under 
an “in commerce or affecting commerce” rationale, which would permit a court to make the 
required case-by-case determination if the offense at issue, indeed, fell within the commerce 
power.  
In the fourth case, it has been shown that the federal statute that gave rise to Gonzales v. 
Raich was the product of gradual changes in American law, dating to the nineteenth century, 
which permitted a total ban on beverage alcohol and, thereby, retooled constitutional 
understanding to permit the absolute prohibition of other mind-altering intoxicants. Federal 
government experimentation with nominal tax policies that, in fact, regulated and suppressed 
cannabis also constituted an important precursor of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act – which 
distinguished itself as the first anti-illicit drug measure to be based on the Commerce Clause. 
This comprehensive regulatory regime, however, also derived from growing public concern after 
1900 with a narcotic associated originally with black jazz musicians, underground criminality, 
the rapid immigration of Mexican peasants whose customary use of marijuana seemed to 
foreshadow “reefer madness,” and a threatening drug culture rooted in the 1960s counterculture 
insurgency that made cannabis a powerful symbol of culture wars conflict through the early 
twenty-first century. Political contention over the problem of increasing drug abuse and 
addiction, along with a concerted campaign by marijuana advocates to legalize cannabis and then 
free medical marijuana from federal and state controls, produced the California Compassionate 
Use Act of 1996 and, in turn, the challenge to the CSA ban on cannabis that became Gonzales v. 
Raich.  
The decision in Raich certainly did not meet the approval of conservatives who had hoped to 
see New Federalism principles, as in Lopez and Morrison, further circumscribe the commerce 
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power. On the other hand, intense culture wars disputation seems to have distorted somewhat the 
expectations for and perceptions of the decision for conservatives and liberals alike. After all, 
Raich affirmed the 1970 Controlled Substances Act, which had constituted an expansive 
deployment of commerce power in keeping with a cause that conservatives, at the opening of the 
culture wars, had held near and dear – the vigorous suppression of illegal drug trafficking and 
drug abuse. For thirty-five years, the CSA had categorically forbidden the possession, 
distribution, and use of cannabis, and yet the decision of the more liberal members of the Court 
in Raich to not to recognize an exception to the proscription fueled the ire of conservative 
partisans. Even Justice Scalia could not escape their censure – an example of how culture wars 
imperatives could rearrange partisan priorities. Liberal jurists undoubtedly could chuckle at the 
way the liberal majority in Raich relied on New Federalism Commerce Clause jurisprudence to 
sustain the congressional deployment of commerce power fully to the new limits identified in 
Lopez – albeit with a result that flouted well-established liberal positions on drug policy, criminal 
law enforcement, and racial justice. But liberal partisans who demanded that federal authorities 
exclude medical marijuana from the CSA proscription, if only for humanitarian reasons, were no 
more satisfied with the decision in Raich than civil libertarians who, simply, preferred that 
recreational marijuana be made legal in all states and permitted by federal law.    
 
The four Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions closely examined in this study 
indicate that five members of that Court, in each case, sought to see Commerce Clause 
legislation limited in some way; that much is clear. One answer to the question of whether 
Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions amounted to a “constitutional revolution” similar 
to that which the New Deal Court instituted in 1937 might be provided by examining the short-
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term consequences of each decision, especially the responses of Congress to three of them. 
Given the outcome in Raich, the prohibition of medical marijuana under the Controlled 
Substances Act remained in place, at least through 2017. The CSA, a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme, was certainly a constitutional use of the commerce power, even though the Supreme 
Court upheld the Schedule I ban on cannabis because it deemed such to be necessary to give 
effect to the legislation. However, it appears that the doctrinal limitations articulated in Lopez, 
Seminole Tribe, Morrison, and Raich did little to impede the legislative objectives of Congress in 
the case of each statute at issue. In all three, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional all or part 
of a statute. Congress, however, had the prerogative to revise the statute, in each case, to make it 
conform to New Federalism jurisprudence – even if Congress did not choose to do so in every 
case. A brief review of the response of Congress in each case is in order. 
Congress was able to pass legislation achieving its original goal with a revision to the 
Gun Free School Zones Act. The majority in Lopez did not overturn any precedents; instead, it 
identified and articulated barriers. In response, President Bill Clinton led Congress in revising 
the legislation by including the required jurisdictional element such that the statute reached only 
firearms brought within 1000 feet of a school that had “moved in or that otherwise affects 
interstate commerce.”1  Since most firearms were produced in states other than the ones in which 
they were purchased, the statute remained, at least in the abstract, almost all-encompassing. 
Under pre-existing precedent, a federal court was to verify, on a case-by-case basis, that 
prosecuted activity, in fact, came within the commerce power. Even so, the statute remained in 
effect, albeit not sustained by the substantial effects rationale, with only negligible limitations.2  
                                                 
1 “Clinton Seeks to Reinstate Ban on Guns,” New York Times, May 7, 1995, A23. 
2 Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, “Federal Law on Guns in Schools,” May 21, 2012. 
http://smartgunlaws.org/federal-law-on-guns-in-schools/ (accessed Feb 22, 2016). 
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In Seminole Tribe, another limit was set out to the employment of the “Indian Commerce 
Clause” – that is, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the sovereign authority of the states to forestall 
legal action by Native American Tribes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.  
Notwithstanding the decision, however, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act continued to 
facilitate the opening of Indian casinos. Congress, immediately after the ruling of the Supreme 
Court, initiated amendments to the statute that reflected the holdings of the Court. In the two 
years following the ruling, nineteen gaming-related stand-alone bills and amendments to the 
IGRA were introduced. But none provided the tribes with the negotiating power of the IGRA 
before the Seminole decision. Amendments that authorized the Secretary of the Interior to dictate 
state-tribal compact terms and similar amendments were introduced but could find no traction.3  
In the case of Indian casinos, Congress might have sidestepped the ruling in Seminole Tribe with 
new legislation if there had been the political will to do so. 
 After the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison, Congress re-
authorized the Violence Against Women Act, albeit without the controversial civil remedy struck 
down in that decision. The remainder of the VAWA remained intact. After the 2000 decision, 
Congress and President George W. Bush reauthorized the statute in 2005. The act expired in 
2011 but Congress and President Barack Obama reauthorized it again in 2013.4 The civil-remedy 
title of the original act was never revived. Shortly after the Court decided Morrison, 
Representative John Conyers (D-MI) attempted to amend the act by including language setting 
                                                 
3 Paul Moorhead, “IGRA at 25, With So Much More to Do,” Indian Country Today Media 
Network., http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/10/25/25-years-indian-gaming-
regulatory-act (accessed February 22, 2016). 
4 President Signs H.R. 3402, the “Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005.” http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060105-3.html (accessed February 2, 2017)  
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out a jurisdictional nexus of gender-motivate violence and interstate commerce with a bill 
entitled the Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act (VAWCRRA). Creating the 
jurisdictional nexus was, it seems, difficult. Adding language that stipulated that the crime of 
gender-motivated violence was actionable only when the defendant or victim “travels in 
interstate or foreign commerce,” or when the defendant “uses a facility or instrumentality of 
interstate or foreign commerce,” did not seem to be sufficiently encompassing.5  Legislators 
easily saw that the revised act would not reach all gender-motivated violence and refrained from 
supporting the amendment. Morrison was the one decision, of the three considered here, that 
posed a difficult legislative barrier to Congress, one that remained as of 2017. 
 
The contention here is that the four decisions, and particularly Lopez, Morrison, and Raich, 
did not amount to a constitutional revolution.6  In none of these decisions did the Rehnquist 
Court overturn a major New Deal Era or Great Society Era Commerce Clause holding. Likewise, 
not one of these decisions disrupted the basic rules for identifying the scope of the Commerce 
Clause: regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the flow of 
people and goods in interstate commerce, and, per the New Deal “revolution of 1937,” the 
substantial effects and comprehensive regulatory regime rationales. Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and 
Morrison, as discussed, caused only minor setbacks to Congress in the pursuit of its legislative 
goals in each case, indicating the substantial prerogative of Congress to forestall Commerce 
Clause strictures by seeking alternative legislative strategies, such as the inclusion in a statute of 
                                                 
5 John Dinan, “Congressional Responses to the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions,” 
Publius (Summer 2002): 6. 
6 Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, “Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the 
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?” Wisconsin Law Review 
(2000): 369, 371, 378-91. 
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a jurisdictional element, textually at least, linking the activity to be regulated with interstate 
commerce. Consider the wisdom of Senator Fred Thompson (R-TN) indicating the nimbleness of 
Congress in this regard in an October 11, 2000 speech on the Senate floor:  
We, from time to time, try to get around the commerce clause.  We want to 
federalize things, such as guns in schools. Every state in the Union has a tough 
law they deal with in their own way as to what to do about a terrible problem – 
guns in schools. We get no headlines out of that, so we had a federal law to which 
the Supreme Court said: No, that does not affect interstate commerce. Then we 
just try to basically directly force States to enforce Federal laws and regulations 
that we make – background checks for guns, when judges should retire, Federal 
regulations. Finally, the Supreme Court said: No, we cannot do that.  The 10th 
Amendment prohibits us from doing that. So we have a steady array of our 
attempting to figure out ways in and around the Constitution in order to impose 
our will because ‘we know best.’ The latest, of course, now is the use of the 
spending clause.7 
 
It is apparent from the four Rehnquist Court decisions and their aftermath, in each case, that if 
the political winds were strong enough, Congress remained quite capable of finding ways to pass 
the legislation it preferred. 
Another contention here, and perhaps one that is more important, Lopez, Morrison, and 
Raich constituted, in fact, a major accomplishment for the Rehnquist Court New Federalism – 
one that, beginning with Lopez, articulated discernible limits to commerce power by strictly 
construing the Commerce Clause decisions of the Supreme Court dating back to 1937. In Lopez, 
the Supreme Court declared that the Commerce Clause did not provide an open-ended grant of 
legislative power as liberal jurists had maintained since the New Deal. And, contrary to the view 
                                                 
7 Congressional Record, V. 146, Pt. 15, October 6, 2000 to October 12, 2000, 22087. 
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of some jurists, one can, in fact, look to Gonzales v. Raich to appreciate the culmination of this 
breakthrough.  
 The decision in Gonzales v. Raich reiterated holdings set out in Lopez and affirmed in 
Morrison amply demonstrating that the Supreme Court intended to enforce the outer limits of the 
commerce power rather than, as before Lopez, allow the Commerce Clause to serve as an open-
ended grant of general legislative authority. The decision in Gonzales v. Raich did not contradict 
or undercut any of the major holdings in those two decisions. In fact, the majority in Raich 
affirmed the articulation of the substantial effects test set out in Lopez and reiterated in Morrison 
The Court defined and effectively narrowed the range of economic activity that commerce power 
could reach under its parameters to include only “the production, distribution, and consumption 
of commodities.” Commerce power alone could not extend so far as to reach intrastate non-
economic activity, even if such activity substantially affected interstate commerce. As in Lopez 
and Morrison, the majority agreed that the Constitution permitted Congress to regulate intrastate 
non-economic and non-commercial activity – but only if such was essential to sustain the 
effectiveness of a comprehensive regulatory regime well-grounded in the commerce power. 
Raich did not draw into question holdings in Morrison declaring that Congress could not 
circumvent the limited grant of power set out in the Commerce Clause by issuing a legislative 
finding and declaration that demonstrated only an “attenuated” connection between a non-
economic or non-commercial intrastate activity and interstate commerce. The decision in Raich 
did not suggest that the Court would abandon its commitment to viewing with skepticism 
congressional regulatory measures that encroached upon the sovereign authority of the states. As 
discussed, for thirty-five years before the decision, Congress had readily exercised the power to 
regulate controlled substances. Upholding the CSA ban on medical marijuana, notwithstanding 
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the strenuous complaints of justices O’Connor and Thomas, did not constitute any kind of new 
threat to well-established areas of state government authority. Notwithstanding the superheated 
partisan conflict over the legalization of medical marijuana, the decision in Gonzales v. Raich 
meshed entirely with other seminal Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions. These 
decisions, including Raich, held the line against the further expansion of commerce power that 
had commenced during the New Deal – locking in place the articulation of New Federalism 
Commerce Clause doctrines set out by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez. 
 The decision of the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius, insofar as Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence was concerned, powerfully and vitally augmented the limits to commerce power 
articulated initially in Lopez and reaffirmed in Morrison and Raich. The passage by Congress 
and President Barack Obama in March 2010 of the Patient Care and Affordable Care Act, 
similarly to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994, was the consequence of an unprecedented surge in culture wars strife. The ACA 
constituted an extraordinary congressional overreach – driven by well-intended progressive 
commitments to providing universal health care. The unprecedented tactics employed in 
Congress by the Democrat Party to pass the ACA strictly along party lines, however, were an 
integral feature of partisan conflict and related cultural polarization dating back decades.8 
Conservatives and libertarians, far more than liberal-left supporters of the ACA, saw its 
Commerce Clause-based individual mandate as nothing less than an effort by Congress, in effect, 
to establish an unbounded authority for it to legislate on all subjects.   
                                                 
8 H. R.3600, Health Security Act, 103rd Congress (1993-1994), introduced on November 20, 
1993 by Democrat Representative Rep. Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri. 
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That Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB v. Sebelius was joined by the four most liberal members 
of the Court to uphold the ACA individual mandate penalty under the taxing power of Congress 
constituted a notable departure from the originalist and textualist principles of interpretation that 
had commonly motivated the decisions of the Rehnquist Court – and from the commitments to 
judicial restraint among the conservatives of that Court. That a majority of the Court in Sebelius 
may have rendered this holding in deference to Congress, under the circumstances, only 
highlights the extent to which powerful partisan antagonisms had come to figure prominently in 
both the processes of federal lawmaking and adjudication. More problematically, the virtual 
rewriting of the ACA mandate and penalty by the Chief Justice to cast the penalty as a tax also 
constituted a species of judicial activism that blatantly disregarded the principles of popular 
sovereignty enshrined in the Constitution, which most Americans, even in 2012, supposed to 
have made the will of the people, expressed through their representatives in Congress, the 
legitimate source of lawmaking authority. 
On the other hand, the holding of a different 5-4 majority, also led by Chief Justice Roberts, 
constituted a firm rejection of the unprecedented congressional overreach that fundamentally 
distinguished the ACA – its reliance on the commerce power to support the individual mandate. 
Strongly indicating the persistence of Rehnquist Court New Federalism principles was that part 
of the opinion authored by the chief justice holding that the commerce power, under the Court’s 
substantial effects rationale, could not reach inactivity – even in tandem with the ancillary power 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Neither the substantial effects or comprehensive regulatory 
scheme rationales were sufficient to uphold the individual mandate penalty. Not so surprising 
was that Justice Anthony Kennedy, widely deemed to be the “swing vote,” supported these 
holdings by siding with the three more conservative justices in a joint dissent. The four dissenters 
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did not formally join the Chief Justice in this part of his opinion. But they were certainly 
sufficiently in accord with him to constitute a bona fide holding.  
NFIB v. Sebelius, thus, held that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to 
command the individual to engage in commercial activity because such an omission in the 
aggregate might affect, in any relevant market, the future price of goods or services in that 
market – or because the individual might later become active in that market. The individual 
mandate of the Affordable Care Act, at least as presented by the government in Sebelius, 
assumed, in a classic utilitarian way, that the provision would provide the most benefit for the 
most people. This aggregate utility rational, however, appears to have ignored long-established 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence holding that statutes based on the commerce power could only 
regulate the actual activities of an individual – not what a person might do in the future. Indeed, 
the proposition that government could only bring its power to bear on the individual for her or 
his actions, rather than his or her probable future actions, was a fundamental proposition of due 
process dating back centuries in the Anglo-American constitutional tradition. 
In several respects, Chief Justice Roberts exhibited an ambivalent stance toward the New 
Federalism principles established by the Rehnquist Court. In addition to holding that the 
Commerce Clause, even together with the Necessary and Proper Clause, could not support the 
individual mandate.  The Court held that the federal government could not coerce the state 
governments into accepting the ACA Medicaid expansion with the threat to deny existing 
Medicaid arrangements if they did not do so. However, the four joint dissenters in Sebelius 
refused to join that part of the opinion authored by the chief justice declaring that, under the 
Court’s substantial effects rationale, intrastate activity of any kind having a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce was within the commerce power of Congress. This wholly unsupported part 
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of the opinion harkened back to the New Deal-era that aimed toward an unbounded, plenary 
commerce power.  
 
Taken together, the three seminal Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause decisions and Sebelius 
defined a coherent set of categorical limits to the range of commerce power under the Supreme 
Court’s substantial effects test. Under the rationale articulated in Lopez and reaffirmed in 
Morrison and Raich, commerce power could, at its furthest extent, reach only intrastate 
economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. Chief Justice Roberts and the 
four joint dissenters in Sebelius effectively established a second outer limit to that power – 
inactivity. Intrastate non-economic activity and inactivity, consequently, remained beyond the 
scope of commerce power under its substantial effects rationale. Commerce power could reach 
intrastate activity of any kind only if necessary to give effect to a bona fide comprehensive 
regulatory scheme, while inactivity remained out of bounds even for that purpose.  
The controversy over the ACA and the decision in Sebelius spelled out in high relief at 
least the value of persistent constitutional restraints on central power under the Commerce 
Clause. To an unprecedented extent, this episode of culture wars contention illuminated vividly 
the potential of Congress to legislate far more extensively than sober, thoughtful citizens had 
previously considered. Court watchers were amused on the second day of oral argument in 
Sebelius when Justice Antonin Scalia asked Solicitor General Donald Verrilli why Washington 
bureaucracies could not require citizens to buy vegetables: 
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Could you define the market – everybody has to buy food sooner or later, so you define 
the market as food, therefore, everybody is in the market; therefore, you can make people 
buy broccoli?9 
 
Amusing or not, the query made more than a few Americans think. Any act or omission to act 
that could affect the ever-rising costs of health care, the environment, or any other public interest 
implicating the national economy suddenly seemed within range of federal economic planners. 
New Federalism restraints on commerce power set out in key Supreme Court decisions at least 
remained serviceable in a federated republic beset by partisans bent on extending regulatory 
power in directions previously unimagined to promote their various visions of progress.  
Amid rising culture wars conflict in the period 1964-2012 conservative and liberal 
lawmakers in Washington, D.C. could not resist the opportunities afforded by an increasingly 
expansive federal government apparatus to promote rapidly the changes their constituencies, 
with increasing certainty, deemed vital to comfort, security, and happiness. Congress, much 
more than the federal courts, drove innovations in the deployment of commerce power that 
spurred culture wars contention. Regulatory and criminal statutes based on the commerce power 
in fact, aimed at remaking socioeconomic, race, and gender relations, protecting the environment 
and various species of endangered flora and fauna, and controlling urban violence and 
criminality, a task once exclusively within the jurisdiction of state governments and local courts. 
These changes in the employment of central power arose in a nation increasingly fragmented as 
to understandings of right and wrong and the relationship of the individual to government power. 
                                                 
9 Byron Tau, “Scalia Wonders about a Broccoli Mandate,” March 27, 2012. 
https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico44/2012/03/scalia-wonders-about-a-broccoli-mandate-
118823 (accessed February 3, 2016). 
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Increasingly complex statutes and judicial decisions evolved beyond the understanding of 
ordinary persons further produced a growing sense that government was too large, too big, and 
too out of control. Culture wars conflict, in the final analysis, involved power and divergent 
understandings of power and who might succeed in seizing it. 
Whether elite lawmakers, judges, and partisans had a superior vision of a perfected 
society, however, was not, ultimately, the question. The federalization of authority came too fast 
for too many people in the United States and too often at the expense of the sentiments and 
preferences of persons not sharing the ideals and goals of well-intended elite planners. 
Ultimately central power seemed to more than a few to impose itself far too often at the expense 
of consent and liberty.  
The Commerce Clause decisions of the Rehnquist Court both fueled and responded to the 
culture wars conflict. Rather than attempt to overturn a substantial amount of New Deal and 
Great Society legislation, conservative majorities on the Rehnquist Court and, as well as Chief 
Justice Roberts and the four joint dissenters in Sebelius, opted to read strictly existing Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence and avoid establishing precedents that further expanded commerce power 
at the expense of the states. In keeping with conservative commitments to judicial restraint, they 
did so without overturning seminal New Deal decisions. This strategy, which Randy Barnett, 
denotes with the rubric “this far, and no further” was at the crux of Commerce Clause New 
Federalism.10 
                                                 
10 Solum, “How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt,” 50-54; Randy Barnett, 
“‘This Far and No Farther’: Baselines and the Individual Insurance Mandate, Volokh Conspiracy, 
January 22, 2012. http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/22/this-far-and-no-farther-baselines-and-the-
individual-insurance-mandate (accessed November 2, 2017). 
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Epilogue 
Whereto the Commerce Power and Culture Wars after Sebelius? 
 
After Sebelius the political climate in America grew even more contentious, as liberals, 
progressives, conservatives, and libertarians vied for control of the moral, cultural, and economic 
direction of the country. Additionally, as the reach of the federal government continued to 
expand, the concerns and activity of previously inactive citizens grew as well. Federal power 
could be a blessing or a curse, depending on who it affected as it grew. In response, many 
citizens began to demand more from their state governments to protect them from federal 
overreach. By early 2014, states had begun to show their willingness to simply ignore federal 
statutes and regulations that its citizens deemed to be too intrusive.1 The use of medical 
marijuana, for instance, continued in various states, until it became, by late 2017, federally 
permissible. In 2015, “state legislators introduced close to 400 bills that rejected or simply 
ignored federal authority,” according to a 2015 year-end report by the Tenth Amendment 
Center.2  
                                                 
1 Eric Fein, “State Nullification and the Tenther Movement: Fight the Fed,” 
Wondergressive.com, Feb 13, 2014. http://wondergressive.com/state-nullification-tenther-
movement/ (accessed March 17, 2016). 
2 Tenth Amendment Center, “2015 State of the Nullification Movement: Report on the Growth 
of State-Level Resistance to Federal Power, 16. 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/TAChandbooks/2015-state-of-the-nullification-movement-report.pdf 
(accessed March 18, 2016). 
566 
 
Other state initiatives to reign in federal power included a rediscovery of Article V as it 
pertains to state-level initiatives for amending the Constitution. According to that provision, “on 
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,” Congress shall call a 
“Convention for proposing Amendments.”3 Once an amendment proposal was agreed upon, it 
had to be ratified by three quarters of the states’ legislatures or by specially formed conventions 
to become a part of the Constitution. Popularized by Mark Levin in his book The Liberty 
Amendments and on his radio program, the idea was taken up even by those in government.4 As 
of April 2015, there were twenty-seven active petitions to Congress to hold a convention to add a 
balanced budget amendment to the Constitution.5 In regard to reining in the commerce power, in 
early 2016 Governor Mark Abbott of Texas proposed a series of amendments to be considered 
by the Texas legislature, including one aimed at prohibiting Congress from regulating activity 
that occurs wholly within one state.6   
In the highly contentious 2016 presidential election, citizens with a wide array of political 
views showed a general dissatisfaction with the federal government on both sides of the political 
aisle, but for differing reasons, as evidenced by the four candidates who did best during the party 
primaries. Aside from Hillary Clinton of the Democratic Party, the other three candidates who 
drew the most votes came from outside of the mainstream of their parties. Senator Bernie 
                                                 
3 U.S. Const. Art. V 
4 Mark R. Levin, The Liberty Amendments: Restoring the American Republic, (New York: 
Threshold Editions) 2013. 
5 “Doing the Math for a New Constitutional Convention,” National Constitution Center, April 6, 
2015. http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/04/doing-the-math-for-a-new-constitutional-
convention/ (accessed March 18, 2016). 
6 Brandi Grissom, “Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Calls for Convention of States to Take Back States’ 
Rights,” The Dallas Morning News Trail Blazers Blog, January 8, 2016. 
http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2016/01/gov-greg-abbott-calls-for-constitutional-
convention-to-take-back-states-rights.html/ (accessed March 18, 2016). 
567 
 
Sanders (I-VT, who caucuses with the Democratic Party), a self-proclaimed socialist, decried the 
excessive influence of corporate interests on the political system. On the Republican side, 
Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) represented those who wished for a return to the Founding principles 
to an extent far greater than the leadership of his party. Finally, entrepreneur Donald Trump, who 
had never held political office, appealed to Americans across the political spectrum who wanted 
to see the United States protect its jobs, its traditional middle-class culture, and its economic 
preeminence in the world. Trump ultimately won the election, showing that, in 2016, citizens 
sought solutions not provided by the longstanding political parties.  
President Trump’s first year in office appeared to produce a new level of culture wars 
conflict. The legitimacy of his election was called into question; he and members of his team 
dealt with ongoing investigations into alleged illegal dealings with Russians prior to his stunning 
victory of November 8, 2016. Culture wars vitriol generated a constant flood of denigrating 
public disparagements characterizing him as a “racist,” “xenophobe,” “fascist” whose campaign 
motto “Make America Great Again” was only a code for returning America to a white male 
dominated society.7        
                                                 
7 David Leonhardt, Donald Trump’s First 100 Days: The Worst on Record” New York Times, 
April 26, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/opinion/donald-trumps-first-100-days-the-
worst-on-record.html (accessed July 30, 2017); 
Conor Lynch, “Decoding Trump’s Meaningless Mantra: Making America Great Again for the 
Sour, Mean and Delusional,” Salon.com, January 21, 2017. 
http://www.salon.com/2017/01/21/decoding-trumps-meaningless-mantra-making-america-great-
again-for-the-sour-mean-and-delusional/ (accessed July 30, 2017). 
Jesse Berney, “Is Patriotism Possible in Trump's America?” Rolling Stone, July 3, 2017. 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/how-to-be-patriotic-in-trumps-america-w490449 
(accessed July 30, 2017); 
 Robert Schlesinger, “Donald Trump Is What's Wrong With America,” U.S. News and World 
Report, December 11, 2015. https://www.usnews.com/news/the-
report/articles/2015/12/11/donald-trump-is-whats-wrong-with-america (accessed July 30, 2017) 
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While political commentators did not generally characterize Trump as a constitutional 
conservative or constitutional originalist, one of his campaign promises was to appoint 
conservative judges to the federal court system when he had the opportunity. He had that 
opportunity early in his presidency – responding thereto with an appointment to replace Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who passed away in February 2016. That appointment was rather quarrelsome 
from the start because the Senate, with a Republican majority, had refused to consider President 
Barack Obama’s nominee, Washington D.C. Court of Appeals Judge Merrick Garland, for the 
position, instead allowing the incoming president to make the selection.8 President Trump, as one 
his first acts as president, nominated Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Neil Gorsuch in 
January 2017.9 The nomination process was filled with drama. Senate Democrats, still stinging 
from not having been given the opportunity to vote on Garland’s nomination, likewise 
filibustered to prevent Gorsuch’s nomination from proceeding. In response, Republican senators 
employed the so called “nuclear option,” which changed long-held Senate rules to allow a simple 
majority to close debate on Supreme Court nominees and let a vote go forward. In the end, the 
Senate confirmed Gorsuch by a 54-45 vote along party lines, aside from three Democrat senators 
who voted to confirm him.10 
                                                 
8 Ariane de Vogue, “How McConnell won, and Obama lost, the Merrick Garland fight,” CNN, 
November 9, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/merrick-garland-supreme-
court/index.html (accessed July 30, 2017). 
9 By Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Mark Landler, “Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme 
Court,” The New York Times, January 31, 2017 (accessed July 30, 2017). 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html 
10 Adam Liptak and Matt Flegenheimer, “Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court 
Justice,” The New York Times, April 7, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html (accessed 
July 30, 2017).   
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As of this writing, it was too early to predict if Gorsuch would render decisions in the 
Supreme Court as he did at the Tenth Circuit, where, as the New York Times reported, he 
adjudicated as a “reliable conservative committed to following the original understanding of 
those who drafted and ratified the Constitution.”11 Indeed, several sources expected him to rule 
in the same originalist manner as Justice Scalia, but with less deference to administrative 
agencies. “He is also a textualist as Scalia was. He interprets legal provisions according to the 
meaning they had when adopted. He appears to shun balancing tests and legislative history,” 
wrote Ryan Black and Ryan Owens in the Washington Post.12 In fact, he and Justice Thomas 
appear to have been rather consistent in their voting patterns and formal alignments in decisions, 
resulting, for instance, in a 7-2 vote with only Thomas and Gorsuch dissenting, in Perry v. Merit 
Systems Protection Board. This decision dealt with a byzantine statute prescribing formal 
discipline of federal employees, but which failed to address adequately the dispute in the case at 
hand.13 In Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, he lectured the majority for trying to do the work Congress 
had failed to do.  
If a statute needs repair, there’s a constitutionally prescribed way to do it. It’s 
called legislation. To be sure, the demands of bicameralism and presentment 
are real and the process can be protracted. But the difficulty of making new 
laws isn’t some bug in the constitutional design: it’s the point of the design, 
the better to preserve liberty.14 
 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ryan Black and Ryan Owens, “Neil Gorsuch could be the most conservative justice on the 
Supreme Court,” Washington Post, March 20, 2017.  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/15/neil-gorsuch-could-be-the-
most-conservative-justice-on-the-supreme-court/?utm_term=.59a7748c9500 (accessed July 30, 
2017). 
13 Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 582 US ___ (2017). 
14 Ibid. 
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The replacement of Justice Scalia with Justice Gorsuch, was likely to help sustain the 
persistence of New Federalism principles in the Supreme Court, including Commerce Clause 
doctrines, since the appointment of Gorsuch appears to have helped to maintain the previous 
balance on the Court.15 The fact that Justice Kennedy sided with the conservatives on the Court 
in Sebelius, all of whom agreed with Chief Justice Roberts that the individual mandate of the 
ACA was unsustainable under the Commerce Clause, strongly indicated the persistence of 
Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence favoring renewed recognition of state 
sovereignty. 
If the successful elevation of a new Supreme Court Associate Justice was a success for 
President Trump, he did not, in his first year in office, fulfill his campaign promise to repeal and 
replace the Affordable Care Act. To that end, he based his efforts more on politics than 
constitutional principles. In January 2017, he stressed that he would replace the ACA with a plan 
to provide “insurance for everybody,” but provided few details.16 Through the spring and 
summer of 2017, the Republican majorities in both houses of Congress were unable to garner the 
votes necessary to pass a new version of the ACA or even to completely repeal it with a 
commitment to replace it with some other enactment within two years.17 The Commerce Clause 
                                                 
15 Justice Scalia died on Feb 13, 2016 and was replaced by Justice Neil Gorsuch on April 9, 
2017.  For Gorsuch’s conservative views on the Court see, Ariane de Vogue, “Justice Neil 
Gorsuch Delivering as Trump's Promised Conservative,” CNN, June 27, 2017. 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/26/politics/justice-neil-gorsuch-president-trump-gets-his-
man/index.html (accessed July 26, 2017). 
16 Tami Luhby, “Trump promises his Obamacare replacement plan will cover everybody, report 
says,” CNN, January 17, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/15/politics/trump-
obamacare/index.html (accessed July 30, 2017). 
17 Leigh Ann Caldwell, “Obamacare Repeal Fails: Three GOP Senators Rebel in 49-51 Vote,” 
NBC News, July 28, 2017. http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-gop-effort-repeal-
obamacare-fails-n787311 (accessed July 30, 2016).   
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and the constitutionality of the ACA did not, it seems, figure into these discussions. Congress 
and the President were more concerned with producing a bill that could generate a majority and 
win passage to get the healthcare issue behind them. This permitted them to appear as though 
they had not abandoned Americans who could not afford healthcare without financial assistance. 
The final result of this congressional horse trading remained distant at the end of President 
Trump’s first year in office, but he was then, it seems, quite likely to sign any bill that appeared 
on his desk to claim a legislative victory. 
Regardless of the successes or failures President Trump earns, one eventuality remained 
certain – the persistence of extraordinarily vicious partisan conflict. By the end of 2017, culture 
wars conflict centered on the supposed flaws and misdeeds of the new president, but, in fact, 
continued to array partisans struggling for cultural and political power to advance their own 
visions of a better America. Some fought for the persistence of traditional middle-class 
understandings of morality and proper social organization and others sought to advance the cause 
of freedom, equality, and global harmony in wholly new directions. Vicious epithets broadcast 
with ever wider effect through social media and the internet, in lieu of civil debate and the 
exchange of ideas, promised to be the continuing order of the day, even as the issue of federal 
regulation of the internet portended yet another encroachment by federal authorities. We can 
only hope that the Article I, Section 8 provision intended initially to bring the states of the Union 
together in commerce and prosperity does not ultimately result in tearing the nation apart in high 
stakes cultural political conflicts. 
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